首页 > 最新文献

ERKENNTNIS最新文献

英文 中文
Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness 动物意识测试就是机器意识测试
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9
Leonard Dung
Abstract If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is underscored by the observation that many, if not all, putative tests of machine consciousness can be passed by non-conscious machines via ad hoc means. Second, we can identify ad hoc AI by taking inspiration from the notion of an ad hoc hypothesis in philosophy of science. Third, given the first and the second claim, the most reliable tests of animal consciousness turn out to be valid and useful positive tests of machine consciousness as well. If a non-ad hoc AI exhibits clusters of cognitive capacities facilitated by consciousness in humans which can be selectively switched off by masking and if it reproduces human behavior in suitably designed double dissociation tasks, we should treat the AI as conscious.
如果机器有了意识,我们该如何发现呢?在本文中,我对机器意识的阳性测试提出了三个相关的主张。所有这三种说法都围绕着AI可以“特别”构建的理念,也就是说,它可以在明显没有意识的情况下满足特定的意识测试。首先,提议的机器意识测试可以是合法的,即使人工智能可以特别构建来通过这个测试。观察结果强调了这一点,即许多(如果不是全部的话)假定的机器意识测试可以由无意识的机器通过特殊手段通过。其次,我们可以通过从科学哲学中的特设假设概念中获得灵感来识别特设人工智能。第三,考虑到第一种和第二种说法,对动物意识的最可靠的测试结果也是对机器意识的有效和有用的积极测试。如果一个非特定的人工智能表现出由人类意识促进的认知能力集群,可以通过掩蔽选择性地关闭,如果它在适当设计的双重分离任务中再现人类行为,我们应该将人工智能视为有意识的。
{"title":"Tests of Animal Consciousness are Tests of Machine Consciousness","authors":"Leonard Dung","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract If a machine attains consciousness, how could we find out? In this paper, I make three related claims regarding positive tests of machine consciousness. All three claims center on the idea that an AI can be constructed “ad hoc”, that is, with the purpose of satisfying a particular test of consciousness while clearly not being conscious. First, a proposed test of machine consciousness can be legitimate, even if AI can be constructed ad hoc specifically to pass this test. This is underscored by the observation that many, if not all, putative tests of machine consciousness can be passed by non-conscious machines via ad hoc means. Second, we can identify ad hoc AI by taking inspiration from the notion of an ad hoc hypothesis in philosophy of science. Third, given the first and the second claim, the most reliable tests of animal consciousness turn out to be valid and useful positive tests of machine consciousness as well. If a non-ad hoc AI exhibits clusters of cognitive capacities facilitated by consciousness in humans which can be selectively switched off by masking and if it reproduces human behavior in suitably designed double dissociation tasks, we should treat the AI as conscious.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"53 14","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134991733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold 道德地位的程度:相关性问题和门槛的需要
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9
David Wendler
{"title":"Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold","authors":"David Wendler","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"73 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134901277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How to Do Empirical Political Philosophy: A Case Study of Miller’s Argument for Needs-Based Justice 如何做经验主义政治哲学:以米勒的需求正义论为例
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7
Thomas Pölzler
Abstract In recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing.
近年来,越来越多的政治哲学家开始将他们的论点建立在经验证据的基础上。我通过实例来研究这种新颖的方法。我的案例研究的对象是大卫·米勒(David Miller)对基于需求的正义原则的最新实证论证。首先,我介绍米勒的观点。然后,我对他的方法论的应用提出了四个担忧,这些担忧对如何进行经验政治哲学提出了相应的一般性建议。这种方法的支持者应该注意(1)检查不适当的狭窄(和广泛)样本,(2)验证研究与经验假设的相关性,(3)调整他们对现有经验证据的信心,以及(4)适当地将他们的假设整合到他们的哲学理论中。
{"title":"How to Do Empirical Political Philosophy: A Case Study of Miller’s Argument for Needs-Based Justice","authors":"Thomas Pölzler","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00747-7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years an increasing number of political philosophers have begun to ground their arguments in empirical evidence. I investigate this novel approach by way of example. The object of my case study is David Miller’s renewed empirical argument for a needs-based principle of justice. First, I introduce Miller’s argument. Then I raise four worries about the application of his methodology that give rise to corresponding general recommendations for how to do empirical political philosophy. Proponents of this approach should take care to (1) check for inappropriately narrow (and broad) samples, (2) verify studies’ relevance for their empirical hypotheses, (3) adjust their confidence to the available empirical evidence, and (4) properly integrate their hypotheses into their philosophical theorizing.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"59 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134901372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Topic Transparency and Variable Sharing in Weak Relevant Logics 弱相关逻辑中的主题透明与变量共享
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6
Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, Shay Allen Logan
{"title":"Topic Transparency and Variable Sharing in Weak Relevant Logics","authors":"Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, Shay Allen Logan","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00748-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"19 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135043055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reproductive Work and Productive Fairness 生殖工作和生产公平
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y
Serena Olsaretti
Abstract In academic and public debates, defenders of the case for sharing the costs of children often claim that by having and rearing children parents produce public goods for the rest of society, or perform socially valuable or necessary labour, and that it would be unfair to parents for others to not share the costs of children, for example through publicly funded parental leave and schools for this reason. Critics of the public goods argument have claimed that it fails because there is no defensible principle that can serve to buttress the claims of parents. Furthermore, these same critics, as well as others, have argued that a certain view of liberal equality militates against sharing the costs of children.This paper challenges both the contention that there is no defensible principle of fairness that can buttress the public goods argument and the contention that liberal equality militates against socialisation. It accomplishes these two tasks together, arguing that the ideal of equality of resources, rather than militating against socialisation, in fact grounds a principle of productive fairness that can serve as the normative premise of the public goods argument for sharing the costs of children.
在学术和公共辩论中,分担孩子成本的辩护者经常声称,通过生育和抚养孩子,父母为社会其他部分生产公共产品,或从事有社会价值或必要的劳动,而其他人不分担孩子的成本对父母来说是不公平的,例如,出于这个原因,通过公共资助的育儿假和学校。公共物品论的批评者声称,它之所以失败,是因为没有可辩护的原则可以用来支持父母的主张。此外,同样是这些批评者,以及其他人,认为某种自由平等的观点不利于分担孩子的成本。本文既挑战了没有可辩护的公平原则可以支持公共产品论点的论点,也挑战了自由平等不利于社会化的论点。它同时完成了这两项任务,认为资源平等的理想,而不是阻碍社会化,实际上建立了一个生产公平的原则,可以作为分担儿童成本的公共产品论点的规范性前提。
{"title":"Reproductive Work and Productive Fairness","authors":"Serena Olsaretti","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00718-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In academic and public debates, defenders of the case for sharing the costs of children often claim that by having and rearing children parents produce public goods for the rest of society, or perform socially valuable or necessary labour, and that it would be unfair to parents for others to not share the costs of children, for example through publicly funded parental leave and schools for this reason. Critics of the public goods argument have claimed that it fails because there is no defensible principle that can serve to buttress the claims of parents. Furthermore, these same critics, as well as others, have argued that a certain view of liberal equality militates against sharing the costs of children.This paper challenges both the contention that there is no defensible principle of fairness that can buttress the public goods argument and the contention that liberal equality militates against socialisation. It accomplishes these two tasks together, arguing that the ideal of equality of resources, rather than militating against socialisation, in fact grounds a principle of productive fairness that can serve as the normative premise of the public goods argument for sharing the costs of children.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"2 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135041825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Logical Instrumentalism and Anti-exceptionalism about Logic 逻辑的工具主义与反例外论
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w
Leon Commandeur
Abstract This paper critically examines logical instrumentalism as it has been put forth recently in the anti-exceptionalism about logic debate. I will argue that if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, as the anti-exceptionalists have it, then logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. The reason for this, I will argue, is that as the position currently stands, first, it reduces to a trivial claim about the instrumental value of logical systems, and second, by its denial that logic aims to account for extra-systemic phenomena it significantly differs from science, in contrast with the AEL agenda. I will conclude by proposing a different kind of logical instrumentalism that I take to have a broad appeal, but especially for anti-exceptionalists, for it is developed as analogous to—and thus much closer aligned with—scientific instrumentalism.
摘要本文对近年来在反例外论的逻辑论争中提出的逻辑工具主义进行了批判性的考察。我要说的是,如果一个人希望支持逻辑与科学非常相似的说法,就像反例外论者所认为的那样,那么逻辑工具主义就不可能是以前的作者所认为的那样。我认为,其原因在于,就目前的立场而言,首先,它简化为一个关于逻辑系统的工具价值的琐碎主张,其次,通过否认逻辑旨在解释系统外现象,它与科学有很大的不同,与AEL议程相反。最后,我将提出一种不同的逻辑工具主义,我认为它具有广泛的吸引力,尤其是对反例外论者来说,因为它的发展类似于科学工具主义,因此更接近于科学工具主义。
{"title":"Logical Instrumentalism and Anti-exceptionalism about Logic","authors":"Leon Commandeur","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00752-w","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper critically examines logical instrumentalism as it has been put forth recently in the anti-exceptionalism about logic debate. I will argue that if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, as the anti-exceptionalists have it, then logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. The reason for this, I will argue, is that as the position currently stands, first, it reduces to a trivial claim about the instrumental value of logical systems, and second, by its denial that logic aims to account for extra-systemic phenomena it significantly differs from science, in contrast with the AEL agenda. I will conclude by proposing a different kind of logical instrumentalism that I take to have a broad appeal, but especially for anti-exceptionalists, for it is developed as analogous to—and thus much closer aligned with—scientific instrumentalism.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"43 8","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135476026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency 不可知论——涉及自相矛盾的不一致
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9
Avery Archer
{"title":"Agnosticism-Involving Doxastic Inconsistency","authors":"Avery Archer","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00745-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"15 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135678971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism 不透明的基础和基础还原论
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-11-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y
Henrik Rydéhn
Abstract This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding , a form of grounding which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard cases. I then argue that certain important and interesting views in metaphysics are committed to there being cases of opaque grounding and demonstrate that four representative accounts of grounding available in the literature are unable to accommodate such cases. This is argued to constitute a problem for those accounts that is likely to extend to other possible reductive accounts of grounding that employ the popular strategy of explaining grounding in terms of other hyperintensional phenomena. Unless the reductionist is willing to opt for some sophisticated modalist account, the possibility of opaque grounding cases thus provides indirect support for primitivism about grounding, a view that has previously been widely embraced but rarely supported by argument.
摘要本文旨在探讨一个被忽视的问题,即形而上学的基础——一个事实的获得与另一个事实(或其他事实)的获得之间的关系——是否可以给予还原性的解释。我介绍了形而上学上不透明的基础的概念,这种基础的形式与标准情况相比,构成了一种不那么形而上学的亲密联系。然后,我认为形而上学中某些重要而有趣的观点致力于存在不透明基础的情况,并证明了文献中关于基础的四种代表性描述无法适应这种情况。有人认为,这对那些可能延伸到其他可能的基础还原解释构成了一个问题,这些解释采用了用其他高内涵现象来解释基础的流行策略。除非还原论者愿意选择一些复杂的情态论的解释,否则不透明的接地情况的可能性就为关于接地的原始主义提供了间接的支持,这种观点以前被广泛接受,但很少得到论证的支持。
{"title":"Opaque Grounding and Grounding Reductionism","authors":"Henrik Rydéhn","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00750-y","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article aims to contribute to the largely neglected issue of whether metaphysical grounding – the relation of one fact’s obtaining in virtue of the obtaining of some other (or others) – can be given a reductive account. I introduce the notion of metaphysically opaque grounding , a form of grounding which constitutes a less metaphysically intimate connection than in standard cases. I then argue that certain important and interesting views in metaphysics are committed to there being cases of opaque grounding and demonstrate that four representative accounts of grounding available in the literature are unable to accommodate such cases. This is argued to constitute a problem for those accounts that is likely to extend to other possible reductive accounts of grounding that employ the popular strategy of explaining grounding in terms of other hyperintensional phenomena. Unless the reductionist is willing to opt for some sophisticated modalist account, the possibility of opaque grounding cases thus provides indirect support for primitivism about grounding, a view that has previously been widely embraced but rarely supported by argument.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence 纠正:认识上的指责与证据的规范性
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x
Sebastian Schmidt
{"title":"Correction: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence","authors":"Sebastian Schmidt","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00743-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"198 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136159304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums 科学自由,道德批评,错误的代价
2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1
Tim Henning
Abstract This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth. Furthermore, I accept the anti-moralistic view that (non-)conformity with moral ideals is never itself evidence. On the other hand, the article nevertheless argues that there is a possibility of legitimate moral criticism of moral claims. This argument relies on the popular (if controversial) idea that there is pragmatic encroachment – specifically, the idea that the standard of sufficiency for evidence is in part determined by pragmatic factors like the costs of error. This opens up the door for a certain type of legitimate moral criticism. For the costs that determine a standard of sufficiency for epistemic justification can also plausibly count as morally significant. There is thus a con-contingent connection between epistemic and moral defects of certain scientific claims. The resulting view is applied to concrete debates, most importantly about race, genetics and IQ.
摘要本文试图对当前公共辩论中两种相互矛盾的观点进行公正的评价。一方面,它捍卫了一种强有力的科学自由,根据这种自由,科学应该是自由的,不仅不受外部障碍和压力的影响,而且不受基于“错误原因”的批评的影响。我认为,在关于科学主张的辩论中,唯一可以接受的标准是,是否有足够的证据证明其真实性。此外,我接受反道德主义的观点,即(不)符合道德理想本身从来不是证据。另一方面,这篇文章仍然认为,对道德主张进行合理的道德批评是可能的。这一论点依赖于一种流行的(如果有争议的)观点,即存在实用主义侵占——具体来说,证据的充分性标准在一定程度上是由诸如错误成本之类的实用主义因素决定的。这为某种类型的合法道德批评打开了大门。因为决定认识论证明的充分性标准的成本也可能被认为具有道德意义。因此,在某些科学主张的认知缺陷和道德缺陷之间存在着一种偶然的联系。由此产生的观点被应用到具体的辩论中,最重要的是关于种族、基因和智商的辩论。
{"title":"Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums","authors":"Tim Henning","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00715-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article attempts to do justice to two conflicting positions in current public debates. On the one hand, it defends a strong version of scientific freedom, according to which science should be free, not only from external obstacles and pressures but also from criticism that is based on reasons “of the wrong kind.” The only admissible criterion in debates about scientific claims, I argue, is whether there is sufficient evidence for their truth. Furthermore, I accept the anti-moralistic view that (non-)conformity with moral ideals is never itself evidence. On the other hand, the article nevertheless argues that there is a possibility of legitimate moral criticism of moral claims. This argument relies on the popular (if controversial) idea that there is pragmatic encroachment – specifically, the idea that the standard of sufficiency for evidence is in part determined by pragmatic factors like the costs of error. This opens up the door for a certain type of legitimate moral criticism. For the costs that determine a standard of sufficiency for epistemic justification can also plausibly count as morally significant. There is thus a con-contingent connection between epistemic and moral defects of certain scientific claims. The resulting view is applied to concrete debates, most importantly about race, genetics and IQ.","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135918510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
ERKENNTNIS
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1