Pub Date : 2022-09-09DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09766-7
Natalie Struwe, Esther Blanco, James M Walker
We present experimental evidence for decision settings where public good providers compete for endogenous rewards which are donations (transfers) offered by outside donors. Donors receive benefits from public good provision but cannot provide the good themselves. The performance of three competition mechanisms is examined in relation to the level of public good provision and transfers offered by donors. In addition to a contest where transfers received by public good providers are proportional to effort, we study two contests with exclusion from transfers, namely a winner-takes-all and a loser-gets-nothing. We compare behavior in these three decision settings to the default setting of no-contest (no-transfers). Results for this novel decision environment with endogenous transfers show that donors offer transfers (contest prizes) at similar levels across contests and contributions to the public good are not significantly different in the three contests settings, but are consistently and significantly higher in all contests compared to the setting with no-transfers. Initially, the winner-takes-all setting leads to a significantly higher increase in public good contributions compared to the other two contests; but this difference diminishes across decision rounds.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09766-7.
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Pub Date : 2022-08-24DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09768-5
Jean-Louis Bago, Bruce S. Shearer
{"title":"Risk preferences and contract choices","authors":"Jean-Louis Bago, Bruce S. Shearer","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09768-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09768-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"1374 - 1398"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46672399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-08DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09765-8
T. Buser, Noémi Péter, S. Wolter
{"title":"Willingness to compete, gender and career choices along the whole ability distribution","authors":"T. Buser, Noémi Péter, S. Wolter","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09765-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09765-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"1299 - 1326"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43211763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-12DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09763-w
Pau Balart, Lara Ezquerra, Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz
{"title":"Correction to: Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple choice tests","authors":"Pau Balart, Lara Ezquerra, Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09763-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09763-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"1298 - 1298"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47799968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-09DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09762-x
Tobias Huber, Johannes G. Jaspersen, Andreas Richter, Dennis Strümpel
{"title":"On the change of risk aversion in wealth: a field experiment in a closed economic system","authors":"Tobias Huber, Johannes G. Jaspersen, Andreas Richter, Dennis Strümpel","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09762-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09762-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"1 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49124865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-10DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09757-8
Arturo Macias
{"title":"Capital structure irrelevance in the laboratory: an experiment with complete and asymmetric information","authors":"Arturo Macias","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09757-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09757-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"1418 - 1440"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47567966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-21DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09754-x
P. Ferraro, J. Tracy
{"title":"A reassessment of the potential for loss-framed incentive contracts to increase productivity: a meta-analysis and a real-effort experiment","authors":"P. Ferraro, J. Tracy","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09754-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09754-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"25 1","pages":"1441 - 1466"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48971650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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