Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a statistical life (VSL). This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL should vary across risks. More controversially, VSL should vary across individuals -- even or especially if the result would be to produce a lower number for some people than for others. One practical implication is that a higher value should be given to programs that reduce cancer risks. Another is that government should use a higher VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy -- and a lower VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor. But there are two serious complications here. First, bounded rationality raises problems for the use of private willingness to pay, which underlies current calculations of VSL. Second, the beneficiaries of regulation sometimes pay only a fraction or even none of its cost; when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, on distributional grounds, than market evidence suggests. An understanding of this point has implications for foundational issues about government regulation, including valuation of persons in poor and wealthy nations.
One of the most significant problems facing environmental law is the dearth of scientific information available to assess the impact of industrial activities on public health and the environment. After documenting the significant gaps in existing information, this Article argues that existing laws both exacerbate and perpetuate this problem. By failing to require actors to assess the potential harm from their activities, and by penalizing them with additional regulation when they do, existing laws fail to counteract actors' natural inclination to remain silent about the harms that they might be causing. Both theory and practice confirm that when the stakes are high, actors not only will resist producing potentially incriminating information but will invest in discrediting public research that suggests their activities are harmful. The Article concludes with specific recommendations about how these perverse incentives for ignorance can be reversed.