{"title":"Spying Through a Glass Darkly","authors":"Michael Skerker","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61098288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"On Believing: Being Right in a World of Possibilities","authors":"Simon Wimmer","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48418398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that what speakers mean or express can be determined by their implicit or unconscious states, rather than explicit or conscious states. Further, on this basis, I show that the sincerity conditions for utterances can also be fixed by implicit states. This is a surprising result, which goes against common assumptions about speech acts and sincerity. Roughly, I argue that the result is implied by two plausible and independent theories of the metaphysics of speaker meaning and, further, that this is a robust basis on which to make an inference, with a fair degree of confidence, about the relationship between expression and implicit attitudes.
{"title":"How to Express Implicit Attitudes","authors":"E. Unnsteinsson","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I argue that what speakers mean or express can be determined by their implicit or unconscious states, rather than explicit or conscious states. Further, on this basis, I show that the sincerity conditions for utterances can also be fixed by implicit states. This is a surprising result, which goes against common assumptions about speech acts and sincerity. Roughly, I argue that the result is implied by two plausible and independent theories of the metaphysics of speaker meaning and, further, that this is a robust basis on which to make an inference, with a fair degree of confidence, about the relationship between expression and implicit attitudes.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47278413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental.
{"title":"Can We have Justified Beliefs about Fundamental Properties?","authors":"D. Bradley","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An attractive picture of the world is that some features are metaphysically fundamental and others are derivative, with the derivative features grounded in the fundamental features. But how do we have justified beliefs about which features are fundamental? What is the epistemology of fundamentality? I sketch a response in this paper. The guiding idea is that the same properties cause the same experiences. I argue that a probabilistic connection between epistemic fundamentality and metaphysical fundamentality is sufficient for justified beliefs about the metaphysically fundamental.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44376254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization Get access Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization. By Michael E. Bratman (New York: OUP, 2022. Pp. xxii + 257. Price £19.99.) Miguel Garcia-Godinez Miguel Garcia-Godinez University College Cork, Ireland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 837–840, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad017 Published: 22 February 2023
共享与制度代理:走向人类实践组织的规划理论迈克尔·布拉特曼(Michael E. Bratman)著(纽约:OUP, 2022)。第22 + 257页。价格£19.99)。Miguel Garcia-Godinez Miguel Garcia-Godinez University College Cork, Ireland搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，第73卷，第3期，2023年7月，第837-840页，https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad017出版:2023年2月22日
{"title":"Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization","authors":"Miguel Garcia-Godinez","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad017","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization Get access Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization. By Michael E. Bratman (New York: OUP, 2022. Pp. xxii + 257. Price £19.99.) Miguel Garcia-Godinez Miguel Garcia-Godinez University College Cork, Ireland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 837–840, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad017 Published: 22 February 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136275248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article The Conceptual Foundation of Morality Get access The Conceptual Foundation of Morality. By Gal Yehezkel (Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. x + 156. Price £79.99.) Regan Lance Reitsma Regan Lance Reitsma King's College, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 889–892, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad018 Published: 22 February 2023
{"title":"The Conceptual Foundation of Morality","authors":"Regan Lance Reitsma","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad018","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article The Conceptual Foundation of Morality Get access The Conceptual Foundation of Morality. By Gal Yehezkel (Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. x + 156. Price £79.99.) Regan Lance Reitsma Regan Lance Reitsma King's College, USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 73, Issue 3, July 2023, Pages 889–892, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad018 Published: 22 February 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136275263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field—a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience—possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Accommodating this justification in turn requires recognising a new way for visual experience to encode information about the world. Reflection upon the epistemic contribution of sensory experience's structural features thus forces us to revise our understanding of how perception, cognition, and the world fit together.
{"title":"On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure","authors":"Dominic Alford-Duguid","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Our awareness of the boundedness of the spatial sensory field—a paradigmatic structural feature of visual experience—possesses a distinctive epistemic role. Properly understood, this result undermines a widely assumed picture of how visual experience permits us to learn about the world. This paper defends an alternative picture in which visual experience provides at least two kinds of non-inferential justification for beliefs about the external world. Accommodating this justification in turn requires recognising a new way for visual experience to encode information about the world. Reflection upon the epistemic contribution of sensory experience's structural features thus forces us to revise our understanding of how perception, cognition, and the world fit together.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44891604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar overarching concerns and conclusions. Thus, Chapter 1 offers not only an analysis of the self, but also defends its introspective powers, its capacity for freewill, and its immateriality. Chapter 2 diverges somewhat from Cartesian themes; it rebuts two arguments for ‘ulterior selves’, that is, for the view that material objects are composed of selves (a view that Nathan associates with panpsychism). But Chapters 3 and 4 return to distinctly Cartesian issues, offering a cosmological argument for the existence of (something like) a god, and explaining how the account of selves bears on the possibility of post-mortem existence. Naturally, Nathan is not simply repeating Descartes or his scholastic influences. Written after the ‘metaphysical turn’ (instituted by David Lewis, David Armstrong, etc.), Nathan's book can be seen instead as a significant, 21st-century ‘update’ to a Cartesian-scholastic view.
{"title":"A Map of Selves: Beyond Philosophy of Mind","authors":"T Parent","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad014","url":null,"abstract":"In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar overarching concerns and conclusions. Thus, Chapter 1 offers not only an analysis of the self, but also defends its introspective powers, its capacity for freewill, and its immateriality. Chapter 2 diverges somewhat from Cartesian themes; it rebuts two arguments for ‘ulterior selves’, that is, for the view that material objects are composed of selves (a view that Nathan associates with panpsychism). But Chapters 3 and 4 return to distinctly Cartesian issues, offering a cosmological argument for the existence of (something like) a god, and explaining how the account of selves bears on the possibility of post-mortem existence. Naturally, Nathan is not simply repeating Descartes or his scholastic influences. Written after the ‘metaphysical turn’ (instituted by David Lewis, David Armstrong, etc.), Nathan's book can be seen instead as a significant, 21st-century ‘update’ to a Cartesian-scholastic view.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135473747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since E.J. Lowe's premature passing, there has been a growing interest in Lowe scholarship, reflecting on and discussing the influence of his work on other figures as well as exploring various aspects of his own (often highly systematic) views. This book is a contribution to this emerging field of interest, focused on selected themes in Lowe's metaphysics and ontology (broadly conceived). The chapters in the book cover a wide range of topics, as befitting the wide range of metaphysical issues that Lowe himself engaged with. Split into four parts, most of the chapters are valuable contributions to their respective literatures, and those working in the relevant areas interested in Lowe's work will gain from reading and engaging with them. In some chapters, the connection with Lowe's work is weaker or harder to discern. These chapters, though often interesting in their own rights, will offer less to a reader who picks this volume up as a way into, or as a further discussion of, Lowe's work.
{"title":"E.J. Lowe and Ontology","authors":"J T M Miller","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad013","url":null,"abstract":"Since E.J. Lowe's premature passing, there has been a growing interest in Lowe scholarship, reflecting on and discussing the influence of his work on other figures as well as exploring various aspects of his own (often highly systematic) views. This book is a contribution to this emerging field of interest, focused on selected themes in Lowe's metaphysics and ontology (broadly conceived). The chapters in the book cover a wide range of topics, as befitting the wide range of metaphysical issues that Lowe himself engaged with. Split into four parts, most of the chapters are valuable contributions to their respective literatures, and those working in the relevant areas interested in Lowe's work will gain from reading and engaging with them. In some chapters, the connection with Lowe's work is weaker or harder to discern. These chapters, though often interesting in their own rights, will offer less to a reader who picks this volume up as a way into, or as a further discussion of, Lowe's work.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135727310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the accounts. We then address the promise to explain why the conditions that render one blameworthy are as they are. According to proponents, these conditions render one blameworthy because they render fitting the selected emotion. But why do just these conditions do the latter? We find no good answer to this question from proponents of the accounts. While we do not contend that blameworthiness is response-independent, we are unconvinced that it is response-dependent.
{"title":"Blameworthiness and Dependence","authors":"Randolph Clarke, P. Rawling","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Some recent accounts of blameworthiness present this property as response-dependent: an agent is blameworthy, they say, if and only if, and (if so) in virtue of the fact that, it is fitting to respond to her with a certain blaming emotion. Given the explanatory aim of these views, the selected emotion cannot be said simply to appraise its object as blameworthy. We argue that articulation of the appraisal in other terms suggested by proponents yields a failure of the coextension required by the accounts. We then address the promise to explain why the conditions that render one blameworthy are as they are. According to proponents, these conditions render one blameworthy because they render fitting the selected emotion. But why do just these conditions do the latter? We find no good answer to this question from proponents of the accounts. While we do not contend that blameworthiness is response-independent, we are unconvinced that it is response-dependent.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46300187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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