International Tax and Public Finance最新文献

This paper examines the impact of foreign aid and taxes on government spending for 67 developing countries during 1980-2013 using dynamic heterogeneous (panel) time-series techniques. We find that spending, aid and tax ratios comprise an equilibrium (cointegrated) relation. On average, the aid coefficients (and marginal impacts) are positive but smaller than the tax coefficients, indicating that in the long-run and short-run taxes have a stronger association with expenditures than aid. Central to this heterogeneous relationship is the political calculus between aid and tax-measured according to accountability and bureaucratic costs-whereby recipients offset the political costs of raising taxes against the political costs of receiving more aid. Once measures of political costs are incorporated into the analysis, we find the political costs of aid to be higher than those of tax, reinforcing the primary assertion that for spending, taxes are more important than aid. Countries with higher political costs of aid typically show no aid-spending relationship, while those with lower political costs of aid tend to show an aid-spending relationship. The findings are largely when replicated once we split total spending into capital and consumption spending.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10797-022-09763-9.

Consumption is an important source of greenhouse gas emissions. This study extends the footloose capital model to investigate consumption-generated emissions and consumption taxes in the presence of endogenous firm locations and different market sizes. We find that consumption taxes cause firm relocation and carbon leakage. That is, tax increase in one country induces firms to relocate to the other country; meanwhile, emissions decrease in that country but increase in the other country. We also show that when countries decide on their consumption taxes cooperatively to maximize the joint welfare, the optimal taxes are identical across them, regardless of different market sizes. However, under consumption tax competition, the larger country imposes a higher tax than the smaller country.

This paper studies how linear tax and education policy should optimally respond to skill-biased technical change (SBTC). SBTC affects optimal taxes and subsidies by changing (1) direct distributional benefits of each policy instrument, (2) indirect, general-equilibrium effects on wages, and (3) education distortions. Analytically, the effect of SBTC on these three components is shown to be ambiguous. In simulations for the US economy, SBTC makes the optimal tax system more progressive and lowers optimal education subsidies. This is because for both income taxes and education subsidies; their direct distributional effects become more important, which more than offsets the larger general-equilibrium effects and increased education distortions.

Many countries have a two-tiered unemployment compensation system that provides earnings-related unemployment insurance for a limited period of time and less generous unemployment assistance thereafter. This study evaluates the effects of a reform in Finland that increased the level of unemployment assistance by 22%. The reform led to a drop of 9% in the unemployment exit hazard, which can be attributed to fewer exits to both employment and inactivity. The implied elasticities suggest that a 10% increase in unemployment assistance reduces the unemployment exit hazard by 4% and the job-finding hazard by 6%. These effects are relatively small compared to the existing evidence on the effects of unemployment insurance benefits.