Legislative Studies Quarterly最新文献

Though many scholars find that incumbent party legislators benefit from higher access to distributive resources than opposition ones, there is less attention on how resources are distributed among opposition districts. In most contexts, opposition districts cannot be fully cut off from funds and opposition legislators get credit for spending in their constituencies, which harms the ruling party. I argue that, in such situations, the incumbent party will discriminate between its own legislators and opposition ones but this discrimination will be based on opposition swing districts being punished rather than opposition strongholds. Using data on federal development funds from Pakistan and fixed-effects estimators, I show that the difference in funds between opposition and ruling party legislators is driven by opposition swing districts while their core areas have similar access as the incumbent party's own districts. The findings further our understanding of distributive politics and have potential implications for long-term development patterns.

In recent years, legislators from both parties have drawn attention for their public support or opposition to leading figures within their party, such as Donald Trump and Nancy Pelosi. Yet we know relatively little about the extent to which voters care about members' professed loyalty to party leaders, especially when compared to competing considerations such as members' policy positions. In two national survey experiments, we independently manipulate hypothetical Democratic and Republican legislators' ideological reputations and levels of support for a leading party figure. Through our experiments and a supplemental observational analysis, we find that partisans in the electorate do use information about support for or opposition to leading party figures as a basis for evaluating members of Congress. At the same time, the results reaffirm the importance voters attach to policy and ideological factors and suggest these considerations are not overwhelmed by partisan loyalty considerations.

In many Western European states, right-wing populist parties made it into national parliaments. This presents the established parties with the challenge of how to behave towards the new party. While the scholarly literature has focused more on the interaction with the populist radical right in the electoral arena, we know little about how it functions in an institutionally constrained arena such as parliament. This study asks in what way these structures affect the position taking and confrontation in speeches. Using different text-as-data approaches, I analyze parliamentary debates in four Western European parliaments after the entry of right-wing populist parties. The results show that government-opposition dynamics continue to structure parliamentary debates by and large, but right-wing populist parties succeed in polarizing debates on immigration. They also become the center of attention in these debates. These results have important implications for the analysis of strategic party interaction in the parliamentary context.

The electoral dominance of “quality” candidates—political insiders with a history of holding office—is well-established. However, research on the recent rise in successful political neophytes is less studied. Despite longstanding trends in the predominance of experienced candidates in primary elections, nearly half of all quality candidates who ran in non-incumbent races lost to a candidate without prior electoral experience in 2018. In this article, we investigate the success of political newcomers in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives by examining a topic often overlooked in the growing literature on primaries: campaign finance. We show that, from 2016 to 2020, political newcomers saw (1) greater success in future fundraising, and (2) an increased likelihood of primary election victory when they garnered more early contributions from outside their district. This contrasts with prior elections, where early money from inside a candidate's own congressional district served as the strongest predictor of future fundraising and electoral success.

An ongoing debate in American politics concerns the extent to which subnational politics has become “nationalized.” We advance this debate by collecting issue-position data on four distinct policy topics from unprecedented national surveys of public officials at both the local and state levels. We then combine this survey data with precinct-level presidential vote-share data that is tabulated to match the boundary of each survey respondent's government jurisdiction. In doing so, we demonstrate that national party sorting of subnational officials is substantively and statistically significant across a range of issues with national salience, that it is consistent across local and state levels of government and it cannot be explained by the party sorting of constituents. These findings have implications both for the scope of nationalization as well as its implications for substantive representation.

Do interpersonal relationships among and between representatives and senators affect legislative collaboration in the contemporary Congress? The extant literature on Congress suggests interpersonal dimensions of life on Capitol Hill should play a minimal role in the legislative process. However, research in other fields, including psychology, finds that relationships are crucially important within organizations. In addition, many contemporary accounts of congressional deal-making highlight the role of personal relationships. Drawing on interviews with high-level congressional staff, and data on CODEL trips taken by members of Congress, we show that interpersonal relationships help promote collaboration across the aisle. These findings have implications for how we understand the contours of conflict and cooperation on Capitol Hill.

An important challenge facing political decision making today is inequality in representation. Political scientists have shown that the preferences of certain groups—especially those who have higher incomes or are better educated—systematically preponderate in political decision making. Trying to elucidate the mechanisms behind these findings, this research note explores one specific possible driver of representational inequality: that politicians downplay the opinions of disadvantaged groups, and here specifically, of the lower-educated. By means of a survey experiment with politicians, we test the idea that politicians have a hard-wired inclination to assume that the opinions of citizens who have received lower (i.e., vocational) education are less thoughtful than the opinions of citizens who followed a higher (i.e., general) education. The findings are somewhat ambiguous but the expectation is at least partly corroborated by the evidence. The findings illustrate the psychological foundations that may ultimately make politicians disregard the preferences of the lower-educated.

Members of parliament (MPs) are elected via two different tiers in mixed-member electoral systems—as winners of a seat in a constituency or as party candidates under proportional rules. While previous research has identified important consequences of this “mandate divide” in parliaments, questions remain how this institutional setup affects MPs' political behavior in other arenas. Analyzing more than one million social media posts, this article investigates regional representation in the online communication of German MPs. The results show that MPs elected under a direct mandate refer approximately twice as often to their constituencies by using regionalized wording and geographic references than MPs elected under the proportional tier. The substantive findings provide new evidence for the benefits of mixed-member electoral systems for political representation while the methodological approach demonstrates the added value of social media data for analyzing the political behavior of elites.

Machine learning models, especially ensemble and tree-based approaches, offer great promise to legislative scholars. However, they are heavily underutilized outside of narrow applications to text and networks. We believe this is because they are difficult to interpret: while the models are extremely flexible, they have been criticized as “black box” techniques due to their difficulty in visualizing the effect of predictors on the outcome of interest. In order to make these models more useful for legislative scholars, we introduce a framework integrating machine learning models with traditional parametric approaches. We then review three interpretative plotting strategies that scholars can use to bring a substantive interpretation to their machine learning models. For each, we explain the plotting strategy, when to use it, and how to interpret it. We then put these plots in action by revisiting two recent articles from Legislative Studies Quarterly.