Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863
Alex Moran
Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties. The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence. The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appealing to grounding laws, thereby making room for ‘Moorean’ connections between distinct types of property.
{"title":"Grounding physicalism and ‘Moorean’ connections","authors":"Alex Moran","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2253863","url":null,"abstract":"Grounding physicalism is the doctrine that mental properties are metaphysically grounded in underlying physical properties. The present paper develops a novel challenge to this view derived from two main claims: one of them concerning the natures of phenomenal properties, the other concerning the relation between grounding and essence. The central goal of the paper is to explain how grounding physicalists can meet this challenge by means of appealing to grounding laws, thereby making room for ‘Moorean’ connections between distinct types of property.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135943956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2270527
Alex Madva, Katherine Gasdaglis, Shannon Doberneck
ABSTRACTAmartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based ‘reasoned choices,’ Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences.KEYWORDS: Social IdentityAmartya Senintersectionalityfeminism AcknowledgmentsThis paper has benefited greatly from audiences at the Mind, Language, and Social Change Conference in Knoll Farm, VT in August 2021, especially from Gabbrielle Johnson, Kate Ritchie, Umrao Sethi, Rima Basu, Jessica Moss, Michael Brownstein, Daniel Kelly, Ellen Fridland, Daniel Harris, Jonathan Phillips, and Peter Epstein; at the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in Vancouver in May 2017, especially from Fiona Jenkins, Georgie Warnke, and Derick Hughes; and at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in April 2015, where Ranjoo Herr provided extremely helpful and incisive commentary.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Among work contemporaneous with Sen’s, and as we will gesture toward in §6, we are most sympathetic with, and influenced by, Alcoff (Citation2006; but see also Afshar, Aitken, and Franks Citation2005; Appiah Citation2007; Barvosa Citation2008; Phillips Citation2009; Warnke Citation2008).2 Sen’s Identity and Violence is cited over 5,550 times on Google Scholar but typically just in passing or sloganized form. We cite theorists who engage more carefully with his work on identity in what follows.3 We find this example phenomenologically implausible (must a person choose rather than discover their rooting preference?) and return to related concerns in §2.2.4 See Wills (Citation2018) for discussion of the shortcomings of class-reductionist readings of Marx. Wills (Citation2018, 236, original emphasis) also draws a key distinction between class exploitation and ‘classism’: ‘Workers do experience ‘classism’ – oppression on the basis of their workin
{"title":"Duties of social identity? Intersectional objections to Sen’s identity politics","authors":"Alex Madva, Katherine Gasdaglis, Shannon Doberneck","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2270527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2270527","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAmartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based ‘reasoned choices,’ Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences.KEYWORDS: Social IdentityAmartya Senintersectionalityfeminism AcknowledgmentsThis paper has benefited greatly from audiences at the Mind, Language, and Social Change Conference in Knoll Farm, VT in August 2021, especially from Gabbrielle Johnson, Kate Ritchie, Umrao Sethi, Rima Basu, Jessica Moss, Michael Brownstein, Daniel Kelly, Ellen Fridland, Daniel Harris, Jonathan Phillips, and Peter Epstein; at the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in Vancouver in May 2017, especially from Fiona Jenkins, Georgie Warnke, and Derick Hughes; and at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in April 2015, where Ranjoo Herr provided extremely helpful and incisive commentary.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Among work contemporaneous with Sen’s, and as we will gesture toward in §6, we are most sympathetic with, and influenced by, Alcoff (Citation2006; but see also Afshar, Aitken, and Franks Citation2005; Appiah Citation2007; Barvosa Citation2008; Phillips Citation2009; Warnke Citation2008).2 Sen’s Identity and Violence is cited over 5,550 times on Google Scholar but typically just in passing or sloganized form. We cite theorists who engage more carefully with his work on identity in what follows.3 We find this example phenomenologically implausible (must a person choose rather than discover their rooting preference?) and return to related concerns in §2.2.4 See Wills (Citation2018) for discussion of the shortcomings of class-reductionist readings of Marx. Wills (Citation2018, 236, original emphasis) also draws a key distinction between class exploitation and ‘classism’: ‘Workers do experience ‘classism’ – oppression on the basis of their workin","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135995970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269576
Taylor-Grey Miller
ABSTRACTI argue that there is significant pressure to adopt a domain-fixing conception of essence if one wants to vindicate the claim that essentialist facts are proper ends of metaphysical explanation. I then argue that the zero-ground account best accommodates a domain-fixing view. I then respond to a number of objections to the zero-ground account and show how they can be met. I conclude that there is good reason to give the zerogrounding view more serious attention than it has received.KEYWORDS: EssencegroundexplanationZero-Groundmodality Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For discussion of fundamentality see Fine (Citation2001), Schaffer (Citation2010), Bennett (Citation2017) and Sider (Citation2011), among others.2 For discussion of zero-grounding see Fine (Citation2012), Litland (Citation2017), Donaldson (Citation2017), Muñoz (Citation2020), and more recently, Kappes (Citation2020a; Citation2020b; Citation2022). The notion of being generated from nothing may be stronger in the case of grounding than in corresponding case of theorems. Given that validity is monotonic, it follows that a theorem is also derivable from any set of premises. But because ground is not monotonic, it may turn out that a zero-grounded fact is only grounded in the zero-ground.3 I’m not the first to advance the zero-grounding view in relation to the explanatory distinctiveness of the essentialist facts. Miller (Citation2022) and Kappes (Citation2020a) both argue that this view is motivated by taking the essentialist facts to play the role of explanatory links. These sorts of considerations will not play a particularly significant role in the argument of this paper.4 I borrow this term from Raven (Citation2020).5 In particular that it is asymmetric, transitive, irreflexive. We thus obtain a partial ordering over the domain of facts. I note the standard assumptions here to help the reader gain a sense of what grounding is supposed to be, although nothing I say in what follows hangs on these assumptions being wholly vindicated across all instances of grounding. I also take partial ground to be definable in terms of full ground. P is a partial ground for Q just in case P on its own or together with some other facts fully grounds Q. See Fine (Citation2012, 50).6 See e.g., Mason’s (Citation1967) translation of the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence p. 13–17 for a rich expression of Leibniz’s view.7 One must, however, be careful here. On this framing, it appears that objects can have essences without existing which engages with some rather delicate issues about being, existence, and quantification, the discussion of which lie beyond the scope of the present paper. In particular, such a conception appears in tension with what Williamson calls the being constraint. Roughly, the being constraint says that having properties requires existence, and it corresponds model-theoretically to the domain constraint; that all predicate e
{"title":"Nothing explains essence","authors":"Taylor-Grey Miller","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269576","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTI argue that there is significant pressure to adopt a domain-fixing conception of essence if one wants to vindicate the claim that essentialist facts are proper ends of metaphysical explanation. I then argue that the zero-ground account best accommodates a domain-fixing view. I then respond to a number of objections to the zero-ground account and show how they can be met. I conclude that there is good reason to give the zerogrounding view more serious attention than it has received.KEYWORDS: EssencegroundexplanationZero-Groundmodality Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For discussion of fundamentality see Fine (Citation2001), Schaffer (Citation2010), Bennett (Citation2017) and Sider (Citation2011), among others.2 For discussion of zero-grounding see Fine (Citation2012), Litland (Citation2017), Donaldson (Citation2017), Muñoz (Citation2020), and more recently, Kappes (Citation2020a; Citation2020b; Citation2022). The notion of being generated from nothing may be stronger in the case of grounding than in corresponding case of theorems. Given that validity is monotonic, it follows that a theorem is also derivable from any set of premises. But because ground is not monotonic, it may turn out that a zero-grounded fact is only grounded in the zero-ground.3 I’m not the first to advance the zero-grounding view in relation to the explanatory distinctiveness of the essentialist facts. Miller (Citation2022) and Kappes (Citation2020a) both argue that this view is motivated by taking the essentialist facts to play the role of explanatory links. These sorts of considerations will not play a particularly significant role in the argument of this paper.4 I borrow this term from Raven (Citation2020).5 In particular that it is asymmetric, transitive, irreflexive. We thus obtain a partial ordering over the domain of facts. I note the standard assumptions here to help the reader gain a sense of what grounding is supposed to be, although nothing I say in what follows hangs on these assumptions being wholly vindicated across all instances of grounding. I also take partial ground to be definable in terms of full ground. P is a partial ground for Q just in case P on its own or together with some other facts fully grounds Q. See Fine (Citation2012, 50).6 See e.g., Mason’s (Citation1967) translation of the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence p. 13–17 for a rich expression of Leibniz’s view.7 One must, however, be careful here. On this framing, it appears that objects can have essences without existing which engages with some rather delicate issues about being, existence, and quantification, the discussion of which lie beyond the scope of the present paper. In particular, such a conception appears in tension with what Williamson calls the being constraint. Roughly, the being constraint says that having properties requires existence, and it corresponds model-theoretically to the domain constraint; that all predicate e","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267084
Nicholas Allott
While utterance interpretation is standardly understood as context-sensitive inference, there are prima facie reasons to doubt it is fully unencapsulated. First, utterance interpretation is normally fast and automatic, while it has been argued that unencapsulated processes are slow and reflective. Secondly, certain illusions appear to show that the processing of utterances is unrevisable in light of further information. I argue that these reasons are not conclusive, and utterance interpretation relies on indefinite tracts of background knowledge and contextual information.
{"title":"Encapsulation, inference and utterance interpretation","authors":"Nicholas Allott","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267084","url":null,"abstract":"While utterance interpretation is standardly understood as context-sensitive inference, there are prima facie reasons to doubt it is fully unencapsulated. First, utterance interpretation is normally fast and automatic, while it has been argued that unencapsulated processes are slow and reflective. Secondly, certain illusions appear to show that the processing of utterances is unrevisable in light of further information. I argue that these reasons are not conclusive, and utterance interpretation relies on indefinite tracts of background knowledge and contextual information.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261489
Jacob Browning, Zed Adams
ABSTRACTA central question for understanding social media platforms is whether the design of these systems is itself responsible for the harmful effects they have on society. Do these systems push users toward unhealthy forms of engagement? Is there something inherently toxic about the design that distorts who we are when we use it? In a recent paper, Thi Nguyen argues that the design of Twitter is responsible for many of its most toxic outcomes. Nguyen’s argument is based on an analogy between Twitter and games. He argues that Twitter’s game-like features encourage users to rack up Likes and Retweets rather than engaging in the rich and subtle activity of communication. For Nguyen, this drive for high scores leads to many of the toxic effects of the platform. In this paper, we critique Nguyen’s argument. We contend that, in a crucial respect that matters, Twitter is not game-like. We show that the apparent plausibility of Nguyen’s argument rests upon overlooking this crucial disanalogy. Moreover, drawing out how Nguyen’s analogy breaks down makes clear not just that his account fails to explain Twitter’s toxicity, but also that it actively occludes the design choices that have negative effects on its users.KEYWORDS: Social mediaphilosophy of technologynormativity of artifactsargument by analogy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Unless noted, all emphases are in original.2 Another objection might arise at this point: what if there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency? This is an interesting objection, but it is first-and-foremost an objection to Nguyen’s account of games. If there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency, Nguyen would have to draw his proposed analogy between Twitter and games somewhere else.
{"title":"Why Twitter does not gamify communication","authors":"Jacob Browning, Zed Adams","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261489","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTA central question for understanding social media platforms is whether the design of these systems is itself responsible for the harmful effects they have on society. Do these systems push users toward unhealthy forms of engagement? Is there something inherently toxic about the design that distorts who we are when we use it? In a recent paper, Thi Nguyen argues that the design of Twitter is responsible for many of its most toxic outcomes. Nguyen’s argument is based on an analogy between Twitter and games. He argues that Twitter’s game-like features encourage users to rack up Likes and Retweets rather than engaging in the rich and subtle activity of communication. For Nguyen, this drive for high scores leads to many of the toxic effects of the platform. In this paper, we critique Nguyen’s argument. We contend that, in a crucial respect that matters, Twitter is not game-like. We show that the apparent plausibility of Nguyen’s argument rests upon overlooking this crucial disanalogy. Moreover, drawing out how Nguyen’s analogy breaks down makes clear not just that his account fails to explain Twitter’s toxicity, but also that it actively occludes the design choices that have negative effects on its users.KEYWORDS: Social mediaphilosophy of technologynormativity of artifactsargument by analogy Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Unless noted, all emphases are in original.2 Another objection might arise at this point: what if there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency? This is an interesting objection, but it is first-and-foremost an objection to Nguyen’s account of games. If there are games that do not have constitutive rules that sculpt temporary agency, Nguyen would have to draw his proposed analogy between Twitter and games somewhere else.","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135855207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228
Endre Begby
ABSTRACTThis article provides an overview of ideas and arguments developed in my book Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal (Oxford University Press, 2021; paperback edition, 2022).KEYWORDS: Epistemologysocial epistemologynon-ideal epistemoloyepistemic rationalityprejudice Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To be clear, this is not meant to tell us anything about whether particular prejudiced individuals are justified in believing as they do, whether particular kinds prejudiced beliefs are typically justified, and so on. Indeed, part of the point of the book is to discourage these sorts of questions: for virtually any class of beliefs, the question of whether a subject is justified in having such beliefs can only be answered after careful examination of their evidential situation and their cognitive processing. Given the proper methodology, we should not expect broad generalizations at this level. More about this in my response to Thomas Kelly below.2 Moreover, reflection suggests that even true beliefs can be prejudicially deployed in context, as I argue in Begby (Citation2021, 10–11).3 Indeed, on my view, stereotype-reasoning just is the manifestation of categorization in the domain of social cognition. To argue that our cognition should only ever track individuals qua individuals is basically to give up on the idea of social cognition altogether.4 Recall Fricker’s stipulation that ‘[t]he idea of a prejudice is […] most naturally interpreted […] as a judgement made or maintained without proper regard to the evidence’ (Fricker Citation2007, 32–33, my emphasis.)5 The fact that so-called ‘looping effects’ (cf. Haslanger Citation2011, 196–198, drawing on Hacking Citation1999) might be in play here, does nothing to change the fact that these observations might nonetheless constitute evidence.6 More about this in my response to Giulia Napolitano below.7 Note the echoes of Gordon Allport’s view (Citation1954, 9) that ‘[p]rejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge. A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it’.8 In particular, it helps shed light on the phenomenon of ‘echo chamber construction’, as argued in Nguyen (Citation2020).9 The mechanics of evidential preemption is further discussed in my response to Thomas Kelly below.10 These issues receive further discussion in my response to Renee Jorgensen below.11 Correspondingly, when we talk about ‘algorithmic bias’, it seems natural to assume that the phenomenon arises specifically from the deployment of algorithms in decision making (perhaps computerized algorithms, in particular).12 On this, see Begby (Citation2018). In the book (Begby Citation2021, 161–163), I explore and cautiously endorse the possibility that the considerations levied by moral encroachment are good ones: the only problem is that they don’t, strictly speaking, bear on belief, b
{"title":"Precis of prejudice: a study in non-ideal epistemology","authors":"Endre Begby","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2269228","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article provides an overview of ideas and arguments developed in my book Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal (Oxford University Press, 2021; paperback edition, 2022).KEYWORDS: Epistemologysocial epistemologynon-ideal epistemoloyepistemic rationalityprejudice Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To be clear, this is not meant to tell us anything about whether particular prejudiced individuals are justified in believing as they do, whether particular kinds prejudiced beliefs are typically justified, and so on. Indeed, part of the point of the book is to discourage these sorts of questions: for virtually any class of beliefs, the question of whether a subject is justified in having such beliefs can only be answered after careful examination of their evidential situation and their cognitive processing. Given the proper methodology, we should not expect broad generalizations at this level. More about this in my response to Thomas Kelly below.2 Moreover, reflection suggests that even true beliefs can be prejudicially deployed in context, as I argue in Begby (Citation2021, 10–11).3 Indeed, on my view, stereotype-reasoning just is the manifestation of categorization in the domain of social cognition. To argue that our cognition should only ever track individuals qua individuals is basically to give up on the idea of social cognition altogether.4 Recall Fricker’s stipulation that ‘[t]he idea of a prejudice is […] most naturally interpreted […] as a judgement made or maintained without proper regard to the evidence’ (Fricker Citation2007, 32–33, my emphasis.)5 The fact that so-called ‘looping effects’ (cf. Haslanger Citation2011, 196–198, drawing on Hacking Citation1999) might be in play here, does nothing to change the fact that these observations might nonetheless constitute evidence.6 More about this in my response to Giulia Napolitano below.7 Note the echoes of Gordon Allport’s view (Citation1954, 9) that ‘[p]rejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge. A prejudice, unlike a simple misconception, is actively resistant to all evidence that would unseat it’.8 In particular, it helps shed light on the phenomenon of ‘echo chamber construction’, as argued in Nguyen (Citation2020).9 The mechanics of evidential preemption is further discussed in my response to Thomas Kelly below.10 These issues receive further discussion in my response to Renee Jorgensen below.11 Correspondingly, when we talk about ‘algorithmic bias’, it seems natural to assume that the phenomenon arises specifically from the deployment of algorithms in decision making (perhaps computerized algorithms, in particular).12 On this, see Begby (Citation2018). In the book (Begby Citation2021, 161–163), I explore and cautiously endorse the possibility that the considerations levied by moral encroachment are good ones: the only problem is that they don’t, strictly speaking, bear on belief, b","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135854082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2267099
Joan Gimeno-Simó
ABSTRACTComplex demonstratives are often seen as a source of trouble for the idea that demonstratives are directly referential. Several authors have provided an array of counterexamples that preclude us from treating complex demonstratives as devices of direct reference, since they could hardly be considered rigid designators. In this paper I argue that a revision of the classic theories can accommodate all the counterevidence from non-deictic uses of complex demonstratives. Namely, I argue that the two chief objections that have been posed to the traditional picture, the so-called ‘quantification in’ and ‘no demonstration, no speaker reference’ problems, can be given a unified solution by treating them as instances of monstrous quantification into the character of the term.KEYWORDS: Rigid designationdirect referencemonstersindexicalityquantifying in AcknowldgementsI wish to thank Derek Ball, María de Ponte, Manuel García-Carpintero, Stefano Predelli and Jordi Valor for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to an anonymous reviewer for a very thorough and constructive report.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 It is in this sense that the nominal can be said to contribute to character. In these theories, the character of a complex demonstrative of the form ⟦that P⟧ is not a function F such that, for each context c, f(c) = dc, but rather a proper subfunction of F: one whose domain only includes contexts c such that ⟦P⟧()(dc) = 1. The character of any complex demonstrative is always given by a subfunction of F, and the role of the nominal is to determine exactly which of these subfunctions is to be selected.2 The validity of these arguments is debatable (cf. Braun Citation2008a, 70, footnotes 20–24), but this is not in conflict with the kind of approach advocated by c-theorists.3 Predelli (Citation2001) has posed a challenge to c-theories based on anaphora, but I have argued elsewhere that the counterevidence he points out can be given an alternative explanation (Gimeno-Simó Citation2021).4 King (Citation2001) also provides some syntactic evidence that seems to point towards the idea that complex demonstratives are quantifiers, but it has been subject to severe criticism (Altshuler Citation2007).5 Some defenders of the traditional paradigm have tried to explain away these readings by arguing that complex demonstratives can act as ‘stylistically altered definite descriptions’ (Dever Citation2001, 286; Salmon Citation2002, 522; Citation2006a, 446; Citation2006b, 272, footnote 11; Corazza Citation2003, 272; Georgi Citation2012). These ambiguity theories have been severely criticised by Ethan Nowak (Citation2014; Citation2021a; Citation2022).6 Notice in fact that the problem can be posed without even resorting to the third sentence in (18): (18*) [A student]1 was sitting in the library. Another student was sitting across from her1.Who is the referent of ‘her’ on this occasio
摘要复杂指示词通常被认为是直接指称的一个麻烦来源。几位作者提供了一系列反例，使我们无法将复杂指示语视为直接指称的手段，因为它们很难被视为严格的指示语。在本文中，我认为对经典理论的修正可以容纳复杂指示语非指示用法的所有反证据。也就是说，我认为，对传统图景提出的两个主要反对意见，即所谓的“量化”和“没有证明，没有说话人参考”问题，可以通过将它们视为对术语特征进行可怕量化的实例来给出统一的解决方案。我要感谢Derek Ball, María de Ponte, Manuel García-Carpintero, Stefano Predelli和Jordi Valor对本文早期版本的评论，以及一位非常全面和建设性的匿名审稿人。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1正是在这个意义上，名义上的东西可以说对性格有贡献。在这些理论中，形式为:::::::形式为:::::::在这些理论中，形式为:::::::::::在这些理论中，形式为::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::任何复数指示的性质总是由F的子函数给出，而标称函数的作用是确定这些子函数中究竟选择哪一个这些论点的有效性是有争议的(参见Braun Citation2008a, 70，脚注20-24)，但这与c-理论家所提倡的方法并不冲突Predelli (Citation2001)对基于回指的c理论提出了挑战，但我在其他地方争论过，他指出的反证可以给出另一种解释(Gimeno-Simó Citation2021)King (Citation2001)也提供了一些句法证据，似乎指向了复杂指示词是量词的观点，但它受到了严厉的批评(Altshuler Citation2007)一些传统范式的捍卫者试图解释这些解读，他们认为复杂指示可以作为“风格上改变的明确描述”(Dever citation2001,286;三文鱼引文，2002,522;Citation2006a, 446;Citation2006b, 272，脚注11;科拉扎引文2003,272;格奥尔基Citation2012)。这些歧义理论受到了Ethan Nowak (citation; 2014;Citation2021a;Citation2022)。6请注意，事实上，这个问题甚至可以不借助(18)中的第三句话来提出:(18*)[一个学生]1坐在图书馆里。另一个学生坐在她对面。在这种情况下，“她”指的是谁?让我们假设是玛丽。在这种情况下，这两个句子在任何一个世界里都是正确的，在这个世界里，任何一个学生坐在图书馆里，而玛丽坐在另一个学生对面，比如说在咖啡店里。由于同样的原因，这是错误的为简单起见，这个词汇条目将许多与当前讨论不直接相关的细节(如远性或复数)放在一边。我也没有提到诸如空术语的可解释性和如何处理多次出现的指示词等问题要确定的是，(26)所陈述的并不是对于每一个实际的红色物体x，存在一个可能的世界w，使得x在w中发光，相反，我们希望所有实际的红色物体在一个世界中一起发光。它也没有说明存在一个可能的世界w，使得对于每个x, x是w中的红色物体，x在w中是闪亮的。如果我们只有一个评估参数的世界，我们就会不知所措:我们需要根据初始世界对“红色”进行评估，这意味着它的范围应该比“可能”更广，但同时“红色”应该在量词“一切”的范围内，而“一切”又应该在“可能”的范围内，以便所有这些事物在一个单一的世界中共同发光。因此，作用域是不兼容的Schaffer强调了模态和时域之间的类比(Citation2012)。参见Neale (Citation2006)有些作者经常在形容词中加入显性世界变量，因为这个想法提供了一种很好的方式来解释所谓的“Fodor读数”(范围既不窄也不宽;参见Heim and von Fintel (Citation2011，§8)的概述。但是，正如Musan (Citation1995)和Kusumoto (Citation1999)的论点所表明的那样，具有显式形容词变量的系统通常会过度生成，因为它们预测许多句子的读数实际上并没有显示出来。 我不愿意失去句子的表面形式和深层形式之间的对应关系;因此，我不会包括那些不是由句子的某些显式元素所贡献的变量人们普遍认为，过去时通常是指代性的，如帕蒂(Citation1973)的著名例子“我没有关掉炉子”。在这里，关于现在时刻的先验是预先假定的，而不是断言的。然而，这并不意味着某些句子不能提供现在时的明确表示。相反，表征现在时对于确保预设材料被正确解释是必要的。例如，在像von Stechow (Citation2003)这样的系统中，任何包含参照使用的过去时的句子p都会收到一个类似于(a)的LF，其中包含一个显式现在时变量:(a) t0 [t0 < t1pres] (p)12在这个系统中，共同标引是必要的，否则我们最终会将(26)这样的句子不具有的阅读归为它。然而，也有其他选择。例如，同样的结果可以通过在每个句子前面加上两个变量来实现，这两个变量总是挑选出环境的参数，并且通过让标记为指示符的任何变量具有以下预设语义:Gc (wn)这里n是任意自然数。(n) = λc: gc(tn) = gc(t0)。Gc (tn)其中n是任意自然数。为了简单起见，我将采用联合索引诚然，后一种阅读更难实现，但如果提供一些背景，它可以变得非常贴切，甚至比前一种阅读更受欢迎。想象一下，你和我是茱莉亚的同学，我们正在交谈，回忆过去的时光。如果我在这种情况下说出(31)，第二段阅读就更明显了实际上，这就是我在整篇论文中处理这个表达式的方法。其他作者更喜欢将其视为语义上空洞的表达式，并将lambda作为隐蔽元素添加到关系子句本身中。我看不出这两种方法有什么真正的区别，我的建议两者都适用高类型跟踪是解决语义中一些难题的一种相对常见的方法，它们通常与新的组合原则的引入密切相关(关于手册处理，参见Heim和von Fintel Citation2011, 94-95)。诚然，引入这种机制并不是没有成本的，但是为了达到正确的结果，而不诉诸于更可疑的资源(如非正统的语法)，这通常是必要的。重要的是，引入这种方法不仅仅是为了解释与复杂指示词相关的问题:我们在这里处理的同样的问题可以提出给任何包含关系从句的NP，比如(31)中的一个，它可以类似地解决(见脚注17)有些哲学家可能不愿意采用另一种构成原则。然而，请注意，环境规范是对上述个体识别的补充，这意味着它不会带来更大的概念成本，更不用说考虑到引入它的唯一原因是为了保持从采用类型>派生的整体简单性——毕竟，在内涵设置中，这是一种远不常见的类型该系统预测(31)可能接收到两种不同的逻辑形式:(31a) λ。[一个同学谁[Ǝt3: t3 < t1] (r2戴眼镜)]λ4。玛丽嫁给了r4(31b) λ。[一个同学who2 [Ǝt3: t3 < t1] (R2戴眼镜)]λ4。玛丽嫁给了r4，这两者之间唯一的区别是运动痕迹的类型。在(31a)中，根据个人识别，“
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Pub Date : 2023-10-01DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2262758
Timothy Perrine
ABSTRACTOrdinary and philosophical thought suggests recognizing a distinction between two ways something can be of final value. Something can be of final value in virtue of its connection to other things of value (‘non-basic final value’) or something can be of final value regardless of its connection to other things of value (‘basic final value’). The primary aim of this paper is to provide an account of this distinction. I argue that we have reason to draw this distinction as it helps avoid certain problems. I criticize accounts of this distinction due to Warren Quinn, Fred Feldman, and Michael Zimmerman. I then provide my own positive account which incorporates several of the insights of those accounts while avoiding their pitfalls. I conclude by relating my account to issues concerning partiality and appropriate attitudes.KEYWORDS: Final valuebasic final valuepro-attitudesFred FeldmanMichael Zimmerman Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 As the examples illustrate, by things of value, I have in mind facts, events, states of affairs, or ways the world could be. I don’t have in mind specific concrete objects, like a frying pan. See fn. 3 for further relevant discussion.2 See, for instance, Brentano (Citation1902, 15f.), Ross (Citation1939, 279, 282), Ewing (Citation1947, 146ff.) Chisholm (Citation1986, 47ff.), Anderson (Citation1993, 2–3), Lemos (Citation1994, 6ff.), Scanlon (Citation1998, 78ff.), Zimmerman (Citation2001), Audi (Citation2004, 125). Merely maintaining that there is a substantive normative connection in no way identifies which property cluster is more fundamental. Further, this assumption does not require the particular kind of buck-passing popularized by Scanlon that is open to the wrong kind of reason objection. For a discussion of this last point, see Zimmerman (Citation2010).3 I focus on relationships between states of affairs of final value. Some authors might be interested in the relationships between concrete things that are of final value. For instance, Langton (Citation2007) suggests that something—e.g. a wedding ring—might be of final value but in virtue of something else—e.g., a personal relationship (see also Korsgaard (Citation1983)). These cases are sometimes called cases of ‘extrinsic final value,’ since the wedding ring is of final value, but the ‘source’ of its value is extrinsic to it. Since these cases involve individual objects, they are not the focus of my discussion. It’s an interesting question how exactly views about extrinsic final value interact with my proposals here. I don’t see any grand conflict. After all, if an object is of extrinsic final value, there’s a state of affairs about that object and its source of value that is, presumably, of final value. But I hope to explore this question in future work. For a negative view of how they might interact, see Bradley (Citation2006); for a critical discussion of extrinsic final value in general, see Tucker
{"title":"Towards an account of basic final value","authors":"Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1080/0020174x.2023.2262758","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2023.2262758","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTOrdinary and philosophical thought suggests recognizing a distinction between two ways something can be of final value. Something can be of final value in virtue of its connection to other things of value (‘non-basic final value’) or something can be of final value regardless of its connection to other things of value (‘basic final value’). The primary aim of this paper is to provide an account of this distinction. I argue that we have reason to draw this distinction as it helps avoid certain problems. I criticize accounts of this distinction due to Warren Quinn, Fred Feldman, and Michael Zimmerman. I then provide my own positive account which incorporates several of the insights of those accounts while avoiding their pitfalls. I conclude by relating my account to issues concerning partiality and appropriate attitudes.KEYWORDS: Final valuebasic final valuepro-attitudesFred FeldmanMichael Zimmerman Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 As the examples illustrate, by things of value, I have in mind facts, events, states of affairs, or ways the world could be. I don’t have in mind specific concrete objects, like a frying pan. See fn. 3 for further relevant discussion.2 See, for instance, Brentano (Citation1902, 15f.), Ross (Citation1939, 279, 282), Ewing (Citation1947, 146ff.) Chisholm (Citation1986, 47ff.), Anderson (Citation1993, 2–3), Lemos (Citation1994, 6ff.), Scanlon (Citation1998, 78ff.), Zimmerman (Citation2001), Audi (Citation2004, 125). Merely maintaining that there is a substantive normative connection in no way identifies which property cluster is more fundamental. Further, this assumption does not require the particular kind of buck-passing popularized by Scanlon that is open to the wrong kind of reason objection. For a discussion of this last point, see Zimmerman (Citation2010).3 I focus on relationships between states of affairs of final value. Some authors might be interested in the relationships between concrete things that are of final value. For instance, Langton (Citation2007) suggests that something—e.g. a wedding ring—might be of final value but in virtue of something else—e.g., a personal relationship (see also Korsgaard (Citation1983)). These cases are sometimes called cases of ‘extrinsic final value,’ since the wedding ring is of final value, but the ‘source’ of its value is extrinsic to it. Since these cases involve individual objects, they are not the focus of my discussion. It’s an interesting question how exactly views about extrinsic final value interact with my proposals here. I don’t see any grand conflict. After all, if an object is of extrinsic final value, there’s a state of affairs about that object and its source of value that is, presumably, of final value. But I hope to explore this question in future work. For a negative view of how they might interact, see Bradley (Citation2006); for a critical discussion of extrinsic final value in general, see Tucker","PeriodicalId":47504,"journal":{"name":"Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135408864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2254816
Bogdan Dicher
ABSTRACTThis paper discusses two revisionary views about substructurality. The first attempts to reduce the structural features of a logic to properties of its logical vocabulary. It will be found to be untenable. The second aims to separate the structural features of a logic from the properties of logical consequence and to reinterpreted them as sui generis proof resources. I will argue that it is a viable path for a renewed understanding of substructurality.KEYWORDS: Substructural logiclogical consequencesequents Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 These ‘collections’ can be sequences (lists), multisets (lists with repetitions but without order), sets simpliciter, etc. A full characterisation of a sequent (in a specific calculus) requires the specification of their precise mathematical nature. But here we allow, in principle, variations of the components of the sequents. Therefore generality is preferable to precision hence the use of the term ‘collection’ – with the caveat that the default choice will be to treat collections as sets.2 I follow the usual notational conventions and use minuscules from the second half of the Latin alphabet as sentential variables. Majuscules, with or without superscripts, from the beginning of the alphabet are metavariables ranging over sentential variables while those from its end range over collections (see the previous note) of formulae.3 An anonymous referee points out that the same view appears in Sambin, Battilotti, and Faggian (Citation2000). I am not convinced that this is the position advocated in that paper. The matter deserves more attention than I can give it here, but the following passage from Sambin, Battilotti, and Faggian (Citation2000) seems to be decisive for the overall understanding of their position: ‘It is an ambition of basic logic to offer a new perspective and new tools to the search for unity in logic. …[O]ur plan is to look for the basic principles and structures common to many different logics. So one aim is to obtain each specific logic by the addition of rules concerning exclusively the structure (i.e. structural rules dealing only with assertions), while keeping the logic of propositions (i.e. operational rules dealing with logical constants) absolutely fixed’. I take this to indicate a commitment to the priority of the structural level over the operational one which is quite antithetical to A-heresy.4 Henceforth I will use ‘structural property’ and ‘structural rule’ interchangeably. Each structural rules generates a structural property and each structural property correlates in some way with a structural rule.5 By ‘set-theoretic aggregate’ I mean any kind of collection that can be represented within set-theory; that includes sequences, multisets, sequences of set-theoretic aggregates, etc. For the most part, however, I will represent these using the set-theoretic accolades.6 See note 16 for details and examples.7 A model is a
在文献中有观点认为，前提组合不是独立于连接构成的，就像连接不是独立于前提组合构成的一样(Dicher Citation2016, Citation2020)。根据这些论证，逻辑的结构性质和逻辑的算子处于一种共定关系中。然而，由于这些论点所涉及的资源太过特殊，无法被扎尔迪尼所接受，而且他们的辩护也太过复杂，因此我不作进一步讨论对于Ai∈X(i=1,2,3，…，n)，重复应用演绎定理可以将X,A∈B转化为∈A1→(A2→…(A→B)…)。精明的读者可能会想，为什么多个前提被解释为连接而不是连接条件?虽然我不知道扎尔迪尼的确切目标。他谈论的是"蕴涵"，而似乎不关心诸如区分作为行为的推理和作为客体的推理(=结论主张)等更细微的问题这一点被认为是加雷思·埃文斯在《休史密斯和斯迈利》(Citation1978)中提出的，在其他文献中也出现过，参见达米特(Citation1991);斯坦伯格(Citation2010)含量也许有一种方法可以做到鱼与熊掌兼得，但那将发生在一家完全不同的餐厅，比如Dicher (Citation2019)它们的缺失会对“词汇”产生影响，正如第5页上面已经提到的那样。在线性逻辑中可互导的运算规则在线性逻辑中不再是等价的。例如，以下两个规则A,X:YA∧B,X:YB,X:YA∧B,X: yy与规则A,B,X:YA∧B,X: yy使用弱化和收缩是可导的。(对上排任意一条规则的前提应用弱化可以得到A, B,X:Y，而对下排规则可以得到A∧B,X:Y。反之，将顶规则应用于底规则的前提，并在A∧b上进行缩并。在线性逻辑中，我们可以区分出两种不同的连接词:由规则X:Y,AX:Y,BX:Y,A∧B∧RA,X:YA∧B,X:Y∧L1B,X:YA∧B,X:Y∧l2和由规则X:Y,AW:Z,BX,W:Y,Z,A⊗BA,B,X:YA⊗B,X:Y一般来说，LK的每一个二元连接词都是重复的(有人会说:消除歧义(Paoli Citation2007))，这样就有了一个加法和一个乘法的版本吉拉德使用“结果”一词是否与我在这里使用它的意思相同，或者相反，他使用它来表示本文意义上的“推论”，这是一个有争议的问题我感谢一位匿名的裁判，他提出了弱化和收缩的最后两种可能的解释，作为自定义的证明资源参见下面的讨论，包括注释20，以及Yagisawa (Citation1993)或Russell (Citation2018)对同一可能性的不同探索可以肯定的是，这一观点在一段时间内被广泛接受。Georgi (Citation2015)和Zardini (Citation2014)已经探索了处理指示/指示的逻辑，即使它们在论证中改变了引用某些结构规则可以用来控制在序列中出现的公式的同义词的(一般)想法起源于吉拉德(Citation1976);参见吉拉德，拉丰，泰勒(Citation1989)和迪彻(Citation2019)。22感谢Alef研讨会(罗马尼亚巴贝斯-博利亚大学)和langcog研讨会(葡萄牙里斯本大学哲学中心)的听众对本文以前版本的评论和建议。我还要感谢本刊一位匿名审稿人，他给了我许多建议和修改，大大改进了我的论文。我要特别感谢布鲁诺·哈辛托和埃利亚·扎尔迪尼，他们就这里所讨论的话题进行了多次对话。本研究由葡萄牙<s:1> <s:1> <s:1> para - Ciência e a tecologia基金(FCT)资助，资助项目CEECIND/02877/2018(“metainference: New perspectives on logic”)和2022.03194。PTDC (On Objects and Grounds of Substructural Rules)。进一步的资金支持来自欧盟，通过101086295号拨款(“亚结构性的哲学、逻辑和实验视角- plexus”，这是欧盟在地平线欧洲研究和创新计划下资助的玛丽·斯克洛多夫斯卡-居里行动)。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2023.2261468
Kate Vredenburgh
Algorithmic decision-making has the potential to radically reshape policy-making and policy implementation. Many of the moral examinations of AI in government take AI to be a neutral epistemic tool or the value-driven analogue of a policymaker. In this paper, I argue that AI systems in public administration are often better analogised to a street-level bureaucrat. Doing so opens up a host of questions about the moral dispositions of such AI systems. I argue that AI systems in public administration often act as indifferent bureaucrats, and that this can introduce a problematic homogeneity in the moral dispositions in administrative agencies.
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