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Correction to: Social status and prosocial behavior 更正为社会地位与亲社会行为
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-12-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09819-5
Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, Tianle Song
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引用次数: 0
Forecasting returns instead of prices exacerbates financial bubbles 预测收益而不是价格会加剧金融泡沫
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-12-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09815-9
Nobuyuki Hanaki, Cars Hommes, Dávid Kopányi, Anita Kopányi-Peuker, Jan Tuinstra

Expectations of future returns are pivotal for investors’ trading decisions, and are therefore an important determinant of the evolution of actual returns. Evidence from individual choice experiments with exogenously given time series of returns suggests that subjects’ return forecasts are substantially affected by how they are elicited and by the format in which subjects receive information about past asset performance. In order to understand the impact of these effects found at the individual level on market dynamics, we consider a learning to forecast experiment where prices and returns are endogenously determined and depend directly upon subjects’ forecasts. We vary both the variable (prices or returns) subjects observe and the variable (prices or returns) they have to forecast, with the same underlying data generating process for each treatment. Although there is no significant effect of the presentation format of past information, we do find that markets are significantly more unstable when subjects have to forecast returns instead of prices. Our results therefore show that the elicitation format may exacerbate, or even create, bubbles and crashes in financial markets.

对未来回报的预期对投资者的交易决策至关重要,因此也是实际回报演变的重要决定因素。来自外生给定回报时间序列的个人选择实验的证据表明,受试者的回报预测在很大程度上受到其推导方式和受试者接收有关过去资产表现信息的格式的影响。为了理解在个人层面上发现的这些效应对市场动态的影响,我们考虑了一个学习预测实验,其中价格和回报是内生决定的,直接取决于受试者的预测。我们改变受试者观察到的变量(价格或回报)和他们必须预测的变量(价格或回报),对每种处理都使用相同的基础数据生成过程。虽然过去信息的呈现形式没有显著影响,但我们确实发现,当受试者必须预测收益而不是价格时,市场明显更不稳定。因此,我们的研究结果表明,这种诱导形式可能会加剧、甚至制造金融市场的泡沫和崩溃。
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引用次数: 0
Defaults and effortful tasks 默认和费力的任务
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09808-8
Lars Behlen, Oliver Himmler, Robert Jäckle

Nothing is known about the effectiveness of defaults when moving the target outcomes requires substantial effort. We conduct two field experiments to investigate how defaults fare in such situations: we change the university exam sign-up procedure in two study programs to “opt-out” (a) for a single exam, and (b) for many exams. Both interventions increase task uptake (exam sign-up). Concerning the outcomes which require effort, we find no effects for many exams. For a single exam, the opt-out increases task completion (exam participation) in the study program where the default arguably entails stronger endorsement. Within this program, the effects on successful task completion (exam passing) are heterogeneous: treated students who in the past were willing to communicate with the university (responsive individuals) invest more effort into exam preparation and are more likely to pass the exam than their control counterparts.For non-responsive individuals, we find increased sign-ups but no effects on the target outcomes. Defaults can thus be effective and may be an attractive policy option even when the target outcome requires substantial effort provision. It is, however crucial that the interventions target the appropriate individuals.

当移动目标结果需要大量的努力时,对于默认值的有效性一无所知。我们进行了两个实地实验来调查默认值在这种情况下是如何发挥作用的:我们将两个学习项目的大学考试报名程序更改为“选择退出”(a)参加一次考试,(b)参加多次考试。两种干预措施都增加了任务吸收(考试报名)。至于需要努力的结果,我们发现许多考试没有效果。对于单个考试,选择退出增加了学习计划中的任务完成(考试参与),而默认的选择可能需要更强的支持。在这个项目中,对成功完成任务(通过考试)的影响是不同的:过去愿意与大学沟通的接受治疗的学生(反应灵敏的个体)在考试准备上投入了更多的努力,比对照组的学生更有可能通过考试。对于没有反应的人,我们发现注册人数增加了,但对目标结果没有影响。因此,违约可能是有效的,并且可能是一种有吸引力的政策选择,即使目标结果需要付出大量努力。然而,至关重要的是,干预措施要针对适当的个人。
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引用次数: 0
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study 信息不对称和外部性条件下的契约研究
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-11-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09813-x
Petra Nieken, Patrick W. Schmitz
Abstract We investigate contract negotiations in the presence of externalities and asymmetric information in a controlled laboratory experiment. In our setup, it is commonly known that it is always ex post efficient for player A to implement a project that has a positive external effect on player B . However, player A has private information about whether or not it is in player A ’s self-interest to implement the project even when no agreement with player B is reached. Theoretically, an ex post efficient agreement can always be reached if the externality is large, whereas this is not the case if the externality is small. We vary the size of the externality and the bargaining process. The experimental results are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions. However, even when the externality is large, the players fail to achieve ex post efficiency in a substantial fraction of the observations. This finding holds in ultimatum-game bargaining as well as in unstructured bargaining with free-form communication.
摘要:本文研究了存在外部性和信息不对称情况下的合同谈判。在我们的设置中,玩家A执行一个对玩家B具有积极外部影响的项目总是事后有效的。然而,参与人A拥有关于实施该项目是否符合其自身利益的私人信息,即使没有与参与人B达成协议。从理论上讲,如果外部性较大,总是可以达成事后效率协议,而如果外部性较小,则并非如此。我们改变外部性的大小和议价过程。实验结果与理论预测基本一致。然而,即使外部性很大,玩家也无法在相当一部分观察中实现事后效率。这一发现既适用于最后通牒博弈讨价还价,也适用于具有自由形式沟通的非结构化讨价还价。
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引用次数: 0
On the relevance of irrelevant strategies 论不相关策略的相关性
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09814-w
Ayala Arad, Benjamin Bachi, Amnon Maltz
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引用次数: 1
Social status and prosocial behavior 社会地位和亲社会行为
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09810-0
Jin Di Zheng, Arthur Schram, Tianle Song
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引用次数: 0
Auction design and order of sale with budget-constrained bidders 拍卖设计和销售顺序与预算有限的投标人
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09812-y
Ulrich Bergmann, Arkady Konovalov
Abstract The presence of financial constraints changes traditional auction theory predictions. In the case of multiple items, such constraints may affect revenue equivalence and efficiency of different auction formats. We consider a simple complete information setting with three financially constrained bidders and two items that have different values common to all the bidders. Using a laboratory experiment, we find that, as predicted by theory, it is more beneficial for the seller to sell the higher value item first. We then show that the first-price sealed-bid auction yields higher revenue than the English auction, with significant differences in learning of equilibrium strategies.
摘要资金约束的存在改变了传统拍卖理论的预测。在多物品的情况下,这种约束可能会影响不同拍卖形式的收益等价性和效率。我们考虑一个简单的完整信息设置,其中有三个财务受限的投标人和两个对所有投标人具有不同共同价值的项目。通过实验室实验,我们发现,正如理论预测的那样,卖家优先出售高价值的商品更有利。然后我们表明,第一价格密封拍卖比英式拍卖产生更高的收入,在均衡策略的学习上有显著差异。
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引用次数: 0
Using social norms to explain giving behavior 用社会规范来解释给予行为
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-10-06 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09811-z
Catherine C. Eckel, Hanna G. Hoover, Erin L. Krupka, Nishita Sinha, Rick K. Wilson
Abstract Transfers of resources in dictator games vary significantly by the characteristics of recipients. We focus on social norms and demonstrate that variation in the recipient changes both giving and injunctive norms and may offer an explanation for differences in giving. We elicit generosity using dictator games, and social norms using incentivized coordination games, with two different recipient types: an anonymous student and a charitable organization. A within-subjects design ensures that other factors are held constant. Our results show that differences in giving behavior are closely related to differences in social norms of giving across contexts. Controlling for individual differences in beliefs about the norm, subjects do not weight compliance with the norms in the student recipient or charity recipient dictator game differently. These results suggest that the impact of context on giving co-occurs with an impact on social norms.
在独裁者博弈中,资源的转移因接受者的特征而有显著差异。我们关注社会规范,并证明接受者的变化会改变给予和禁令规范,并可能为给予的差异提供解释。我们用独裁者游戏诱导慷慨,用激励性协调游戏诱导社会规范,有两种不同的接受者类型:匿名学生和慈善组织。主题内设计确保其他因素保持不变。我们的研究结果表明,在不同的背景下,捐赠行为的差异与捐赠的社会规范的差异密切相关。在控制了个体对规范信念的差异后,被试在学生接受者和慈善接受者独裁者游戏中对遵守规范的权重没有差异。这些结果表明,情境对捐赠的影响与对社会规范的影响是共同发生的。
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引用次数: 0
Endowments, expectations, and the value of food safety certification: experimental evidence from fish markets in Nigeria 禀赋、期望和食品安全认证的价值:来自尼日利亚鱼市场的实验证据
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09809-7
Kelvin Mashisia Shikuku, Erwin Bulte, Carl Johan Lagerkvist, Nhuong Tran
Abstract We study the impact of endowments and expectations on reference point formation and measure the value of food safety certification in the context of fish trading on real markets in Nigeria. In our field experiment, consumers can trade a known food item for a novel food item that is superior in terms of food safety––or vice versa. Endowments matter for reference point formation, but we also document a reverse endowment effect for a subsample of respondents. The effect of expectations about future ownership is weak and mixed. While expectations seem to affect bidding behavior for subjects “trading up” to obtain the certified food product (a marginally significant effect), it does not affect bids for subjects “trading down” to give up this novel food item. Finally, willingness to pay for safety certified food is large for our respondents—our estimate of the premium is bounded between 37 and 53% of the price of conventional, uncertified food.
我们研究了禀赋和期望对参考点形成的影响,并在尼日利亚真实市场上的鱼类交易背景下衡量食品安全认证的价值。在我们的实地实验中,消费者可以用一种已知的食品来换取一种在食品安全方面更优越的新型食品,反之亦然。禀赋对参考点的形成很重要,但我们也记录了受访者子样本的反向禀赋效应。对未来所有权的预期的影响是微弱和混杂的。虽然预期似乎会影响受试者“向上交易”以获得认证食品的投标行为(一个略微显着的影响),但它不会影响受试者“向下交易”以放弃这种新型食品的投标。最后,对我们的受访者来说,购买安全认证食品的意愿很大——我们估计的溢价在传统的、未经认证的食品价格的37%到53%之间。
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引用次数: 0
Correction to: A mechanism requesting prices and quantities may increase the provision of heterogeneous public goods 修正:要求价格和数量的机制可能会增加异质公共产品的供给
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09807-9
Federica Alberti, César A. Mantilla
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引用次数: 0
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Experimental Economics
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