Pub Date : 2023-12-05DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2284279
Hannah M. Ridge
{"title":"The d-word: surveying democracy in America","authors":"Hannah M. Ridge","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2284279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2284279","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138601046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-30DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2288622
Benjamin Yoel
{"title":"Resisting backsliding: opposition strategies against the erosion of democracy Resisting backsliding: opposition strategies against the erosion of democracy , by Laura Gamboa, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2022, 320 pp., $105(cloth), $34.99(paperback), ISBN: 978-1-00916-408-5","authors":"Benjamin Yoel","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2288622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2288622","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139206937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-23DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2278709
Annika Werner, Reinhard Heinisch
{"title":"Ideological beasts or effective organizations? Do voters’ views of democracy affect their expectations of political parties?","authors":"Annika Werner, Reinhard Heinisch","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2278709","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2278709","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139243537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-17DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2282621
Erin Accampo Hern
{"title":"Voting out autocrats: evidence from Zambia","authors":"Erin Accampo Hern","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2282621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2282621","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139266294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2279677
Joep van Lit, Carolien van Ham, Maurits J. Meijers
Many democracies around the world face the challenge of democratic recession and autocratization as democratically elected incumbents increasingly show autocratic tendencies. Existing research has mainly focused on the circumstances under which these autocratizing incumbents erode democracy and on the structural factors explaining the resilience of democratic institutions. Much less is known about the actors within those institutions and when they stand up against the autocratizing incumbent to defend democracy. In this article, we present a novel theoretical framework of democratic defence that focuses on the interaction between the incumbent, institutional elites, and citizens. Developing a two-level model of democratic defence, we show how the democratic defender’s personal interests, repression by the incumbent, the perceived ambiguity of the autocratic action, and the perceived credibility of the democratic defender interact to affect the occurrence of democratic defence. The resulting framework can guide future research on the role of specific actors in defending democracy. We demonstrate the utility of our framework with illustrative case studies of (attempted) democratic defence in Senegal (2011–2012) and Poland (2017–2018). An actor-based approach of democratic defence is crucial to understand what actions domestic and international actors can take to prevent (further) democratic recession.
{"title":"Countering autocratization: a roadmap for democratic defence","authors":"Joep van Lit, Carolien van Ham, Maurits J. Meijers","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2279677","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2279677","url":null,"abstract":"Many democracies around the world face the challenge of democratic recession and autocratization as democratically elected incumbents increasingly show autocratic tendencies. Existing research has mainly focused on the circumstances under which these autocratizing incumbents erode democracy and on the structural factors explaining the resilience of democratic institutions. Much less is known about the actors within those institutions and when they stand up against the autocratizing incumbent to defend democracy. In this article, we present a novel theoretical framework of democratic defence that focuses on the interaction between the incumbent, institutional elites, and citizens. Developing a two-level model of democratic defence, we show how the democratic defender’s personal interests, repression by the incumbent, the perceived ambiguity of the autocratic action, and the perceived credibility of the democratic defender interact to affect the occurrence of democratic defence. The resulting framework can guide future research on the role of specific actors in defending democracy. We demonstrate the utility of our framework with illustrative case studies of (attempted) democratic defence in Senegal (2011–2012) and Poland (2017–2018). An actor-based approach of democratic defence is crucial to understand what actions domestic and international actors can take to prevent (further) democratic recession.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2273871
Anja Osei, Elisabeth Bruhn
Contemporary research has shown that authoritarian regimes are not static. At the same time, gradual changes are often difficult to detect and the literature has not yet developed convincing tools to identify autocracy-to-autocracy transitions outside the visible ruptures of coups, power transfers, and opposition victories. Building on fieldwork in Tanzania, we show that patterns of rule shifted significantly under Magufuli. Once the model case of a party-based system in Africa, we argue that Tanzania should be reclassified as a party-personalist regime for the time of his presidency. The basis for his success lies in the increasing factional tensions within the CCM which gave him the power to act as the arbiter and to manipulate party institutions and nominations to his favour. Beyond providing a thick description of a single case, we address the theoretical and empirical challenges of correctly classifying authoritarian regimes.
{"title":"Tanzania under Magufuli: the personalization of a party-based regime","authors":"Anja Osei, Elisabeth Bruhn","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2273871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2273871","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary research has shown that authoritarian regimes are not static. At the same time, gradual changes are often difficult to detect and the literature has not yet developed convincing tools to identify autocracy-to-autocracy transitions outside the visible ruptures of coups, power transfers, and opposition victories. Building on fieldwork in Tanzania, we show that patterns of rule shifted significantly under Magufuli. Once the model case of a party-based system in Africa, we argue that Tanzania should be reclassified as a party-personalist regime for the time of his presidency. The basis for his success lies in the increasing factional tensions within the CCM which gave him the power to act as the arbiter and to manipulate party institutions and nominations to his favour. Beyond providing a thick description of a single case, we address the theoretical and empirical challenges of correctly classifying authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-14DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2277283
Marius Mehrl, Abel Escribà-Folch
Several countries recruit foreign nationals into their armed forces. This is despite the norm of citizen armies and the strong idea that individuals join the military to defend their home country while military service socializes them into good citizens. We argue that foreign recruits can have very specific benefits for some authoritarian governments. Because they lack strong links to society, their loyalties lie with whoever recruited and pays them, not the nation, country, or its citizens. As such, we argue, first, that their recruitment is especially attractive for personalistic rulers. Second, we propose that foreigners’ presence in the armed forces stymies these forces’ ability to carry out coup attempts and deters the occurrence of mass uprisings by signalling the security forces’ willingness to respond with violent repression. Empirical tests for the period 1946–2010 support these arguments. This research expands our understanding of legionnaire recruitment, civil–military relations, and comparative authoritarianism.
{"title":"The dictator’s legionnaires: foreign recruitment, coups, and uprisings","authors":"Marius Mehrl, Abel Escribà-Folch","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2277283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2277283","url":null,"abstract":"Several countries recruit foreign nationals into their armed forces. This is despite the norm of citizen armies and the strong idea that individuals join the military to defend their home country while military service socializes them into good citizens. We argue that foreign recruits can have very specific benefits for some authoritarian governments. Because they lack strong links to society, their loyalties lie with whoever recruited and pays them, not the nation, country, or its citizens. As such, we argue, first, that their recruitment is especially attractive for personalistic rulers. Second, we propose that foreigners’ presence in the armed forces stymies these forces’ ability to carry out coup attempts and deters the occurrence of mass uprisings by signalling the security forces’ willingness to respond with violent repression. Empirical tests for the period 1946–2010 support these arguments. This research expands our understanding of legionnaire recruitment, civil–military relations, and comparative authoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134954553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-09DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2267992
Gerardo L. Munck
ABSTRACTThis article claims that the state and, more precisely, whether the state has a rational-legal or a patrimonial public administration, affects (1) the extent to which democratic standards are met and (2) the costs of abandoning office and the support leaders unwilling to accept electoral defeat can expect to have within the state and their party. Further, this argument is elaborated so as to account for the typical political regime in contemporary Latin America, durable poor-quality democracies. Latin America’s semi-patrimonial states are held to determine this outcome through two mechanisms: selective collusion and political opportunism. The plausibility of the theory about mechanisms is gauged. Additionally, implications for the field of comparative democracy studies are spelled out.KEYWORDS: DemocracyDemocratic erosionStatePatrimonialismLatin America AcknowledgementsFor useful comments on this paper, I thank Lasse Aaskoven, David Andersen, Ana Arjona, Kent Eaton, Lucas González, Ken Greene, Aram Hur, Marko Klašnja, Juan Pablo Luna, Raúl Madrid, Sebastián Mazzuca, Silvia Otero-Bahamonde, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Maria Paula Saffon, Indrajit Roy, Andreas Schedler, Merete Bech Seeberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Dan Slater, Richard Snyder, Jakob Tolstrup, Dan Treisman, Maya Tudor and Andrew Yeo.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State, 155.2 Munck and Luna, Latin American Politics, ch. 3.3 Tocqueville, Democracy in America; Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime.4 O’Donnell, “On the State”; O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State; Linz, “State Building”; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition; Tilly, Democracy.5 Slater, Ordering Power; Norris, Making Democratic Governance; Møller and Skaaning, The State-Democracy Nexus; Berman, Democracy and Dictatorship; Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor; Stasavage, The Decline and Rise of Democracy; Andersen, “The Limits of Meritocracy”.6 Bauer et al., Democratic Backsliding; Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding, 8.7 Handlin, State Crisis; Mazzuca and Munck, A Middle-quality Institutional Trap; Foweraker, Oligarchy in The Americas.8 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State, 4, 13.9 Mazzuca, “Access to Power”; Mazzuca, Latecomer State Formation, 401–3. See also Mazzuca and Munck, A Middle-quality Institutional Trap.10 Tilly, Democracy, ch. 6; Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor, 63–7.11 Weber, Economy and Society, chs. 11–3.12 Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding, 2; García Holgado and Mainwaring, “Why Democracy Survives,” 531.13 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 155.14 O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” 39; Schwartz, Undermining the State, 17–8, 21.15 Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, 59–60.16 Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, 20–1, 24–6, 59–60, ch. 7; Dahl, Polyarchy, ch. 1; Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 112–4, 221–2.17 Cadena-Roa and López Leyva, El malestar; Romero Ballivián, Elecciones
摘要本文认为，国家，更确切地说，国家是否拥有理性-法律或世袭的公共行政，影响着(1)民主标准得到满足的程度，(2)放弃公职的成本，以及不愿接受选举失败的领导人在国家和政党内部所能获得的支持。此外，本文还详细阐述了这一论点，以便解释当代拉丁美洲典型的政治制度，即持久的低质量民主。人们认为，拉丁美洲的半世袭制国家通过两种机制决定了这一结果:选择性勾结和政治机会主义。这一机制理论的合理性得到了检验。此外，本文还阐述了对比较民主研究领域的影响。关键词:对于本文的有用评论，我感谢Lasse Aaskoven, David Andersen, Ana Arjona, Kent Eaton, Lucas González, Ken Greene, Aram Hur, Marko Klašnja, Juan Pablo Luna, Raúl Madrid, Sebastián Mazzuca, Silvia Otero-Bahamonde, Grigore popeleches, Maria Paula Saffon, Indrajit Roy, Andreas Schedler, Merete Bech Seeberg, send - erik skaing, Dan Slater, Richard Snyder, Jakob Tolstrup, Dan Treisman, Maya Tudor和Andrew Yeo。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1奥唐奈:《民主、机构与国家》，155.2蒙克和卢纳:《拉丁美洲政治》，第3.3章;托克维尔:《美国的民主》;4 .托克维尔:《古老的革命》奥唐纳，《论国家》;奥唐纳:《民主、机构与国家》;林茨，“国家大厦”;林茨和斯捷潘:《民主转型问题》5 .斯莱特，命令权力;诺里斯:《建立民主治理》;Møller和skaning:《国家与民主的关系》;伯曼:《民主与独裁》;阿塞莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《狭窄的走廊》;斯塔萨维奇:《民主的兴衰》安徒生，《精英政治的极限》，第6页Bauer等人，《民主倒退》;哈格德和考夫曼，《倒退》，8.7;汉德林，《国家危机》;马祖卡、蒙克:《中等质量制度陷阱》8 O’donnell，《民主、代理和国家》，第4期，13.9 Mazzuca，《获得权力》;马祖卡，后来者国家编队，401-3。另见Mazzuca和Munck，《中等质量的制度陷阱》。阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《狭窄的走廊》，63-7.11韦伯，《经济与社会》，第6卷。11-3.12哈格德和考夫曼，《倒退》，2;García Holgado and Mainwaring，《为什么民主能够生存》，531.13孟德斯鸠，《法律的精神》，155.14奥唐纳，《关于巩固的幻想》，第39期;15博比奥，《民主的未来》，59-60.16博比奥，《民主的未来》，20-1,24-6,59-60，第7章;达尔，《多元社会》，第1章;达尔，《民主及其批评者》，112-4,221-2.17卡德纳-罗阿和López莱瓦，El malestar;罗梅罗Ballivián，拉丁美洲电子，第3章;卡梅隆和哈拉米略:《对民主的挑战》;蒙克和卢娜，《拉丁美洲政治》，第5章;Welp The Will of People.18 Alconada monla raíz;杜兰,Odebrecht;Gargarella, La derrota del derecho;卡梅隆和哈拉米略:《对民主的挑战》;拉丁美洲的Llanos和Marsteintredet;González-Ocantos等，检察官，选民;《破坏国家》19《全球见证:反抗的十年》;保护记者委员会说,.20“数据库”巴伦苏埃拉，“拉丁美洲总统”;马祖卡:《食利者民粹主义的兴起》，第22期卡梅隆和哈拉米略:《对民主的挑战》;23 Freidenberg和Saavedra-Herrera，“拉丁美洲的民主”。不过，请参阅Fernández-Ramil， " Declive de la democracia "O 'Donnell和Schmitter:《威权统治的转型》，11月25日，韦伯:《经济与社会》，217-6页，999页，1006页，1050页。比赛取得。后来，在21世纪，一些国家变得更加纯粹的世袭制(委内瑞拉和尼加拉瓜)，一个国家走向了韦伯的理想(乌拉圭)27格林德尔，男孩们的工作;Pinho和Sacramento，“巴西”;德尔加多，《不公正》，第2章;González-Ocantos和Oliveros，“Clientelism”;拉莫斯和米兰内西，《一个简短的故事》，9-10页;Sánchez Talanquer，“La recesión democrática”;卡梅隆和哈拉米略:《对民主的挑战》;蒙克和卢纳，《拉丁美洲政治》，第6卷。5和12;Panizza, Peters和Ramos Larraburu，《政治赞助》。28关于因果机制的概念，见Coleman，《社会理论》;邦格:《机制与解释》;邦吉，《追逐现实》，第5章;克拉弗和达顿:《寻找机制》;埃尔斯特:《解释社会行为》;以及Shan和Williamson，证据多元论。29 Alconada Mon, La raíz.30杜兰,Odebrecht;施瓦茨，破坏国家，chs。4和8.31奥耶罗和清醒，矛盾的状态;González，“检验证据”。 32 gonzalez - ocantos等人，检察官，选民。33 Delgado, injustice;埃斯科瓦尔，《如何有组织犯罪》罗梅罗ballivian，《拉丁美洲的选举》，185 - 7,403 - 4,ch. 8.35 Netto, The Mechanism;gonzalez - ocantos等人，检察官，选民。36 Olmos，污泥巨人;Lozoya Austin，“声明”;Alconada Mon, the root, ch. 3;Schwartz, Undermining the State, ch. 8.38 gonzalez - ocantos and Oliveros，“Clientelism”美国地方法院，“美国”;cordova和Murayama，《选举、金钱和腐败》;Alconada Mon, La根，ch. 1.41 Michener and Pereira，“一个伟大的飞跃向前。洛索亚·奥斯汀，《宣言》阿根廷民族司法机构，“事业”;Delgado, injustice, 48 - 9.44 West, Candidate Matters, 29.45 O 'Donnell, Propaganda K;民权协会和开放社会正义倡议，《沉默的代价》;Casal，比较研究奥利弗罗斯，《工作中的赞助》，第7章。关于拉丁美洲中央和地方公共行政部门的赞助问题，见Dussauge-Laguna，“挑战”;Scherlis，“政党赞助的轮廓”;莫亚·迪亚兹和加里多·埃斯特拉达，“智利赞助”;Peters, terceter和Ramos，《翡翠公共行政手册》;and mismatches Ramos Larraburu,彼得斯,and Th
{"title":"The state as a determinant of democracy: durable poor-quality democracies in contemporary Latin America","authors":"Gerardo L. Munck","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2267992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2267992","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article claims that the state and, more precisely, whether the state has a rational-legal or a patrimonial public administration, affects (1) the extent to which democratic standards are met and (2) the costs of abandoning office and the support leaders unwilling to accept electoral defeat can expect to have within the state and their party. Further, this argument is elaborated so as to account for the typical political regime in contemporary Latin America, durable poor-quality democracies. Latin America’s semi-patrimonial states are held to determine this outcome through two mechanisms: selective collusion and political opportunism. The plausibility of the theory about mechanisms is gauged. Additionally, implications for the field of comparative democracy studies are spelled out.KEYWORDS: DemocracyDemocratic erosionStatePatrimonialismLatin America AcknowledgementsFor useful comments on this paper, I thank Lasse Aaskoven, David Andersen, Ana Arjona, Kent Eaton, Lucas González, Ken Greene, Aram Hur, Marko Klašnja, Juan Pablo Luna, Raúl Madrid, Sebastián Mazzuca, Silvia Otero-Bahamonde, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Maria Paula Saffon, Indrajit Roy, Andreas Schedler, Merete Bech Seeberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Dan Slater, Richard Snyder, Jakob Tolstrup, Dan Treisman, Maya Tudor and Andrew Yeo.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State, 155.2 Munck and Luna, Latin American Politics, ch. 3.3 Tocqueville, Democracy in America; Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime.4 O’Donnell, “On the State”; O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State; Linz, “State Building”; Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition; Tilly, Democracy.5 Slater, Ordering Power; Norris, Making Democratic Governance; Møller and Skaaning, The State-Democracy Nexus; Berman, Democracy and Dictatorship; Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor; Stasavage, The Decline and Rise of Democracy; Andersen, “The Limits of Meritocracy”.6 Bauer et al., Democratic Backsliding; Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding, 8.7 Handlin, State Crisis; Mazzuca and Munck, A Middle-quality Institutional Trap; Foweraker, Oligarchy in The Americas.8 O’Donnell, Democracy, Agency, and the State, 4, 13.9 Mazzuca, “Access to Power”; Mazzuca, Latecomer State Formation, 401–3. See also Mazzuca and Munck, A Middle-quality Institutional Trap.10 Tilly, Democracy, ch. 6; Acemoglu and Robinson, The Narrow Corridor, 63–7.11 Weber, Economy and Society, chs. 11–3.12 Haggard and Kaufman, Backsliding, 2; García Holgado and Mainwaring, “Why Democracy Survives,” 531.13 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 155.14 O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” 39; Schwartz, Undermining the State, 17–8, 21.15 Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, 59–60.16 Bobbio, The Future of Democracy, 20–1, 24–6, 59–60, ch. 7; Dahl, Polyarchy, ch. 1; Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 112–4, 221–2.17 Cadena-Roa and López Leyva, El malestar; Romero Ballivián, Elecciones","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135242755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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