Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2258082
Christopher Green, Steven Denney
This study investigates why anti-democratic laws persist in democratic societies, focusing on South Korea's National Security Act (NSA). Enacted in 1948, the NSA restricts freedom of expression and movement to deter pro-North Korea behaviour. Despite being at odds with the tenets of running contrary to liberal democracy, the Act remains in place. Existing public opinion data indicates modest to strong support for the law, but measurement concerns leave much to be desired. Using a choice-based conjoint, we test the impact of democratic norms and national security rationales on various policy propositions related to the NSA, including its abolition. Results show widespread support for the Act, driven by both democratic norms and security concerns. Progressives are more likely to support revisions limiting the scope of the Act on the basis that it safeguards democracy, but they agree with conservatives that it should not be abolished. This research contributes to understanding South Korea's post-democratic transition and the balance between national security and democracy more broadly.
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Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2260759
Sasha de Vogel
ABSTRACTIn autocracies, low-capacity protest campaigns that lack material and political resources are common, but these weaknesses make them vulnerable to reneging – the deliberate failure to implement concessions as promised. Reneging is critical to how and whether protests actually influence policy. Why are some autocratic concessions to low-capacity campaigns undermined by reneging? I argue concessions are most likely to be implemented when they matter least for meaningfully altering policy. Concessions that provide isolated conflict resolution without constraining state actors elsewhere are more likely to be implemented, while reneging affects concessions that would constrain state agents elsewhere. I find support for this argument using an original dataset of low-capacity protest campaigns in Moscow, Russia, from 2013 to 2018, which includes a novel approach to concessions data. Additionally, I show that reneging is less likely when the campaign demobilizes after the concession, though the effect on constraining concessions is limited. I also address why campaigns about some issues, like labour disputes, experience less reneging, and show that concessions from higher levels of government are just as prone to reneging as lower levels. This article advances scholarship on authoritarian responsiveness and non-violent political control by highlighting reneging as an overlooked response to protest.KEYWORDS: Authoritarianisminstitutionscollective actionprotestcredible commitmentRussia AcknowledgementsI am grateful for the feedback of two anonymous reviewers as well as Santiago Anria, Mark Beissinger, Candelaria Garay, Mai Hassan, Pauline Jones, Andrew Little, Jessica Rich, Graeme Robertson, and Tongtong Zhang, as well as participants in the 2022 authoritarianism mini-conference at WPSA and the Jordan Center – HSE University Joint Lecture Series.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To differentiate from larger and more transformative social movements, I adopt Tilly's (2004, 3) definition of a campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” linking a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public.2 Lipsky, “Protest as a Political Resource.”3 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance; Cai, Collective Resistance; Chen, Social Protest; Li, “Fragmented Authoritarianism”; and Elfstrom, “Two Steps Forward.”4 Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas”; Davenport, “State repression”; Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance; and Davenport and Inman, “The State of State Repression.”5 Muller and Opp, “Rational Choice”; Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Cai, Collective Resistance.6 Ginkel and Smith, “So You Say.”7 Rasler, “Concessions, Repression.”8 Klein and Regan, “Dynamics of Political Protests.”9 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict.10 Hummel, “Sideways Concessions.”11 Guriev and Treisman, “Informational Autocrats”; Hassan et al, “Political Control.”1
透明国际俄罗斯，min' ony khusnullina。作者简介sasha de Vogel是北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校威权政治实验室的博士后研究员。她的研究重点是威权主义、集体行动、政权稳定和镇压。
{"title":"Reneging and the subversion of protest-driven policy change in autocracies","authors":"Sasha de Vogel","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2260759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2260759","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn autocracies, low-capacity protest campaigns that lack material and political resources are common, but these weaknesses make them vulnerable to reneging – the deliberate failure to implement concessions as promised. Reneging is critical to how and whether protests actually influence policy. Why are some autocratic concessions to low-capacity campaigns undermined by reneging? I argue concessions are most likely to be implemented when they matter least for meaningfully altering policy. Concessions that provide isolated conflict resolution without constraining state actors elsewhere are more likely to be implemented, while reneging affects concessions that would constrain state agents elsewhere. I find support for this argument using an original dataset of low-capacity protest campaigns in Moscow, Russia, from 2013 to 2018, which includes a novel approach to concessions data. Additionally, I show that reneging is less likely when the campaign demobilizes after the concession, though the effect on constraining concessions is limited. I also address why campaigns about some issues, like labour disputes, experience less reneging, and show that concessions from higher levels of government are just as prone to reneging as lower levels. This article advances scholarship on authoritarian responsiveness and non-violent political control by highlighting reneging as an overlooked response to protest.KEYWORDS: Authoritarianisminstitutionscollective actionprotestcredible commitmentRussia AcknowledgementsI am grateful for the feedback of two anonymous reviewers as well as Santiago Anria, Mark Beissinger, Candelaria Garay, Mai Hassan, Pauline Jones, Andrew Little, Jessica Rich, Graeme Robertson, and Tongtong Zhang, as well as participants in the 2022 authoritarianism mini-conference at WPSA and the Jordan Center – HSE University Joint Lecture Series.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 To differentiate from larger and more transformative social movements, I adopt Tilly's (2004, 3) definition of a campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” linking a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public.2 Lipsky, “Protest as a Political Resource.”3 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance; Cai, Collective Resistance; Chen, Social Protest; Li, “Fragmented Authoritarianism”; and Elfstrom, “Two Steps Forward.”4 Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas”; Davenport, “State repression”; Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance; and Davenport and Inman, “The State of State Repression.”5 Muller and Opp, “Rational Choice”; Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”; Cai, Collective Resistance.6 Ginkel and Smith, “So You Say.”7 Rasler, “Concessions, Repression.”8 Klein and Regan, “Dynamics of Political Protests.”9 Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict.10 Hummel, “Sideways Concessions.”11 Guriev and Treisman, “Informational Autocrats”; Hassan et al, “Political Control.”1","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135719500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2255146
Katrina Keegan
ABSTRACTWhy do some autocratic countries embrace digital authoritarianism and others do not? The literature describes the political benefits of e-government for autocrats, but not the political costs. This study theorizes that e-government helps autocrats reduce the threat of revolution from the public, but its anti-corruption properties increase the threat of a coup from elites. Analysis of three Central Asian cases, based on original interviews and open-source research, and a global statistical analyses establish a causal link between politics and digitalization. When elites are powerful, they resist e-government reforms that threaten their corruption income, and autocrats overcome this resistance only if the public threat outweighs the elite threat.KEYWORDS: e-governmentdigital governmentdigital authoritarianismauthoritarian politicscorruptionanti-corruption reformgovernanceCentral Asia AcknowledgementsI am immensely grateful to Nargis Kassenova, Sarah Hummel, and Alexandra Vacroux for their invaluable advice, feedback, and support throughout the research and writing process. This research would not have been possible without my interviewees, who generously gave me their time and expertise, and to whom I extend my deepest thanks. I would also like to thank Matt Andrews and Steve Worthington for their feedback on specific sections.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See, for example: Knox and Janenova, “The e-Government Paradox”; Gobel, “The Information Dilemma”; Ma et al., “E-government in China.”2 Park and Kim, “E-government as an Anti-corruption Tool,” and Bertot et al., “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of Transparency.”3 See, for example: Stier, “Political Determinants of E-government”; Kneuer and Harnisch, “Diffusion of e-Government;” Kardan and Sadeghiani, “Is e-Government a Way to e-Democracy?”4 This work builds on the simplified model of authoritarian politics developed in Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.5 Wintrobe, “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian.”6 Maerz, “The Electronic Face of Authoritarianism.”7 Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness”; Yan and Xin, “Reforming Governance Under Authoritarianism.”8 Polyakova and Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism.”9 de Mesquita et al., “Political Competition and Economic Growth.”10 Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise; Hale, Patronal Politics.11 The only discussion of corruption-driven resistance to e-government I could find in the literature were two brief mentions in Warf, e-Government in Asia, 7 and 122.12 Of course, this is not the only reason an e-government reform could fail: a lack of resources, human capital, and technological infrastructure could all impede reforms.13 Kyrgyzstan’s regime type is most debatable, but many international measures, like that of Freedom House, classify it as authoritarian during the period of study. Kyrgyzstan’s unique manifestation of authoritarianism, particularly its powerful p
【摘要】为什么一些专制国家接受数字威权主义，而另一些国家不接受?文献描述了电子政务对独裁者的政治利益，但没有描述其政治成本。本研究认为，电子政务有助于独裁者减少来自公众的革命威胁，但其反腐属性增加了来自精英的政变威胁。基于原始访谈和开源研究的三个中亚案例分析，以及全球统计分析，建立了政治与数字化之间的因果关系。当精英势力强大时，他们会抵制威胁到他们腐败收入的电子政务改革，而独裁者只有在公众威胁超过精英威胁的情况下才能克服这种抵制。关键词:电子政务数字政府数字威权政治腐败反腐改革治理中亚致谢我非常感谢Nargis Kassenova、Sarah Hummel和Alexandra Vacroux在研究和写作过程中提供的宝贵建议、反馈和支持。如果没有我的受访者，这项研究是不可能完成的，他们慷慨地为我提供了时间和专业知识，我对他们表示最深切的感谢。我还要感谢Matt Andrews和Steve Worthington对具体部分的反馈。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1参见:Knox和Janenova的《电子政府悖论》;戈贝尔:《信息困境》;Ma等人，“中国的电子政务。”2 Park和Kim，“电子政府作为反腐败工具”，Bertot等人，“利用信息通信技术创造透明文化”。3参见，例如:斯蒂尔，“电子政府的政治决定因素”;Kneuer和Harnisch，“电子政务的扩散”;Kardan和Sadeghiani，“电子政务是通往电子民主的道路吗?”4本书建立在斯沃利克的《威权统治的政治》和温特罗布的《铁锅和极权主义》中对威权政治的简化模型的基础上。6 . Maerz，《威权主义的电子面孔》。7 Chen et al.，“威权回应的来源”;严、新，《威权主义下的治理改革》。8 Polyakova和Meserole，《输出数字威权主义》。9 de Mesquita et al.，《政治竞争与经济增长》。《俄罗斯能实现现代化吗?》我能在文献中找到的关于腐败驱动的对电子政务的抵制的唯一讨论是Warf在《亚洲的电子政务》7和122.12中的两个简短提及。当然，这并不是电子政务改革失败的唯一原因:资源、人力资本和技术基础设施的缺乏都可能阻碍改革吉尔吉斯斯坦的政权类型是最有争议的，但在研究期间，许多国际标准，如自由之家，将其归类为威权主义。吉尔吉斯斯坦独特的威权主义表现，特别是其强大的公众，使其成为有用的案例。哈萨克斯坦是该地区最富有的国家，它自己为自己的项目提供资金，而乌兹别克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦这两个人均国内生产总值相似的较贫穷国家，则从国际捐助者那里获得了大量资金作为补偿。14 .作者汇编的关于中亚所有捐助者资助的电子政府方案的数据，可应要求提供根据世界银行的数据，从2017年到2019年，乌兹别克斯坦的互联网普及率从48%上升到70%，吉尔吉斯斯坦从38%上升到51%。15根据受访者的喜好，他们用俄语或英语在Zoom上进行了大约一个小时的交谈选择匿名的受访者没有得到他们所在组织的授权公开发言，或者担心批评政府会遭到报复我确实向一些受访者提出了一些更主要的问题，比如“谁是电子政务计划的赢家和输家?”我发现，如果受访者没有自发地提出反腐败问题，他们也不会在回答更多的引导性问题时提到它资料来源应要求提供我从相对独立的渠道寻求信息，尽管独立程度因国家而异:Gazeta。乌兹和昆。乌兹别克斯坦的uz;Vlast。哈萨克斯坦的kz;以及Kaktus Media、Kloop和24。kg在吉尔吉斯斯坦。事实内容和对政府的负面评价也来自亲政府的媒体中华人民共和国驻乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统“Обутвеждениистратегии«ЦифровойУзбекистан»-2030 .21点尽管卡里莫夫时代的《电子政府法》要求全面的政府内部信息共享，但米尔济约耶夫说，截至2020年5月，只有30个数据库被整合。Uza， Шавкат Мирзиёев。在2020年1月向议会发表的讲话中，米尔济约耶夫承认电子政务存在“组织和制度问题”。乌兹别克斯坦共和国总统，“Послание Президента”，2020年1月23日。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2255833
Leonardo Puleo, Ramona Coman
ABSTRACTOver the past decade, governing parties in Central and Eastern Europe have dismantled liberal democracy, violating the rule of law and limiting the power of judges. This article examines the opposition to these transformations, focusing on the role of judges in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Drawing on an original survey, as well as a set of interviews with judges, the article shows that while in Poland judges have developed a unified opposition to the government in defending their independence, in Romania, in contrast, governmental measures have polarized judges into a divided opposition, while their mobilization has been rather non-existent in Hungary. Why do judges oppose governmental action limiting judicial independence in some contexts but not in others? The article shows that the nature and the sequencing of domestic transformations, coupled with ideational factors and interests-based calculations, explain judges’ opposition at the collective and individual levels.KEYWORDS: Rule of lawjudicial independencejudges professional associationHungaryPolandRomania Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Ioannidis and von Bogdandy, “Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law”; Pech and Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding”; Bodnar, “Polish Road Toward an Illiberal State”; Kelemen, “The European Union’s Authoritarian Equilibrium”; Closa, “The politics of Guarding the Treaties.”2 Scheppele, “Autocratic Legalism.”3 Bugarič and Ginsburg, “The Assault on Postcommunist Courts.”4 Bugarič and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe”; Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown.5 Zielonka, “Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat.”6 Gerring and Cojocaru, “Case-Selection: A Diversity of Methods and Criteria,” 397–8.7 Burbank and Friedman, Judicial Independence at the Crossroads.8 Helmke, Courts Under Constraints; Pereira, Political (In) Justice; Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power; Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship; Ginsburg and Moustafa, Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts.9 Bojarski, “Civil Society Organizations for and with the Courts and Judges”; Matthes, “Judges as Activists: How Polish Judges Mobilise.”10 Gersdorf and Pilich “Judges and Representatives of the People.”11 O’Donnel and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1.12 Goodin, Institutions and Their Design.13 March and Olsen, “The New Institutionalism.”14 Ibid.15 Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.16 Brack and Weinblum, “Political Opposition: Towards a Renewed Research Agenda,” 74.17 Segal, “What’s Law Got to Do With It.”18 Dezaley and Garth, “Dealing with Virtue. International Commercial Arbitration.”19 Ginsburg and Moustafa, “Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts,” 14–17.20 Hilbink, Judges Beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship, 27.21 Pizzorno, “La Corruzione Nel Sistema Politico,” 63.22 Segal, “Judicial Behaviour,” 277.23 Hilbink, Judges Beyond
在过去的十年中，中欧和东欧的执政党拆除了自由民主，违反了法治，限制了法官的权力。本文考察了对这些变革的反对，重点是波兰、匈牙利和罗马尼亚法官的作用。根据一项原始调查，以及对法官的访谈，文章显示，波兰法官为了捍卫自己的独立性，已经形成了统一的反对政府的力量;相反，在罗马尼亚，政府的措施使法官分化成分裂的反对派，而在匈牙利，他们的动员几乎不存在。为什么法官在某些情况下反对限制司法独立的政府行为，而在其他情况下则不反对?文章表明，国内变革的性质和顺序，加上观念因素和基于利益的计算，解释了法官在集体和个人层面的反对。关键词:法治司法独立法官专业协会披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突注1:约阿尼迪斯、冯·博格丹迪:《法治的体制性缺陷》;《内在的非自由主义:法治的倒退》;博德纳，《波兰通往不自由国家的道路》;克莱门:《欧盟的威权均衡》;《保卫条约的政治》2 Scheppele，专制法家主义。3布加里尼奇和金斯伯格，《对后共产主义法庭的攻击》4 bugarinik和Kuhelj:《欧洲民粹主义的多样性》;5 Zielonka， <反革命>。自由主义的欧洲正在退却。6 Gerring and Cojocaru，“案例选择:方法和标准的多样性”，397-8.7伯班克和弗里德曼，“十字路口的司法独立”。政治(In)正义;穆斯塔法:《争取宪法权力的斗争》;希尔宾克:《民主与独裁中的超越政治的法官》;金斯伯格和穆斯塔法:《法治:法院的政治》。9博贾尔斯基:《为法院和法官服务并与之合作的公民社会组织》;《作为积极分子的法官:波兰法官如何动员》。“10格斯多夫和皮利希”法官和人民代表。11 O 'Donnel and Schmitter，《威权统治的过渡》，1.12 Goodin，《制度及其设计》，13 March and Olsen，《新制度主义》。14同上15达尔:《西方民主国家的政治反对派》。16布兰克和温布卢姆:《政治反对派:走向一个新的研究议程》，74.17西格尔:《法律与之有何关系》。18 Dezaley和Garth，《处理美德》国际商事仲裁。19金斯伯格和穆斯塔法，《法治:法院的政治》，14-17.20希尔宾克，《民主和独裁中超越政治的法官》，27.21皮佐诺，《政治体系中的瓦瓦罗》，63.22西格尔，《司法行为》，277.23希尔宾克，《民主和独裁中超越政治的法官》;希尔宾克:《反政治的代理人:皮诺切特统治下的智利法院》24关于该模型的最新应用，见本泽的《司法民粹主义与韦伯法官》。25希尔宾克，“反政治的代理人”，120.26海伊，“危机中的善”，107.27伯班克和弗里德曼，司法独立在十字路口，27;Pizzorno，《政治体系》。28西格尔，“司法行为”，280.29伯班克和弗里德曼，“十字路口的司法独立”，28.30希尔宾克，“民主和独裁中的法官超越政治”，29.31斯通-斯威，“欧洲的司法建设”。Jaremba和Mayoral， <国家司法机构的欧洲化>。33 Jaremba and Mayoral， <国家司法机构的欧洲化>。34 Piana and Dallara，《网络法治》。35 Coman，《司法改革的现状》。36科曼:《法治的政治》;37温曼和沃曼:《从没有选择的政治》。38哈迈:《反对宪政民主的政变》;Moraru和Bercea，《罗马尼亚统治的第一段》;从2022年3月到7月，我们对匈牙利、波兰和罗马尼亚的法官进行了12次具有代表性的半结构化访谈(波兰4次，匈牙利4次，罗马尼亚4次)。访谈日期和受访者的协会成员情况见附录A1(见在线补充材料)。半结构化问卷见附录A2(见在线补充材料)Jaspers, Lubbers和De Graaf，《一次测量两次》根据格斯多夫和皮利希的说法，属于专业协会的法官占其总数的40%在波兰，我们于2022年3月22日联系了Iustitia。该调查于2022年4月2日分发，并于4月4日至5月19日开放。我们收到175份完整的问卷。 在罗马尼亚，AFJR和UNJR同意分别于2022年2月23日和4月15日分发调查结果。调查从5月4日持续到6月19日，我们收到了来自AFJR的67份问卷和来自UNJR的11份问卷。由于受访者数量有限，我们将UNJR的回复排除在我们的分析之外。最后，在匈牙利，MABIE同意于2022年5月2日分发调查问卷，并于2022年9月将其发送给评委。这项调查是由MABIE的一些成员发起的，但没有人回答其他组织也遇到了类似的困难，比如ENCJ.44 Dobbin等人，“调查困难人群”。《乔利等人》，Chapell Hill专家调查趋势文件。46 Coppedge et al.，“V-Dem[国家-年/国家-日期]数据集v13。”47 Coman and Puleo，《匈牙利、波兰和罗马尼亚法官协会》。“48 UNJR，”Apel UNJR si AMR。" 49 AFJR， " Asociaţia罗马司法法庭。50引用于Raisz，“宪法的环境，宪法中的环境”，56-7.51 MABIE, visszaeml<s:1> kezzor Makai Lajos博士，az egyes<e:1> let Elnöke 2008-2018 között。52 Fleck，《匈牙利的司法独立》，817.53 Coman and Puleo，《匈牙利、波兰和罗马尼亚的法官协会》。" 54 may " Tájékoztató az EAJ jelent<s:1> kapcsán。55 Halmai， "一场反对宪政民主的政变。56 Bánkuti, Halmai和Scheppele，匈牙利的反自由主义转向。57 Kovács和Scheppele，《司法独立的脆弱性》。58 Bodnar，《波兰通往不自由国家的道路》。59 Kovács和Scheppele，“独立司法的脆弱性”，4.60 Halmai，“反对宪政民主的政变。61欲了解更多关于匈牙利司法院长权力的细节，请参见大赦国际的《匈牙利司法现状》。“格拉博夫斯卡-莫罗兹和苏列卡，从人事开始。2017年8月至2018年2月普通法院院长和副院长的替换8.63 Sadurski，波兰宪法崩溃。64 Moliterno and Čuroš，“最近对司法独立的攻击”，1176.65 Kovács and Scheppele，“独立司法的脆弱性”，9.66 Gajda-Roszczynialska and Markiewicz，“纪律程序作为一种工具”。67 Sadurski，《波兰宪法的崩溃》。68 Duncan and Macy，《司法独立的崩溃》。69 Marcisz，《一定责任的法庭》;萨多斯基:“惩戒室可以解散。”70 Moraru和Bercea，罗马尼亚统治的第一集。71同上，89.72 Selejan-Gut an，“罗马尼亚:‘完美的欧洲模式’的风险”。73 V-Dem团队向国家专家提出的问题如下:“当司法系统中的高等法院裁决对政府来说很重要的案件时，你会说它做出的决定仅仅反映了政府的意愿，而不顾它对法律记录的真诚看法吗?”有关
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Pub Date : 2023-09-18DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2257607
Andrew Dawson, Isabel L. Krakoff
ABSTRACT This article empirically assesses competing perspectives of the relationship between democracy and political trust. We conduct multilevel analyses on a cross-national panel dataset of 82 countries for the period 1990–2020. The findings suggest that there is a strong, negative relationship between democracy and political trust that cannot easily be dismissed as an artifact of model misspecification or response bias. Moreover, we re-examine the critical citizens thesis by disaggregating political trust into trust in partisan and “non-partisan” institutions to test the claim that well-functioning democracies contain and channel distrust into the more partisan political institutions to keep distrust from generalizing to the entire political system. The results fail to find a statistically significant difference of the effect of democracy on trust between partisan and non-partisan institutions, suggesting that low political trust within democracies may be a more acute problem than much of the literature suggests.
24 Cinar and Ugur-Cinar，“执行约束的影响”;道尔顿和申，《重新评估》;“阿喀琉斯之踵”道森;Karstedt，《信任权威》;诺里斯，民主党赤字;朴，“政治信任”;van der Meer, Political Trust.25 Cinar and Ugur-Cinar，“行政约束的影响”;道森，“阿喀琉斯之踵”。布斯和塞利格森，《合法性之谜》;Cinar and Kose，《政治信任》。27 brustedt，“测量不变性”;Marien，“测量等效”;van der Meer和Ouattara，“让‘政治’回归”;Zmerli和Newton， <政治和社会信任>28 Cinar and Ugur-Cinar， <执行约束的影响>。29 Uslaner， <信任研究>。30牛顿等人，《社会与政治信任》;Zmerli和Newton， <政治和社会信任>31见范德梅尔和瓦塔拉，“把‘政治’放回去”;Zmerli和Newton， <政治和社会信任>“32范德米尔，政治信托;van der Meer和Zmerli，“根深蒂固的关注”。33 Cinar and Ugur-Cinar，“行政约束的影响”;《测量等效性》。34 Zmerli和Newton，“政治与社会信任”，106.35 van der Meer和Ouattara，“回归政治”。" 36同上，2992.37 Breustedt， "测量不变性。“38 .她指出，对于公务员制度是代表性机构还是执行机构的归属存在分歧，因此最终将公务员制度排除在分析之外Newton等人，“社会和政治信任”40-1.40 Breustedt，“测量不变性”;Marien，“计量等值”，89.41 Baum，“官僚开放”;brustedt，“测量不变性”;布鲁施泰特和斯塔克，《思考外面》;Cinar和Ugur-Cinar，“执行约束的影响”;Jacob and Schenke，“党派关系与机构信任”;“政治信任”。42 Park，政治信任。43见伊斯顿，《系统分析》;伊斯顿,“重新”;诺里斯，民主党赤字brustedt，“测量不变性”;Cinar和Ugur-Cinar，“执行约束的影响”;Marien，“测量等效”;Newton et al.，《社会与政治信任》;van der Meer和Ouattara，“让‘政治’回归”;Zmerli和Newton， <政治和社会信任>45 EVS，欧洲价值研究;Haerpfer等人，世界价值观调查。46 Dahl，民主及其批评者，131,221.47 Coppedge等人，V-Dem数据集。考虑到理解民主概念的文化差异以及国家内部(包括专制政权)对政体民主的看法的差异，我们使用标准化指数而不是主观看法来衡量民主(Durand, State of democracy;《翻译中的民主》;48 Rivetti和Cavatorta，“政治信任的功能”;Uslaner,“腐败”;范德米尔《政治信任》;范德米尔，《经济表现》;沃伦，<信任与民主>;“大众对民主的认知。49世界银行，《世界发展指标》，50 Solt，《衡量收入不平等》。我们还测试了来自Penn世界表的GDP数据的另一个来源(Feenstra等人，“Penn世界表”)。由于结果与使用世界银行GDP数据的结果基本相似，我们使用后者，因为在撰写本文时，宾夕法尼亚大学世界表的数据在2019年之后不可用。van der Meer，政治信任。52 Coppedge等人，V-Dem数据集。53 Hutchison和Johnson，“政治信任”。国家能力是以国家有效控制下的国家领土的百分比来衡量的温默，《战争的波浪》，55页民族权力关系数据集，EPR核心数据集;Vogt等人，“整合数据。56 Putterman and Bockstette，《国家文物索引》。57参见Kuran，《私人真相，公共谎言》;《支配的歧义》58道尔顿和申，《重新评估》;朴，“政治信任”;里维蒂和卡瓦托尔塔:《政治信任的功能》;范德米尔《政治信任》;Zmerli和Newton， <政治和社会信任>59吉布尼等人，《政治恐怖量表》。60伍德和吉布尼，《政治恐怖量表》。61库兰，《私人真相，公共谎言》。62有可能，特别是在非民主政体中，不同群体的个人可能会感到更自由地表达他们的真实意见。因此，我们运行了额外的模型(未显示)，其中包含政治恐怖量表与各种微观层面因素(性别、年龄、教育、收入和意识形态倾向)之间的相互作用项。教育、收入和意识形态倾向这三个与政治恐怖的交互项在统计上显著，这表明政治恐怖对来自更特权的社会阶层或意识形态左倾的个体的影响相对较小。然而，从下面的结果来看，包括相互作用条件并没有实质性地改变民主的影响。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2242789
Anthony J. DeMattee
ABSTRACT Civil society is a bulwark against autocratic rule; its erosion contributes to democratic recession worldwide. Scholars and activists are calling attention to repressive laws non-democratic governments enact to undermine civil society organizations (CSOs). Yet, non-democratic governments do not only enact repressive laws; they also enact permissive, quasi-democratic legal rules. Evidence from case studies suggests that non-democratic governments enact such rules as part of a broader strategy to stabilize the regime. This article adds a within-case comparative study of Kenya’s four CSO regulators to the growing evidence showing that non-democracies can choose to manipulate civil society rather than repress it. The government’s words and documentation provide evidence: I triangulate elite interviews with elected officials and bureaucrats with archival data from government libraries and four CSO regulators. I find that the government enacts permissive legal rules and then uses several control and consultation tactics collectively, separately, and episodically to manipulate CSOs and legitimise the regime.
{"title":"To manipulate and legitimise: government officials explain why non-democracies enact and enforce permissive civil society laws","authors":"Anthony J. DeMattee","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2242789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2242789","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Civil society is a bulwark against autocratic rule; its erosion contributes to democratic recession worldwide. Scholars and activists are calling attention to repressive laws non-democratic governments enact to undermine civil society organizations (CSOs). Yet, non-democratic governments do not only enact repressive laws; they also enact permissive, quasi-democratic legal rules. Evidence from case studies suggests that non-democratic governments enact such rules as part of a broader strategy to stabilize the regime. This article adds a within-case comparative study of Kenya’s four CSO regulators to the growing evidence showing that non-democracies can choose to manipulate civil society rather than repress it. The government’s words and documentation provide evidence: I triangulate elite interviews with elected officials and bureaucrats with archival data from government libraries and four CSO regulators. I find that the government enacts permissive legal rules and then uses several control and consultation tactics collectively, separately, and episodically to manipulate CSOs and legitimise the regime.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2255976
Hakkı Taş
Scholars largely view populism as a democratic game and study it through the lens of civilian mass politics, thereby, dismissing the role of the military elite. Nevertheless, populist mobilization may introduce new dynamics into the political landscape of countries that have a long history of politically active militaries. This article scrutinizes the degree and type of civilian control of the military in populist settings. It primarily contends that incumbent populists tend to limit the veto power of the military. However, civilianization in populist regimes does not occur through a consistent reform agenda geared towards democratic governance of the security sector. Populists instead seek to gain personal control of the military through individual, communal, or ideological ties to civilian leadership. The personal model does not aim to hinder the military’s political influence. On the contrary, it politicizes the army and seeks to use it under civilian authority towards shared goals. However, populism operates on shaky ground due to the institutional decay it causes.
{"title":"Populism and civil–military relations","authors":"Hakkı Taş","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2255976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2255976","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars largely view populism as a democratic game and study it through the lens of civilian mass politics, thereby, dismissing the role of the military elite. Nevertheless, populist mobilization may introduce new dynamics into the political landscape of countries that have a long history of politically active militaries. This article scrutinizes the degree and type of civilian control of the military in populist settings. It primarily contends that incumbent populists tend to limit the veto power of the military. However, civilianization in populist regimes does not occur through a consistent reform agenda geared towards democratic governance of the security sector. Populists instead seek to gain personal control of the military through individual, communal, or ideological ties to civilian leadership. The personal model does not aim to hinder the military’s political influence. On the contrary, it politicizes the army and seeks to use it under civilian authority towards shared goals. However, populism operates on shaky ground due to the institutional decay it causes.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135878086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2252346
Ethem Ilbiz, Christian Kaunert
ABSTRACT This article examines how opposition parties with diverse ideologies can form alliances in competitive authoritarian regimes despite the securitization strategy used by authoritarian incumbents. Using Turkey as a case study, the article demonstrates that an authoritarian leader may associate terrorism with opposition parties and may disseminate this fear to manipulate moderate voters and prevent coalition formation between niche parties. By analysing public speeches of political actors in Turkey, the study argues that if opposition parties recognize the vulnerabilities of the regime and believe that forming an alliance would gain support from the masses and encourage cross-party voting, then the securitization strategy would not deter them from forming a pre-electoral alliance. However, the failure of the securitization strategy to prevent opposition parties from forming an alliance does not guarantee opposition victory in elections. The securitization strategy employed by the authoritarian regime can still be utilized to effectively empower the authoritarian leader, enabling them to win elections by capitalizing on fear and depicting the opposition alliance as a security threat and a potential source of instability if they were to come into power.
{"title":"Securitization, fear politics, and the formation of an opposition alliance in competitive authoritarian regimes","authors":"Ethem Ilbiz, Christian Kaunert","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2252346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2252346","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how opposition parties with diverse ideologies can form alliances in competitive authoritarian regimes despite the securitization strategy used by authoritarian incumbents. Using Turkey as a case study, the article demonstrates that an authoritarian leader may associate terrorism with opposition parties and may disseminate this fear to manipulate moderate voters and prevent coalition formation between niche parties. By analysing public speeches of political actors in Turkey, the study argues that if opposition parties recognize the vulnerabilities of the regime and believe that forming an alliance would gain support from the masses and encourage cross-party voting, then the securitization strategy would not deter them from forming a pre-electoral alliance. However, the failure of the securitization strategy to prevent opposition parties from forming an alliance does not guarantee opposition victory in elections. The securitization strategy employed by the authoritarian regime can still be utilized to effectively empower the authoritarian leader, enabling them to win elections by capitalizing on fear and depicting the opposition alliance as a security threat and a potential source of instability if they were to come into power.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135936327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2254707
Sebastian Dettman, Thomas B. Pepinsky
{"title":"Demographic structure and voting behaviour during democratization: evidence from Malaysia’s 2022 election","authors":"Sebastian Dettman, Thomas B. Pepinsky","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2254707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2254707","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135981812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433
Áron Hajnal
{"title":"The great experiment: why diverse democracies fall apart and how they can endure","authors":"Áron Hajnal","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2253433","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47007554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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