British Journal of Industrial Relations最新文献

The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) is based on an annual 1% sample of employee jobs and provides many of the UK's official earnings statistics. These statistics are produced using official weights designed to make the achieved sample in each year representative of the population of employee jobs in Britain by gender, age, occupation and region. However, we show that jobs in small, young, private-sector organisations remain significantly under-represented after applying these weights. To address this issue, we develop new weights and demonstrate their importance through policy-relevant examples. Our new estimates suggest that the bite of the National Living Wage is greater than previously reported, and the gender pay gap is wider. We conclude that a new official review of the methodology for ASHE is merited to improve the accuracy and reliability of data informing earnings analysis and research in the United Kingdom.

In April 2016, the National Living Wage (NLW) raised the statutory wage floor for employees in the United Kingdom aged 25 and above by 50 pence per hour. This uprating was almost double any in the previous decade and expanded the share of jobs covered by the wage floor by around 50%. Using a difference-in-differences approach with linked employer–employee data from the UK's Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, we examine how the introduction and uprating of the NLW affected the likelihood of minimum-wage employees changing firms. We find some evidence that the NLW reduced the rate of job-to-job transitions among such workers, consistent with predictions that an increase in the wage floor discourages job search. However, we find no evidence that the NLW affected differences in job mobility between minimum wage workers and their co-workers in the same firm. Together, these findings suggest that the increased wage floor made quits less attractive to minimum-wage workers in firms with limited opportunities for progression.

Presenteeism behaviour, that is, working despite illness, is a common phenomenon worldwide and can have severe consequences for employees and firms alike. In this study, we investigate the relationship between the use of company performance appraisals and employees’ presenteeism behaviour. We use linked-employer–employee data (the German Linked Personnel Panel) and apply pooled Poisson as well as linear fixed effects panel estimations. We show that the use of performance appraisals is associated with significantly lower annual presenteeism days in the amount of half a day, which corresponds to a 10% difference from the base rate. The results are driven by performance appraisals that are linked to performance-related pay, in particular. In addition, the significantly negative relationships between performance appraisals or performance pay and presenteeism only emerge when a works council is present at the workplace. Our study contributes to the understanding of employment relation-specific behavioural consequences of management practices.

Wages across occupations in Western Europe have diverged, resulting in increased wage inequality. However, existing theories such as routine-biased technological change (RBTC) or task offshoring fail to explain this trend. We propose a new explanation based on occupational autonomy. Autonomy measures workers' control and influence over their work process based on the tasks required in an occupation. Analysing individual-level data from the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions, we reveal a rising autonomy wage premium, that is, higher wage growth for occupations with higher autonomy, which accurately predicts the observed occupational wage divergence. We also find that the autonomy premium increases more rapidly in countries and industries with greater employee monitoring and outsourcing, as well as in countries with declining minimum wages. These findings imply that low-autonomy occupations have been disadvantaged by recent socioeconomic trends that have altered power relations in the workplace. Notably, our analysis does not support previous explanations for occupational wage trends based on RBTC or task offshoring.

Teamwork has become widely embraced in recent decades; however, its adoption carries significant implications that require thorough understanding. In this article, we study the relationship between teamwork and a number of selection procedures. The use of teams may increase the value of investing in comprehensive selection, as it facilitates the identification of workers with complementary skills. However, teamwork may also substitute intensive selection if team members engage in mutual monitoring. Using data from a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing plants, we find a significant negative association between the number of selection procedures and teamwork that is aligned with the mutual monitoring hypothesis.