Pub Date : 2023-03-30DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6
Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt
This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the endogenous reference price auction, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using "reference prices." Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.
{"title":"Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis.","authors":"Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the <i>endogenous reference price auction</i>, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using \"reference prices.\" Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":"1-27"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10061412/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9742589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-28DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2
Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, B. Yurtoglu
{"title":"When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection?","authors":"Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, B. Yurtoglu","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"749 - 774"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44189958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-07DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8
Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy
Abstract Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.
{"title":"Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions","authors":"Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136340770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-20DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x
D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick
{"title":"Call for papers – Special issue in memory of Amnon Rapoport: Experimental Economics","authors":"D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"251 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43173614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-15DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2
James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang
{"title":"Morally monotonic choice in public good games","authors":"James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"697 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46853601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-03DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0
Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck
{"title":"Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents","authors":"Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"646 - 672"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45764790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w
Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl
Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.
{"title":"The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.","authors":"Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 2","pages":"468-488"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10129933/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9746646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1
Wenbo Zou, Xue Xu
Does social learning and subsequent private information processing differ depending on whether the observer shares the same group identity as the predecessor whose action is observed? In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to answer this question, in which subjects first observe a social signal and then receive a private signal. We find that subjects put greater weights on the social signal if they share with the predecessor the same group identity that is induced in the experimental environment. We also provide suggestive evidence that such an ingroup-outgroup difference cannot be explained by individuals' beliefs of the predecessor's rationality. Moreover, heterogeneous effects of group identity exist in weights given to the subsequent private signal: Compared to when the predecessor is an outgroup, those who have learned from an ingroup predecessor put a greater (smaller) weight on the private signal if it contradicts (confirms) the social signal. We conjecture that such group effects are consistent with the perspective that group identity works as a framing device and brings about certain decision heuristics in the social signal phase, which no longer exist in the private signal phase.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1.
{"title":"Ingroup bias in a social learning experiment.","authors":"Wenbo Zou, Xue Xu","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Does social learning and subsequent private information processing differ depending on whether the observer shares the same group identity as the predecessor whose action is observed? In this paper, we conduct a lab experiment to answer this question, in which subjects first observe a social signal and then receive a private signal. We find that subjects put greater weights on the social signal if they share with the predecessor the same group identity that is induced in the experimental environment. We also provide suggestive evidence that such an ingroup-outgroup difference cannot be explained by individuals' beliefs of the predecessor's rationality. Moreover, heterogeneous effects of group identity exist in weights given to the subsequent private signal: Compared to when the predecessor is an outgroup, those who have learned from an ingroup predecessor put a greater (smaller) weight on the private signal if it contradicts (confirms) the social signal. We conjecture that such group effects are consistent with the perspective that group identity works as a framing device and brings about certain decision heuristics in the social signal phase, which no longer exist in the private signal phase.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09788-1.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"27-54"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9795456/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10688562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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