Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/09593543221106440
Vivien Burr, N. King
In response to Jones’s (2022) article, we argue that if we understand personal construct psychology as being less rationalistic and more holistic than is often assumed, important synergies between it and Jungian analytical psychology can be observed. We argue that the two theories can be considered to align with each other on a number of points. These include taking a similar epistemological position, a recognition of psychological processes operating outside of immediate awareness, and the implications that these can have for personal change. We argue for a more “social” understanding of personal construct psychology than Jones allows for, and further suggest that possibilities for its alignment with social constructionism should not be understated. We conclude that both theories deserve greater visibility in the world of academic psychology, and argue for greater consideration of their potential use in research.
{"title":"Contrasts and synergies: A comment on Jones (2022)","authors":"Vivien Burr, N. King","doi":"10.1177/09593543221106440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221106440","url":null,"abstract":"In response to Jones’s (2022) article, we argue that if we understand personal construct psychology as being less rationalistic and more holistic than is often assumed, important synergies between it and Jungian analytical psychology can be observed. We argue that the two theories can be considered to align with each other on a number of points. These include taking a similar epistemological position, a recognition of psychological processes operating outside of immediate awareness, and the implications that these can have for personal change. We argue for a more “social” understanding of personal construct psychology than Jones allows for, and further suggest that possibilities for its alignment with social constructionism should not be understated. We conclude that both theories deserve greater visibility in the world of academic psychology, and argue for greater consideration of their potential use in research.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"651 - 657"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45475705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-07DOI: 10.1177/09593543221101020
Raya A. Jones
The article (Jones, 2022) on which Burr and King (2022) comment represents my theoretical work in the field of history and philosophy of psychology. Their commentary conveys certain misunderstanding of its nature and contains some inaccuracies. This reply clarifies the original article’s purposes and attributes the misunderstanding to differing agendas or motivations for comparing theories.
{"title":"Cross purposes and crossed wires: A reply to","authors":"Raya A. Jones","doi":"10.1177/09593543221101020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221101020","url":null,"abstract":"The article (Jones, 2022) on which Burr and King (2022) comment represents my theoretical work in the field of history and philosophy of psychology. Their commentary conveys certain misunderstanding of its nature and contains some inaccuracies. This reply clarifies the original article’s purposes and attributes the misunderstanding to differing agendas or motivations for comparing theories.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"658 - 662"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42070141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-22DOI: 10.1177/09593543221097334
S. Oppong
I present here an assessment of African Psychology (AP) to give insights about how it has been conceptualised and practised thus far as well as what its future holds. I begin with a focus on the centrality of culture and how AP treats the concept of culture. I will then attempt to respond to some concerns often raised by Africa-based psychologists who do not operate in and from a multiracial space about the relevance and legitimacy of AP. Theoretically, multiracial space is conceptualised not to mean the mere presence of people from diverse races in a particular space but also to the uneven distribution of power in spaces such as a country, state, university, or any community of people. Further, I attempt to argue for positioning of AP to contribute to global psychology. I will discuss implications for theory development, practice, curriculum design, and pedagogical practices as well.
{"title":"Indigenous psychology in Africa: Centrality of culture, misunderstandings, and global positioning","authors":"S. Oppong","doi":"10.1177/09593543221097334","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221097334","url":null,"abstract":"I present here an assessment of African Psychology (AP) to give insights about how it has been conceptualised and practised thus far as well as what its future holds. I begin with a focus on the centrality of culture and how AP treats the concept of culture. I will then attempt to respond to some concerns often raised by Africa-based psychologists who do not operate in and from a multiracial space about the relevance and legitimacy of AP. Theoretically, multiracial space is conceptualised not to mean the mere presence of people from diverse races in a particular space but also to the uneven distribution of power in spaces such as a country, state, university, or any community of people. Further, I attempt to argue for positioning of AP to contribute to global psychology. I will discuss implications for theory development, practice, curriculum design, and pedagogical practices as well.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"953 - 973"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47876381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-14DOI: 10.1177/09593543221103819
Jan Grimell, M. Holmberg
Research on ambulance culture and identity is globally scant and nonexistent within a Swedish context. This study on Swedish ambulance nurses serves as a first step and an important entry point into this topic. The purpose was to describe professional ambulance identities among four participants who had served between several years and decades in the ambulance services. Qualitative data was obtained through initial in-depth interviews and follow-up data gathering at a later stage. The theoretical underpinnings adhered to both narrative psychology and dialogical self theory, strengthening the capacity to develop new knowledge about professional identities. The findings present four distinct types of identities among the participants. Individuality and diversity amongst the development of core identities is shown to be cultivated by the dialogue between professional and personal identities. This dialogical process began at a stage in the ambulance career when the strict demarcation line between professional and personal identities was crossed.
{"title":"Identifying and mapping professional identities among Swedish ambulance nurses: A multiple qualitative case study","authors":"Jan Grimell, M. Holmberg","doi":"10.1177/09593543221103819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221103819","url":null,"abstract":"Research on ambulance culture and identity is globally scant and nonexistent within a Swedish context. This study on Swedish ambulance nurses serves as a first step and an important entry point into this topic. The purpose was to describe professional ambulance identities among four participants who had served between several years and decades in the ambulance services. Qualitative data was obtained through initial in-depth interviews and follow-up data gathering at a later stage. The theoretical underpinnings adhered to both narrative psychology and dialogical self theory, strengthening the capacity to develop new knowledge about professional identities. The findings present four distinct types of identities among the participants. Individuality and diversity amongst the development of core identities is shown to be cultivated by the dialogue between professional and personal identities. This dialogical process began at a stage in the ambulance career when the strict demarcation line between professional and personal identities was crossed.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"714 - 732"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49439805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-31DOI: 10.1177/09593543221100493
Antonio Fabio Bella
The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define as “motivational primitives,” and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes.
{"title":"Where psychological science meets moral theory: Linking up motivational primitives with normative ethics","authors":"Antonio Fabio Bella","doi":"10.1177/09593543221100493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221100493","url":null,"abstract":"The main normative moral theories in Western thought, from deontology to virtue and consequentialist ethics, revolve around conceptions of the moral right, good, and worth. However, a few elementary psychological motives lie at a deeper level. In the present article, I outline the key tenets of regulatory focus, regulatory mode, and the hedonic principle (approach/avoidance), which I define as “motivational primitives,” and provide a conceptual analysis of their links with specific ethical systems. I unveil how moral judgment in each of them is psychologically construed on the basis of the motivational primitives and their underlying self-regulatory processes. The credibility of the proposed framework will be fully brought to life when researchers, having agreed on satisfactory operationalizations and manipulations of the primitives, will be able to reconcile the speculative and the empirical planes.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"590 - 612"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46033178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1177/09593543221103822
A fundamental emotion paradox: People are compelltements that we might together label “the dilemma of adequate explanation.” by their own experiences to believe that emotions exist as natural-kind entities, yet a century of research has not produced a strong evidentiary basis for this belief. To date, there is no clear, unambiguous criterion for indicating the presence of anger or sadness or fear. (Barrett, 2006, p. 27)
{"title":"Erratum to “The ‘placebo’ paradox and the emotion paradox: Challenges to psychological explanation”","authors":"","doi":"10.1177/09593543221103822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221103822","url":null,"abstract":"A fundamental emotion paradox: People are compelltements that we might together label “the dilemma of adequate explanation.” by their own experiences to believe that emotions exist as natural-kind entities, yet a century of research has not produced a strong evidentiary basis for this belief. To date, there is no clear, unambiguous criterion for indicating the presence of anger or sadness or fear. (Barrett, 2006, p. 27)","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"663 - 663"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43144388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-21DOI: 10.1177/09593543221095471
Lucas A. Keefer
Recent research on the psychology of metaphor is based primarily on the cognitivist framework provided by conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This approach has been generative and does much to explain the pervasive role that metaphoric language plays in everyday life. However, interest in metaphor is not limited to this cognitive approach; Lacan accorded metaphor a central role in his psychoanalytic understanding of the process of signification that structures language and, thereby, the unconscious. Although the two frameworks have different assumptions and aims, they are largely compatible ways of thinking about the role of metaphor in psychology. The goal of this article is to briefly introduce both approaches and ultimately to suggest several key insights about metaphor that could be gained through a greater attention to Lacanian psychoanalysis.
{"title":"Whose metaphor? Rethinking conceptual metaphor in Lacanian terms","authors":"Lucas A. Keefer","doi":"10.1177/09593543221095471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221095471","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research on the psychology of metaphor is based primarily on the cognitivist framework provided by conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). This approach has been generative and does much to explain the pervasive role that metaphoric language plays in everyday life. However, interest in metaphor is not limited to this cognitive approach; Lacan accorded metaphor a central role in his psychoanalytic understanding of the process of signification that structures language and, thereby, the unconscious. Although the two frameworks have different assumptions and aims, they are largely compatible ways of thinking about the role of metaphor in psychology. The goal of this article is to briefly introduce both approaches and ultimately to suggest several key insights about metaphor that could be gained through a greater attention to Lacanian psychoanalysis.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"789 - 807"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43992153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-02DOI: 10.1177/09593543221092708
Dylan LaValley
In the language used by those who take an empirical approach to the study of consciousness, the subliminal–supraliminal binary and the unconscious–conscious process binary are treated as one and the same, despite the unconscious–conscious process distinction having a historical association to a different meaning. The historical meaning of the unconscious–conscious process distinction may then become implicitly associated with the interpretations of related studies, resulting in a misinterpretation of evidence. This is to say, where the ability to differentially respond to subliminal and supraliminal stimuli may be indicative of a variety of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes, as these terms relate to a qualitative conception of consciousness, subliminal threshold testing does not tell us anything about consciousness and the associated binary of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes as these terms relate to their historical, metacognitive conceptions.
{"title":"Equivocating on unconsciousness","authors":"Dylan LaValley","doi":"10.1177/09593543221092708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221092708","url":null,"abstract":"In the language used by those who take an empirical approach to the study of consciousness, the subliminal–supraliminal binary and the unconscious–conscious process binary are treated as one and the same, despite the unconscious–conscious process distinction having a historical association to a different meaning. The historical meaning of the unconscious–conscious process distinction may then become implicitly associated with the interpretations of related studies, resulting in a misinterpretation of evidence. This is to say, where the ability to differentially respond to subliminal and supraliminal stimuli may be indicative of a variety of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes, as these terms relate to a qualitative conception of consciousness, subliminal threshold testing does not tell us anything about consciousness and the associated binary of “unconscious” and “conscious” processes as these terms relate to their historical, metacognitive conceptions.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"521 - 534"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43675001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-02DOI: 10.1177/09593543221094551
Zhipeng Gao
Since the late 1970s, psychologists from several developing countries have launched indigenization movements upon the realization that mainstream Western psychology was ill-fitted to their cultures. Among these international movements, Kuo-Shu Yang (1932–2018) played a leadership role in the establishment of a vibrant Chinese indigenous psychology, which expanded from Taiwan to other greater Chinese regions. Upon Yang’s passing away in 2018, Louise Sundararajan, Kwang-Kuo Hwang, and Kuang-Hui Yeh edited this volume to commemorate his life and work. Contributions to this volume come from key scholars in Chinese indigenous psychology as well as allied scholars who approach this field from international and transdisciplinary backgrounds. The volume is divided into three major sections. The first section is largely biographical. Featuring contributions from Yang’s close associates, this section provides a rare opportunity for readers to learn about Yang not only as a scholar, but also as a person, a colleague, a mentor, and a political activist. Building on this memorial section, the second and third sections serve as a forum where scholars extend their assessments of Yang’s legacy to analyses of the status and future of indigenous psychology. When developing these two sections, the editors asked the contributors to provide critical reflections while having close dialogue among themselves. This was an excellent approach to honor Yang as a visionary scholar and a community builder. To begin with, one critical reflection is concerned with the epistemological foundation of Yang’s scholarship. Although Yang suggested that Indigenous psychologists should adopt multiple paradigms, his view of indigenous psychology was fundamentally shaped by his positivist training. Kwang-Kuo Hwang, based on his knowledge of the philosophy of science, discusses several epistemological issues in Yang’s writings, including the notion of indigenous compatibility, the question of interpretation, inductive methods, and the proposal of a bottom-up approach for expanding indigenous psychology to global psychology. A second question pertains to universality, namely to what degree findings made in one particular culture could shed light on phenomena in other cultures. In this regard, 1094551 TAP0010.1177/09593543221094551Theory & PsychologyReview research-article2022
{"title":"Indigenous psychology: Difficult engagements with culture and power","authors":"Zhipeng Gao","doi":"10.1177/09593543221094551","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221094551","url":null,"abstract":"Since the late 1970s, psychologists from several developing countries have launched indigenization movements upon the realization that mainstream Western psychology was ill-fitted to their cultures. Among these international movements, Kuo-Shu Yang (1932–2018) played a leadership role in the establishment of a vibrant Chinese indigenous psychology, which expanded from Taiwan to other greater Chinese regions. Upon Yang’s passing away in 2018, Louise Sundararajan, Kwang-Kuo Hwang, and Kuang-Hui Yeh edited this volume to commemorate his life and work. Contributions to this volume come from key scholars in Chinese indigenous psychology as well as allied scholars who approach this field from international and transdisciplinary backgrounds. The volume is divided into three major sections. The first section is largely biographical. Featuring contributions from Yang’s close associates, this section provides a rare opportunity for readers to learn about Yang not only as a scholar, but also as a person, a colleague, a mentor, and a political activist. Building on this memorial section, the second and third sections serve as a forum where scholars extend their assessments of Yang’s legacy to analyses of the status and future of indigenous psychology. When developing these two sections, the editors asked the contributors to provide critical reflections while having close dialogue among themselves. This was an excellent approach to honor Yang as a visionary scholar and a community builder. To begin with, one critical reflection is concerned with the epistemological foundation of Yang’s scholarship. Although Yang suggested that Indigenous psychologists should adopt multiple paradigms, his view of indigenous psychology was fundamentally shaped by his positivist training. Kwang-Kuo Hwang, based on his knowledge of the philosophy of science, discusses several epistemological issues in Yang’s writings, including the notion of indigenous compatibility, the question of interpretation, inductive methods, and the proposal of a bottom-up approach for expanding indigenous psychology to global psychology. A second question pertains to universality, namely to what degree findings made in one particular culture could shed light on phenomena in other cultures. In this regard, 1094551 TAP0010.1177/09593543221094551Theory & PsychologyReview research-article2022","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"974 - 976"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45968154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1177/09593543221088555
B. Held
Charges of scientism in mainstream psychology are on the rise among theoretical psychologists, yet not much attention has been paid to the diverse meanings and applications of the term “scientism.” In examining scientism’s relation to such contrast classes as pseudoscience, bad science, and antiscience, I focus on whether allegations of psychology’s scientism are made with the goal of supplementing mainstream ontological and epistemological frameworks and their methodological implications, or supplanting them altogether. The former suggests supplying a mainstream that is seen as thinly conceived with essential missing nutrients, whereas the latter suggests overturning a mainstream that is seen as irreparable and/or irredeemable in its disregard of lived experience. In light of the scientific reform sought by theoretical psychologists, many of whom now turn to the humanities for remedy, I question whether applying the term “scientism” to mainstream psychology is likely to help in achieving theorists’ disciplinary goals, and I suggest alternatives.
{"title":"Making sense of charges of scientism in psychology and beyond: Logical and epistemological implications","authors":"B. Held","doi":"10.1177/09593543221088555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543221088555","url":null,"abstract":"Charges of scientism in mainstream psychology are on the rise among theoretical psychologists, yet not much attention has been paid to the diverse meanings and applications of the term “scientism.” In examining scientism’s relation to such contrast classes as pseudoscience, bad science, and antiscience, I focus on whether allegations of psychology’s scientism are made with the goal of supplementing mainstream ontological and epistemological frameworks and their methodological implications, or supplanting them altogether. The former suggests supplying a mainstream that is seen as thinly conceived with essential missing nutrients, whereas the latter suggests overturning a mainstream that is seen as irreparable and/or irredeemable in its disregard of lived experience. In light of the scientific reform sought by theoretical psychologists, many of whom now turn to the humanities for remedy, I question whether applying the term “scientism” to mainstream psychology is likely to help in achieving theorists’ disciplinary goals, and I suggest alternatives.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"32 1","pages":"535 - 555"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46819439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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