Journal of Evolutionary Economics最新文献

We develop a representation of creative evolution in economics based on the theory of the adjacent possible. We start by introducing an epistemological framework for economic theorizing that copes with unknowability and the unlistability of possibility spaces. From this framework, we discuss the use of knowledge in creatively evolving systems and derive four main results: that local knowledge is itself a mechanism of movement through the adjacent possible; that all action is entrepreneurial action; that causality is ambiguous; and that individuals can agree to disagree. We then apply these results to decision-making, innovation, and the emergence of institutions and commons in creatively evolving systems.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have significantly attracted the attention of institutional investors over the last decade. However, previous literature has not deeply explored the characteristics of venture capital (VC) investments in AI ventures. In this study, we explore whether and to what extent investments in AI ventures differ from those in similar non-AI ventures, and whether they are moderated by venture-level, country-level, and investor-level factors. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 5235 investments in 2689 AI ventures and 9215 investments in 4373 non-AI ventures belonging to the Industry 4.0 domain, observed from 2000 to 2019. We find that the amount invested in AI ventures is significantly lower than non-AI ones: this negative relationship is, however, moderated by a venture’s development stage, VC investor’s experience and the AI development level of the country in which the invested venture operates.

Economic development requires endogenous novelties, according to evolutionary economics. To find the endogenous source of novelties, we focus on the creativity of ordinary people when they forge their life path. We argue that such ‘life creativity’ is endogenous to the economic system because it is a typical capability of human beings, because it is intrinsically motivated, thus directly yielding well-being, and because it can be developed with better economic conditions. The paper first introduces the insights of three pioneers of evolutionary economics; it proceeds by showing the key role of creativity in human evolution; then it proposes ‘creative activity’ as an input-output technology that is both useful for and conditioned by economic development. It concludes by contrasting the Industrial Revolution in Britain with the ICT revolution in the US for their different effects of successful innovations on life creativity and well-being.

We develop a model of endogenous growth with automation to study the impact of industrial robots on growth and labour income. We incorporate human capital accumulation into that framework to examine the role of human capital in sustaining growth without displacing low-skilled labour. While automation replaces low-skilled labour with industrial robots in conducting routine tasks, horizontal innovation creates new varieties in which low-skilled labour has an employment advantage. Labour-augmenting technology takes place to improve productivity of low-skilled labour. As such, those latter types of innovation help counterbalance the adverse effect of automation on low-skilled labour. Human capital, the essential production factor that takes part in every economic activity, including conducting non-routine tasks, accumulates over time through education and training. We show that there exists a long-run equilibrium at which either robots or low-skilled workers are employed, together with human capital, to produce varieties. In the fully endogenous model, final output grows at the rate of human capital accumulation. An improvement in the quality of education and training leads to an acceleration of both automation and variety expansion, but not human capital growth. Our numerical exercise indicates that a permanent increase in automation entails a permanent impact on the range of automated varieties, long-run output level and human capital wage. The shock lowers long-run growth and low-skilled workers’ wage and their effective income share. However, it has no effect on the effective income share of human capital.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of environmental regulation on innovation and international competitiveness. We test the weak, narrow, and strong versions of Porter's hypotheses by looking at the impact of environmental regulation on exports both directly and indirectly through innovation and by introducing the role of pollution intensity in moderating the impact of stringent regulation on innovation and international competitiveness. Green policies are measured with the OECD Environmental Stringency Policy Index, distinguishing between market, non-market instruments, and technology support policies. Differently from previous papers, we adopt the technology gap approach to trade, which is suitable for relating environmental regulation to trade competitiveness and we apply the simultaneous-equation system econometric model with a moderating factor represented by pollution intensity. The results support the weak and strong versions of Porter’s hypotheses and find that the positive impact of regulation on innovation and exports increases with a country’s pollution intensity, suggesting that green policies, if properly coordinated, can represent a win–win strategy, fostering, at the same time, sustainability and international competitiveness.

We analyze, using the micro data of the Household Financial Survey (HFS) of the Bank of Spain, the consumption consequences of the household balance sheets and debt accumulation during the real estate bubble of 2002–2005, the Great Recession (2008–2011) and the subsequent economic recovery phase (2014–2017). Using quantile regression models, we find heterogeneity in household consumption behavior with respect to income and net worth levels, and in response to changes in household net worth in the last two periods. During the considered real estate bubble period, this heterogeneity in behavior is diminished, and only occurs in relation to the level of net wealth, in line with Hyman Minsky’s Paradox of Tranquility. These findings favor the post-Keynesian theory on consumption. The greater inequality leads to a higher propensity of certain households to consume in response to changes in housing and financial net worth. This is compatible with the relative income hypothesis extended in expenditure cascades models. Otherwise, households will be willing to take on more risk during economic boom periods associated with a real estate bubble, which translates into debt-financed consumption that virtually makes such heterogeneity practically disappear.

The Hydrogen Illusion (2022) is a self-published book by Samuel Furfari, a retired chemical engineer who worked for 36 years in energy policy at the European Commission. Hydrogen has been brought to the forefront of environmental policy in recent years as the EU and other Western economies are allocating billions of euros and dollars towards hydrogen production. Furfari argues that this is a mistake, and that hydrogen has little potential as an energy form, primarily as it requires so much energy in order to be produced. While at times technical and difficult to follow, The Hydrogen Illusion is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about how Western economies can combine economic and environmental development.

This study documents the changes in work from home (WFH) practices since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic using panel data from original firm surveys in Japan. Particular attention has been given to the productivity dynamics of WFH. The results indicate the following: First, compared to when the first state of emergency was declared in the spring of 2020, at the end of 2021, the ratio of firms utilizing WFH and the intensity of WFH decreased substantially. Second, according to the firms’ evaluations, the mean productivity of WFH improved by more than 10 percentage points, although it was still approximately 20% lower than that of conventional workplaces. The selection effect arising from the exit from this practice among firms with low WFH productivity, and the improvement in productivity among WFH-continuing firms contributed almost equally to the average productivity growth. Third, the majority of firms are planning to discontinue WFH practices and revert to the conventional work style or to reduce WFH intensity after the end of COVID-19, and the gap between firms’ plans and the desire of remote workers is widening.

This paper provides an analytical review of the literature on the role of technology cycle time (TCT) in the catching-up process of latecomers at the firm, sectoral, and national levels. At the national level, latecomer economies follow a detour that consists of economic growth through specialization in short-TCT sectors during the catching-up phase, followed by a shift to long-TCT sectors in the post-catching-up phase. The paper then discusses the double-edged nature of TCT at the sectoral level, such that short TCT can either be a window of opportunity associated with the rapid obsolescence of existing technologies and thus low entry barriers, or another source of difficulty associated with the truncation of learning from existing technologies. Only latecomers with a certain absorptive capacity can benefit from short TCT as a window of opportunity. Finally, at the firm level, this paper discusses the issue of possible convergence in the behavior of catching-up firms towards those of mature firms in advanced economies. At all three levels, the keywords are detours and convergence. Given the barriers to entry in long-TCT sectors, latecomers pursue a strategy of detouring into short-TCT sectors. That is, instead of trying to emulate incumbents by entering long-TCT sectors, latecomers take the opposite route. Subsequently, as latecomers improve their capabilities over time, they shift their specialization from short to long TCT sectors, thereby achieving convergence in behavior and strategy at the firm, sectoral, and national levels.

Extending the research on secondary education and entrepreneurship, we ask whether compulsory schooling laws influence selection into and earnings from self-employment. We exploit the increase in the minimum school-leaving age from 14 to 15 in the mid-1960s in Victoria and South Australia. The findings show that for both males and females, likelihood and income from self-employment declined. The additional year of schooling did not influence self-employment through cognitive abilities, locus of control, well-being outcomes, or Big-Five personality dimensions.