Pub Date : 2024-04-27DOI: 10.1177/09589287241240966
Fiona Gogescu
This article analyses how educational and initial vocational training systems in Europe vary regarding the way in which they structure educational routes for pupils of different academic ability. The study uses cluster analysis to explore the degree of similarity between 25 European countries, including variables related to: stratification within compulsory education; vocational orientation; links between initial vocational education and the labour market; transitions from secondary education; stratification within tertiary education; and links between educational qualifications and labour market outcomes. I identify three clusters of countries that have distinct patterns of stratification. This article contributes to the literature on educational regimes and school-to-work transitions by adding countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and integrating multiple dimensions pertaining to the link between educational and social stratification. Thus, it develops a more encompassing representation of the architecture of educational pathways in different European countries.
{"title":"Mapping the distinct patterns of educational and social stratification in European countries","authors":"Fiona Gogescu","doi":"10.1177/09589287241240966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241240966","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses how educational and initial vocational training systems in Europe vary regarding the way in which they structure educational routes for pupils of different academic ability. The study uses cluster analysis to explore the degree of similarity between 25 European countries, including variables related to: stratification within compulsory education; vocational orientation; links between initial vocational education and the labour market; transitions from secondary education; stratification within tertiary education; and links between educational qualifications and labour market outcomes. I identify three clusters of countries that have distinct patterns of stratification. This article contributes to the literature on educational regimes and school-to-work transitions by adding countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and integrating multiple dimensions pertaining to the link between educational and social stratification. Thus, it develops a more encompassing representation of the architecture of educational pathways in different European countries.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140811372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-05DOI: 10.1177/09589287241240322
Francesco Corti, Robin Huguenot-Noël
Is the EU evolving towards a Re-Insurance Union? The creation of SURE, an EU financial tool to support national short-time work (STW) schemes in the midst of the pandemic, has revitalized debates on fiscal stabilizers as a means to counter economic downturns and protect jobs within the European Union. Drawing from document analyses and 17 interviews with EU and national stakeholders, this study explores the politics underpinning SURE’s adoption following a decade of heated and unsuccessful debates on the European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme (EURS). Through the lens of ‘purposeful opportunism’, the article illustrates how the European Commission leveraged prior EURS insights and the emerging consensus on STW schemes to craft SURE in a way which addressed national concerns about EU-wide welfare harmonization, while positioning the EU as a holding environment for national welfare states. Looking ahead, making SURE a permanent ‘second line of defence’ against macroeconomic shocks could contribute to further substantiating new, EU-wide, social rights codified in the European Pillar of Social Rights.
{"title":"Towards a Re-insurance union? Support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency as an EU response to preserve jobs in the COVID-19 pandemic","authors":"Francesco Corti, Robin Huguenot-Noël","doi":"10.1177/09589287241240322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241240322","url":null,"abstract":"Is the EU evolving towards a Re-Insurance Union? The creation of SURE, an EU financial tool to support national short-time work (STW) schemes in the midst of the pandemic, has revitalized debates on fiscal stabilizers as a means to counter economic downturns and protect jobs within the European Union. Drawing from document analyses and 17 interviews with EU and national stakeholders, this study explores the politics underpinning SURE’s adoption following a decade of heated and unsuccessful debates on the European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme (EURS). Through the lens of ‘purposeful opportunism’, the article illustrates how the European Commission leveraged prior EURS insights and the emerging consensus on STW schemes to craft SURE in a way which addressed national concerns about EU-wide welfare harmonization, while positioning the EU as a holding environment for national welfare states. Looking ahead, making SURE a permanent ‘second line of defence’ against macroeconomic shocks could contribute to further substantiating new, EU-wide, social rights codified in the European Pillar of Social Rights.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140578750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-25DOI: 10.1177/09589287241240311
G. Eick, Benjamin Leruth
This conceptual article and special issue introduction argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms surrounding welfare policy opposition. The first is welfare populism, the opposition to welfare policies that do not benefit the ‘common people’. The second is welfare chauvinism, the opposition to welfare policies for non-natives within a nation-state. The third is welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to welfare policies at the European Union level. These paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied in more detail across different political actors. And while welfare policy opposition may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. This article offers summaries of the special issue contributions with empirical snapshots of welfare policy opposition and concludes with avenues for future research.
{"title":"A farewell to welfare? Conceptualising welfare populism, welfare chauvinism and welfare Euroscepticism","authors":"G. Eick, Benjamin Leruth","doi":"10.1177/09589287241240311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241240311","url":null,"abstract":"This conceptual article and special issue introduction argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms surrounding welfare policy opposition. The first is welfare populism, the opposition to welfare policies that do not benefit the ‘common people’. The second is welfare chauvinism, the opposition to welfare policies for non-natives within a nation-state. The third is welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to welfare policies at the European Union level. These paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied in more detail across different political actors. And while welfare policy opposition may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. This article offers summaries of the special issue contributions with empirical snapshots of welfare policy opposition and concludes with avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140382750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-08DOI: 10.1177/09589287241235802
Alexandre Afonso, Samir Mustafa Negash
Existing research on welfare chauvinism, which involves preferences about the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in welfare programmes, often overlooks individual preferences regarding immigration policy openness (the number of immigrants allowed into a country). This article posits that these two dimensions should be considered together. The reason is that the implications of including or excluding migrants in welfare programmes vary significantly depending on whether a country admits few or many immigrants. Utilizing data from two waves of the European Social Survey across 23 European countries, we develop a typology of individual stances that encapsulate attitudes towards both immigration policy openness and immigrant inclusion in the welfare state. Our analysis reveals that the distribution of these stances varies considerably across European nations. We further examine how the probability of endorsing one of these typologies correlates with individual socio-economic characteristics, especially education. We find that higher education levels are linked to a higher likelihood of supporting either a combination of openness and inclusion or, to a lesser extent, openness paired with welfare exclusion. Additionally, more exclusionary attitudes are observed in countries where welfare usage by migrants is higher.
关于福利沙文主义的现有研究涉及将移民纳入或排除在福利计划之外的偏好，但往往忽略了个人对移民政策开放度（允许进入一个国家的移民数量）的偏好。本文认为应将这两个方面放在一起考虑。原因在于，一个国家接纳的移民数量是少还是多，对福利计划中接纳或排斥移民的影响也大不相同。利用两次欧洲社会调查（European Social Survey）的数据，我们对 23 个欧洲国家的个人立场进行了分类，这些立场既包括对移民政策开放的态度，也包括对将移民纳入福利国家的态度。我们的分析表明，这些立场在欧洲各国的分布差异很大。我们进一步研究了赞同其中一种类型的概率与个人社会经济特征（尤其是教育程度）之间的关系。我们发现，教育水平越高，越有可能支持开放与包容的结合，或者在较小程度上支持开放与福利排斥的结合。此外，在移民使用福利较多的国家，我们观察到了更多的排斥态度。
{"title":"Building a wall around the welfare state, or around the country? Preferences for immigrant welfare inclusion and immigration policy openness in Europe","authors":"Alexandre Afonso, Samir Mustafa Negash","doi":"10.1177/09589287241235802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241235802","url":null,"abstract":"Existing research on welfare chauvinism, which involves preferences about the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in welfare programmes, often overlooks individual preferences regarding immigration policy openness (the number of immigrants allowed into a country). This article posits that these two dimensions should be considered together. The reason is that the implications of including or excluding migrants in welfare programmes vary significantly depending on whether a country admits few or many immigrants. Utilizing data from two waves of the European Social Survey across 23 European countries, we develop a typology of individual stances that encapsulate attitudes towards both immigration policy openness and immigrant inclusion in the welfare state. Our analysis reveals that the distribution of these stances varies considerably across European nations. We further examine how the probability of endorsing one of these typologies correlates with individual socio-economic characteristics, especially education. We find that higher education levels are linked to a higher likelihood of supporting either a combination of openness and inclusion or, to a lesser extent, openness paired with welfare exclusion. Additionally, more exclusionary attitudes are observed in countries where welfare usage by migrants is higher.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140071575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-01DOI: 10.1177/09589287241232817
Katy Jones, Calum Carson
This chapter explores employer perspectives on the extension of behavioural conditionality to working social security claimants (‘in-work conditionality’). As policymakers across Europe and other developed nations have pursued increasingly interventionist approaches to activating the unemployed through conditional welfare policies, the UK has gone a significant and ‘unprecedented’ step further by requiring those in receipt of in-work benefits to demonstrate their efforts to increase their working hours and/or pay. As the actors ultimately in control over the jobs people can access and progress in, understanding employer perspectives on this new policy development is critical, which, however, has so far been overlooked by policymakers and researchers. We address this omission through presenting original analysis of 84 semi-structured interviews conducted with a diverse group of employers. We find that while the UK’s Work First approach to activation has seemingly encountered little resistance from employers to date, this new Work First, Work More approach may be a step too far. We contribute theoretically by identifying a potential role for employers as latent path disruptors in policy development, and challenge the commonly-held assumption that employers are typically supportive of extensions of behavioural conditionality to social security claimants.
{"title":"A step too far: Employer perspectives on in-work conditionality","authors":"Katy Jones, Calum Carson","doi":"10.1177/09589287241232817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241232817","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores employer perspectives on the extension of behavioural conditionality to working social security claimants (‘in-work conditionality’). As policymakers across Europe and other developed nations have pursued increasingly interventionist approaches to activating the unemployed through conditional welfare policies, the UK has gone a significant and ‘unprecedented’ step further by requiring those in receipt of in-work benefits to demonstrate their efforts to increase their working hours and/or pay. As the actors ultimately in control over the jobs people can access and progress in, understanding employer perspectives on this new policy development is critical, which, however, has so far been overlooked by policymakers and researchers. We address this omission through presenting original analysis of 84 semi-structured interviews conducted with a diverse group of employers. We find that while the UK’s Work First approach to activation has seemingly encountered little resistance from employers to date, this new Work First, Work More approach may be a step too far. We contribute theoretically by identifying a potential role for employers as latent path disruptors in policy development, and challenge the commonly-held assumption that employers are typically supportive of extensions of behavioural conditionality to social security claimants.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140032544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-29DOI: 10.1177/09589287241231893
Gianna M Eick
While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.
{"title":"Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status","authors":"Gianna M Eick","doi":"10.1177/09589287241231893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241231893","url":null,"abstract":"While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140032535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-29DOI: 10.1177/09589287241232272
András Gábos, Barbara Binder, Réka Branyiczki, István György Tóth
Despite the rise in employment, consistently high EU-average poverty rates continue to generate debates about the factors that explain the level and changes in the relative poverty rate, both within and across countries. Assuming a strong negative correlation between poverty and employment, the article investigates the role of four mechanisms responsible for this blurred relationship. Using decomposition analysis and macro-level regression analysis, we investigate the extent to which (i) the distribution of employment across households with different levels of work intensity, (ii) the expansion of non-standard work, (iii) the change in the effectiveness of social welfare systems, and (iv) the change in median income and the corresponding shift in the poverty threshold have contributed to changes in relative income poverty in the last decades. We found that employment growth benefits poverty reduction, but this positive effect was partially offset by the precarious characteristics of some newly created jobs. If the distribution of jobs had favoured the jobless more in the pre-crisis period, the relative income poverty rate would have been lower. Although the share of persons in jobless households decreased during the recovery years, their risk of poverty increased due to the retrenchment of social transfers during and after the Great Recession. Furthermore, the use of a floating threshold, which is linked to changes in median income, underestimates the strength of the relationships between poverty, employment and social transfers: when the poverty threshold is kept fixed, not only do the dynamics of poverty look different, but the estimated coefficients are considerably larger.
{"title":"Unravelling the relationship between employment, social transfers and income poverty: Policy and measurement","authors":"András Gábos, Barbara Binder, Réka Branyiczki, István György Tóth","doi":"10.1177/09589287241232272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241232272","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the rise in employment, consistently high EU-average poverty rates continue to generate debates about the factors that explain the level and changes in the relative poverty rate, both within and across countries. Assuming a strong negative correlation between poverty and employment, the article investigates the role of four mechanisms responsible for this blurred relationship. Using decomposition analysis and macro-level regression analysis, we investigate the extent to which (i) the distribution of employment across households with different levels of work intensity, (ii) the expansion of non-standard work, (iii) the change in the effectiveness of social welfare systems, and (iv) the change in median income and the corresponding shift in the poverty threshold have contributed to changes in relative income poverty in the last decades. We found that employment growth benefits poverty reduction, but this positive effect was partially offset by the precarious characteristics of some newly created jobs. If the distribution of jobs had favoured the jobless more in the pre-crisis period, the relative income poverty rate would have been lower. Although the share of persons in jobless households decreased during the recovery years, their risk of poverty increased due to the retrenchment of social transfers during and after the Great Recession. Furthermore, the use of a floating threshold, which is linked to changes in median income, underestimates the strength of the relationships between poverty, employment and social transfers: when the poverty threshold is kept fixed, not only do the dynamics of poverty look different, but the estimated coefficients are considerably larger.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140032610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-21DOI: 10.1177/09589287241231889
Karen Hermans, Bea Cantillon, Sarah Marchal
In recent decades, disappointing poverty trends and welfare state limitations in many European countries – including constraints on minimum income benefits – have paved the way for a larger role of the third sector. An interesting but controversial form of third-sector in-kind support is food aid provision. In Europe, food aid is, so far, a non-rights-based practice displaying worrisome discretionary and stigmatizing characteristics. Yet, the phenomenon of food aid in Europe has spread, professionalized, and penetrated the institutions of the welfare state. This raises the question if, how and to what extent food aid plays a role in bypassing structural constraints on minimum income protection. This article applies an exploratory case study approach to estimate the monetary value of food aid in relation to statutory minimum incomes in four EU-countries. We use cross-nationally comparable food reference budgets to price food aid packages in Belgium, Finland, Hungary and Spain. The results show that food aid, although not sufficient to close the at-risk-of-poverty gap, is non-trivial for some European households. In Spain and Belgium food aid packages can reach up to €100 a month (expressing 7% to 11% of respective minimum income benefit levels). Importantly, we perceive (formalized) cooperation and interaction between local welfare agencies and food charities in all countries, suggesting that welfare state actors use non-rights-based food aid for filling gaps in the social safety net. The large between- and within-country variation of the monetary values of food aid packages points, however, to food aid as a problematic discretionary practice.
{"title":"Shifts at the margin of European welfare states: How important is food aid in complementing inadequate minimum incomes?","authors":"Karen Hermans, Bea Cantillon, Sarah Marchal","doi":"10.1177/09589287241231889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241231889","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, disappointing poverty trends and welfare state limitations in many European countries – including constraints on minimum income benefits – have paved the way for a larger role of the third sector. An interesting but controversial form of third-sector in-kind support is food aid provision. In Europe, food aid is, so far, a non-rights-based practice displaying worrisome discretionary and stigmatizing characteristics. Yet, the phenomenon of food aid in Europe has spread, professionalized, and penetrated the institutions of the welfare state. This raises the question if, how and to what extent food aid plays a role in bypassing structural constraints on minimum income protection. This article applies an exploratory case study approach to estimate the monetary value of food aid in relation to statutory minimum incomes in four EU-countries. We use cross-nationally comparable food reference budgets to price food aid packages in Belgium, Finland, Hungary and Spain. The results show that food aid, although not sufficient to close the at-risk-of-poverty gap, is non-trivial for some European households. In Spain and Belgium food aid packages can reach up to €100 a month (expressing 7% to 11% of respective minimum income benefit levels). Importantly, we perceive (formalized) cooperation and interaction between local welfare agencies and food charities in all countries, suggesting that welfare state actors use non-rights-based food aid for filling gaps in the social safety net. The large between- and within-country variation of the monetary values of food aid packages points, however, to food aid as a problematic discretionary practice.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139950017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-20DOI: 10.1177/09589287241231885
Peter Starke, Georg Wenzelburger
When it comes to the relationship between social policy and penal policy, existing scholarship often focuses on the penal–welfare tradeoff, according to which countries with large and generous welfare states tend to have lower incarceration rates and less harsh treatment of offenders. We know much less about the relationship between the punitive turn in criminal justice and the use of discipline within social policy. Has there been a parallel trend of law-and-order policies and stricter benefit conditionality, a kind of ‘criminalization’ of welfare beneficiaries, as critical scholarship suggests? We test this idea for the first time with quantitative data, using public spending on public order and safety and unemployment benefit conditionality data for 18 rich democracies between 1990 and 2012, that is, the period when a punitive turn as well as the rise of activation and workfare is said to have taken place. Contrary to the critical literature, we do not find evidence of parallel trends toward more discipline in both areas, but rather a negative relationship of ‘communicating vessels’, where a greater use of disciplinary tools in social policy is associated with stagnating or even shrinking spending on police and prisons. Moreover, this pattern tends to emerge under conditions of higher welfare state generosity. These findings have important implications about the role of state ‘discipline’ in contemporary policymaking.
{"title":"Disciplinary welfare and the punitive turn in criminal justice: Parallel trends or communicating vessels?","authors":"Peter Starke, Georg Wenzelburger","doi":"10.1177/09589287241231885","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241231885","url":null,"abstract":"When it comes to the relationship between social policy and penal policy, existing scholarship often focuses on the penal–welfare tradeoff, according to which countries with large and generous welfare states tend to have lower incarceration rates and less harsh treatment of offenders. We know much less about the relationship between the punitive turn in criminal justice and the use of discipline within social policy. Has there been a parallel trend of law-and-order policies and stricter benefit conditionality, a kind of ‘criminalization’ of welfare beneficiaries, as critical scholarship suggests? We test this idea for the first time with quantitative data, using public spending on public order and safety and unemployment benefit conditionality data for 18 rich democracies between 1990 and 2012, that is, the period when a punitive turn as well as the rise of activation and workfare is said to have taken place. Contrary to the critical literature, we do not find evidence of parallel trends toward more discipline in both areas, but rather a negative relationship of ‘communicating vessels’, where a greater use of disciplinary tools in social policy is associated with stagnating or even shrinking spending on police and prisons. Moreover, this pattern tends to emerge under conditions of higher welfare state generosity. These findings have important implications about the role of state ‘discipline’ in contemporary policymaking.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139949912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.1177/09589287241229304
Matthias Enggist, Silja Häusermann
Welfare chauvinism and welfare populism as characteristic features of radical right parties’ welfare stances have become challenges to the welfare state. However, in order to understand how these claims may indeed affect welfare politics, it is essential to study whether welfare chauvinism and welfare populism attract voters beyond the radical right, especially among the mainstream right or even parts of the left. Results based on original public opinion data in eight Western European countries show that, contrary to widespread assumptions, welfare chauvinism and welfare populism divide the right more than the left. Electorates of not only green, but also most social democratic and radical left parties are consistently most opposed to discriminating welfare rights between natives and immigrants, although this opposition is weaker among left working-class voters than among left middle-class voters. Even voters of most mainstream right parties show only moderate support for welfare populism and welfare chauvinism, leaving the fervent support of radical right voters for welfare chauvinism and populism unmatched by any other electorate. These findings have important implications for the strategic situation of left parties and for understanding how welfare chauvinism and welfare populism may challenge welfare states.
{"title":"Partisan preference divides regarding welfare chauvinism and welfare populism – Appealing only to radical right voters or beyond?","authors":"Matthias Enggist, Silja Häusermann","doi":"10.1177/09589287241229304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09589287241229304","url":null,"abstract":"Welfare chauvinism and welfare populism as characteristic features of radical right parties’ welfare stances have become challenges to the welfare state. However, in order to understand how these claims may indeed affect welfare politics, it is essential to study whether welfare chauvinism and welfare populism attract voters beyond the radical right, especially among the mainstream right or even parts of the left. Results based on original public opinion data in eight Western European countries show that, contrary to widespread assumptions, welfare chauvinism and welfare populism divide the right more than the left. Electorates of not only green, but also most social democratic and radical left parties are consistently most opposed to discriminating welfare rights between natives and immigrants, although this opposition is weaker among left working-class voters than among left middle-class voters. Even voters of most mainstream right parties show only moderate support for welfare populism and welfare chauvinism, leaving the fervent support of radical right voters for welfare chauvinism and populism unmatched by any other electorate. These findings have important implications for the strategic situation of left parties and for understanding how welfare chauvinism and welfare populism may challenge welfare states.","PeriodicalId":47919,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Social Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139837637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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