Pub Date : 2023-03-16DOI: 10.1177/09593543231160111
F. Oyebode
The role of the humanities in medicine, especially mental health, is now well established. The importance of the subjective experience of people in the clinical encounter; the values and meanings that influence and determine how healthcare decisions are made and responded to; and the degree to which language pervades, structures, limits or enriches communication within the clinical space, are now explicit. This edited book extends, deepening our appreciation and understanding, the ways in which context, history, and politics impact on conceptional notions of madness. Furthermore, it demonstrates the capacity of literary theory to not only reflect but also to refract the realities that underlie behaviours and experiences termed madness. Finally, as if to make the point clear that the role of literature is not merely theoretical, it ends with a section on the instrumental uses of literature in clinical practice. One of the challenges of the postmodern world is the loss of the grand, monolithic narrative that disregards the emic, subsuming it within a supposed universalizing etic. Alan Weber’s chapter, “Layla and Majnun in Historical and Contemporary Conceptions of Madness in Islamic Psychology,” introduces the role of context, cultural as well as religious, in framing potential causes of inner turmoil, perhaps too, prescribing what emotions or beliefs arise in specific situations. Here then is a relativizing dialogue in which translations are inevitable with terms such as melancholia, delusionary disease, excessive love, and depression becoming the currencies that are exchanged to facilitate our cross-cultural understanding. Whether or not these terms cover the same semantic field in both Arabic and English is moot. Weber’s chapter makes it impossible to ignore the competing explanatory claims in mental health and, without saying so explicitly, centres psychiatry as a contested field. Sebastian Galbo’s chapter, “Apartheid’s Garden: Dismantling Madness in J.M. Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K,” develops this theme further by examining how politically oppressive systems such as apartheid South Africa can co-opt the power of diagnostic systems to disenfranchise political enemies by labelling them as mentally ill and thus fit for incarceration. In this reading, madness is not a medical condition, but a social construction perpetuated by racist and politically oppressive regimes. 1160111 TAP0010.1177/09593543231160111Theory & PsychologyReview review-article2023
{"title":"Fiction and psychiatry","authors":"F. Oyebode","doi":"10.1177/09593543231160111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543231160111","url":null,"abstract":"The role of the humanities in medicine, especially mental health, is now well established. The importance of the subjective experience of people in the clinical encounter; the values and meanings that influence and determine how healthcare decisions are made and responded to; and the degree to which language pervades, structures, limits or enriches communication within the clinical space, are now explicit. This edited book extends, deepening our appreciation and understanding, the ways in which context, history, and politics impact on conceptional notions of madness. Furthermore, it demonstrates the capacity of literary theory to not only reflect but also to refract the realities that underlie behaviours and experiences termed madness. Finally, as if to make the point clear that the role of literature is not merely theoretical, it ends with a section on the instrumental uses of literature in clinical practice. One of the challenges of the postmodern world is the loss of the grand, monolithic narrative that disregards the emic, subsuming it within a supposed universalizing etic. Alan Weber’s chapter, “Layla and Majnun in Historical and Contemporary Conceptions of Madness in Islamic Psychology,” introduces the role of context, cultural as well as religious, in framing potential causes of inner turmoil, perhaps too, prescribing what emotions or beliefs arise in specific situations. Here then is a relativizing dialogue in which translations are inevitable with terms such as melancholia, delusionary disease, excessive love, and depression becoming the currencies that are exchanged to facilitate our cross-cultural understanding. Whether or not these terms cover the same semantic field in both Arabic and English is moot. Weber’s chapter makes it impossible to ignore the competing explanatory claims in mental health and, without saying so explicitly, centres psychiatry as a contested field. Sebastian Galbo’s chapter, “Apartheid’s Garden: Dismantling Madness in J.M. Coetzee’s Life & Times of Michael K,” develops this theme further by examining how politically oppressive systems such as apartheid South Africa can co-opt the power of diagnostic systems to disenfranchise political enemies by labelling them as mentally ill and thus fit for incarceration. In this reading, madness is not a medical condition, but a social construction perpetuated by racist and politically oppressive regimes. 1160111 TAP0010.1177/09593543231160111Theory & PsychologyReview review-article2023","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"433 - 435"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45505056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-06DOI: 10.1177/09593543231154223
D. Trafimow
Reviewers on manuscripts or grant proposals often react positively if authors use in-favor study techniques and negatively if authors use not-in-favor study techniques. A tacit assumption is that the in-favor technique is superior to alternate techniques. However, study techniques for theory testing depend on auxiliary assumptions that connect nonobservational terms in theories with observational terms in empirical hypotheses. Therefore, the extent to which a technique is useful depends on the theory and empirical hypothesis under investigation. A technique might be useful from one theoretical perspective and not useful from another theoretical perspective. Or a technique might successfully connect to one empirical hypothesis but not another. The present work threshes out some of the relevant philosophical issues.
{"title":"Why is one study technique superior to another?","authors":"D. Trafimow","doi":"10.1177/09593543231154223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543231154223","url":null,"abstract":"Reviewers on manuscripts or grant proposals often react positively if authors use in-favor study techniques and negatively if authors use not-in-favor study techniques. A tacit assumption is that the in-favor technique is superior to alternate techniques. However, study techniques for theory testing depend on auxiliary assumptions that connect nonobservational terms in theories with observational terms in empirical hypotheses. Therefore, the extent to which a technique is useful depends on the theory and empirical hypothesis under investigation. A technique might be useful from one theoretical perspective and not useful from another theoretical perspective. Or a technique might successfully connect to one empirical hypothesis but not another. The present work threshes out some of the relevant philosophical issues.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"386 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42573540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-17DOI: 10.1177/09593543231153820
Joel Owen
Over the last five decades, a substantial and increasing number of scholarly studies have appeared on the topic of resilience, but relatively little attention has been paid to the way in which it relates to a body of work in ancient Greek and Roman practical philosophy. In this article, I review contemporary research on psychological resilience alongside a discussion of ancient practical philosophy such as it was conceived of by philosophers such as Socrates, the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. I suggest that acknowledging and exploring the connections between these two fields has the potential to enrich the study both of psychological resilience and of ancient practical philosophy. Having drawn attention to a number of important points of connection, I discuss some of the theoretical implications for our current understanding of resilience and finish by pointing towards several areas of potential interest for future exploration on this topic.
{"title":"Psychological resilience: Connecting contemporary psychology to ancient practical philosophy","authors":"Joel Owen","doi":"10.1177/09593543231153820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543231153820","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last five decades, a substantial and increasing number of scholarly studies have appeared on the topic of resilience, but relatively little attention has been paid to the way in which it relates to a body of work in ancient Greek and Roman practical philosophy. In this article, I review contemporary research on psychological resilience alongside a discussion of ancient practical philosophy such as it was conceived of by philosophers such as Socrates, the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. I suggest that acknowledging and exploring the connections between these two fields has the potential to enrich the study both of psychological resilience and of ancient practical philosophy. Having drawn attention to a number of important points of connection, I discuss some of the theoretical implications for our current understanding of resilience and finish by pointing towards several areas of potential interest for future exploration on this topic.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"366 - 385"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41778036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-01DOI: 10.1177/09593543221126165
Helen L Ma, Michael R W Dawson, Ruby S Prinsen, Dana A Hayward
Cognitive psychology considers the environment as providing information, not affecting fundamental information processes. Thus, cognitive psychology's traditional paradigms study responses to precisely timed stimuli in controlled environments. However, new research demonstrates the environment does influence cognitive processes and offers cognitive psychology new methods. The authors examine one such proposal: cognitive ethology. Cognitive ethology improves cognitive psychology's ecological validity through first drawing inspiration from robust phenomena in the real world, then moving into the lab to test those phenomena. To support such methods, cognitive ethologists appeal to embodied cognition, or 4E cognition, for its rich relationships between agents and environments. However, the authors note while cognitive ethology focuses on new methods (epistemology) inspired by embodied cognition, it preserves most traditional assumptions about cognitive processes (ontology). But embodied cognition-particularly its radical variants-also provides strong ontological challenges to cognitive psychology, which work against cognitive ethology. The authors argue cognitive ethology should align with the ontology of less radical embodied cognition, which produces epistemological implications, offering alternative methodologies. For example, cognitive ethology can explore differences between real-world and lab studies to fully understand how cognition depends on environments.
{"title":"Embodying cognitive ethology.","authors":"Helen L Ma, Michael R W Dawson, Ruby S Prinsen, Dana A Hayward","doi":"10.1177/09593543221126165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221126165","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cognitive psychology considers the environment as providing information, not affecting fundamental information processes. Thus, cognitive psychology's traditional paradigms study responses to precisely timed stimuli in controlled environments. However, new research demonstrates the environment does influence cognitive processes and offers cognitive psychology new methods. The authors examine one such proposal: cognitive ethology. Cognitive ethology improves cognitive psychology's ecological validity through first drawing inspiration from robust phenomena in the real world, then moving into the lab to test those phenomena. To support such methods, cognitive ethologists appeal to embodied cognition, or 4E cognition, for its rich relationships between agents and environments. However, the authors note while cognitive ethology focuses on new methods (epistemology) inspired by embodied cognition, it preserves most traditional assumptions about cognitive processes (ontology). But embodied cognition-particularly its radical variants-also provides strong ontological challenges to cognitive psychology, which work against cognitive ethology. The authors argue cognitive ethology should align with the ontology of less radical embodied cognition, which produces epistemological implications, offering alternative methodologies. For example, cognitive ethology can explore differences between real-world and lab studies to fully understand how cognition depends on environments.</p>","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"42-58"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9893303/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10661700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1177/09593543221131511
F. Hasselman
In their article on theory-based measurement, Borgstede and Eggert (2023) argue that a substantive formal psychological theory that is capable of predicting expected measurement outcomes for the theoretical objects of measurement it posits to exist is both necessary and sufficient for psychological measurement. They reveal that measurement in psychology mostly concerns the estimation of latent variables and compares unfavorably to the development of measurement in the history of physics. They, however, fail to include a comparison with the great advances in theory-based measurement achieved in modern physics. In this commentary, I describe how measurement is formalized in classical physics and examine what would be required to formalize the physical measurement of psychological phenomena. I conclude that, without an examination of the theoretical assumptions underlying current measurement procedures and a formal notion of psychological measurement, it is unlikely that psychological science will be able to generate the substantive theories suggested by Borgstede and Eggert.
{"title":"Going round in squares: Theory-based measurement requires a theory of measurement","authors":"F. Hasselman","doi":"10.1177/09593543221131511","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221131511","url":null,"abstract":"In their article on theory-based measurement, Borgstede and Eggert (2023) argue that a substantive formal psychological theory that is capable of predicting expected measurement outcomes for the theoretical objects of measurement it posits to exist is both necessary and sufficient for psychological measurement. They reveal that measurement in psychology mostly concerns the estimation of latent variables and compares unfavorably to the development of measurement in the history of physics. They, however, fail to include a comparison with the great advances in theory-based measurement achieved in modern physics. In this commentary, I describe how measurement is formalized in classical physics and examine what would be required to formalize the physical measurement of psychological phenomena. I conclude that, without an examination of the theoretical assumptions underlying current measurement procedures and a formal notion of psychological measurement, it is unlikely that psychological science will be able to generate the substantive theories suggested by Borgstede and Eggert.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"145 - 152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47018695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1177/09593543221128522
K. Slaney
In this commentary on Borgstede and Eggert’s article “Squaring the Circle: From Latent Variables to Theory-Based Measurement,” (2023) three problematic areas of their proposed psychological measurement framework are identified. These pertain, respectively, to (a) confusions regarding the meaning of “meaning”; (b) vagueness and ambiguity in Borgstede and Eggert’s theory-based measurement framework; and (c) the decidedly thin promise of the aim of replacing ordinary “folk” psychological concepts with theoretically defined formalisms. The commentary concludes with the suggestion that building a psychological measurement framework on the model of the physical sciences may be likely to create more problems than it solves.
在对Borgstede和Eggert的文章“Squaring the Circle：从潜在变量到基于理论的测量”（2023）的评论中，确定了他们提出的心理测量框架的三个问题领域。这些分别涉及（a）关于“意义”含义的混淆；（b） Borgstede和Eggert基于理论的测量框架中的模糊性和歧义性；以及（c）用理论上定义的形式主义取代普通的“民间”心理概念这一目标的明确承诺。评论最后建议，在物理科学模型上建立一个心理测量框架可能会产生比解决更多的问题。
{"title":"Why force a square peg into a round hole? The ongoing (pseudo-)problem of psychological measurement","authors":"K. Slaney","doi":"10.1177/09593543221128522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221128522","url":null,"abstract":"In this commentary on Borgstede and Eggert’s article “Squaring the Circle: From Latent Variables to Theory-Based Measurement,” (2023) three problematic areas of their proposed psychological measurement framework are identified. These pertain, respectively, to (a) confusions regarding the meaning of “meaning”; (b) vagueness and ambiguity in Borgstede and Eggert’s theory-based measurement framework; and (c) the decidedly thin promise of the aim of replacing ordinary “folk” psychological concepts with theoretically defined formalisms. The commentary concludes with the suggestion that building a psychological measurement framework on the model of the physical sciences may be likely to create more problems than it solves.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"138 - 144"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42182417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-27DOI: 10.1177/09593543221139811
M. Borgstede, F. Eggert
In this article, we take the opportunity to elaborate on some aspects of our article “Squaring the Circle: From Latent Variables to Theory-Based Measurement” (Borgstede & Eggert, 2023) that gave rise to the concerns uttered by Hasselman (2023) and Slaney (2023), and to clarify why we think that theory-based measurement is indeed necessary and sufficient for the establishment of meaningful psychological measurement procedures. Moreover, we will illustrate how theory-based measurement might be accomplished in psychology by means of an example from behavioral selection theory.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-10DOI: 10.1177/09593543221136103
Chloe Bamboulis
Some researchers who examine the similarities between philosophy and psychology conclude that engaging in philosophy can improve one’s mental health, instead of, or in addition to, traditional forms of therapy. This article reinforces this by establishing the relationship between self-knowledge as self-improvement in Plato’s dialogues and in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Despite multiple important points of congruence, some authors have rejected the idea that self-knowledge in Plato can be assimilated to self-knowledge in psychotherapy. Here, I argue against this criticism by focusing on three key areas of interest: (a) self-knowledge as improving one’s beliefs via objective (nonsubjective) means, (b) self-knowledge as resulting in objective (nonsubjective) outcomes, and (c) self-knowledge as progress towards the Good. I reinforce the link by demonstrating that CBT uses methods which are equally objective as those of the Platonic dialogues. I then continue by claiming that the outcome of self-knowledge in both is also equally objective. Finally, I explore the nature of their relationship. Instead of arguing that self-knowledge in CBT is a modern version of Platonic self-knowledge, I propose that although not intended to, it functions as a preparatory process for one to be able to participate in Platonic self-knowledge.
{"title":"Self-Knowledge as self-improvement in Plato’s dialogues and cognitive behavioural therapy","authors":"Chloe Bamboulis","doi":"10.1177/09593543221136103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221136103","url":null,"abstract":"Some researchers who examine the similarities between philosophy and psychology conclude that engaging in philosophy can improve one’s mental health, instead of, or in addition to, traditional forms of therapy. This article reinforces this by establishing the relationship between self-knowledge as self-improvement in Plato’s dialogues and in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Despite multiple important points of congruence, some authors have rejected the idea that self-knowledge in Plato can be assimilated to self-knowledge in psychotherapy. Here, I argue against this criticism by focusing on three key areas of interest: (a) self-knowledge as improving one’s beliefs via objective (nonsubjective) means, (b) self-knowledge as resulting in objective (nonsubjective) outcomes, and (c) self-knowledge as progress towards the Good. I reinforce the link by demonstrating that CBT uses methods which are equally objective as those of the Platonic dialogues. I then continue by claiming that the outcome of self-knowledge in both is also equally objective. Finally, I explore the nature of their relationship. Instead of arguing that self-knowledge in CBT is a modern version of Platonic self-knowledge, I propose that although not intended to, it functions as a preparatory process for one to be able to participate in Platonic self-knowledge.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"346 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"65324559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-10DOI: 10.1177/09593543221135559
Dawna Daigneault, Chris Brown
In this article, we introduce a theory of worth consciousness that builds on the research from self-worth with attention to the importance of honoring birthright self-worth (BSW), which is foundational to human dignity. This new empirically testable construct, Worth-Conscious theory (WCT), concerns human worth and requires individuals to recognize and acknowledge their value and significance (i.e., worth) even when smaller (e.g., family) and larger (e.g., community and society) systems fail to support them in affirming and repairing their worth. Self-Worth is the birthright of all individuals; hence our central aim is to introduce and explain the four pillars of self-worth, which are major tenets of WCT that align with Erikson’s developmental stages. These four pillars of self-worth (self-awareness, self-respect, self-esteem(ed), and self-confidence) are instrumental in understanding clients’ life challenges, presenting issues, and how to assist them in repairing and maintaining their worth. More specifically, many clients’ mental health issues, interpersonal conflicts, and other concerns can be directly or indirectly related to the experience of negative and critical beliefs about their worth and, more specifically, that their BSW has not been affirmed or realized throughout the lifespan.
{"title":"Worth-Conscious theory: Understanding the role of birthright self-worth and application to clinical practice","authors":"Dawna Daigneault, Chris Brown","doi":"10.1177/09593543221135559","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221135559","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we introduce a theory of worth consciousness that builds on the research from self-worth with attention to the importance of honoring birthright self-worth (BSW), which is foundational to human dignity. This new empirically testable construct, Worth-Conscious theory (WCT), concerns human worth and requires individuals to recognize and acknowledge their value and significance (i.e., worth) even when smaller (e.g., family) and larger (e.g., community and society) systems fail to support them in affirming and repairing their worth. Self-Worth is the birthright of all individuals; hence our central aim is to introduce and explain the four pillars of self-worth, which are major tenets of WCT that align with Erikson’s developmental stages. These four pillars of self-worth (self-awareness, self-respect, self-esteem(ed), and self-confidence) are instrumental in understanding clients’ life challenges, presenting issues, and how to assist them in repairing and maintaining their worth. More specifically, many clients’ mental health issues, interpersonal conflicts, and other concerns can be directly or indirectly related to the experience of negative and critical beliefs about their worth and, more specifically, that their BSW has not been affirmed or realized throughout the lifespan.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"306 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46985753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-25DOI: 10.1177/09593543221135149
Anders Essom-Stenz, T. Roald
The phenomenon of imagination plays an important though ambiguous role in philosophy and psychology. In this article, we describe its prereflective aspects, elucidating a form of imagination with defining consequences for our every experience. We lean on the epistemological framework developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his book, Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012), and argue that prereflective imagination can affect perceptual experiences in specific ways: it signifies an awareness of potential variations of our phenomenological field. This variability affects how we experience our perceptual field as meaningful. By discussing both perception of ordinary objects and experiences of art, we show how the latter involve prereflective imagination to a greater extent than ordinary perception. Our awareness of the difference between imaginary engagement in these experiences both enhances the theoretical clarity of the phenomenon of imagination and is a necessity if we wish to understand the psychological meanings arising from experiences of imagination.
{"title":"Imagination in perception and art","authors":"Anders Essom-Stenz, T. Roald","doi":"10.1177/09593543221135149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221135149","url":null,"abstract":"The phenomenon of imagination plays an important though ambiguous role in philosophy and psychology. In this article, we describe its prereflective aspects, elucidating a form of imagination with defining consequences for our every experience. We lean on the epistemological framework developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his book, Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012), and argue that prereflective imagination can affect perceptual experiences in specific ways: it signifies an awareness of potential variations of our phenomenological field. This variability affects how we experience our perceptual field as meaningful. By discussing both perception of ordinary objects and experiences of art, we show how the latter involve prereflective imagination to a greater extent than ordinary perception. Our awareness of the difference between imaginary engagement in these experiences both enhances the theoretical clarity of the phenomenon of imagination and is a necessity if we wish to understand the psychological meanings arising from experiences of imagination.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"99 - 117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46753170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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