Pub Date : 2024-01-22DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00773-5
James Turner
{"title":"Bad Feelings, Best Explanations: In Defence of the Propitiousness Theory of the Low Mood System","authors":"James Turner","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00773-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00773-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139607192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-17DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00772-6
Fridolin Gross
{"title":"The Explanatory Role of Machine Learning in Molecular Biology","authors":"Fridolin Gross","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00772-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00772-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139617480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-15DOI: 10.1007/s10670-023-00769-1
Brentyn J. Ramm
{"title":"How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie","authors":"Brentyn J. Ramm","doi":"10.1007/s10670-023-00769-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00769-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139623533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-08-07DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00605-y
Tim Räz, Claus Beisbart
Some machine learning models, in particular deep neural networks (DNNs), are not very well understood; nevertheless, they are frequently used in science. Does this lack of understanding pose a problem for using DNNs to understand empirical phenomena? Emily Sullivan has recently argued that understanding with DNNs is not limited by our lack of understanding of DNNs themselves. In the present paper, we will argue, contra Sullivan, that our current lack of understanding of DNNs does limit our ability to understand with DNNs. Sullivan's claim hinges on which notion of understanding is at play. If we employ a weak notion of understanding, then her claim is tenable, but rather weak. If, however, we employ a strong notion of understanding, particularly explanatory understanding, then her claim is not tenable.
{"title":"The Importance of Understanding Deep Learning.","authors":"Tim Räz, Claus Beisbart","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00605-y","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-022-00605-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some machine learning models, in particular deep neural networks (DNNs), are not very well understood; nevertheless, they are frequently used in science. Does this lack of understanding pose a problem for using DNNs to understand empirical phenomena? Emily Sullivan has recently argued that understanding with DNNs is not limited by our lack of understanding of DNNs themselves. In the present paper, we will argue, <i>contra</i> Sullivan, that our current lack of understanding of DNNs does limit our ability to understand with DNNs. Sullivan's claim hinges on which notion of understanding is at play. If we employ a weak notion of understanding, then her claim is tenable, but rather weak. If, however, we employ a strong notion of understanding, particularly explanatory understanding, then her claim is not tenable.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11090801/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74087474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-08-27DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00589-9
Brett Topey
The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence-i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty-is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment of the evolution of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn't the response to higher-order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy.
{"title":"Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.","authors":"Brett Topey","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00589-9","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-022-00589-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The thesis that agents should <i>calibrate</i> their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence-i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty-is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain <i>steadfast</i> in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment of the evolution of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn't the response to higher-order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11014817/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87164866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-07-29DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00591-1
Lisa Vogt, Jonas Werner
The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa (Analysis 72(3):455-457, 2012) and Smith (Erkenntnis 84(1):41-55, 2019) to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn (Analysis 69(1):27-31, 2009a, Philos Q 59(235):193-201, 2009b). However, neither Weak Unrestricted Composition alone nor the different variants of it that have been proposed in the literature can provide us with a satisfying answer to the special composition question, or so we will argue. We will then go on to explore an alternative family of purely mereological rules in the vicinity of Weak Unrestricted Composition, Cardinal Composition: A plurality of pairwise non-overlapping objects composes an object iff the objects in the plurality are of cardinality smaller than . As we will show, all the instances for infinite s determine fusion and are compatible with junk, and every instance for a is furthermore compatible with gunk and dense chains of parthood.
{"title":"Cardinal Composition.","authors":"Lisa Vogt, Jonas Werner","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00591-1","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-022-00591-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa (Analysis 72(3):455-457, 2012) and Smith (Erkenntnis 84(1):41-55, 2019) to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn (Analysis 69(1):27-31, 2009a, Philos Q 59(235):193-201, 2009b). However, neither Weak Unrestricted Composition alone nor the different variants of it that have been proposed in the literature can provide us with a satisfying answer to the special composition question, or so we will argue. We will then go on to explore an alternative family of purely mereological rules in the vicinity of Weak Unrestricted Composition, Cardinal Composition: A plurality of pairwise non-overlapping objects composes an object iff the objects in the plurality are of cardinality smaller than <math><mi>κ</mi></math>. As we will show, all the instances for infinite <math><mi>κ</mi></math>s determine fusion and are compatible with junk, and every instance for a <math><mrow><mi>κ</mi><mo>></mo><msub><mi>ℵ</mi><mn>0</mn></msub></mrow></math> is furthermore compatible with gunk and dense chains of parthood.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11014879/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76863949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-06-21DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8
Feraz Azhar, Alan H Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo
In Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.
{"title":"A Bayesian View on the Dr. Evil Scenario.","authors":"Feraz Azhar, Alan H Guth, Mohammad Hossein Namjoo","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00536-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In <i>Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief</i>, Adam Elga proposes and defends a principle of indifference for self-locating beliefs: if an individual is confident that his world contains more than one individual who is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from his own, then he should assign equal credences to the hypotheses that he is any one of these individuals. Through a sequence of thought experiments, Elga in effect claims that he can derive the credence function that should apply in such situations, thus justifying his principle of indifference. Here we argue, using a Bayesian approach, that Elga's reasoning is circular: in analyzing the third of his thought experiments, he uses an assertion that is justifiable only if one assumes, from the start, the principle of indifference that he is attempting to justify. We agree with Elga that the assumption of equal credences is a very reasonable principle, in the absence of any reason to assign unequal credences, but we do not agree that the equality of credences can be so derived.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10827816/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139674055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-03-02DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00523-z
Marvin Mathony, Michael Messerli
In the last seven years, philosophers have discussed the topic of transformative experiences. In this paper, we contribute to a crucial issue that is currently under-researched: transformative experiences' influence on cognitive modelling. We argue that cognitive modelling can be operationalized as affective forecasting, and we compare transformative and non-transformative experiences with respect to the ability of affective forecasting. Our finding is that decision-makers' performance in cognitively modelling transformative experiences does not systematically differ from decision-makers' performance in cognitively modelling non-transformative experiences. This claim stands in strict opposition to L.A. Paul's main argument.
在过去的七年里,哲学家们讨论了变革性体验这一话题。在本文中,我们将探讨一个目前研究不足的重要问题:变革性体验对认知建模的影响。我们认为,认知建模可操作化为情感预测,并就情感预测能力对变革性体验和非变革性体验进行了比较。我们的发现是,决策者在对变革性体验进行认知建模时的表现与决策者在对非变革性体验进行认知建模时的表现并无系统性差异。这一观点与 L.A. Paul 的主要论点完全相反。
{"title":"Transformative Experiences, Cognitive Modelling and Affective Forecasting.","authors":"Marvin Mathony, Michael Messerli","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00523-z","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-022-00523-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In the last seven years, philosophers have discussed the topic of transformative experiences. In this paper, we contribute to a crucial issue that is currently under-researched: transformative experiences' influence on cognitive modelling. We argue that cognitive modelling can be operationalized as affective forecasting, and we compare transformative and non-transformative experiences with respect to the ability of affective forecasting. Our finding is that decision-makers' performance in cognitively modelling transformative experiences does not systematically differ from decision-makers' performance in cognitively modelling non-transformative experiences. This claim stands in strict opposition to L.A. Paul's main argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10827997/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88687458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-05-11DOI: 10.1007/s10670-022-00537-7
Lorenzo Casini, Jürgen Landes
Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models can confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances.
{"title":"Confirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account.","authors":"Lorenzo Casini, Jürgen Landes","doi":"10.1007/s10670-022-00537-7","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10670-022-00537-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models <i>can</i> confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances.</p>","PeriodicalId":47741,"journal":{"name":"ERKENNTNIS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10827917/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89417348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}