Romain Duval, Yi Ji, Chris Papageorgiou, Ippei Shibata, Antonio Spilimbergo
Are preferences for labor regulations driven by individuals’ own endowments or their beliefs? To address this question, we conducted a cross-country survey on people’s opinions on employment protection legislation—an area where reform has proven to be difficult and personal interests are at stake. We find that individuals’ beliefs contribute two to three times more than their own endowments and personal pay-offs. A randomized information treatment confirms that beliefs can explain views about regulations, but beliefs can also change with new information. Our results are robust to several checks, including to alternative estimation techniques and samples.
{"title":"Preferences for Labor Regulation: Endowments vs. Beliefs","authors":"Romain Duval, Yi Ji, Chris Papageorgiou, Ippei Shibata, Antonio Spilimbergo","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae021","url":null,"abstract":"Are preferences for labor regulations driven by individuals’ own endowments or their beliefs? To address this question, we conducted a cross-country survey on people’s opinions on employment protection legislation—an area where reform has proven to be difficult and personal interests are at stake. We find that individuals’ beliefs contribute two to three times more than their own endowments and personal pay-offs. A randomized information treatment confirms that beliefs can explain views about regulations, but beliefs can also change with new information. Our results are robust to several checks, including to alternative estimation techniques and samples.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140070793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Lionel Fontagne, Philippe Martin, Gianluca Orefice
Based on firm level data in the French manufacturing sector, we find that firms adapt quickly, strongly and through multiple channels to energy shocks, even though electricity and gas bills represent a small share of their total costs. Over the period 1996-2019, faced with an idiosyncratic energy price increase, firms reduce their energy demand, improve their energy efficiency, increase intermediate inputs imports and optimize energy use across plants. Firms are also able to pass-through the cost shock fully into their export prices. Their production, exports and employment fall. A consequence of these multiple adjustment mechanisms is that the fall in profits is either non-significant, small or specific to only the most energy intensive firms. We also find that the impact of electricity shocks has weakened over time, suggesting that only firms able to adapt their production process to energy cost shocks have survived. Importantly, when faced with large electricity and gas price increases, firms are less able to reduce their consumption. These results shed light on the mechanisms of resilience of the European manufacturing sector in the context of the present energy crisis.
{"title":"The many channels of firm’s adjustment to energy shocks: Evidence from France","authors":"Lionel Fontagne, Philippe Martin, Gianluca Orefice","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae011","url":null,"abstract":"Based on firm level data in the French manufacturing sector, we find that firms adapt quickly, strongly and through multiple channels to energy shocks, even though electricity and gas bills represent a small share of their total costs. Over the period 1996-2019, faced with an idiosyncratic energy price increase, firms reduce their energy demand, improve their energy efficiency, increase intermediate inputs imports and optimize energy use across plants. Firms are also able to pass-through the cost shock fully into their export prices. Their production, exports and employment fall. A consequence of these multiple adjustment mechanisms is that the fall in profits is either non-significant, small or specific to only the most energy intensive firms. We also find that the impact of electricity shocks has weakened over time, suggesting that only firms able to adapt their production process to energy cost shocks have survived. Importantly, when faced with large electricity and gas price increases, firms are less able to reduce their consumption. These results shed light on the mechanisms of resilience of the European manufacturing sector in the context of the present energy crisis.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"255 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139903506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to reduce political violence in regions of conflict, but agreements are often followed by violence. This is due to the fact that such agreements are introduced during periods of political violence when a country is inside the conflict trap, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the agreement from the political context that generates persistent political violence. In this study we match on pre-agreement conflict risk to estimate the effects of power-sharing agreements on violence using a difference-in-difference method. The results show that violence falls immediately after an agreement, with the effects strengthening over time. Comprehensive agreements tend to be particularly successful. We show that broader institutional changes that have their nucleus in the agreements are crucial elements explaining these large changes.
{"title":"Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements","authors":"Hannes Mueller, Christopher Rauh","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae010","url":null,"abstract":"Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to reduce political violence in regions of conflict, but agreements are often followed by violence. This is due to the fact that such agreements are introduced during periods of political violence when a country is inside the conflict trap, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the agreement from the political context that generates persistent political violence. In this study we match on pre-agreement conflict risk to estimate the effects of power-sharing agreements on violence using a difference-in-difference method. The results show that violence falls immediately after an agreement, with the effects strengthening over time. Comprehensive agreements tend to be particularly successful. We show that broader institutional changes that have their nucleus in the agreements are crucial elements explaining these large changes.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139586903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, Muhammed A Yıldırım
We build on Baqaee and Farhi (2019, 2021) and derive a theoretically-grounded criterion that allows targeting bans on exports to a sanctioned country at the level of ∼5000 6-digit HS products. The criterion implies that the costs to the sanctioned country are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties. Hence, there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia reveals that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. We discuss drivers of these differences, and then provide a quantitative evaluation of the export bans to show that (i) they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners; (ii) improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 80% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners; and (iii) there is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
{"title":"On the design of effective sanctions: the case of bans on exports to russia*","authors":"Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, Muhammed A Yıldırım","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad043","url":null,"abstract":"We build on Baqaee and Farhi (2019, 2021) and derive a theoretically-grounded criterion that allows targeting bans on exports to a sanctioned country at the level of ∼5000 6-digit HS products. The criterion implies that the costs to the sanctioned country are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties. Hence, there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia reveals that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. We discuss drivers of these differences, and then provide a quantitative evaluation of the export bans to show that (i) they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners; (ii) improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 80% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners; and (iii) there is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139586991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oscar Arce, Miguel García-Posada, Sergio Mayordomo, Banco de España, Steven Ongena
What is the long-term impact of negative interest rates on bank lending? To answer this question, we construct a unique summary measure of negative rate exposure by individual banks based on exclusive survey data and banks’ balance sheets and couple it with the credit register of Spain and firms’ balance sheets to identify this impact on the supply of credit to firms. We find that only when deposit rates reached the zero lower bound (ZLB) did affected banks (relative to non-affected banks) decrease their supply, especially when undercapitalized and lending to risky firms. The adverse effects of the negative rates on banks’ intermediation capacity only took place after a protracted period of time.
{"title":"Bank lending policies and monetary policy: Some lessons from the negative interest era","authors":"Oscar Arce, Miguel García-Posada, Sergio Mayordomo, Banco de España, Steven Ongena","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiae001","url":null,"abstract":"What is the long-term impact of negative interest rates on bank lending? To answer this question, we construct a unique summary measure of negative rate exposure by individual banks based on exclusive survey data and banks’ balance sheets and couple it with the credit register of Spain and firms’ balance sheets to identify this impact on the supply of credit to firms. We find that only when deposit rates reached the zero lower bound (ZLB) did affected banks (relative to non-affected banks) decrease their supply, especially when undercapitalized and lending to risky firms. The adverse effects of the negative rates on banks’ intermediation capacity only took place after a protracted period of time.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"138 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139464560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Barry Eichengreen, Massimo Ferrari Minesso, Arnaud Mehl, Isabel Vansteenkiste, Roger Vicquéry
We test the predictions of recent theoretical studies of the impact of sanctions on the exchange rate. We build a database of exchange rates and sanctions spanning 1914-1945—an era when both large and small economies were targeted by multilateral sanction packages, facilitating comparisons with today’s Russian war episode. We estimate the dynamic response of the exchange rate in a panel of sanction episodes at weekly frequency using local projections, conditioning on the type of sanctions taken. We tease out mechanisms through which sanctions affect the exchange rate by estimating their effects on macroeconomic variables plausibly acting as transmission channels. Our estimates suggest that import restrictions, export restrictions, asset freezes and trade embargoes lead to exchange rate effects consistent with theory, though the precision of the measured effects varies across sanction type. These findings suggest that recent models of the effects of sanctions on the exchange rate do not just match developments in today’s specific Russia episode but have broader applicability. It follows that the direction of exchange rate movements is not an adequate metric of the success or failure of sanctions but a reflection of the type and scale of the measures taken.
{"title":"Sanctions and the Exchange Rate in Time","authors":"Barry Eichengreen, Massimo Ferrari Minesso, Arnaud Mehl, Isabel Vansteenkiste, Roger Vicquéry","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad034","url":null,"abstract":"We test the predictions of recent theoretical studies of the impact of sanctions on the exchange rate. We build a database of exchange rates and sanctions spanning 1914-1945—an era when both large and small economies were targeted by multilateral sanction packages, facilitating comparisons with today’s Russian war episode. We estimate the dynamic response of the exchange rate in a panel of sanction episodes at weekly frequency using local projections, conditioning on the type of sanctions taken. We tease out mechanisms through which sanctions affect the exchange rate by estimating their effects on macroeconomic variables plausibly acting as transmission channels. Our estimates suggest that import restrictions, export restrictions, asset freezes and trade embargoes lead to exchange rate effects consistent with theory, though the precision of the measured effects varies across sanction type. These findings suggest that recent models of the effects of sanctions on the exchange rate do not just match developments in today’s specific Russia episode but have broader applicability. It follows that the direction of exchange rate movements is not an adequate metric of the success or failure of sanctions but a reflection of the type and scale of the measures taken.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"167 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138579894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We survey a representative sample of the U.S. population to understand stakeholders’ desire to see their firms leave Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Only 37% of the respondents think that leaving Russia is a pure business decision, and only 30% think that sanctions are a pure matter for the government. If a firm does not conform to the desire to leave Russia, 66% of the respondents are willing to boycott it (exit). We randomize a (hypothetical) cost of exiting the firm. This cost has a strong effect on the stated propensity to exit. This sensitivity allows us to provide a natural $equivalent of moral motivations for exiting. We try to distinguish deontological and impact-related motives to exit, by randomizing beliefs about the impact on the firm. We find a clear effect of impact for shareholders, but not for consumers and employees. Our results continue to hold on the subsample of participants who actually donate part of their survey compensation to Ukraine. In our survey, consumers emerge as the most powerful force to control the morality of firms. We discuss the geopolitical and economic implications of a world where private corporations can discontinue profitable business relationships for moral or political reasons.
{"title":"Private Sanctions","authors":"Oliver Hart, David Thesmar, Luigi Zingales","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad041","url":null,"abstract":"We survey a representative sample of the U.S. population to understand stakeholders’ desire to see their firms leave Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Only 37% of the respondents think that leaving Russia is a pure business decision, and only 30% think that sanctions are a pure matter for the government. If a firm does not conform to the desire to leave Russia, 66% of the respondents are willing to boycott it (exit). We randomize a (hypothetical) cost of exiting the firm. This cost has a strong effect on the stated propensity to exit. This sensitivity allows us to provide a natural $equivalent of moral motivations for exiting. We try to distinguish deontological and impact-related motives to exit, by randomizing beliefs about the impact on the firm. We find a clear effect of impact for shareholders, but not for consumers and employees. Our results continue to hold on the subsample of participants who actually donate part of their survey compensation to Ukraine. In our survey, consumers emerge as the most powerful force to control the morality of firms. We discuss the geopolitical and economic implications of a world where private corporations can discontinue profitable business relationships for moral or political reasons.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138563155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco D’Amuri, Marta De Philippis, Elisa Guglielminetti, Salvatore Lo Bello
Despite the magnitude and cyclicality of transitions into and out of the labor force, the literature generally considers unemployment as a sufficient statistic of labor market slack. We question this view by jointly estimating natural unemployment and participation rates through a Phillips curve informed by structural labor market flows. Focusing on Italy, a country where flows into and out of the labor force are particularly large, we find that the participation margin accounts for a significant share of total slack and explains one third of the missing inflation that followed the 2011 Sovereign Debt Crisis. Exploiting a reform that sharply and unexpectedly increased the statutory retirement age and expanded labor supply without directly affecting unemployment, we confirm that neglecting the participation gap biases inflation forecasts.
{"title":"Natural Unemployment and Activity Rates in Italy: Flow-based Determinants and Implications for Price Dynamics","authors":"Francesco D’Amuri, Marta De Philippis, Elisa Guglielminetti, Salvatore Lo Bello","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad032","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the magnitude and cyclicality of transitions into and out of the labor force, the literature generally considers unemployment as a sufficient statistic of labor market slack. We question this view by jointly estimating natural unemployment and participation rates through a Phillips curve informed by structural labor market flows. Focusing on Italy, a country where flows into and out of the labor force are particularly large, we find that the participation margin accounts for a significant share of total slack and explains one third of the missing inflation that followed the 2011 Sovereign Debt Crisis. Exploiting a reform that sharply and unexpectedly increased the statutory retirement age and expanded labor supply without directly affecting unemployment, we confirm that neglecting the participation gap biases inflation forecasts.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leonardo Gambacorta, Tommaso Oliviero, Hyun Song Shin
Banks with a low price-to-book ratio have a greater propensity to pay out dividends. This propensity is especially marked for banks with a price-to-book ratio below a threshold of 0.7, a situation that characterises many banks in recent years, especially in the euro area. We demonstrate these features using data for 271 advanced economy banks in 29 jurisdictions. Dividend payouts as a proportion of profits rise in a non-linear way as the price-to-book ratio falls below 0.7. In a hypothetical exercise with fixed balance sheet ratios, we find that a suspension of bank dividends in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic would have added, under different stress scenarios and parametrisations, an additional US$0.2–1.1 trillion of bank lending capacity in our sample, equivalent to 0.3–1.6% of total GDP.
{"title":"Low price-to-book ratios and bank dividend payouts: economic policy implications","authors":"Leonardo Gambacorta, Tommaso Oliviero, Hyun Song Shin","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad028","url":null,"abstract":"Banks with a low price-to-book ratio have a greater propensity to pay out dividends. This propensity is especially marked for banks with a price-to-book ratio below a threshold of 0.7, a situation that characterises many banks in recent years, especially in the euro area. We demonstrate these features using data for 271 advanced economy banks in 29 jurisdictions. Dividend payouts as a proportion of profits rise in a non-linear way as the price-to-book ratio falls below 0.7. In a hypothetical exercise with fixed balance sheet ratios, we find that a suspension of bank dividends in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic would have added, under different stress scenarios and parametrisations, an additional US$0.2–1.1 trillion of bank lending capacity in our sample, equivalent to 0.3–1.6% of total GDP.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper empirically shows that the imbalance between an ethnic group’s political and military power is crucial to understanding the likelihood that such a group engages in a conflict. We develop a novel measure of a group’s military power by combining machine learning techniques with rich data on ethnic group characteristics and outcomes of civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. We couple this measure with available indicators of an ethnic group’s political power as well as with a novel proxy based on information about the ethnicity of cabinet members. We find that groups characterized by a higher mismatch between military and political power are between 30% and 50% more likely to engage in a conflict against their government depending on the specification used. We also find that the effects of power mismatch are nonlinear, which is in agreement with the predictions of a simple model that accounts for the cost of conflict. Moreover, our results suggest that high-mismatched groups are typically involved in larger and centrist conflicts. The policy implication is that power-sharing recommendations and institutional design policies for peace should consider primarily the reduction of power mismatches between relevant groups, rather than focusing exclusively on equalizing political power in isolation.
{"title":"Power Mismatch and Civil Conflict: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Massimo Morelli, Laura Ogliari, Long Hong","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiad030","url":null,"abstract":"This paper empirically shows that the imbalance between an ethnic group’s political and military power is crucial to understanding the likelihood that such a group engages in a conflict. We develop a novel measure of a group’s military power by combining machine learning techniques with rich data on ethnic group characteristics and outcomes of civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. We couple this measure with available indicators of an ethnic group’s political power as well as with a novel proxy based on information about the ethnicity of cabinet members. We find that groups characterized by a higher mismatch between military and political power are between 30% and 50% more likely to engage in a conflict against their government depending on the specification used. We also find that the effects of power mismatch are nonlinear, which is in agreement with the predictions of a simple model that accounts for the cost of conflict. Moreover, our results suggest that high-mismatched groups are typically involved in larger and centrist conflicts. The policy implication is that power-sharing recommendations and institutional design policies for peace should consider primarily the reduction of power mismatches between relevant groups, rather than focusing exclusively on equalizing political power in isolation.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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