Pub Date : 2023-05-09DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2205129
Alexander Schmotz, Oisín Tansey
ABSTRACT Governments around the world have been implementing measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and ease its economic fallout, and there has been extensive variation in the speed and extent to which they have introduced new policies. This article examines the role that regime type plays in determining the decisiveness of government policies to tackle the coronavirus pandemic and its spill over effects. We hypothesize that democratic regimes may be slower to introduce restrictions on civil liberties due to a “freedom commitment” and may be faster to provide economic protections due to a “welfare commitment”. We use event history analysis and data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker to examine whether less democratic regimes are more likely to implement restrictions faster, and spending programmes slower. Contrary to expectations, our findings suggest that more authoritarian regimes do not implement constraints more quickly or spending more slowly than more democratic regimes. The finding holds across various regime measures and model specifications.
{"title":"Do institutions matter in a crisis? Regime type and decisive responses to Covid-19","authors":"Alexander Schmotz, Oisín Tansey","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2205129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2205129","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Governments around the world have been implementing measures to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and ease its economic fallout, and there has been extensive variation in the speed and extent to which they have introduced new policies. This article examines the role that regime type plays in determining the decisiveness of government policies to tackle the coronavirus pandemic and its spill over effects. We hypothesize that democratic regimes may be slower to introduce restrictions on civil liberties due to a “freedom commitment” and may be faster to provide economic protections due to a “welfare commitment”. We use event history analysis and data from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker to examine whether less democratic regimes are more likely to implement restrictions faster, and spending programmes slower. Contrary to expectations, our findings suggest that more authoritarian regimes do not implement constraints more quickly or spending more slowly than more democratic regimes. The finding holds across various regime measures and model specifications.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"938 - 959"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45851095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-05DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2203918
Natasha Wunsch, Theresa Gessler
ABSTRACT In contexts of democratic backsliding, citizens represent the last bulwark against the systematic dismantling of checks and balances by overbearing executives. And yet, they repeatedly fail to punish authoritarian-leaning leaders at the ballot box, allowing them to consolidate their grip on power. Why is that so? We leverage a conjoint survey experiment in Hungary to probe competing mechanisms of citizen tolerance towards democratic violations in a context of severe backsliding. Our main contribution consists of demonstrating empirically the presence of a composite effect, whereby authoritarian-leaning elites succeed in offering targeted compensations to different groups, ultimately building a mosaic of support among voters to secure enduring electoral backing. We pinpoint trade-offs notably related to cultural conservatism and economic benefits among different subgroups of the population. At the same time, our empirical findings indicate surprisingly high levels of condemnation of undemocratic positions by Hungarian respondents. We discuss how this unexpected pattern points to the limitations of conjoint designs as well as the overlooked supply side of democratic backsliding. Our study feeds into broader debates about the unfolding and entrenchment of democratic backsliding and how we study these processes.
{"title":"Who tolerates democratic backsliding? A mosaic approach to voters’ responses to authoritarian leadership in Hungary","authors":"Natasha Wunsch, Theresa Gessler","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2203918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2203918","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 In contexts of democratic backsliding, citizens represent the last bulwark against the systematic dismantling of checks and balances by overbearing executives. And yet, they repeatedly fail to punish authoritarian-leaning leaders at the ballot box, allowing them to consolidate their grip on power. Why is that so? We leverage a conjoint survey experiment in Hungary to probe competing mechanisms of citizen tolerance towards democratic violations in a context of severe backsliding. Our main contribution consists of demonstrating empirically the presence of a composite effect, whereby authoritarian-leaning elites succeed in offering targeted compensations to different groups, ultimately building a mosaic of support among voters to secure enduring electoral backing. We pinpoint trade-offs notably related to cultural conservatism and economic benefits among different subgroups of the population. At the same time, our empirical findings indicate surprisingly high levels of condemnation of undemocratic positions by Hungarian respondents. We discuss how this unexpected pattern points to the limitations of conjoint designs as well as the overlooked supply side of democratic backsliding. Our study feeds into broader debates about the unfolding and entrenchment of democratic backsliding and how we study these processes.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"914 - 937"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47581538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2207214
P. Tap
{"title":"Authoritarian police in democracy: contested security in Latin America","authors":"P. Tap","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2207214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2207214","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"1182 - 1183"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45934016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-03DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2189699
Tiziana Corda
ABSTRACT After leadership changes, how do new leaders recast the composition of their surrounding elites to ensure support and secure their tenure? Using original data on African cabinets, this article contributes to the debate on leaders’ survival with new theoretical inputs and empirical evidence about senior level changes new leaders introduce after assuming office to ensure a longer and more stable tenure. The article concentrates primarily on leaders emerged from an under-theorized and yet frequent type of leadership change, which is neither violent nor electoral, such as after a predecessor’s resignation. Because these leaders lack the authority generally granted, albeit through different means, by electoral and violent takeovers, the article builds on regime cycle frameworks to develop a sequential interpretation of elite management for such hybrid types which is distinct from both violence-born and electoral regimes. The comparative analysis of two recent such cases in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe empirically illustrates how the timing and sequencing of post-change elite management eventually affect leadership stability over time. These findings ultimately reinforce the view that the survival debate needs to dilute its focus on leaders as the organizing principles of regimes, and instead concentrate on wider senior elite coalitions.
{"title":"For things to remain the same, how many things have to change? Elite continuity and change after leadership changes","authors":"Tiziana Corda","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2189699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2189699","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After leadership changes, how do new leaders recast the composition of their surrounding elites to ensure support and secure their tenure? Using original data on African cabinets, this article contributes to the debate on leaders’ survival with new theoretical inputs and empirical evidence about senior level changes new leaders introduce after assuming office to ensure a longer and more stable tenure. The article concentrates primarily on leaders emerged from an under-theorized and yet frequent type of leadership change, which is neither violent nor electoral, such as after a predecessor’s resignation. Because these leaders lack the authority generally granted, albeit through different means, by electoral and violent takeovers, the article builds on regime cycle frameworks to develop a sequential interpretation of elite management for such hybrid types which is distinct from both violence-born and electoral regimes. The comparative analysis of two recent such cases in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe empirically illustrates how the timing and sequencing of post-change elite management eventually affect leadership stability over time. These findings ultimately reinforce the view that the survival debate needs to dilute its focus on leaders as the organizing principles of regimes, and instead concentrate on wider senior elite coalitions.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46258843","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2205132
Büke Boşnak
{"title":"Politicizing gender and democracy in the context of the Istanbul Convention","authors":"Büke Boşnak","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2205132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2205132","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"966 - 968"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44592727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2196068
Steven Feldstein
{"title":"Evaluating Europe's push to enact AI regulations: how will this influence global norms?","authors":"Steven Feldstein","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2196068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2196068","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48025054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2199452
Felix Wiebrecht, Yuko Sato, Marina Nord, Martin Lundstedt, Fabio Angiolillo, Staffan I. Lindberg
ABSTRACT This article presents the state of democracy in the world in 2022 using the most recent Varieties of Democracy dataset (V13). There are four main findings. First, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen is down to 1986-levels and 72% of the world’s population live in autocracies. Second, the third wave of autocratization reaches a new height with 42 countries autocratizing. By contrast, only 14 countries are democratizing. Third, between 1992 and 2022, autocracies increased their share of the global economy and now account for 46% of world GDP when measured by purchasing power parity. Fourth, defying the global wave of autocratization, eight countries not only stopped but also reversed autocratization in the last 10 years, which we define as democratic U-turns. We find five elements that seem important across the identified cases: executive constraints, mass mobilization, alternation in power, unified opposition coalescing with civil society, and international democracy support. We analyze different combinations of these factors and discuss how they could be critical in stopping and reversing contemporary autocratization. This first analysis suggests that in-depth, comparative case studies of these eight cases and their counterfactuals would be an important area of future research.
{"title":"State of the world 2022: defiance in the face of autocratization","authors":"Felix Wiebrecht, Yuko Sato, Marina Nord, Martin Lundstedt, Fabio Angiolillo, Staffan I. Lindberg","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2199452","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2199452","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article presents the state of democracy in the world in 2022 using the most recent Varieties of Democracy dataset (V13). There are four main findings. First, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen is down to 1986-levels and 72% of the world’s population live in autocracies. Second, the third wave of autocratization reaches a new height with 42 countries autocratizing. By contrast, only 14 countries are democratizing. Third, between 1992 and 2022, autocracies increased their share of the global economy and now account for 46% of world GDP when measured by purchasing power parity. Fourth, defying the global wave of autocratization, eight countries not only stopped but also reversed autocratization in the last 10 years, which we define as democratic U-turns. We find five elements that seem important across the identified cases: executive constraints, mass mobilization, alternation in power, unified opposition coalescing with civil society, and international democracy support. We analyze different combinations of these factors and discuss how they could be critical in stopping and reversing contemporary autocratization. This first analysis suggests that in-depth, comparative case studies of these eight cases and their counterfactuals would be an important area of future research.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"30 1","pages":"769 - 793"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48506319","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26eCollection Date: 2024-01-01DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2201495
Clionadh Raleigh, Andrea Carboni
This paper examines the importance of, and variations in, political alignment within African regimes. Political alignment is how leaders establish sufficient political support across elites: we posit that formal appointments are the primary way that leaders manipulate political coalitions in order to secure their collective authority and tenure. Appointments, individually and collectively, can take on multiple characteristics: they can create inclusive or exclusive coalitions, transactional or loyal support, volatile or stable elite networks. Appointment powers have greater salience since governments institutionalized and formalized in governance systems across democratic and autocratic states. Manipulating who holds and secures power at the subnational and national levels, rather than repressive control or state capacity, underpins the stability, security, and survival of modern African regimes.
{"title":"Subnational authority and political alignment in African states.","authors":"Clionadh Raleigh, Andrea Carboni","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2201495","DOIUrl":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2201495","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper examines the importance of, and variations in, political alignment within African regimes. Political alignment is how leaders establish sufficient political support across elites: we posit that formal appointments are the primary way that leaders manipulate political coalitions in order to secure their collective authority and tenure. Appointments, individually and collectively, can take on multiple characteristics: they can create inclusive or exclusive coalitions, transactional or loyal support, volatile or stable elite networks. Appointment powers have greater salience since governments institutionalized and formalized in governance systems across democratic and autocratic states. Manipulating who holds and secures power at the subnational and national levels, rather than repressive control or state capacity, underpins the stability, security, and survival of modern African regimes.</p>","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"1 1","pages":"1125-1139"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11346387/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41846920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-18DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2023.2197217
M. Leese
{"title":"Staying in control of technology: predictive policing, democracy, and digital sovereignty","authors":"M. Leese","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2197217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2197217","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44045851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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