When I received the invitation to review Pensamento Feminista Hoje: Perspectivas Decoloniais (Feminist Thought Today: Decolonial Perspectives), I was excited to engage in this work that centers leading feminist scholars from around the world, published in Portuguese. However, my second thought was, they do realize that I’m a feminist anthropologist, and not a feminist philosopher, right? In this essay, I will offer a brief description and overview of the book, as well as a detailed description of a subset of essays that offer key contributions, from my perspective as a Black feminist anthropologist. A key strength of this book is the national, regional, linguistic, racial, and ethnic diversity of the contributors. Of the twenty-two contributors, eleven are from Brazil, two are from Ecuador, two are from Bolivia, and two are from the Dominican Republic, as well as one contributor each from Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Algeria, and Nigeria. Eight of the contributors self-identify as Black. In this sense, the editor, Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda, certainly reflects an awareness of the diversity of women’s lives and transnational feminist perspectives. The book is divided into three major sections: “Desafiando Matrizes” (Challenging Matrices); “Práticas Decolonais” (Decolonial Practices); and “Outras Línguas: Três Artistas Brasileiras” (Other Languages: Three Brazilian Artists). The editor admits that these divisions are arbitrary, and that they “reinforce the urgency of eliminating the binary between theory and practice” (30). The book consists of an introduction, sixteen chapters, and includes three artist profiles at the end. In the introduction, Buarque de Hollanda offers an overview of the decolonial turn, summarizing some of the key interventions of Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Anibal Quijano, and María Lugones. Maldonado-Torres defines the decolonial turn as “a movement of political and epistemological resistance to the logic of modernity/coloniality” (16). Buarque de Hollanda asserts that decolonial feminism “denounces the structural imbrication of notions of heteronormativity, racial classification, and the capitalist system” (17). She provides a chapter overview that highlights key interventions from the contributors, such as Julieta Paredes’s concept of “community feminism,” and Maria da Graça Costa’s argument that feminism is crucial to agroecology. The “Challenging Matrices” section opens with a foundational 1988 essay by Afro-Brazilian feminist scholar Lélia Gonzalez, which denounces how feminism has often “forgotten” about the racial question. Drawing upon Lacanian thought, Gonzalez argues that Black women have been “spoken about, defined and classified
当我收到评论《Pensameto Feminista Hoje:Perspectivas Decolonias》（今日女权主义思想：非殖民化视角）的邀请时，我很高兴能参与这项以葡萄牙语出版的以世界各地领先女权主义学者为中心的工作。然而，我的第二个想法是，他们确实意识到我是一位女权主义人类学家，而不是女权主义哲学家，对吧？在这篇文章中，我将从我作为一名黑人女权主义人类学家的角度，对这本书进行简要描述和概述，并对一些有重要贡献的文章进行详细描述。这本书的一个关键优势是作者的国家、地区、语言、种族和民族多样性。在22个捐款人中，11个来自巴西，2个来自厄瓜多尔，2个玻利维亚，2个多米尼加共和国，哥伦比亚、阿根廷、秘鲁、阿尔及利亚和尼日利亚各有一个捐款人。其中八位贡献者自称为黑人。从这个意义上说，编辑Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda无疑反映了对女性生活多样性和跨国女权主义观点的认识。这本书分为三个主要部分：“Desafiando矩阵”（挑战矩阵）；“Práticas Decolonais”（非殖民化实践）；以及“Outras Línguas:Três Artistas Brasileiras”（其他语言：三位巴西艺术家）。编辑承认，这些划分是武断的，它们“加强了消除理论和实践之间二元性的紧迫性”（30）。这本书由十六章的引言组成，最后包括三个艺术家简介。在引言中，Buarque de Hollanda概述了非殖民化的转变，总结了Nelson Maldonado Torres、Anibal Quijano和María Lugones的一些关键干预措施。马尔多纳多·托雷斯将非殖民化转向定义为“对现代性/殖民主义逻辑的政治和认识论抵抗运动”（16）。Buarque de Hollanda断言，非殖民化女权主义“谴责非规范性、种族分类和资本主义制度概念的结构性重叠”（17）。她提供了一章概述，重点介绍了作者的关键干预措施，如Julieta Paredes的“社区女权主义”概念，以及Maria da Graça Costa关于女权主义对农业生态学至关重要的论点。“挑战矩阵”部分以1988年非裔巴西女权主义学者Lélia Gonzalez的一篇基础文章开场，该文章谴责女权主义如何经常“忘记”种族问题。冈萨雷斯借鉴拉康主义思想，认为黑人女性已经“被谈论、定义和分类”
{"title":"Pensamento Feminista Hoje: Perspectivas Decoloniais. Heloísa Buarque de Hollanda, editor. Rio de Janeiro: Bazar do Tempo, 2020 (ISBN: 978-85-69924-78-4)","authors":"Erica L. Williams","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.43","url":null,"abstract":"When I received the invitation to review Pensamento Feminista Hoje: Perspectivas Decoloniais (Feminist Thought Today: Decolonial Perspectives), I was excited to engage in this work that centers leading feminist scholars from around the world, published in Portuguese. However, my second thought was, they do realize that I’m a feminist anthropologist, and not a feminist philosopher, right? In this essay, I will offer a brief description and overview of the book, as well as a detailed description of a subset of essays that offer key contributions, from my perspective as a Black feminist anthropologist. A key strength of this book is the national, regional, linguistic, racial, and ethnic diversity of the contributors. Of the twenty-two contributors, eleven are from Brazil, two are from Ecuador, two are from Bolivia, and two are from the Dominican Republic, as well as one contributor each from Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Algeria, and Nigeria. Eight of the contributors self-identify as Black. In this sense, the editor, Heloisa Buarque de Hollanda, certainly reflects an awareness of the diversity of women’s lives and transnational feminist perspectives. The book is divided into three major sections: “Desafiando Matrizes” (Challenging Matrices); “Práticas Decolonais” (Decolonial Practices); and “Outras Línguas: Três Artistas Brasileiras” (Other Languages: Three Brazilian Artists). The editor admits that these divisions are arbitrary, and that they “reinforce the urgency of eliminating the binary between theory and practice” (30). The book consists of an introduction, sixteen chapters, and includes three artist profiles at the end. In the introduction, Buarque de Hollanda offers an overview of the decolonial turn, summarizing some of the key interventions of Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Anibal Quijano, and María Lugones. Maldonado-Torres defines the decolonial turn as “a movement of political and epistemological resistance to the logic of modernity/coloniality” (16). Buarque de Hollanda asserts that decolonial feminism “denounces the structural imbrication of notions of heteronormativity, racial classification, and the capitalist system” (17). She provides a chapter overview that highlights key interventions from the contributors, such as Julieta Paredes’s concept of “community feminism,” and Maria da Graça Costa’s argument that feminism is crucial to agroecology. The “Challenging Matrices” section opens with a foundational 1988 essay by Afro-Brazilian feminist scholar Lélia Gonzalez, which denounces how feminism has often “forgotten” about the racial question. Drawing upon Lacanian thought, Gonzalez argues that Black women have been “spoken about, defined and classified","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49381796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Emancipatory Thinking: Simone de Beauvoir and Contemporary Political Thought. Elaine Stavro. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018 (ISBN 9780773553545)","authors":"Lior Levy","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.37","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49548125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Devuélvannos el Oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales brings together the results of more than a year of workshops, exhibitions, public interventions, reflections, and artistic manifestations by the Colectivo Ayllu. Located in Spain, this action group brings together collective research and artistic and political intervention from racialized migrants and queer, sexual, and gender dissidents from former Spanish colonies all over the world. Devuélvannos el Oro includes more than thirty documents of this work, many of which were included in the exhibition of the same name organized in Centro de Residencias Artísticas de Matadero Madrid in 2017. Across a wide variety of genres and styles, the collection comprises photo-performances, poems, visual interventions, personal reflections, and essays. Many of the documents, like their creators and the collective itself, resist being included in the traditional categories with which we have been taught to understand the world, performing the very disruption that the book aims to describe and prescribe, a “shifting/orgasming [corrimien to] of the normative forms of rationalist and intellectualocentric knowledge” (10). The character of this resistance is already graspable in the concept of “ayllu,” which gives the collective its name and is invoked as the central image of the book. Ayllu is a Quechua and Aymara form of community that has existed in different regions of the Andes, in what today is known as South America, before the extension of the Inca empire; it still exists today. The word refers to the form of political organization in place (the shared distribution of labor in an area, not necessarily self-sufficient, based on relations of solidarity and exchange with other ayllus), but also to community ties: ayllus comprise people who see themselves as sharing a distant ancestry, and thus constitute a form of extended family defined by their location in the mountains and not necessarily by blood ties. This last element speaks eloquently of the character of those included in Devuélvannos el Oro, and of the collective itself. Their tenuous location in the “Kingdom of Spain,” particularly Madrid, sometimes makes it impossible for them to be identified as racialized migrants rejected by the racist Spanish society, undocumented and othered, exoticized and fetishized. Yet there a kind of family tie summons writers, artists, and activists to the book and to the workshops and interventions of the collective, which can also be extended toward different territories colonized by Spain in the Americas and Africa.
Devuélvannos el Oro：反殖民主义的宇宙观汇集了Colectivo Ayllu一年多的研讨会、展览、公共干预、反思和艺术表现的成果。该行动小组位于西班牙，汇集了来自世界各地种族化移民以及来自西班牙前殖民地的酷儿、性和性别异见人士的集体研究以及艺术和政治干预。Devuélvannos el Oro收录了这幅作品的30多份文件，其中许多文件被收录在2017年马德里马塔德罗艺术中心组织的同名展览中。该集涵盖了多种类型和风格，包括摄影表演、诗歌、视觉干预、个人反思和散文。许多文件，就像它们的创造者和集体本身一样，都拒绝被纳入我们被教导理解世界的传统类别，这正是本书旨在描述和规定的破坏，是“理性主义和以知识为中心的知识的规范形式的转变/高潮”（10）。这种抵抗的特点已经体现在“ayllu”的概念中，它为集体命名，并被称为本书的中心形象。Ayllu是一个克丘亚和艾马拉社区，在印加帝国扩张之前，它已经存在于安第斯山脉的不同地区，即今天的南美洲；它至今仍然存在。这个词指的是现有的政治组织形式（在一个地区的共同劳动分配，不一定是自给自足的，基于与其他ayllus的团结和交流关系），也指的是社区关系：ayllus包括那些认为自己有着远祖的人，因此构成了一种由他们在山区的位置而不一定由血缘关系定义的大家庭形式。最后一个元素雄辩地说明了Devuélvannos el Oro中所包含的人的性格，以及集体本身。他们在“西班牙王国”，特别是马德里的脆弱位置，有时使他们不可能被认定为被种族主义西班牙社会拒绝的种族化移民，没有证件和其他身份，异国情调和恋物癖。然而，有一种家庭纽带将作家、艺术家和活动家召集到这本书、集体的研讨会和干预活动中，这种联系也可以扩展到西班牙在美洲和非洲殖民的不同领土。
{"title":"Devuélvannos el Oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales. Colectivo Ayllu. Madrid: Matadero. Centro de Residencias Artísticas, 2018","authors":"Miguel Gualdrón Ramírez","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.38","url":null,"abstract":"Devuélvannos el Oro: Cosmovisiones perversas y acciones anticoloniales brings together the results of more than a year of workshops, exhibitions, public interventions, reflections, and artistic manifestations by the Colectivo Ayllu. Located in Spain, this action group brings together collective research and artistic and political intervention from racialized migrants and queer, sexual, and gender dissidents from former Spanish colonies all over the world. Devuélvannos el Oro includes more than thirty documents of this work, many of which were included in the exhibition of the same name organized in Centro de Residencias Artísticas de Matadero Madrid in 2017. Across a wide variety of genres and styles, the collection comprises photo-performances, poems, visual interventions, personal reflections, and essays. Many of the documents, like their creators and the collective itself, resist being included in the traditional categories with which we have been taught to understand the world, performing the very disruption that the book aims to describe and prescribe, a “shifting/orgasming [corrimien to] of the normative forms of rationalist and intellectualocentric knowledge” (10). The character of this resistance is already graspable in the concept of “ayllu,” which gives the collective its name and is invoked as the central image of the book. Ayllu is a Quechua and Aymara form of community that has existed in different regions of the Andes, in what today is known as South America, before the extension of the Inca empire; it still exists today. The word refers to the form of political organization in place (the shared distribution of labor in an area, not necessarily self-sufficient, based on relations of solidarity and exchange with other ayllus), but also to community ties: ayllus comprise people who see themselves as sharing a distant ancestry, and thus constitute a form of extended family defined by their location in the mountains and not necessarily by blood ties. This last element speaks eloquently of the character of those included in Devuélvannos el Oro, and of the collective itself. Their tenuous location in the “Kingdom of Spain,” particularly Madrid, sometimes makes it impossible for them to be identified as racialized migrants rejected by the racist Spanish society, undocumented and othered, exoticized and fetishized. Yet there a kind of family tie summons writers, artists, and activists to the book and to the workshops and interventions of the collective, which can also be extended toward different territories colonized by Spain in the Americas and Africa.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49032945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ELIZABETH ANDERSON is Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, A n n Arbor. She is the author of Value in Ethics and Economics (1993) and various articles on value theory, democratic theory, philosophy of law and feminist epistemology, and philosophy of science. Her recent publications include “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001); and “Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,” New York University Law Review 77 (November 2002). (eandersn@umich.edu)
{"title":"Notes On Contributors","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/camqtly/bfac031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/camqtly/bfac031","url":null,"abstract":"ELIZABETH ANDERSON is Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Michigan, A n n Arbor. She is the author of Value in Ethics and Economics (1993) and various articles on value theory, democratic theory, philosophy of law and feminist epistemology, and philosophy of science. Her recent publications include “Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2001); and “Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,” New York University Law Review 77 (November 2002). (eandersn@umich.edu)","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"19 1","pages":"306 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47910032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Passions of Our Time. Julia Kristeva, Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman; translated by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2019 (ISBN: 9780231171441)","authors":"Fanny Söderbäck","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.27","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.27","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48066372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 – 2022 highlights, once again, the many preexisting inequalities and sources of oppression cutting across and throughout our societies. Petra Bueskens ’ s Modern Motherhood and Women ’ s Dual Identities: Rewriting the Sexual Contract examines the foundations and manifestations of one of these fractures, that is, the continued oppression of women. Although written before the global pandemic, Bueskens ’ s analysis helps us to understand both the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern societies and in doing so sheds light on why the pandemic hit women so hard. So hard that UN Women concluded in 2020 that “ while everyone is facing unprecedented challenges, women are bearing the brunt of the economic and social fallout of COVID-19 ” (UN Women 2020). Moreover, Bueskens claims to offer insight into one possible pathway for disrupting this continuing oppression and for rewriting the sexual contract that underwrites that oppression. Bueskens traces the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern society to a “ conundrum of duality ” (91). It is through this duality that liberalism and capitalism promise women freedom while capturing them in gender roles and institutions enforcing those roles and their continued subordination. In Bueskens ’ s words, this conundrum produced conditions in which “ women ’ s freedom as individuals simultaneously produced their constraints as mothers and wives ” (91). In this way, Bueskens returns us to the rallying cry of the second wave of feminist activists and theorists: “ the personal is political. ” She demonstrates the essential relevance of this assertion for understanding women ’ s oppression today and also points to the immense unfinished work that remains if women ’ s oppression is to be, or can be, addressed within liberal or capitalist societies. Bueskens focuses on Carole Pateman
{"title":"Modern Motherhood and Women's Dual Identities: Rewriting the Sexual Contract. Petra Bueskens, New York: Routledge, 2018 (ISBN 978-1-138-67742-5)","authors":"M. Walsh","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.29","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.29","url":null,"abstract":"The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 – 2022 highlights, once again, the many preexisting inequalities and sources of oppression cutting across and throughout our societies. Petra Bueskens ’ s Modern Motherhood and Women ’ s Dual Identities: Rewriting the Sexual Contract examines the foundations and manifestations of one of these fractures, that is, the continued oppression of women. Although written before the global pandemic, Bueskens ’ s analysis helps us to understand both the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern societies and in doing so sheds light on why the pandemic hit women so hard. So hard that UN Women concluded in 2020 that “ while everyone is facing unprecedented challenges, women are bearing the brunt of the economic and social fallout of COVID-19 ” (UN Women 2020). Moreover, Bueskens claims to offer insight into one possible pathway for disrupting this continuing oppression and for rewriting the sexual contract that underwrites that oppression. Bueskens traces the theoretical and structural roots of women ’ s oppression in modern society to a “ conundrum of duality ” (91). It is through this duality that liberalism and capitalism promise women freedom while capturing them in gender roles and institutions enforcing those roles and their continued subordination. In Bueskens ’ s words, this conundrum produced conditions in which “ women ’ s freedom as individuals simultaneously produced their constraints as mothers and wives ” (91). In this way, Bueskens returns us to the rallying cry of the second wave of feminist activists and theorists: “ the personal is political. ” She demonstrates the essential relevance of this assertion for understanding women ’ s oppression today and also points to the immense unfinished work that remains if women ’ s oppression is to be, or can be, addressed within liberal or capitalist societies. Bueskens focuses on Carole Pateman","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48843199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The gendered division of labor (GDL) is the phenomenon whereby most unpaid household and caring work is done by women, regardless of whether they also do paid work outside of the home. It is sustained by ideologies, practices, and institutional arrangements. Examples include workplace norms demanding worker dedication, which leave workers little time for domestic work, and ideals of motherhood that encourage women to devote themselves unflaggingly to their children. A gender-egalitarian division of labor obtains when domestic labor is divided more or less equally between men and women. Gina Schouten ’ s Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor presents a careful, sophisticated, if somewhat elaborate, argument that the coercive realization of increased opportunities for a gender-egalitarian division of labor can be justified using the limited, but, we assume, independently justified, tools of political liberalism. Schouten begins by presenting data showing that the GDL is indeed entrenched and that individual strategies for avoiding it are costly and difficult. Chapter 2 first explains the obstacle political liberalism presents to combating the GDL, namely the neutrality constraint. This constraint prohibits policies justified by appeal to a particular world-view, such as Catholicism or classical liberalism. Second, it considers and rejects some options for working around this constraint. They include the claim that opposition to a gender-egalitarian division of labor is unreasonable, that the GDL is nonvol-untary, and that it violates basic liberties. Chapters 3 and 5 rebut two prominent arguments for implementing a gender-egalitarian division of labor that observe the neutrality constraint. One claims that the GDL is a type of distributive injustice and the other claims that the GDL undermines women ’ s equal citizenship. Schouten ’ s alternative “ stability argument, ” which I reconstruct below, unfolds in chapters 4, 6, and 7.
{"title":"Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor. Gina Schouten. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019 (ISBN 978-019881307)","authors":"Cynthia A. Stark","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.28","url":null,"abstract":"The gendered division of labor (GDL) is the phenomenon whereby most unpaid household and caring work is done by women, regardless of whether they also do paid work outside of the home. It is sustained by ideologies, practices, and institutional arrangements. Examples include workplace norms demanding worker dedication, which leave workers little time for domestic work, and ideals of motherhood that encourage women to devote themselves unflaggingly to their children. A gender-egalitarian division of labor obtains when domestic labor is divided more or less equally between men and women. Gina Schouten ’ s Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor presents a careful, sophisticated, if somewhat elaborate, argument that the coercive realization of increased opportunities for a gender-egalitarian division of labor can be justified using the limited, but, we assume, independently justified, tools of political liberalism. Schouten begins by presenting data showing that the GDL is indeed entrenched and that individual strategies for avoiding it are costly and difficult. Chapter 2 first explains the obstacle political liberalism presents to combating the GDL, namely the neutrality constraint. This constraint prohibits policies justified by appeal to a particular world-view, such as Catholicism or classical liberalism. Second, it considers and rejects some options for working around this constraint. They include the claim that opposition to a gender-egalitarian division of labor is unreasonable, that the GDL is nonvol-untary, and that it violates basic liberties. Chapters 3 and 5 rebut two prominent arguments for implementing a gender-egalitarian division of labor that observe the neutrality constraint. One claims that the GDL is a type of distributive injustice and the other claims that the GDL undermines women ’ s equal citizenship. Schouten ’ s alternative “ stability argument, ” which I reconstruct below, unfolds in chapters 4, 6, and 7.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44527985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Liberal political theory has long been criticized for its omissions regarding the concerns of justice raised by the facts of human dependency. In Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture, Asha Bhandary aims to reconstruct a version of Rawlsian liberalism that responds to the basic human facts of dependency and the universal need for care (to varying degrees over the course of life), as well as the fact that those who provide care for others (women, generally) are often systematically disadvantaged relative to those without caregiving responsibilities. In other words, she aims to respond to “the dependency critique” of liberalism. As is well known, Eva Feder Kittay offers the most sustained account of that critique in Love’s Labor (Kittay 1999). Kittay argues that traditional forms of liberalism, and Rawls’s view specifically, fail to account for the fact that all humans need various forms of care over the course of a life and some humans need ongoing, sustained care for the whole of life, as well as for the injustices that arise for caregivers. The theoretical bases of liberalism—including strong forms of individualism, the characterization of the moral powers of persons as requiring attainment of forms of rationality, as well as the indices for evaluating just distributions (the account of primary goods in Rawls’s work)—exclude proper theorizing about persons as dependents as well as for dependency workers and fail to provide the conceptual tools for recognizing their needs as claims of justice. Kittay suggests one solution to these problems could include adding the capacity to care to the moral powers of persons as well as including “goods related to our interdependence in state of vulnerability in the index of primary goods” (Kittay 1999, 112). Bhandary takes up Kittay’s response and frames the first chapter in terms of the Rawls–Kittay debate. However, she departs from Kittay and offers her own account of the key issues and potential solutions aiming to recover Rawls. In short, Bhandary argues that Kittay’s proposed solutions for a revised Rawlsian liberalism are inadequate because “they result in an incoherent theory when combined with other Rawslian commitments” (25). Specifically, the suggestion of adding a third moral power fails to “include all utter dependents” (for example, those with extreme cognitive impairments [31]). Rather, Bhandary argues that by making the fact of human dependency known to deliberators in the original position, representatives in that position “will know to consider that they might be a dependent charge or a dependency worker” (32). Yet Bhandary does endorse the suggestion of adding
{"title":"Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture Asha Bhandary, New York: Routledge, 2020 (ISBN: 978-0367245481)","authors":"Lori Watson","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"Liberal political theory has long been criticized for its omissions regarding the concerns of justice raised by the facts of human dependency. In Freedom to Care: Liberalism, Dependency Care, and Culture, Asha Bhandary aims to reconstruct a version of Rawlsian liberalism that responds to the basic human facts of dependency and the universal need for care (to varying degrees over the course of life), as well as the fact that those who provide care for others (women, generally) are often systematically disadvantaged relative to those without caregiving responsibilities. In other words, she aims to respond to “the dependency critique” of liberalism. As is well known, Eva Feder Kittay offers the most sustained account of that critique in Love’s Labor (Kittay 1999). Kittay argues that traditional forms of liberalism, and Rawls’s view specifically, fail to account for the fact that all humans need various forms of care over the course of a life and some humans need ongoing, sustained care for the whole of life, as well as for the injustices that arise for caregivers. The theoretical bases of liberalism—including strong forms of individualism, the characterization of the moral powers of persons as requiring attainment of forms of rationality, as well as the indices for evaluating just distributions (the account of primary goods in Rawls’s work)—exclude proper theorizing about persons as dependents as well as for dependency workers and fail to provide the conceptual tools for recognizing their needs as claims of justice. Kittay suggests one solution to these problems could include adding the capacity to care to the moral powers of persons as well as including “goods related to our interdependence in state of vulnerability in the index of primary goods” (Kittay 1999, 112). Bhandary takes up Kittay’s response and frames the first chapter in terms of the Rawls–Kittay debate. However, she departs from Kittay and offers her own account of the key issues and potential solutions aiming to recover Rawls. In short, Bhandary argues that Kittay’s proposed solutions for a revised Rawlsian liberalism are inadequate because “they result in an incoherent theory when combined with other Rawslian commitments” (25). Specifically, the suggestion of adding a third moral power fails to “include all utter dependents” (for example, those with extreme cognitive impairments [31]). Rather, Bhandary argues that by making the fact of human dependency known to deliberators in the original position, representatives in that position “will know to consider that they might be a dependent charge or a dependency worker” (32). Yet Bhandary does endorse the suggestion of adding","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47391795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article takes the rupturing of normative, linear, reproductive time that occurs in the event of miscarriage as a potentially generative philosophical moment—a catalyst to rethink pregnancy aside from the expectation of child-production. Pregnant time is usually imagined as a linear passage toward birth. Accordingly, the one who “miscarries” appears as suspended within an arrested journey that never arrived at its destination, or indeed, as ejected from pregnant time altogether. But here I propose to rethink both pregnancy and miscarriage through the lens of “suspended time”—a theoretical move that shifts the accent from the future as the dominating frame of reference to the lived present. Drawing on work by Kathryn Bond Stockton, Lauren Berlant, Lisa Baraitser, and others, the article explores overlooked temporalities of pregnancy and miscarriage that operate not in the mode of futural projection or futural loss, but rather through present-oriented forms of adjustment and sensing, attachment and intimacy, maintenance and care. By “suspending the future,” then, we can resist the oppositional framing of pregnancy and miscarriage, because if pregnant time is not represented in exclusively future-oriented terms as being-toward-birth, then miscarriage need not be understood as pregnancy's undoing.
摘要本文将流产时发生的规范性、线性生殖时间的断裂视为一个潜在的生成性哲学时刻，这是一个催化剂，可以在期待孩子出生的同时重新思考怀孕问题。怀孕时间通常被想象成一段直线的分娩过程。因此，“流产”的人看起来是在从未到达目的地的被捕旅程中被停职，或者实际上是完全从怀孕期被驱逐。但在这里，我建议通过“暂停时间”的视角来重新思考怀孕和流产——这是一个理论上的举措，将重点从未来作为生活现在的主要参照系。这篇文章借鉴了Kathryn Bond Stockton、Lauren Berlant、Lisa Baraitser等人的作品，探讨了被忽视的怀孕和流产的暂时性，这些暂时性不是以未来预测或未来损失的模式运作的，而是通过以当下为导向的调整和感知、依恋和亲密、维持和护理形式运作的。那么，通过“暂停未来”，我们可以抵制怀孕和流产的对立框架，因为如果怀孕时间不是完全以未来为导向的，那么流产就不必被理解为怀孕的毁灭。
{"title":"A Pregnant Pause: Pregnancy, Miscarriage, and Suspended Time","authors":"Victoria Browne","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article takes the rupturing of normative, linear, reproductive time that occurs in the event of miscarriage as a potentially generative philosophical moment—a catalyst to rethink pregnancy aside from the expectation of child-production. Pregnant time is usually imagined as a linear passage toward birth. Accordingly, the one who “miscarries” appears as suspended within an arrested journey that never arrived at its destination, or indeed, as ejected from pregnant time altogether. But here I propose to rethink both pregnancy and miscarriage through the lens of “suspended time”—a theoretical move that shifts the accent from the future as the dominating frame of reference to the lived present. Drawing on work by Kathryn Bond Stockton, Lauren Berlant, Lisa Baraitser, and others, the article explores overlooked temporalities of pregnancy and miscarriage that operate not in the mode of futural projection or futural loss, but rather through present-oriented forms of adjustment and sensing, attachment and intimacy, maintenance and care. By “suspending the future,” then, we can resist the oppositional framing of pregnancy and miscarriage, because if pregnant time is not represented in exclusively future-oriented terms as being-toward-birth, then miscarriage need not be understood as pregnancy's undoing.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"447 - 468"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44587329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Black feminisms offer lenses through which Black women can resist and re-exist under new emancipatory conditions. Part of that work is uncovering roots and routes through which Black women's lives can come to the fore as articulated centers. Such a mandate, I argue, must center love. This article's work, therefore, is to articulate the function of love, as an ethic and a discourse of love as a dialectic space, in the creation of emancipatory spaces for Black women. In particular, this article aims to articulate how a love ethic, as a princple, can be used to support a citational politics for Black women toward a Black feminist reclamatory past, liberatory present, and emancipated future.
{"title":"A Love Ethic for Black Feminisms: The Necessity of Love in Black Feminist Discourses and Discoveries","authors":"Ezinwanne Toochukwu Odozor","doi":"10.1017/hyp.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/hyp.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Black feminisms offer lenses through which Black women can resist and re-exist under new emancipatory conditions. Part of that work is uncovering roots and routes through which Black women's lives can come to the fore as articulated centers. Such a mandate, I argue, must center love. This article's work, therefore, is to articulate the function of love, as an ethic and a discourse of love as a dialectic space, in the creation of emancipatory spaces for Black women. In particular, this article aims to articulate how a love ethic, as a princple, can be used to support a citational politics for Black women toward a Black feminist reclamatory past, liberatory present, and emancipated future.","PeriodicalId":47921,"journal":{"name":"Hypatia-A Journal of Feminist Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"241 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49618925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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