Pub Date : 2023-03-09DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2188386
Yaseen Ghulam, Benedict Saunby
{"title":"Does Increase in Defence Spending Lead to More Risk of Sovereign Debt Defaults?","authors":"Yaseen Ghulam, Benedict Saunby","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2188386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2188386","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46292638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2187931
L. Lambertini
{"title":"Concentration and Innovation in the Defence Industry: A Stochastic Game","authors":"L. Lambertini","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2187931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2187931","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43717695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2183346
J. Quinn, T. D. Mason, Mustafa Kirisci, Sally Sharif
{"title":"Proto-Insurgency, Repression-Driven Contagion, and Civil War Onset","authors":"J. Quinn, T. D. Mason, Mustafa Kirisci, Sally Sharif","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2183346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2183346","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46095205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-24DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2180588
Mitja Kleczka, L. Vandercruysse, C. Buts, C. Du Bois
{"title":"The Spectrum of Strategic Autonomy in EU Defence Supply Chains","authors":"Mitja Kleczka, L. Vandercruysse, C. Buts, C. Du Bois","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2180588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2180588","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45661318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-20DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2182869
Renaud Bellais
{"title":"Market Structures, Competition and Innovation: Grounds for an Alternative Defence Industrial Policy","authors":"Renaud Bellais","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2182869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2182869","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49524885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2161739
Amitai Gilad, A. Tishler
ABSTRACT Modern countries employ computer networks that manage organizations in the private and public sectors. Cyber-attacks aim to disrupt, block, delete, manipulate or steal the data held in these networks, which challenge these countries’ national security. Consequently, cybersecurity programs must be developed to protect these networks from cyber-attacks in a manner that is similar to operations against terrorism. This study presents several models that analyze a contest between a network operator (defender) that deploys costly detectors to protect the network and a capable cyber attacker. Generally, when the deployed detectors become more potent or the defender exhibits higher vigilance, the attacker allocates more resources to R&D to ensure that the attack remains covert. We show that detectors may be substitutes, complements, or even degrade each other, implying that defenders must account for the cyber weapons’ characteristics and the attacker’s profile and strategic behavior. We derive the optimal number of detectors when the attacker’s R&D process features R&D spillovers and show that targeted detectors act as deterrents against high-quality weapons only if the attacker’s budget is not substantial. Finally, we demonstrate that common cybersecurity practices may be detrimental from a social-welfare perspective by enhancing an arms race with the attacker.
{"title":"Mitigating the Risk of Advanced Cyber Attacks: The Role of Quality, Covertness and Intensity of Use of Cyber Weapons","authors":"Amitai Gilad, A. Tishler","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2022.2161739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2161739","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Modern countries employ computer networks that manage organizations in the private and public sectors. Cyber-attacks aim to disrupt, block, delete, manipulate or steal the data held in these networks, which challenge these countries’ national security. Consequently, cybersecurity programs must be developed to protect these networks from cyber-attacks in a manner that is similar to operations against terrorism. This study presents several models that analyze a contest between a network operator (defender) that deploys costly detectors to protect the network and a capable cyber attacker. Generally, when the deployed detectors become more potent or the defender exhibits higher vigilance, the attacker allocates more resources to R&D to ensure that the attack remains covert. We show that detectors may be substitutes, complements, or even degrade each other, implying that defenders must account for the cyber weapons’ characteristics and the attacker’s profile and strategic behavior. We derive the optimal number of detectors when the attacker’s R&D process features R&D spillovers and show that targeted detectors act as deterrents against high-quality weapons only if the attacker’s budget is not substantial. Finally, we demonstrate that common cybersecurity practices may be detrimental from a social-welfare perspective by enhancing an arms race with the attacker.","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":"34 1","pages":"726 - 746"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45095448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-12DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2023.2164913
V. Diwakar
{"title":"Conflict Trajectories and Education: Gender-Disaggregated Evidence from India","authors":"V. Diwakar","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2164913","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2164913","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48385809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-19DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2152956
Karl Sörenson
{"title":"Prospects of Deterrence: Deterrence Theory, Representation and Evidence","authors":"Karl Sörenson","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2022.2152956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2022.2152956","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45271033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：