Legislative Studies Quarterly最新文献

Classic theories of political ambition assume relatively stable and programmatic party systems. However, in many parts of the world, ‘fluid’ or ‘inchoate’ party systems do not provide ambitious legislators with the electoral benefits associated with stable party brands. In this paper, we examine ambition in fluid party systems: What is the frequency of party switching for legislators who seek re-election, and what are their characteristics? What incentives do parties create to push away or retain legislators? And which parties do ambitious legislators seek out? Using a systems approach, we argue that in fluid party systems, legislators' office-seeking behavior is driven by their attitudes towards parties and their constituents, their prospective evaluation of party performance, and ideology. Incentives for politicians to switch parties act as negative feedback mechanisms which keep the party system stuck in a fluid state. We test the determinants of party switching using two data sources from Ecuador: a public records dataset of every legislator who earned re-election from 1979 to 2021, and the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) surveys of all legislators from 1994 to 2017. Both sources distinguish between switchers and non-switchers. The results support the conclusion that ambitious legislators in fluid party systems are strategic actors that seek or keep parties to maximize their probability of re-election—and thereby further exacerbate the party system's fluidity.

Reformers assert that lobbyists take advantage of legislators who lack adequate staffing and research to win policy outcomes for their interest group clients. However, in the United States, legislators usually determine their own levels of staff. This paper exploits the 1990 passage of California's Proposition 140 to test a situation when the legislature's capacity dropped. Proposition 140 immediately lowered legislative expenditures for the 1991–1992 session by 38%, which decimated the policy staff, particularly in the state's Assembly. Using bill analyses that identify which outside groups served as the source of legislation, we show that group sponsored bills became more likely to pass than non-group bills in the wake of Proposition 140. This effect is concentrated in bills introduced in the Assembly. We account for other factors that could explain this relationship, particularly direct and indirect effects of the term limits wrought by Proposition 140, but find they did not alter legislator relationships with outside groups.

Although presidential vetoes are central to the legislative process, the role of total versus line item vetoes (LIV) is largely unclear. While total vetoes are a sign of conflict between the branches, as the literature has emphasized, we argue that LIV function as a negative agenda setting mechanism that enables presidents to coordinate within their coalition. To test our argument, we use an original dataset on all statutes and executive decrees approved and vetoed in Brazil for the period 1988–2010. In both, statutes and decrees, we show that while total vetoes occur when conflict between branches is stronger, LIV happen when such conflict is minimal and presidents have tight control over their coalition. The results are robust across dependent variables, model specifications, and estimation strategies. Our findings highlight that while the total veto is a blunt bargaining mechanism, the LIV provides a scalpel, a much finer tool that helps presidents manage and sustain their congressional coalition.

How do legislators, many of whom hold policy positions that are not consistently conservative or progressive, position themselves on the left–right ideological scale? Analyzing data from the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey, this paper leverages combinations of moral and economic policy positions to determine the weight—germaneness—of each policy on that scale. Using bi- and multivariate models on a database of about 5000 legislators, we confirm the importance of economics but also find that moral issues can be germane to the left–right placement of many of the region's legislators. The relative germaneness of the policies is inconsistent for legislators of the left and right. The left is more heterogeneous because moral policies are less germane to their identification. However, many centrists hold conservative economic and moral views, blurring the tie between policy and ideological positions. We confirm that contextual factors can sharpen the issue-to-ideology relationship.

While popular with voters, politicians rarely advance anticorruption policies because they can personally inconvenience them. When do the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? I explore the role of electoral incentives by leveraging original data on over 600 anticorruption initiatives introduced to state legislatures in Mexico and an overlap between two reforms—one that required states to create local anticorruption systems and one that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection. Results show that legislators with reelection incentives were more likely to advance anticorruption initiatives and more likely to comply with the creation of local anticorruption systems. Findings underscore that while anticorruption reform is often met with resistance because corruption benefits those in power, electoral incentives can generate conditions under which reform takes place.

Opposition is a core component of any democracy, yet it is scarcely studied. Leaning on research prescribing blurred lines between government and opposition in parliamentary democracies, we use word embeddings in tandem with sentiment analysis on written parliamentary questions in the Norwegian parliament to study conflict patterns between the government and opposition. Our findings consistently show that MPs of governing parties are more negative than MPs of the opposition. However, the effect is reduced considerably when the topical content of the question is included in the analysis. We attribute our finding to the existence of a participation threshold in parliamentary questions; MPs of governing parties will only ask questions whenever a given issue is sufficiently contentious.

This study analyzes whether the personality traits of Members of Parliament (MPs) affect their attitudes toward the representation of gender equality issues. Based on the Big Five personality traits, we argue that Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness shape MPs' positions toward gender equality policies through two different pathways. The first pathway proposes a direct connection. While Openness is expected to positively affect MPs' support for gender equality, Conscientiousness is assumed to have a negative impact. The second pathway runs indirectly, linking Openness and Conscientiousness to preferences toward gender equality through the effect of these personality traits on MPs' general ideological positions. Using data from a survey of elite politicians in Germany and Switzerland, the results of a causal mediation analysis show a positive direct effect of Openness that holds independent of a mediating influence of political ideology. The analysis deepens our understanding of gender equality legislation and the MPs engaging in it.

In separation of powers systems, in theory, legislative and executive branches must concur for policies to be enacted. However, empirical research, especially on Latin American cases, suggests that rather than reaching a compromise, it is common for the executive to make unilateral decisions, leaving the legislature marginalized in the policymaking process. Contrary to this trend, I argue that understanding important policy choices, including the national budget, requires considering the formal powers assigned to the president and the assembly, in interaction with their ideological divergence. Examining 12 presidential democracies for the past 20 years, I investigate the legislative majority's success in determining government expenditures under various policymaking institutions. I identify a number of institutional scenarios where legislative majorities are highly likely to succeed, while in other configurations, their success depends on their ideological divergence from the president.

Political representation can be described as a process brought about via an electoral and a perceptual path. Drawing on original survey data on the perceptual accuracy of elected representatives in Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, this study explores whether and how the two paths are connected. It shows, first, that representatives who more accurately perceive voters' opinion are more likely to be re-elected, suggesting that perceptual accuracy impacts the electoral path to representation. Second, representatives who are electorally safe hold less accurate perceptions of voters' policy preferences, meaning that the electoral path impacts the perceptual path. In all, the study provides evidence for the role of politicians' perceptual accuracy in their electoral career: voters sanction those representatives who are not sufficiently acquainted with their preferences, and representatives who fear to be voted out of office put more effort in getting acquainted with what voters want.