Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, Wanjia Zhu
We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.
{"title":"Product Repositioning by Merging Firms*","authors":"Enghin Atalay, Alan Sorensen, Christopher Sullivan, Wanjia Zhu","doi":"10.1111/joie.12373","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12373","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine merging firms' additions and removals of products for a sample of 66 mergers across a wide variety of consumer packaged goods markets. We find that mergers lead to a net reduction in the number of products offered by merging firms. Merging firms tend to both drop and add products at the periphery of their joint product portfolios, with the net effect of increasing within-firm product similarity. These results are consistent with theories of the firm that emphasize cost synergies among similar types of products or managerial core competencies linked to particular segments of the product market.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"868-908"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.
{"title":"Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems with Consumer Hold-Up*","authors":"Daniele Condorelli, Jorge Padilla, Youngji Sohn","doi":"10.1111/joie.12377","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12377","url":null,"abstract":"<p>An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. In many cases, final consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"909-939"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12377","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Roman Inderst, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas
We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first-mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm-based sustainability preferences.
{"title":"Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability","authors":"Roman Inderst, Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas","doi":"10.1111/joie.12360","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12360","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze firms' incentives to coordinate on the introduction of a sustainable product variant when consumers' preferences for sustainability depend on the perceived social norm, which in turn is shaped by average consumption behavior. We show that such preferences could lead to multiple equilibria. If the level of competition among potential adopters is very low and adoption of the sustainable variant allows them to sufficiently expand their aggregate market share, they will coordinate on introducing the sustainable variant when a lenient legal regime makes this feasible. If competition among them is intense and market expansion under the sustainable variant is very limited, coordination can forestall the adoption of the sustainable variant. Our analysis thus both confirms and qualifies the notion of a sustainability “first-mover disadvantage” as a justification for an agreement between competitors, which has gained traction in antitrust. We also provide empirical evidence for norm-based sustainability preferences.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"71 4","pages":"1038-1071"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12360","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how import license restriction-induced resource misallocation affects industry aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We apply a recently proposed consistent estimator to micro-level data from the Chinese steel industry, considering material price heterogeneity. We back out the potential extent of misallocation, finding the importers' TFP is not significantly higher than that of the nonimporters, and resource misallocation caused by the iron-ore import license lowers aggregate productivity. Our analysis indicates that removing the trade barrier counterfactually would increase the industrial TFP by 76.8%, on average.
{"title":"Import License, Misallocation, and Aggregate Total Factor Productivity in the Chinese Steel Industry*","authors":"Li Su, Su Zhang","doi":"10.1111/joie.12375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12375","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper examines how import license restriction-induced resource misallocation affects industry aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We apply a recently proposed consistent estimator to micro-level data from the Chinese steel industry, considering material price heterogeneity. We back out the potential extent of misallocation, finding the importers' TFP is not significantly higher than that of the nonimporters, and resource misallocation caused by the iron-ore import license lowers aggregate productivity. Our analysis indicates that removing the trade barrier counterfactually would increase the industrial TFP by 76.8%, on average.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"848-867"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141251509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.
{"title":"Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model*","authors":"Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Christian Wey","doi":"10.1111/joie.12368","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12368","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"729-761"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12368","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.
{"title":"Secret Bilateral Forward Contracting*","authors":"Geert Van Moer","doi":"10.1111/joie.12372","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12372","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I analyze secret bilateral forward contracting in a Cournot oligopoly. A secret bilateral forward contract affects the production quantities of the firms which are party to the contract but not of the outsiders. On the one hand, forward contracts facilitate for heterogeneous firms to rationalize production across facilities. On the other hand, firms also consider how forward contracting affects their combined production. I show that the spot market is less concentrated than the ownership of dispatchable facilities in the industry. Furthermore, the ownership distribution of nondispatchable facilities is irrelevant for consumer welfare. I discuss implications for policy in electricity markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"807-847"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/joie.12372","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In vertical markets, eliminating double marginalization with a two-part tariff may not be possible due to risk aversion. Under uncertain demand, contracts with large fixed fees expose the downstream firm to more risk than contracts that are more reliant on variable fees. In equilibrium, contracts may thus rely on variable fees, giving rise to double marginalization. Counterintuitively, however, we show that increased demand risk or risk aversion can actually mitigate double marginalization. We also characterize several sufficient conditions under which increased risk or risk aversion is guaranteed to exacerbate double marginalization. We conclude by discussing potential applications and extensions.
{"title":"Risk Aversion and Double Marginalization*","authors":"Soheil Ghili, Matt Schmitt","doi":"10.1111/joie.12369","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12369","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In vertical markets, eliminating double marginalization with a two-part tariff may not be possible due to risk aversion. Under uncertain demand, contracts with large fixed fees expose the downstream firm to more risk than contracts that are more reliant on variable fees. In equilibrium, contracts may thus rely on variable fees, giving rise to double marginalization. Counterintuitively, however, we show that increased demand risk or risk aversion can actually <i>mitigate</i> double marginalization. We also characterize several sufficient conditions under which increased risk or risk aversion is guaranteed to exacerbate double marginalization. We conclude by discussing potential applications and extensions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"762-806"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the productivity effects of corporate diversification. I estimate a model that allows diversification decisions to affect future productivity. I apply the model to a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms to measure the impact of diversification on productivity. My estimates suggest that diversification plays a key role in explaining differences in productivity across productive units and time. The average productivity effect of diversification is estimated to be positive at the productive unit level. However, the effect varies considerably across productive units and sectors of activity, depending crucially on already attained productivity.
{"title":"The Productivity Effects Of Corporate Diversification*","authors":"Germán Bet","doi":"10.1111/joie.12370","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12370","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper studies the productivity effects of corporate diversification. I estimate a model that allows diversification decisions to affect future productivity. I apply the model to a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms to measure the impact of diversification on productivity. My estimates suggest that diversification plays a key role in explaining differences in productivity across productive units and time. The average productivity effect of diversification is estimated to be positive at the productive unit level. However, the effect varies considerably across productive units and sectors of activity, depending crucially on already attained productivity.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"685-728"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.
{"title":"Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation*","authors":"Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio, Ying Lei Toh","doi":"10.1111/joie.12374","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12374","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We analyze how a privacy regulation taking the form of a cap on information disclosure affects quality-enhancing innovation incentives by a monopolist—who derives revenues solely from disclosing user data to third parties—and consumer surplus. If the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently small, privacy regulation has a negative effect on innovation and may harm users. However, if the share of privacy-concerned users is sufficiently large, privacy regulation has a positive effect on innovation. In this case, there is no trade-off between privacy and innovation and users always benefit from privacy regulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"662-684"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I review models of consumer search and competition when product quality is uncertain and differs across firms. Although firms are vertically—and possibly also horizontally—differentiated, an appropriate symmetric price equilibrium with optimal consumer search can be neatly characterized. I propose a “random-quality” framework that unifies these models and discuss their insights on the operation of consumer search markets, focusing on (i) online advertising and search through platforms, (ii) the welfare effects of entry in search markets, and (iii) the role of quality observability under search frictions. I suggest directions for further research on these and related topics.
{"title":"Search and Competition Under Product Quality Uncertainty*","authors":"Yongmin Chen","doi":"10.1111/joie.12365","DOIUrl":"10.1111/joie.12365","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I review models of consumer search and competition when product quality is uncertain and differs across firms. Although firms are vertically—and possibly also horizontally—differentiated, an appropriate symmetric price equilibrium with optimal consumer search can be neatly characterized. I propose a “random-quality” framework that unifies these models and discuss their insights on the operation of consumer search markets, focusing on (i) online advertising and search through platforms, (ii) the welfare effects of entry in search markets, and (iii) the role of quality observability under search frictions. I suggest directions for further research on these and related topics.</p>","PeriodicalId":47963,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Industrial Economics","volume":"72 2","pages":"633-661"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138496893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}