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Defence and Peace Economics最新文献

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Verification of Peace Accords and Military Expenditures in Post-Conflict Societies 核查和平协定和冲突后社会的军事支出
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-19 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2158648
Wakako Maekawa
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引用次数: 0
Insecurity and Ambition: Dual Drivers of Chinese Innovation? 不安全与雄心:中国创新的双重驱动力?
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-19 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2155903
Daniel Aum, Fei-ling Wang
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引用次数: 0
Constraining Compliance? Reconsidering the Effect of Veto Players on Sanctions Success 约束合规性?重新思考维托球员对制裁成功的影响
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-15 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2158288
Tiziana Corda
ABSTRACT What effect do domestic political and institutional constraints such as veto players have on the success of international sanctions which their countries have been subjected to? Do they facilitate or constrain compliance with them? Although in the literature on sanctions success the role of domestic factors has received extensive attention, a typically public-policy concept such as veto players has remained largely underexplored. The potential of its application to the literature on sanctions was only recently uncovered by sanction scholars who found empirical support for the hypothesis that the larger the size of veto players in a country under sanctions, the higher the probability of compliance. Contrary to their findings, this article theorises a negative causal mechanism whereby a growing divergence in the relevant policy-area preferences of veto players prevents the targeted country from complying with sanctions-related demands. An empirical reassessment of this relationship with George Tsebelis’ original policy-area-specific veto player data confirms this negative effect.
摘要:国内政治和制度约束(如否决权参与者)对其国家受到的国际制裁的成功有何影响?他们是否促进或限制遵守这些规定?尽管在关于制裁成功的文献中,国内因素的作用受到了广泛关注,但否决权参与者等典型的公共政策概念在很大程度上仍未得到充分探索。制裁学者最近才发现其在制裁文献中的应用潜力,他们发现了一种假设的实证支持,即一个受制裁国家的否决权参与者规模越大,遵守的可能性就越高。与他们的研究结果相反,这篇文章提出了一种消极的因果机制,即否决权参与者在相关政策领域偏好的日益分歧阻碍了目标国家遵守与制裁相关的要求。对这种关系的实证重新评估与George Tsebelis最初的政策领域特定否决权参与者数据证实了这种负面影响。
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引用次数: 0
Chinese Defense Industry Reforms and Military Firm Performance: Evidence from the Civil—Military Integration Strategy 中国国防工业改革与军工企业绩效——来自军民融合战略的证据
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2154926
Zeng Yang, Changyuan Xia, Shuai Zhao, Daiguo Fu
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引用次数: 0
Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets 固定预算下的集体行动与群内冲突
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-08 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2151083
Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath

ABSTRACT

We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget (‘use-it-or-lose-it’) that is private information and can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights over this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds in overcoming the collective action problem in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In one type of equilibrium, all group members jointly contribute; in the other type of equilibrium, volunteers make full standalone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges.

摘要我们研究不利激励下的集体行为:群体中的每个成员都有一个给定的预算(“要么用,要么丢”),这是私人信息,可以用来为群体赢得奖品而贡献自己的力量,也可以用来为这个奖品进行内部斗争。即使面对这种资源利用上的竞争,群体也常常成功地克服了非合作均衡中的集体行动问题。在一种均衡中,所有群体成员共同贡献;在另一种均衡中,志愿者完全独立地做出贡献。两种平衡都存在于较大的和部分重叠的参数范围。
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引用次数: 0
Global Geopolitical Risk and the Long- and Short-Run Impacts on the Returns and Volatilities of US Treasuries 全球地缘政治风险及其对美国国债收益率和波动性的长期和短期影响
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-12-05 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2150808
Naji Jalkh, Elie Bouri
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引用次数: 1
Military Spending and Economic Output: A Decomposition Analysis of the US Military Budget 军事支出与经济产出:美国军事预算的分解分析
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2145717
Kyriakos Emmanouilidis
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引用次数: 0
Determinants of External, Domestic, and Total Public Debt in Nigeria: The Role of Conflict, Arms Imports, and Military Expenditure 尼日利亚外债、国内债务和公共债务总额的决定因素:冲突、武器进口和军事支出的作用
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-13 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2145709
Princewill U. Okwoche, Eftychia Nikolaidou
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引用次数: 0
The Political Economy of Wargaming 战争博弈的政治经济学
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2145537
Garrett R. Wood
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引用次数: 0
Trade Policy for Dual-Use Technology 两用技术的贸易政策
IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2022-11-11 DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2145645
Leo J. Blanken, Jason J. Lepore
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引用次数: 0
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Defence and Peace Economics
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