International Tax and Public Finance最新文献

Policymakers were surprised to find increases in sales tax revenues in 2020 due to expectations that they would drop 8-20%. We investigate this puzzle and provide novel insights into consumption taxes based on this experience. Using a case study from the State of Utah, we document that shifts in the structure of consumption played a significant role in the robustness of sales tax revenue. Two factors stand out in our results. The first factor is the structure of the tax base for sales taxes in the USA. This tax base covers only a subset of personal consumption, excluding, for example, many services. During the pandemic, when services were restricted or shut down, this caused a shift in spending toward goods that are more likely to be in the sales tax base. The second factor is the boom in e-commerce during the pandemic, which boosted sales tax collections. This was catalyzed by recent legal changes that made the collection of sales taxes in e-commerce easier. Interestingly, this e-commerce boost also shifted the point of sale and related sales tax revenues away from urban areas toward suburban areas. Our case study of the pandemic's effect on sales taxes in the USA generally, and Utah's experience specifically, provides lessons for consumption taxes, such as the VAT more broadly, and lessons on the role of consumption taxes for tax revenue volatility.

This paper compares the implications of tax system and public borrowing limit asymmetries for the welfare cost of business cycles and interregional consumption risk sharing in a two-region fiscal union. We identify the welfare-improving and risk-sharing-improving designs of the regional tax systems and borrowing limits. We find that the choice of public borrowing limits is more consequential than is the choice of a tax regime for union welfare. It also serves as an argument for the harmonization of fiscal policies adopted in the fiscal union, as it would internalize fiscal externalities and improve consumption risk-sharing across the union regions. The key parameter determining the merits of alternative regional tax systems and possible limits to public borrowing in the fiscal union is the productivity of public good. Other aspects of the economy, such as the type of technology process, or the nature of the productivity shock do not affect the union public finance system design significantly. Extensive simulations suggest that if the productivity of public capital lies within the range of plausible empirical estimates, allowing both regions to have flexible borrowing limits and to choose whatever tax system they prefer will reduce the overall welfare costs of business fluctuations. However, for very low productivity of public capital, the welfare-improving regional public finance reforms that would prohibit public borrowing and tax labor income can produce limited benefits.

In a monopolistically competitive model with production externalities, where individuals voluntarily provide offsets which compensate for degradation of environmental quality caused by their income earning activities, this paper examines how an increase in the population size affects the equilibrium levels of environmental quality, offsets, and net contributions. Whether labor supply is institutionally constrained or not, as the population size increases, environmental quality decreases and converges to zero. However, since offsets increase and converge to the degradation rate of environmental quality, the carbon neutrality theorem holds: net contributions are zero. These results are independent of the specification of the utility function.