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On the Top-Down Argument for the Ability to Do Otherwise. 自上而下论证 "不这样做的能力"。
IF 0.8 2区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-11-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00638-3
Leonhard Menges

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work.

自上而下论证 "做其他事情的能力 "的目的是，在与自由意志辩论相关的意义上，确定人类可以做其他事情。它包括两个前提：第一，我们总是需要通过查阅我们在相关领域的最佳科学理论来回答某种现象（比如 "做其他事情的能力"）是否存在的问题。其次，我们关于人类行为的最佳科学理论的前提是人类能够以其他方式行事。本文认为，这不足以确立结论。自上而下论证支持人类在某种意义上可以不这么做。但它并没有证明人类在与自由意志辩论相关的意义上可以不这么做。本文随后指出，使论证成立的看似最好的方法并不奏效。
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引用次数: 0
One Heresy and One Orthodoxy: On Dialetheism, Dimathematism, and the Non-normativity of Logic. 一个异端和一个正统：论 Dialetheism、Dimathematism 和逻辑的非规范性。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-03-09 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00528-8
Heinrich Wansing

In this paper, Graham Priest's understanding of dialetheism, the view that there exist true contradictions, is discussed, and various kinds of metaphysical dialetheism are distinguished between. An alternative to dialetheism is presented, namely a thesis called 'dimathematism'. It is pointed out that dimathematism enables one to escape a slippery slope argument for dialetheism that has been put forward by Priest. Moreover, dimathematism is presented as a thesis that is helpful in rejecting the claim that logic is a normative discipline.

本文讨论了格雷厄姆-普里斯特对 "二律背反"（即存在真正矛盾的观点）的理解，并区分了各种形而上学的 "二律背反"。他还提出了拨神论的替代方案，即 "二律背反论"。论文指出，二律背反论使人们摆脱了普利斯特为辩证神论提出的滑坡论证。此外，"二律背反论 "还有助于驳斥逻辑学是一门规范性学科的说法。
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引用次数: 0
In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance. 为 "无知的规范性解释 "辩护。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-06-26 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7
Anne Meylan

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard's alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

关于无知的标准观点认为，无知仅仅是缺乏知识或真实信念。邓肯-普里查德（Duncan Pritchard）最近反驳了这一标准观点，认为无知是由于不恰当的探究而导致的知识/真实信念的缺乏。我将把普里查德的另一种说法称为 "规范说"。本文的目的是通过提供支持规范说的独立论据来加强规范说。
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引用次数: 0
A Higher-Order Account of the Phenomenology of Particularity 关于特殊性现象学的高级论述
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00764-6
Jacob Berger
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引用次数: 0
The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence 作为对应物的真理的实际意义
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00765-5
Tom Kaspers
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引用次数: 0
Interrogatives, inquiries, and exam questions 询问、调查和考试问题
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-16 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00758-4
Grzegorz Gaszczyk
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引用次数: 0
Why are Actions but not Emotions Done Intentionally, if both are Reason-Responsive Embodied Processes? 既然行为和情感都是理性反应的体现过程，为什么行为是有意为之，而情感不是？
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00756-6
Anders Nes
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引用次数: 0
Spectral Reflectances and Commensurateness 光谱反射率和相似性
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00762-8
William A. Sharp
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引用次数: 0
The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement 道德理由与道德要求之间的关系
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00755-7
Brendan de Kenessey
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引用次数: 0
Conceivability, Kripkean Identity, and S5: A Reply to Jonathon VandenHombergh 可设想性、克里普克同一性和 S5：对 Jonathon VandenHombergh 的答复
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities
ERKENNTNIS
Pub Date : 2023-12-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00759-3
Peter Marton
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引用次数: 0
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