Pub Date : 2025-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2025.100969
Hao Jiang , Yong Ma , Tianyang Wang
This paper presents an in-depth exploration, both empirically and theoretically, of how institutional attention impacts market microstructure. Our innovative theoretical model incorporates an information processing constraint into the dynamic strategic trading framework. The model predicts a trade-off where increased institutional attention enhances price informativeness at the expense of market liquidity, and suggests that the unmonetized portion of institutional investors’ information advantage significantly influences the effect of public information about an asset’s fundamental value on market microstructure. Additionally, our findings are substantiated through rigorous empirical analysis.
{"title":"Too many irons in the fire: The impact of limited institutional attention on market microstructure and efficiency","authors":"Hao Jiang , Yong Ma , Tianyang Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2025.100969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.finmar.2025.100969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents an in-depth exploration, both empirically and theoretically, of how institutional attention impacts market microstructure. Our innovative theoretical model incorporates an information processing constraint into the dynamic strategic trading framework. The model predicts a trade-off where increased institutional attention enhances price informativeness at the expense of market liquidity, and suggests that the unmonetized portion of institutional investors’ information advantage significantly influences the effect of public information about an asset’s fundamental value on market microstructure. Additionally, our findings are substantiated through rigorous empirical analysis.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47899,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Markets","volume":"73 ","pages":"Article 100969"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143593434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100960
Keming Li , Takeshi Nishikawa , Ramesh P. Rao
We document a significant reduction in default risk for the pilot firms relative to non-pilot firms during the Reg SHO period. This effect is more pronounced for firms whose default risk was high prior to the program. We also find that the pilot firms adopt greater accounting conservatism during the program and experience improved bond contracting through reductions in covenant usage in newly issued bonds. Lastly, we find significant improvements in investment efficiency and cash holding value for the pilot firms. Our combined evidence supports the disciplinary role of short selling in the financial markets.
{"title":"Does the threat of short selling discipline management? Evidence from default risk changes around regulation SHO","authors":"Keming Li , Takeshi Nishikawa , Ramesh P. Rao","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100960","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100960","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We document a significant reduction in default risk for the pilot firms relative to non-pilot firms during the Reg SHO period. This effect is more pronounced for firms whose default risk was high prior to the program. We also find that the pilot firms adopt greater accounting conservatism during the program and experience improved bond contracting through reductions in covenant usage in newly issued bonds. Lastly, we find significant improvements in investment efficiency and cash holding value for the pilot firms. Our combined evidence supports the disciplinary role of short selling in the financial markets.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47899,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Markets","volume":"73 ","pages":"Article 100960"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143593426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-03-01DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100959
Yusuke Tsujimoto
This paper documents coarse pricing by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s counterparty intermediaries in quantitative easing operations. Although the Fed explicitly sets a tick size of 1/256th in its reverse auctions to purchase Treasury securities, offer prices of primary dealers exhibit strong clustering on coarser grids. Top dealers price more finely, and coarse pricing is particularly prevalent when the security characteristics indicate greater difficulty in precise pricing. I argue that this coarse pricing results from information costs associated with increasing pricing precision. The results also point to a novel role of tick size in affecting dealer competition in central bank operations.
{"title":"Coarse pricing in QE auctions","authors":"Yusuke Tsujimoto","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100959","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100959","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper documents coarse pricing by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s counterparty intermediaries in quantitative easing operations. Although the Fed explicitly sets a tick size of 1/256th in its reverse auctions to purchase Treasury securities, offer prices of primary dealers exhibit strong clustering on coarser grids. Top dealers price more finely, and coarse pricing is particularly prevalent when the security characteristics indicate greater difficulty in precise pricing. I argue that this coarse pricing results from information costs associated with increasing pricing precision. The results also point to a novel role of tick size in affecting dealer competition in central bank operations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47899,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Markets","volume":"73 ","pages":"Article 100959"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143593431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100949
Yang Guo , Lily Yuanzhi Li , Hongda Zhong
Since investor participation is essential for successful IPOs, we hypothesize that issuers share value gain from IPOs with IPO investors, resulting in IPO underpricing. We test the positive relation between value gain and underpricing from the liquidity angle, as improved liquidity via IPO increases firm value. We find supporting evidence that underpricing is positively related to the expected post-IPO liquidity of the issuer. Using two regulation changes as exogenous shocks to share liquidity before and after an IPO, we show that underpricing is more pronounced with better expected post-IPO liquidity or lower pre-IPO liquidity.
{"title":"Bigger pie, bigger slice: liquidity, value gain, and underpricing in IPOs","authors":"Yang Guo , Lily Yuanzhi Li , Hongda Zhong","doi":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100949","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.finmar.2024.100949","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Since investor participation is essential for successful IPOs, we hypothesize that issuers share value gain from IPOs with IPO investors, resulting in IPO underpricing. We test the positive relation between value gain and underpricing from the liquidity angle, as improved liquidity via IPO increases firm value. We find supporting evidence that underpricing is positively related to the expected post-IPO liquidity of the issuer. Using two regulation changes as exogenous shocks to share liquidity before and after an IPO, we show that underpricing is more pronounced with better expected post-IPO liquidity or lower pre-IPO liquidity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47899,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Markets","volume":"72 ","pages":"Article 100949"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143336287","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}