首页 > 最新文献

Journal of Industrial Economics最新文献

英文 中文
Product Repositioning by Merging Firms* 合并公司的产品重新定位*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12373
Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, Wanjia Zhu

We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.

我们研究了兼并公司的产品添加和移除的66个合并的样本在各种各样的消费品包装市场。我们发现合并导致合并企业提供的产品数量净减少。合并后的公司倾向于在其联合产品组合的边缘减少或增加产品,其净效应是增加公司内部产品相似性。这些结果与强调类似产品类型之间的成本协同效应或与产品市场特定细分相关的管理核心能力的公司理论相一致。
{"title":"Product Repositioning by Merging Firms*","authors":"Enghin Atalay,&nbsp;Alan Sorensen,&nbsp;Christopher Sullivan,&nbsp;Wanjia Zhu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"868-908"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold-Up* 具有消费者支撑的生态系统中的垂直合并*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-29 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12377
Daniele Condorelli, Jorge Padilla, Youngji Sohn

An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.

一个生态系统包括所有下游产品,这些产品使用一定的上游投入。在许多情况下,最终消费者在下游价格确定之前进行不可逆转的投资以加入生态系统。通过承诺购买使用特定生态系统投入的产品,他们有被阻止的风险。由于无法观察到未来的价格,消费者的决定基于他们对每个生态系统中的市场结构的观察,包括上游公司签署的垂直合同。通过与多个竞争的下游公司签订垂直协议,从而创造一个可信的低价格预期,上游公司能够减轻消费者的滞留问题,从而增加生态系统的需求。我们的主要观察是,与传统观点相反,上游垄断者与其下游子公司之一合并后,会发现继续为下游竞争对手服务是有利可图的,即使下游销售的产品是同质的。
{"title":"Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold-Up*","authors":"Daniele Condorelli,&nbsp;Jorge Padilla,&nbsp;Youngji Sohn","doi":"10.1111/joie.12377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"909-939"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability 基于规范的可持续偏好下的企业竞争与合作
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12360
Roman Inderst, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas

We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first-mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm-based sustainability preferences.

我们分析了当消费者对可持续性的偏好取决于感知到的社会规范时,企业协调引入可持续产品变体的动机,而感知到的社会规范又由平均消费行为塑造。我们表明,这种偏好可能导致多重均衡。如果潜在采用者之间的竞争水平非常低,并且采用可持续的变体允许他们充分扩大其总市场份额,那么当宽松的法律制度使其可行时,他们将协调引入可持续的变体。如果它们之间的竞争非常激烈,并且可持续变体下的市场扩张非常有限,那么协调可以阻止可持续变体的采用。因此,我们的分析既证实了可持续性“先发劣势”的概念,也证明了这一概念可以作为竞争对手之间达成协议的理由,该协议在反垄断领域获得了牵引力。我们还提供了基于规范的可持续性偏好的经验证据。
{"title":"Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability","authors":"Roman Inderst,&nbsp;Eftichios S. Sartzetakis,&nbsp;Anastasios Xepapadeas","doi":"10.1111/joie.12360","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first-mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm-based sustainability preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 4","pages":"1038-1071"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12360","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Import License, Misallocation, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity in the Chinese Steel Industry* 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量* * 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量* * 中国钢铁业的进口许可、错配和全要素生产率总量
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12375
Li Su, Su Zhang

This paper examines how import license restriction-induced resource misallocation affects industry aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We apply a recently proposed consistent estimator to micro-level data from the Chinese steel industry, considering material price heterogeneity. We back out the potential extent of misallocation, finding the importers' TFP is not significantly higher than that of the nonimporters, and resource misallocation caused by the iron-ore import license lowers aggregate productivity. Our analysis indicates that removing the trade barrier counterfactually would increase the industrial TFP by 76.8%, on average.

本文探讨了进口许可证限制引发的资源错配如何影响行业的全要素生产率(TFP)。考虑到材料价格的异质性,我们对中国钢铁行业的微观数据采用了最近提出的一致估计方法。我们回溯了潜在的错配程度,发现进口商的全要素生产率并没有显著高于非进口商,而铁矿石进口许可证导致的资源错配降低了总体生产率。我们的分析表明,反事实取消贸易壁垒将使工业全要素生产率平均提高 76.8%。
{"title":"Import License, Misallocation, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity in the Chinese Steel Industry*","authors":"Li Su,&nbsp;Su Zhang","doi":"10.1111/joie.12375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how import license restriction-induced resource misallocation affects industry aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We apply a recently proposed consistent estimator to micro-level data from the Chinese steel industry, considering material price heterogeneity. We back out the potential extent of misallocation, finding the importers' TFP is not significantly higher than that of the nonimporters, and resource misallocation caused by the iron-ore import license lowers aggregate productivity. Our analysis indicates that removing the trade barrier counterfactually would increase the industrial TFP by 76.8%, on average.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"848-867"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model* 连续垄断模型下的转售价格维持*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12368
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey

We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.

我们解释了为什么在连续垄断环境下制造商可能会施加最低转售价格。我们的论点依赖于零售商拥有不可收缩的选择变量,如替代品的价格和/或零售商的服务努力。我们对最低转售价格的解释在经验上与其他理由不同,例如,依赖于零售商竞争和零售商之间的服务免费。最小RPM对消费者是有利还是有害,取决于它的效果:如果它软化了与替代产品的竞争,它就倾向于损害消费者;如果它确保了服务的提供,它就倾向于使消费者受益。
{"title":"Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model*","authors":"Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt,&nbsp;Christian Wey","doi":"10.1111/joie.12368","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12368","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"729-761"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting* 秘密双边远期合同*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12372
Geert Van Moer

I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.

我分析了古诺寡头垄断下的秘密双边远期合约。一份秘密的双边远期合同会影响合同缔约方企业的产量,而非外部企业。一方面,远期合同有助于异质企业实现跨设施生产的合理化。另一方面,企业也要考虑远期合同对其联合生产的影响。我表明,现货市场的集中度低于行业中可调度设施的所有权。此外,不可调度设施的所有权分配与消费者福利无关。我讨论了对电力市场政策的影响。
{"title":"Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting*","authors":"Geert Van Moer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12372","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12372","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"807-847"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Risk Aversion and Double Marginalization* 风险规避与双重边缘化*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-20 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12369
Soheil Ghili, Matt Schmitt

In vertical markets, eliminating double marginalization with a two-part tariff may not be possible due to risk aversion. Under uncertain demand, contracts with large fixed fees expose the downstream firm to more risk than contracts that are more reliant on variable fees. In equilibrium, contracts may thus rely on variable fees, giving rise to double marginalization. Counterintuitively, however, we show that increased demand risk or risk aversion can actually mitigate double marginalization. We also characterize several sufficient conditions under which increased risk or risk aversion is guaranteed to exacerbate double marginalization. We conclude by discussing potential applications and extensions.

在垂直市场中,由于风险厌恶,用两部分关税消除双重边缘化可能是不可能的。在需求不确定的情况下,固定费用较高的合同比变动费用较高的合同使下游企业面临更大的风险。因此,在均衡状态下,合同可能依赖于可变费用,从而产生双重边缘化。然而,与直觉相反,我们表明增加的需求风险或风险厌恶实际上可以减轻双重边缘化。我们还描述了几个充分条件,在这些条件下,风险增加或风险厌恶肯定会加剧双重边缘化。最后,我们将讨论潜在的应用和扩展。
{"title":"Risk Aversion and Double Marginalization*","authors":"Soheil Ghili,&nbsp;Matt Schmitt","doi":"10.1111/joie.12369","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12369","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In vertical markets, eliminating double marginalization with a two-part tariff may not be possible due to risk aversion. Under uncertain demand, contracts with large fixed fees expose the downstream firm to more risk than contracts that are more reliant on variable fees. In equilibrium, contracts may thus rely on variable fees, giving rise to double marginalization. Counterintuitively, however, we show that increased demand risk or risk aversion can actually <i>mitigate</i> double marginalization. We also characterize several sufficient conditions under which increased risk or risk aversion is guaranteed to exacerbate double marginalization. We conclude by discussing potential applications and extensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"762-806"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Productivity Effects Of Corporate Diversification* 公司多元化的生产力效应*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12370
Germán Bet

This paper studies the productivity effects of corporate diversification. I estimate a model that allows diversification decisions to affect future productivity. I apply the model to a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms to measure the impact of diversification on productivity. My estimates suggest that diversification plays a key role in explaining differences in productivity across productive units and time. The average productivity effect of diversification is estimated to be positive at the productive unit level. However, the effect varies considerably across productive units and sectors of activity, depending crucially on already attained productivity.

本文研究了企业多元化对生产率的影响。我估计了一个允许多样化决策影响未来生产力的模型。我将该模型应用于美国制造业公司的一个小组,以衡量多元化对生产率的影响。我的估计表明,多样化在解释不同生产单位和时间的生产率差异方面起着关键作用。多样化的平均生产力效应估计在生产单位一级是积极的。但是,不同生产单位和活动部门的影响差别很大,主要取决于已经达到的生产率。
{"title":"The Productivity Effects Of Corporate Diversification*","authors":"Germán Bet","doi":"10.1111/joie.12370","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12370","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the productivity effects of corporate diversification. I estimate a model that allows diversification decisions to affect future productivity. I apply the model to a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms to measure the impact of diversification on productivity. My estimates suggest that diversification plays a key role in explaining differences in productivity across productive units and time. The average productivity effect of diversification is estimated to be positive at the productive unit level. However, the effect varies considerably across productive units and sectors of activity, depending crucially on already attained productivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"685-728"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation* 私隐规管及提升质素创新*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12374
Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio, Ying Lei Toh

We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.

我们分析了以信息披露上限为形式的隐私监管如何影响垄断者(仅从向第三方披露用户数据中获取收入)提高质量的创新激励和消费者剩余。如果关注隐私的用户比例足够小,隐私监管对创新有负面影响,可能会损害用户。然而,如果关注隐私的用户比例足够大,隐私监管对创新具有积极作用。在这种情况下,隐私和创新之间没有权衡,用户总是从隐私监管中受益。
{"title":"Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation*","authors":"Yassine Lefouili,&nbsp;Leonardo Madio,&nbsp;Ying Lei Toh","doi":"10.1111/joie.12374","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12374","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"662-684"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty* 产品质量不确定性下的搜索与竞争
IF 1.3 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Pub Date : 2023-11-15 DOI: 10.1111/joie.12365
Yongmin Chen

I review models of consumer search and competition when product quality is uncertain and differs across firms. Although firms are vertically—and possibly also horizontally—differentiated, an appropriate symmetric price equilibrium with optimal consumer search can be neatly characterized. I propose a “random-quality” framework that unifies these models and discuss their insights on the operation of consumer search markets, focusing on (i) online advertising and search through platforms, (ii) the welfare effects of entry in search markets, and (iii) the role of quality observability under search frictions. I suggest directions for further research on these and related topics.

我回顾了当产品质量不确定且不同公司之间存在差异时的消费者搜索和竞争模型。尽管企业是垂直的——也可能是水平的——差异化的,但一个具有最优消费者搜索的适当的对称价格均衡可以被简洁地描述出来。我提出了一个“随机质量”框架,将这些模型统一起来,并讨论了它们对消费者搜索市场运作的见解,重点关注(I)在线广告和通过平台进行搜索,(ii)进入搜索市场的福利效应,以及(iii)搜索摩擦下质量可观察性的作用。我提出了进一步研究这些和相关主题的方向。
{"title":"Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty*","authors":"Yongmin Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12365","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12365","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I review models of consumer search and competition when product quality is uncertain and differs across firms. Although firms are vertically—and possibly also horizontally—differentiated, an appropriate symmetric price equilibrium with optimal consumer search can be neatly characterized. I propose a “random-quality” framework that unifies these models and discuss their insights on the operation of consumer search markets, focusing on (i) online advertising and search through platforms, (ii) the welfare effects of entry in search markets, and (iii) the role of quality observability under search frictions. I suggest directions for further research on these and related topics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"633-661"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Industrial Economics
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1