Journal Article Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy Get access Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy. By Evert van der Zweerde. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2022. Pp. xx + 245. Price $85.00.) Punsara Amarasinghe Punsara Amarasinghe Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Italy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad083, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad083 Published: 11 September 2023 Article history Received: 21 August 2023 Published: 11 September 2023
期刊文章俄罗斯政治哲学:无政府状态，权威，专制获取俄罗斯政治哲学:无政府状态，权威，专制。作者:Evert van der Zweerde(爱丁堡:爱丁堡大学出版社，2022。Pp. xx + 245。价格85.00美元。)Punsara Amarasinghe Punsara Amarasinghe意大利圣安娜高等学校(Scuola Superiore Sant Anna)搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者哲学季刊，pqad083, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad083出版日期:2023年9月11日文章历史收稿日期:2023年8月21日出版日期:2023年9月11日
{"title":"Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy","authors":"Punsara Amarasinghe","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad083","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy Get access Russian Political Philosophy: Anarchy, Authority, Autocracy. By Evert van der Zweerde. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2022. Pp. xx + 245. Price $85.00.) Punsara Amarasinghe Punsara Amarasinghe Scuola Superiore Sant Anna, Italy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad083, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad083 Published: 11 September 2023 Article history Received: 21 August 2023 Published: 11 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135939031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Human Rights: Moral or Political? Get access Human Rights: Moral or Political? By Adam Etinson. (Oxford: OUP, 2018. Pp. 1 + 508. Price £63.00.) Jesse Tomalty Jesse Tomalty University of Bergen, Norway Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad084, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad084 Published: 11 September 2023 Article history Received: 21 August 2023 Published: 11 September 2023
{"title":"Human Rights: Moral or Political?","authors":"Jesse Tomalty","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad084","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Human Rights: Moral or Political? Get access Human Rights: Moral or Political? By Adam Etinson. (Oxford: OUP, 2018. Pp. 1 + 508. Price £63.00.) Jesse Tomalty Jesse Tomalty University of Bergen, Norway Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, pqad084, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad084 Published: 11 September 2023 Article history Received: 21 August 2023 Published: 11 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135939045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Grief Worlds: A Study of Emotional Experience","authors":"Ashley Atkins","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad085","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135980656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract According to a dominant assumption the truth of instrumental thoughts—thoughts in which one action is identified as a means to another—are not affected by agents’ normative conceptions of their ends. Agents could in principle grasp these thoughts, and thereby the correct means to their ends, without consulting any conception they may have as to the pursuit-worthiness of those ends. I argue this assumption (the ‘Theoretical Conception’) prevents us from explaining how agents can identify means to their ends. I sketch an alternative account according to which the contents of instrumental thoughts are directly determined by agent's reasons for acting. This is explained by the fact that an agent's reasons for action reveal what they take the good of their ends to be. Ultimately, I argue, agents must have a conception of their final ends as intrinsically good if they are to successfully specify means to them.
{"title":"Two Conceptions of Instrumental Thought","authors":"Rory O’Connell","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to a dominant assumption the truth of instrumental thoughts—thoughts in which one action is identified as a means to another—are not affected by agents’ normative conceptions of their ends. Agents could in principle grasp these thoughts, and thereby the correct means to their ends, without consulting any conception they may have as to the pursuit-worthiness of those ends. I argue this assumption (the ‘Theoretical Conception’) prevents us from explaining how agents can identify means to their ends. I sketch an alternative account according to which the contents of instrumental thoughts are directly determined by agent's reasons for acting. This is explained by the fact that an agent's reasons for action reveal what they take the good of their ends to be. Ultimately, I argue, agents must have a conception of their final ends as intrinsically good if they are to successfully specify means to them.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135253939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Why must incompatibility be symmetric? An odd question, but recent work in the semantics of non-classical logic, which appeals to the notion of incompatibility as a primitive and defines negation in terms of it, has brought this question to the fore. Francesco Berto proposes such a semantics for negation argues that, since incompatibility must be symmetric, double negation introduction must be a law of negation. However, he offers no argument for the claim that incompatibility really must be symmetric. Here, I provide such an argument, showing that, insofar as we think of incompatibility in normative pragmatic terms, it can play its basic pragmatic function only if it is symmetric. The upshot is that we can vindicate Berto’s claim about the symmetry of incompatibility but only if we, pace Berto, think about incompatibility, in the first instance, as a pragmatic relation between acts rather than a semantic relation between contents.
{"title":"Why Must Incompatibility Be Symmetric?","authors":"Ryan Simonelli","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad078","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why must incompatibility be symmetric? An odd question, but recent work in the semantics of non-classical logic, which appeals to the notion of incompatibility as a primitive and defines negation in terms of it, has brought this question to the fore. Francesco Berto proposes such a semantics for negation argues that, since incompatibility must be symmetric, double negation introduction must be a law of negation. However, he offers no argument for the claim that incompatibility really must be symmetric. Here, I provide such an argument, showing that, insofar as we think of incompatibility in normative pragmatic terms, it can play its basic pragmatic function only if it is symmetric. The upshot is that we can vindicate Berto’s claim about the symmetry of incompatibility but only if we, pace Berto, think about incompatibility, in the first instance, as a pragmatic relation between acts rather than a semantic relation between contents.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135255033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘hallucinatory’ will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences.
{"title":"Necessarily Veridical Hallucinations: A New Problem for the Uninstantiated Property View","authors":"Laura Gow","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘hallucinatory’ will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135890296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship.
{"title":"Solidarity and the Work of Moral Understanding","authors":"Samuel Dishaw","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad080","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad080","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Because moral understanding involves a distinctly first-personal grasp of moral matters, there is a temptation to think of its value primarily in terms of achievements that reflect well on its possessor: the moral worth of one's action or the virtue of one's character. These explanations, I argue, do not do full justice to the importance of moral understanding in our moral lives. Of equal importance is the value of moral understanding in our relations with other moral agents. In particular, I argue that an understanding of moral matters is of central importance within relations of solidarity. In addition to highlighting an overlooked aspect of moral understanding's value, this view also has important implications for what solidarity requires of those who stand in that relationship.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136248376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies.
{"title":"Veridicalism and Scepticism","authors":"Yuval Avnur","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad076","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes’ demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don’t know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, non-veridicalist strategies.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43021390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up.
{"title":"Failure and Success in Agency","authors":"David Heering","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad069","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46362159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Context-sensitive expressions appear ill suited to the purpose of sharing content across contexts. Yet we regularly use them to that end (in regulations, textbooks, memos, guidelines, laws, minutes, etc.). This paper describes the utility of the concept of a metacontext for understanding cross-contextual content-sharing with context-sensitive expressions. A metacontext is the context of a group of contexts: an infrastructure that can channel non-linguistic incentives on content ascription so as to homogenize the content ascribed to context-sensitive expressions in each context in the group. Documents composed of context-sensitive expressions can share content across contexts when supported by an appropriate metacontext. The bible has its church, the textbook its education system, the form its bureaucracy, and the manifesto its social movement. Some metacontexts support cross-contextual content-sharing. Some don’t. A promising research programme (one with practical importance) would take metacontexts as its unit of analysis.
{"title":"Metacontexts and Cross-Contextual Communication: Stabilizing the Content of Documents Across Contexts","authors":"A. Davies","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad071","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Context-sensitive expressions appear ill suited to the purpose of sharing content across contexts. Yet we regularly use them to that end (in regulations, textbooks, memos, guidelines, laws, minutes, etc.). This paper describes the utility of the concept of a metacontext for understanding cross-contextual content-sharing with context-sensitive expressions. A metacontext is the context of a group of contexts: an infrastructure that can channel non-linguistic incentives on content ascription so as to homogenize the content ascribed to context-sensitive expressions in each context in the group. Documents composed of context-sensitive expressions can share content across contexts when supported by an appropriate metacontext. The bible has its church, the textbook its education system, the form its bureaucracy, and the manifesto its social movement. Some metacontexts support cross-contextual content-sharing. Some don’t. A promising research programme (one with practical importance) would take metacontexts as its unit of analysis.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44721939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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