{"title":"Metaphysical Animals: How Four Women Brought Philosophy Back to Life","authors":"Peter West","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48214064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Women Are Up to Something: How Elisabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics","authors":"Peter West","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad010","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47059842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot.
{"title":"ON LIVING THE TESTIMONIAL SCEPTIC’S LIFE: CAN TESTIMONIAL SCEPTICISM BE DISMISSED?","authors":"Arnon Keren","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Within the contemporary epistemology of testimony, it is widely assumed that testimonial scepticism can be dismissed without engaging with possible reasons or arguments supporting the view. This assumption of dismissibility both underlies the debate between reductionist and non-reductionist views of testimony and is responsible for the neglect of testimonial scepticism within contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that even given liberal assumptions about what may constitute valid grounds for the dismissal of a sceptical view, the assumption that testimonial scepticism is dismissible should be rejected. For even if familiar sceptical positions and scepticism about testimonial justification can be dismissed on such grounds, scepticism about testimonial knowledge cannot.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135260869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joseph Raz died last year. Sadly, then, this collection of essays, some previously published, and some unpublished, may stand as his last contribution to philosophy. So, it is very good to be able to say that they exemplify his strength and originality as a moral philosopher: his wisdom, care in working through an argument, suspicion of merely fashionable claims, and intentness in arriving in his own way at his own view. Of course, they are not extended studies but essays on various moral subjects, so they sometimes touch only cursorily on a topic, and throw out ideas that are left undeveloped. Raz often works through a kind of linguistic phenomenology. As Ulrike Heuer says, in her helpful introduction, his work is guided by a methodological assumption: the aim of much of philosophy, and, at any rate, his, is to elucidate practices and concepts as we find and already understand them. (p. 1)
{"title":"The Roots of Normativity","authors":"John Skorupski","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad007","url":null,"abstract":"Joseph Raz died last year. Sadly, then, this collection of essays, some previously published, and some unpublished, may stand as his last contribution to philosophy. So, it is very good to be able to say that they exemplify his strength and originality as a moral philosopher: his wisdom, care in working through an argument, suspicion of merely fashionable claims, and intentness in arriving in his own way at his own view. Of course, they are not extended studies but essays on various moral subjects, so they sometimes touch only cursorily on a topic, and throw out ideas that are left undeveloped. Raz often works through a kind of linguistic phenomenology. As Ulrike Heuer says, in her helpful introduction, his work is guided by a methodological assumption: the aim of much of philosophy, and, at any rate, his, is to elucidate practices and concepts as we find and already understand them. (p. 1)","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135489578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There's a recurrent divide among philosophical views about science—those focused on practice vs those focused on metaphysics, assertions of pluralism vs assertions of realism, and accounts of how science's history could have gone otherwise vs accounts of how science achieves knowledge. Michela Massimi's Perspectival Realism (2022) is ultimately a bridging project, aiming to cross this divide. The project is to recruit resources from perspectivism, a kind of pluralism about science, to show how science achieves knowledge and, thus, to inform a scientific realism compatible with this pluralism. A bridging project like Massimi pursues is deeply appealing. This broad divide between a philosophical focus on the messy details of science and a philosophical focus on what science achieves recurs, I think, because philosophers are more or less united in our desire to accommodate both focuses. Massimi's Perspectival Realism positions itself to do justice to both focuses and ultimately transcend the divide. Along the way, it is incredibly expansive in the philosophical questions and philosophical work it engages with. The book is also rich with historical case studies, as well as artistic and literary references. For these reasons, my review will undoubtedly be partial and limited, reflecting my own philosophical interests, limitations, and blind spots. Indeed, this book is expansive and ambitious enough that it may need to be read perspectivally.
{"title":"Critical Notice","authors":"Angela Potochnik","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad005","url":null,"abstract":"There's a recurrent divide among philosophical views about science—those focused on practice vs those focused on metaphysics, assertions of pluralism vs assertions of realism, and accounts of how science's history could have gone otherwise vs accounts of how science achieves knowledge. Michela Massimi's Perspectival Realism (2022) is ultimately a bridging project, aiming to cross this divide. The project is to recruit resources from perspectivism, a kind of pluralism about science, to show how science achieves knowledge and, thus, to inform a scientific realism compatible with this pluralism. A bridging project like Massimi pursues is deeply appealing. This broad divide between a philosophical focus on the messy details of science and a philosophical focus on what science achieves recurs, I think, because philosophers are more or less united in our desire to accommodate both focuses. Massimi's Perspectival Realism positions itself to do justice to both focuses and ultimately transcend the divide. Along the way, it is incredibly expansive in the philosophical questions and philosophical work it engages with. The book is also rich with historical case studies, as well as artistic and literary references. For these reasons, my review will undoubtedly be partial and limited, reflecting my own philosophical interests, limitations, and blind spots. Indeed, this book is expansive and ambitious enough that it may need to be read perspectivally.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135793919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Should we use the same standard of proof to adjudicate guilt for murder and petty theft? Why not tailor the standard of proof to the crime? These relatively neglected questions cut to the heart of central issues in the philosophy of law. This paper scrutinises whether we ought to use the same standard for all criminal cases, in contrast with a flexible approach that uses different standards for different crimes. I reject consequentialist arguments for a radically flexible standard of proof, instead defending a modestly flexible approach on non-consequentialist grounds. The system I defend is one on which we should impose a higher standard of proof for crimes that attract more severe punishments. This proposal, although apparently revisionary, accords with a plausible theory concerning the epistemology of legal judgments and the role they play in society.
{"title":"CRIMINAL PROOF: FIXED OR FLEXIBLE?","authors":"Lewis D. Ross","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Should we use the same standard of proof to adjudicate guilt for murder and petty theft? Why not tailor the standard of proof to the crime? These relatively neglected questions cut to the heart of central issues in the philosophy of law. This paper scrutinises whether we ought to use the same standard for all criminal cases, in contrast with a flexible approach that uses different standards for different crimes. I reject consequentialist arguments for a radically flexible standard of proof, instead defending a modestly flexible approach on non-consequentialist grounds. The system I defend is one on which we should impose a higher standard of proof for crimes that attract more severe punishments. This proposal, although apparently revisionary, accords with a plausible theory concerning the epistemology of legal judgments and the role they play in society.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44722221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.
Giovanni Merlo认为，目前流行的一种解释Kit Fine关于紧张事实的碎片主义(他称之为“非结构化碎片主义”)的方法受到了“紧张信念爆炸”问题的威胁。我认为，这种信仰的爆发对非结构化的碎片主义者没有任何问题。
{"title":"Don’t Stop Believing: Fragmentalism and the Problem of Tensed Belief Explosion","authors":"Roberto Loss","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Giovanni Merlo has argued that a currently popular way to interpret Kit Fine's fragmentalism about tensed facts (which he calls ‘unstructured fragmentalism’) is threatened by the problem of ‘tensed belief explosion’. I argue that such an explosion of belief poses no problem to unstructured fragmentalists.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136043624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As its name implies, Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick gestures to Terrence Malick's ongoing interest in the philosophical qualities of transcendence in cinema. But moreover, this reference—quoted from the character Franziska Jägerstätter (Valerie Pachner) in Malick's A Hidden Life (2019)—also signals a continuing intellectual inquiry into Malick's stirring, provocative, and often puzzling cinematic work. In response to Malick's increased output of films, beginning in the early 2010s until now, many commentators have brought more scholarly attention to his work. Steven DeLay's expansive collection of essays in this anthology proves that the subject of Malick is far from exhausted, and continues to affirm this filmmaker as an arousing artist of aesthetic, philosophical, and cinematic intrigue. DeLay's impressive collection contains nineteen essays from over twenty contributors from a variety of philosophical, theological, literary, and poetic perspectives. While Malick is famously regarded for his early education in philosophy, and there has been much written already on the inherent philosophical themes throughout his filmography, Life Above the Clouds stands, perhaps unexpectedly, as a progressive and expanding addition to the current scholarship. Moreover, the book harbours a larger body of contributors in a single text than any prior substantial publication on Malick.
{"title":"Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick","authors":"M Sellers Johnson","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad004","url":null,"abstract":"As its name implies, Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick gestures to Terrence Malick's ongoing interest in the philosophical qualities of transcendence in cinema. But moreover, this reference—quoted from the character Franziska Jägerstätter (Valerie Pachner) in Malick's A Hidden Life (2019)—also signals a continuing intellectual inquiry into Malick's stirring, provocative, and often puzzling cinematic work. In response to Malick's increased output of films, beginning in the early 2010s until now, many commentators have brought more scholarly attention to his work. Steven DeLay's expansive collection of essays in this anthology proves that the subject of Malick is far from exhausted, and continues to affirm this filmmaker as an arousing artist of aesthetic, philosophical, and cinematic intrigue. DeLay's impressive collection contains nineteen essays from over twenty contributors from a variety of philosophical, theological, literary, and poetic perspectives. While Malick is famously regarded for his early education in philosophy, and there has been much written already on the inherent philosophical themes throughout his filmography, Life Above the Clouds stands, perhaps unexpectedly, as a progressive and expanding addition to the current scholarship. Moreover, the book harbours a larger body of contributors in a single text than any prior substantial publication on Malick.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136197404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Why We Hate: Understanding the Roots of Human Conflict Get access Why We Hate: Understanding the Roots of Human Conflict. By Michael Ruse. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xv + 320. Price $24.95.) David Villena David Villena Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 918–920, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac085 Published: 09 January 2023
期刊文章我们为什么恨:理解人类冲突的根源获取我们为什么恨:理解人类冲突的根源。作者:Michael Ruse。(牛津:牛津大学，2022年。Pp. xv + 320。价格24.95美元。)David Villena香港大学哲学系David Villena香港搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，第73卷，第3期，2023年7月，918-920页，https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac085出版:2023年1月9日
{"title":"Why We Hate: Understanding the Roots of Human Conflict","authors":"David Villena","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqac085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac085","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Why We Hate: Understanding the Roots of Human Conflict Get access Why We Hate: Understanding the Roots of Human Conflict. By Michael Ruse. (Oxford: OUP, 2022. Pp. xv + 320. Price $24.95.) David Villena David Villena Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 918–920, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac085 Published: 09 January 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135014940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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