This paper examines the impact of international automatic exchange of information (AEOI) treaties on cross-border investments in tax havens. Using a restricted version of the BIS Locational Banking Statistics we find that AEOIs significantly reduced cross-border deposits. A sectoral breakdown assessment reveals that households were the key driving force behind this contraction. However, we also document evidence of households’ deposits shifting to non-AEOI haven countries and larger deposits by non-bank financial institutions between tax haven countries, suggesting an increased use of shell corporation networks since AEOI introduction. Extending the analysis to portfolio and direct investment, we observe changes in investment patterns vis-à-vis tax havens which are consistent with a significant impact of AEOI treaties on these forms of cross-border investment.
{"title":"Automatic for the (tax) people: information sharing and cross-border investment in tax havens","authors":"Agustín Bénétrix, Lorenz Emter, Martin Schmitz","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of international automatic exchange of information (AEOI) treaties on cross-border investments in tax havens. Using a restricted version of the BIS Locational Banking Statistics we find that AEOIs significantly reduced cross-border deposits. A sectoral breakdown assessment reveals that households were the key driving force behind this contraction. However, we also document evidence of households’ deposits shifting to non-AEOI haven countries and larger deposits by non-bank financial institutions between tax haven countries, suggesting an increased use of shell corporation networks since AEOI introduction. Extending the analysis to portfolio and direct investment, we observe changes in investment patterns vis-à-vis tax havens which are consistent with a significant impact of AEOI treaties on these forms of cross-border investment.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142202215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper evaluates claims about large macroeconomic implications of new advances in AI. It starts from a task-based model of AI’s effects, working through automation and task complementarities. So long as AI’s microeconomic effects are driven by cost savings/productivity improvements at the task level, its macroeconomic consequences will be given by a version of Hulten’s theorem: GDP and aggregate productivity gains can be estimated by what fraction of tasks are impacted and average task-level cost savings. Using existing estimates on exposure to AI and productivity improvements at the task level, these macroeconomic effects appear nontrivial but modest—no more than a 0.66% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over 10 years. The paper then argues that even these estimates could be exaggerated, because early evidence is from easy-to-learn tasks, whereas some of the future effects will come from hard-to-learn tasks, where there are many context-dependent factors affecting decision-making and no objective outcome measures from which to learn successful performance. Consequently, predicted TFP gains over the next 10 years are even more modest and are predicted to be less than 0.53%. I also explore AI’s wage and inequality effects. I show theoretically that even when AI improves the productivity of low-skill workers in certain tasks (without creating new tasks for them), this may increase rather than reduce inequality. Empirically, I find that AI advances are unlikely to increase inequality as much as previous automation technologies because their impact is more equally distributed across demographic groups, but there is also no evidence that AI will reduce labor income inequality. Instead, AI is predicted to widen the gap between capital and labor income. Finally, some of the new tasks created by AI may have negative social value (such as design of algorithms for online manipulation), and I discuss how to incorporate the macroeconomic effects of new tasks that may have negative social value.
{"title":"The simple macroeconomics of AI","authors":"Daron Acemoglu","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae042","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates claims about large macroeconomic implications of new advances in AI. It starts from a task-based model of AI’s effects, working through automation and task complementarities. So long as AI’s microeconomic effects are driven by cost savings/productivity improvements at the task level, its macroeconomic consequences will be given by a version of Hulten’s theorem: GDP and aggregate productivity gains can be estimated by what fraction of tasks are impacted and average task-level cost savings. Using existing estimates on exposure to AI and productivity improvements at the task level, these macroeconomic effects appear nontrivial but modest—no more than a 0.66% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over 10 years. The paper then argues that even these estimates could be exaggerated, because early evidence is from easy-to-learn tasks, whereas some of the future effects will come from hard-to-learn tasks, where there are many context-dependent factors affecting decision-making and no objective outcome measures from which to learn successful performance. Consequently, predicted TFP gains over the next 10 years are even more modest and are predicted to be less than 0.53%. I also explore AI’s wage and inequality effects. I show theoretically that even when AI improves the productivity of low-skill workers in certain tasks (without creating new tasks for them), this may increase rather than reduce inequality. Empirically, I find that AI advances are unlikely to increase inequality as much as previous automation technologies because their impact is more equally distributed across demographic groups, but there is also no evidence that AI will reduce labor income inequality. Instead, AI is predicted to widen the gap between capital and labor income. Finally, some of the new tasks created by AI may have negative social value (such as design of algorithms for online manipulation), and I discuss how to incorporate the macroeconomic effects of new tasks that may have negative social value.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141946434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since 2015, more than 140 countries have cooperated in the OECD’s “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) project to combat multinational tax avoidance. Several of the key actions, most importantly measures against tax-treaty shopping, require changes to double taxation treaties. The OECD designed a special instrument—the ‘multilateral instrument’ (MLI) - to allow for a swift implementation of BEPS-related tax treaty changes. In this paper, we show that MLI take-up is incomplete, we present (partly surprising) correlates of the take-up decision and develop a simple theoretical model to rationalize the observed take-up behavior. A key insight is that conduit countries, which are the beneficiaries of tax treaty shopping, can benefit from anti-treaty shopping laws as firms have incentives to scale-up real activity in conduit nations in order to be exempted from the new anti-treaty shopping rules. Empirical findings are consistent with these considerations: MLI adoption rates of conduit countries are high. Treaty shopping has, to date, not significantly dropped. And there is indeed indication that firms have scaled up their real economic activity in conduit nations. Overall, our findings reject that treaty shopping has been “killed” as envisaged by the OECD. JEL classification: F21, F23, F53, H25, H26, H32, H87, K34
{"title":"Multilateral Tax Treaty Revision to Combat Tax Avoidance: On the Merits and Limits of BEPS’s Multilateral Instrument","authors":"Antonia Hohmann, Valeria Merlo, Nadine Riedel","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae043","url":null,"abstract":"Since 2015, more than 140 countries have cooperated in the OECD’s “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) project to combat multinational tax avoidance. Several of the key actions, most importantly measures against tax-treaty shopping, require changes to double taxation treaties. The OECD designed a special instrument—the ‘multilateral instrument’ (MLI) - to allow for a swift implementation of BEPS-related tax treaty changes. In this paper, we show that MLI take-up is incomplete, we present (partly surprising) correlates of the take-up decision and develop a simple theoretical model to rationalize the observed take-up behavior. A key insight is that conduit countries, which are the beneficiaries of tax treaty shopping, can benefit from anti-treaty shopping laws as firms have incentives to scale-up real activity in conduit nations in order to be exempted from the new anti-treaty shopping rules. Empirical findings are consistent with these considerations: MLI adoption rates of conduit countries are high. Treaty shopping has, to date, not significantly dropped. And there is indeed indication that firms have scaled up their real economic activity in conduit nations. Overall, our findings reject that treaty shopping has been “killed” as envisaged by the OECD. JEL classification: F21, F23, F53, H25, H26, H32, H87, K34","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141969467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-154-181
A. B. Zolotareva
The article examines the practice of engaging private providers to deliver public social services in Russia, as well as the legal regulation applicable to those activities. In addition, it outlines the evolution of the legislation and incentives affecting the access of private providers to the public services market, what their actual share in this market is, and the benefits and risks from expanding it. The author’s overall conclusion is that involving private providers to deliver public services is advisable, but it should not be an end in itself. The consequences of this policy for the state budget, public infrastructure, and consumers should be considered. In keeping with this recommendation, the author suggests legislative amendments designed to eliminate artificial incentives for expanding the share of private providers in the public services market while maintaining state control over the volume of financing of the public infrastructure in order to prevent its degradation. The article also analyzes the Russian system for independent assessment of the quality of public services (IQA) which began in 2015 and assesses its suitability for comparing the quality of services from public and private providers. The author finds shortcomings in the IQA methodology, which artificially inflate the overall level of assessments. This becomes a disincentive for providers to improve the quality of their services and also reduces public confidence in the results of IQA. This analysis of IQA is used to generate proposals for improving its methodology by making its results more objective.
{"title":"Prospects for Encouraging Competition in the Public Social Services Market","authors":"A. B. Zolotareva","doi":"10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-154-181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-154-181","url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the practice of engaging private providers to deliver public social services in Russia, as well as the legal regulation applicable to those activities. In addition, it outlines the evolution of the legislation and incentives affecting the access of private providers to the public services market, what their actual share in this market is, and the benefits and risks from expanding it. The author’s overall conclusion is that involving private providers to deliver public services is advisable, but it should not be an end in itself. The consequences of this policy for the state budget, public infrastructure, and consumers should be considered. In keeping with this recommendation, the author suggests legislative amendments designed to eliminate artificial incentives for expanding the share of private providers in the public services market while maintaining state control over the volume of financing of the public infrastructure in order to prevent its degradation. The article also analyzes the Russian system for independent assessment of the quality of public services (IQA) which began in 2015 and assesses its suitability for comparing the quality of services from public and private providers. The author finds shortcomings in the IQA methodology, which artificially inflate the overall level of assessments. This becomes a disincentive for providers to improve the quality of their services and also reduces public confidence in the results of IQA. This analysis of IQA is used to generate proposals for improving its methodology by making its results more objective.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141818256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-118-153
V. Barinova, S. P. Zemtsov, P. A. Levakov
After external trade restrictions were imposed on Russia and China in recent years, their access to foreign technologies decreased. This created new incentives for scientific and technological partnership between the two countries. In addition, an analysis of strategic documents indicates that the US and the EU are likely to increase economic and technological pressure in the future. This article analyzes China’s experience in shoring up technological sovereignty under sanctions, an exercise which can be instructive for many countries. China’s long-term scientific and technological policy follows a catch-up development model, which has enabled a transition from borrowing simple technologies via specialized institutions (joint ventures, special economic zones, etc.) to global leadership in R&D and technologies that has been made possible through developing human capital and applying preferential treatment to local innovative businesses. Although Russia is one of the world’s leading scientific and technological centers, to some extent it lags in developing high-tech businesses and exports. Moreover, for some time it has been importing advanced products and technologies, some of which are now being quickly replaced by Chinese versions as Western companies have exited. The article applies a SWOT analysis to Russian-Chinese scientific and technological cooperation in order to highlight the benefits of this collaboration, especially concerning machine tools, microelectronics, and aerospace. The benefits from such partnership will materialize for most high-tech industries over the long run by means of joint scientific research. However, one cannot ignore the risks for Russia due to increased technological dependence on a single partner and the potential outflow of personnel and technology, as well as risks for China related to potential secondary sanctions.
{"title":"Russia and China: Motives, Opportunities, and Risks of Technological Partnership","authors":"V. Barinova, S. P. Zemtsov, P. A. Levakov","doi":"10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-118-153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-118-153","url":null,"abstract":"After external trade restrictions were imposed on Russia and China in recent years, their access to foreign technologies decreased. This created new incentives for scientific and technological partnership between the two countries. In addition, an analysis of strategic documents indicates that the US and the EU are likely to increase economic and technological pressure in the future. This article analyzes China’s experience in shoring up technological sovereignty under sanctions, an exercise which can be instructive for many countries. China’s long-term scientific and technological policy follows a catch-up development model, which has enabled a transition from borrowing simple technologies via specialized institutions (joint ventures, special economic zones, etc.) to global leadership in R&D and technologies that has been made possible through developing human capital and applying preferential treatment to local innovative businesses. Although Russia is one of the world’s leading scientific and technological centers, to some extent it lags in developing high-tech businesses and exports. Moreover, for some time it has been importing advanced products and technologies, some of which are now being quickly replaced by Chinese versions as Western companies have exited. The article applies a SWOT analysis to Russian-Chinese scientific and technological cooperation in order to highlight the benefits of this collaboration, especially concerning machine tools, microelectronics, and aerospace. The benefits from such partnership will materialize for most high-tech industries over the long run by means of joint scientific research. However, one cannot ignore the risks for Russia due to increased technological dependence on a single partner and the potential outflow of personnel and technology, as well as risks for China related to potential secondary sanctions.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141818538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-44-75
L. Serkov
The purpose of the article is to analyze the behavior of economic agents with limited rationality in a New Keynesian model which postulates that imported equipment and technology are one of the factors of production and that households consume only domestic products. Economic agents’ expectations are based on stationary values for the output gap and inflation and also on extrapolation of the latest available data on these variables. The weighted shares of agents applying these rules change endogenously. Histograms of the frequency distribution of the degree of optimism and the impulse responses of monetary policy shocks and technology shocks to the variables under study indicate that a less open economy tends to undergo an economic cycle with a smaller amplitude than a more rigid economy. An analysis of the trade-offs between inflation volatility and the output gap established their non-linear nature (in contrast to standard models with rational expectations). The results from analysis of trade-offs was that stabilization of inflation in models with limited rational expectations requires an increased interest rate reaction compared to a similar reaction for a model in which agents have rational expectations. The results obtained may be useful in designing monetary policy to stabilize inflation and output gaps.
{"title":"Behavior of Economic Agents With Bounded Rationality in a Semi-open New Keynesian Model","authors":"L. Serkov","doi":"10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-44-75","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-44-75","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the article is to analyze the behavior of economic agents with limited rationality in a New Keynesian model which postulates that imported equipment and technology are one of the factors of production and that households consume only domestic products. Economic agents’ expectations are based on stationary values for the output gap and inflation and also on extrapolation of the latest available data on these variables. The weighted shares of agents applying these rules change endogenously. Histograms of the frequency distribution of the degree of optimism and the impulse responses of monetary policy shocks and technology shocks to the variables under study indicate that a less open economy tends to undergo an economic cycle with a smaller amplitude than a more rigid economy. An analysis of the trade-offs between inflation volatility and the output gap established their non-linear nature (in contrast to standard models with rational expectations). The results from analysis of trade-offs was that stabilization of inflation in models with limited rational expectations requires an increased interest rate reaction compared to a similar reaction for a model in which agents have rational expectations. The results obtained may be useful in designing monetary policy to stabilize inflation and output gaps.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141817985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-07-21DOI: 10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-76-117
D. Lomonosov
The paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the Russian economy based on an endogenous housing sector and three categories of homeowners – patient, impatient and non-Ricardian. The DSGE model is applied from the first quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2019 using a Bayesian method for minimizing the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical impulse responses to a shock due to modified terms of trade. The model is then employed to provide a quantitative assessment of how macro variables respond to shocks generated by the housing market, interest rates, mortgage subsidies, financial liberalization, and altered terms of trade. At the same time, the impact of shocks on a number of economic indicators is largely determined by the functional form of household utility, as demonstrated by the robustness test. The results obtained based on the model also do not demonstrate a strong inertial effect in the economy due to the revival of the residential real estate construction sector, and they contradict a number of studies and expert estimates based primarily on the input-output model. One reason for this discrepancy may be the analysis, which is based on a horizontal supply curve, resulting in an overestimation of the impact of the construction sector on the economy. This DSGE model can serve as a starting point for scenario-based projections of the dynamics of the residential real estate market and the associated mortgage market, for testing the impact of various policy measures on the housing sector, and for assessing their effects on various categories of households.
{"title":"A DSGE Model of the Russian Residential Real Estate Market","authors":"D. Lomonosov","doi":"10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-76-117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-3-76-117","url":null,"abstract":"The paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the Russian economy based on an endogenous housing sector and three categories of homeowners – patient, impatient and non-Ricardian. The DSGE model is applied from the first quarter of 2010 to the fourth quarter of 2019 using a Bayesian method for minimizing the discrepancy between theoretical and empirical impulse responses to a shock due to modified terms of trade. The model is then employed to provide a quantitative assessment of how macro variables respond to shocks generated by the housing market, interest rates, mortgage subsidies, financial liberalization, and altered terms of trade. At the same time, the impact of shocks on a number of economic indicators is largely determined by the functional form of household utility, as demonstrated by the robustness test. The results obtained based on the model also do not demonstrate a strong inertial effect in the economy due to the revival of the residential real estate construction sector, and they contradict a number of studies and expert estimates based primarily on the input-output model. One reason for this discrepancy may be the analysis, which is based on a horizontal supply curve, resulting in an overestimation of the impact of the construction sector on the economy. This DSGE model can serve as a starting point for scenario-based projections of the dynamics of the residential real estate market and the associated mortgage market, for testing the impact of various policy measures on the housing sector, and for assessing their effects on various categories of households.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141818457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Advanced-economy central banks are currently experiencing losses. To examine how rate-tightening cycles affect central bank finances, we study the financial statements of ten advanced-economy central banks during the 1970s and 1980s, the most notable and comparable policy environment to the present. We find that central bank profits actually increased in response to the anti-inflationary measures of the 1980s. We thus discuss how central bank profits depend on their policy instruments as well as their balance-sheet position when rate tightening begins, rather than on the tightening per se. Unlike today, central banks in the 1980s avoided losses because they did not remunerate bank reserves and their balance sheets did not carry the legacy of a decade of large asset purchases at low interest rates and long maturity. Our counterfactuals show that only a combination of these factors could have triggered losses in the 1980s: none of them is sufficient on its own. When losses emerged in the late 1970s, before the Volcker shock, they were due to foreign-exchange reserves depreciating. In these instances, when central banks carried them forward and did not rely on transfers from the government, there was no loss of central bank independence or their ability to fight inflation.
{"title":"Do disinflation policies ravage Central bank finances?","authors":"Théodore Humann, Kris Mitchener, Eric Monnet","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Advanced-economy central banks are currently experiencing losses. To examine how rate-tightening cycles affect central bank finances, we study the financial statements of ten advanced-economy central banks during the 1970s and 1980s, the most notable and comparable policy environment to the present. We find that central bank profits actually increased in response to the anti-inflationary measures of the 1980s. We thus discuss how central bank profits depend on their policy instruments as well as their balance-sheet position when rate tightening begins, rather than on the tightening per se. Unlike today, central banks in the 1980s avoided losses because they did not remunerate bank reserves and their balance sheets did not carry the legacy of a decade of large asset purchases at low interest rates and long maturity. Our counterfactuals show that only a combination of these factors could have triggered losses in the 1980s: none of them is sufficient on its own. When losses emerged in the late 1970s, before the Volcker shock, they were due to foreign-exchange reserves depreciating. In these instances, when central banks carried them forward and did not rely on transfers from the government, there was no loss of central bank independence or their ability to fight inflation.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141640394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Germany has become the second-most important destination for migrants worldwide. Using all waves from the microcensus, we study their labor market integration over the last 50 years and highlight differences to the US case. Although the employment gaps between immigrant and native men decline after arrival, they remain large for most cohorts; the average gap after one decade is 10 pp. Conversely, income gaps tend to widen post-arrival. Compositional differences explain how those gaps vary across groups, and why they worsened over time; after accounting for composition, integration outcomes show no systematic trend. Still, economic conditions do matter, and employment collapsed in some cohorts after structural shocks hit the German labor market in the early 1990s. Lastly, we examine the integration of recent arrivals during the European refugee “crisis” and the Russo-Ukrainian war.
{"title":"The Integration of Migrants in the German Labor Market: Evidence Over 50 Years","authors":"Paul Berbée, Jan Stuhler","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae040","url":null,"abstract":"Germany has become the second-most important destination for migrants worldwide. Using all waves from the microcensus, we study their labor market integration over the last 50 years and highlight differences to the US case. Although the employment gaps between immigrant and native men decline after arrival, they remain large for most cohorts; the average gap after one decade is 10 pp. Conversely, income gaps tend to widen post-arrival. Compositional differences explain how those gaps vary across groups, and why they worsened over time; after accounting for composition, integration outcomes show no systematic trend. Still, economic conditions do matter, and employment collapsed in some cohorts after structural shocks hit the German labor market in the early 1990s. Lastly, we examine the integration of recent arrivals during the European refugee “crisis” and the Russo-Ukrainian war.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141742139","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Which households are most affected by energy price shocks? How do interventions in energy markets affect these patterns? To investigate these questions, this paper introduces a measurement framework that leverages granular property-level data representing more than 50% of the English and Welsh housing stock. This framework will form the basis for current and future studies on the heterogeneous effects of the energy crisis more broadly. We find that the energy price shock has a more pronounced effect on relatively more affluent areas where energy use is higher at baseline. We document that commonly used untargeted interventions in energy markets significantly weaken market price signals for able-to-pay households. Alternative, more targeted policies are cheaper, easily implementable, and could better align energy saving incentives.
{"title":"Distributional and climate implications of policy responses to energy price shocks","authors":"Thiemo Fetzer, Ludovica Gazze, Menna Bishop","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae038","url":null,"abstract":"Which households are most affected by energy price shocks? How do interventions in energy markets affect these patterns? To investigate these questions, this paper introduces a measurement framework that leverages granular property-level data representing more than 50% of the English and Welsh housing stock. This framework will form the basis for current and future studies on the heterogeneous effects of the energy crisis more broadly. We find that the energy price shock has a more pronounced effect on relatively more affluent areas where energy use is higher at baseline. We document that commonly used untargeted interventions in energy markets significantly weaken market price signals for able-to-pay households. Alternative, more targeted policies are cheaper, easily implementable, and could better align energy saving incentives.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141568306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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