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Permutation tests for experimental data. 实验数据的置换测试。
IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6
Charles A Holt, Sean P Sullivan

This article surveys the use of nonparametric permutation tests for analyzing experimental data. The permutation approach, which involves randomizing or permuting features of the observed data, is a flexible way to draw statistical inferences in common experimental settings. It is particularly valuable when few independent observations are available, a frequent occurrence in controlled experiments in economics and other social sciences. The permutation method constitutes a comprehensive approach to statistical inference. In two-treatment testing, permutation concepts underlie popular rank-based tests, like the Wilcoxon and Mann-Whitney tests. But permutation reasoning is not limited to ordinal contexts. Analogous tests can be constructed from the permutation of measured observations-as opposed to rank-transformed observations-and we argue that these tests should often be preferred. Permutation tests can also be used with multiple treatments, with ordered hypothesized effects, and with complex data-structures, such as hypothesis testing in the presence of nuisance variables. Drawing examples from the experimental economics literature, we illustrate how permutation testing solves common challenges. Our aim is to help experimenters move beyond the handful of overused tests in play today and to instead see permutation testing as a flexible framework for statistical inference.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6.

本文综述了非参数排列检验在分析实验数据中的应用。排列方法涉及对观测数据的特征进行随机化或排列,是在常见实验环境中进行统计推断的一种灵活方法。在经济学和其他社会科学的对照实验中经常出现的独立观察很少的情况下,它尤其有价值。排列方法构成了统计推断的一种综合方法。在两种治疗测试中,排列概念是流行的基于秩的测试的基础,如Wilcoxon和Mann-Whitney测试。但排列推理并不局限于有序上下文。与秩变换的观测结果相反,可以从测量观测结果的排列中构建类似的测试,我们认为这些测试通常应该是首选的。置换测试也可以用于多种治疗,具有有序的假设效应,以及复杂的数据结构,例如存在干扰变量的假设测试。我们从实验经济学文献中举例说明排列测试如何解决常见的挑战。我们的目标是帮助实验者超越当今少数被过度使用的测试,转而将排列测试视为一种灵活的统计推理框架。补充信息:在线版本包含补充材料,请访问10.1007/s10683-023-09799-6。
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引用次数: 0
Endogenous reference price auctions for a diverse set of commodities: an experimental analysis. 多种商品的内生参考价格拍卖:实验分析。
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6
Olivier Armantier, Charles A Holt

This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the endogenous reference price auction, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using "reference prices." Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller's profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6.

本文研究了一个预算受限的拍卖师对每个对象进行有噪声的价值估计的多对象、多单元拍卖。我们提出了一种新的分配机制,内生参考价格拍卖,具有两个关键特征。首先,使用“参考价格”对各对象的投标进行标准化。其次,使用从提交的投标中提取的信息内生地设置参考价格。我们报告了一项实验,该实验表明,一个简单的内生过程可以缓解价值不准确,并改善三个绩效指标:卖方利润、配置效率和总盈余。这些结果对实践中使用的大型拍卖具有重要意义。补充信息:在线版本包含补充材料,请访问10.1007/s10683-022-09783-6。
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引用次数: 0
When, and why, do teams benefit from self-selection? 什么时候,为什么团队会从自我选择中受益?
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09800-2
Mira Fischer, Rainer Michael Rilke, B. Yurtoglu
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引用次数: 0
The distributional preferences of Americans, 2013–2016 美国人的分配偏好,2013-2016
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09792-z
Raymond J. Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, Shachar Kariv, Silvia Vannutelli
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引用次数: 6
Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions 拍卖中的跨博弈学习与认知能力
3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-07 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09789-8
Thomas Giebe, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Martin G. Kocher, Simeon Schudy
Abstract Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, ‘cross-game learning’ may rather be understood as ‘cross-game transfer’, as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.
在二次竞价拍卖(SPAs)中,出价过高被证明是持续的,并且与认知能力有关。考虑到认知技能,我们通过实验研究了跨游戏学习在多大程度上可以减少spa中的过高出价。采用订单平衡设计,我们使用首价拍卖(fpa)将参与者暴露在拍卖格式中,其中高出价的损失比spa更突出。对于认知能力较弱的参与者来说,fpa的经验会导致大量的跨游戏学习,但对认知能力较强的参与者来说,并不会影响过高的出价。反之亦然,在FPA中投标前经历spa并不会对认知能力较差的参与者的投标行为产生实质性影响,但令人惊讶的是,它会减少认知能力较强的参与者的投标阴影,从而导致FPA中的利润降低。因此,“跨游戏学习”可以理解为“跨游戏迁移”,因为它有可能使认知能力较低的竞买者受益,而对认知能力较高的竞买者几乎没有甚至是不利的影响。
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引用次数: 0
Editorial: Symposium "Pre-results review". 社论:专题讨论会“成果前审查”。
IF 1.7 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-02-27 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09793-y
Urs Fischbacher, Irenaeus Wolff
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引用次数: 0
Call for papers – Special issue in memory of Amnon Rapoport: Experimental Economics 论文征集-纪念阿姆农·拉波波特特刊:实验经济学
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09794-x
D. Budescu, Ido Erev, Tamar Kugler, R. Zwick
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引用次数: 0
Morally monotonic choice in public good games 公共利益博弈中的道德单调选择
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-02-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09787-2
James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj, Susan Xu Tang
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引用次数: 1
Principal’s distributive preferences and the incentivization of agents 委托人的分配偏好与代理人的激励
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09791-0
Sophie Cêtre, Max Lobeck
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引用次数: 0
The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings. 动态委托代理环境下随机冲击对相互行为的影响。
IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w
Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl

Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.

先前的研究表明,对产出的不可观察的随机冲击对短期(“静态”)雇佣关系的效率有不利影响。鉴于企业中长期(“动态”)关系的普遍存在,我们研究了在相同的委托代理对重复交互的礼物交换关系中,冲击的影响是否同样明显。在动态关系中,冲击对效率的负面影响明显小于静态关系。在试图确定我们的结果的驱动因素时,我们发现需要重复博弈效应(当前的不当行为可以在未来受到惩罚)和噪声消除效应(部分噪声在长期内被消除)的结合,以避免不可观察的随机冲击对效率的有害影响。补充信息:在线版本包含补充资料,提供地址:10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w。
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引用次数: 1
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Experimental Economics
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