Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09807-9
Federica Alberti, César A. Mantilla
{"title":"Correction to: A mechanism requesting prices and quantities may increase the provision of heterogeneous public goods","authors":"Federica Alberti, César A. Mantilla","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09807-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09807-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47542922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-02DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09806-w
Federica Alberti, César A. Mantilla
{"title":"A mechanism requesting prices and quantities may increase the provision of heterogeneous public goods","authors":"Federica Alberti, César A. Mantilla","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09806-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09806-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45352350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-27DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w
Jennie Huang, Judd B. Kessler, M. Niederle
{"title":"Fairness has less impact when agents are less informed","authors":"Jennie Huang, Judd B. Kessler, M. Niederle","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09795-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44493317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-17DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09804-y
Thomas Dohmen, Ingrid M. T. Rohde, Tom Stolp
{"title":"Correction to: Tournament incentives affect perceived stress and hormonal stress responses","authors":"Thomas Dohmen, Ingrid M. T. Rohde, Tom Stolp","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09804-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09804-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135861280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09801-1
Thomas Dohmen, Ingrid M. T. Rohde, Tom Stolp
Abstract We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance—in particular, tournament incentives—induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance—fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the entire course of the experiment at both the hormonal and psychological level. Hormonal stress responses are captured by measuring salivary cortisol levels. Psychological stress responses are measured by self-reported feelings of stress and primary appraisals. We find that tournament incentives induce a stress response whereas a fixed payment does not induce stress. This stress response does not differ significantly across situations in which winners and losers of the tournament are publically announced and situations in which this information remains private. Biological and psychological stress measures are positively correlated, i.e. increased levels of cortisol are associated with stronger feelings of stress. Nevertheless, neither perceived psychological stress nor elevated cortisol levels in a previous tournament predict a subsequent choice between tournaments and fixed payment schemes, indicating that stress induced by incentives schemes is not a relevant criterion for sorting decisions in our experiment. Finally, we find that cortisol levels are severely elevated at the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that participants experience stress in anticipation of the experiment per se, potentially due to uncertainties associated with the unknown lab situation. We call this the novelty effect.
{"title":"Tournament incentives affect perceived stress and hormonal stress responses","authors":"Thomas Dohmen, Ingrid M. T. Rohde, Tom Stolp","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09801-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09801-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance—in particular, tournament incentives—induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance—fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the entire course of the experiment at both the hormonal and psychological level. Hormonal stress responses are captured by measuring salivary cortisol levels. Psychological stress responses are measured by self-reported feelings of stress and primary appraisals. We find that tournament incentives induce a stress response whereas a fixed payment does not induce stress. This stress response does not differ significantly across situations in which winners and losers of the tournament are publically announced and situations in which this information remains private. Biological and psychological stress measures are positively correlated, i.e. increased levels of cortisol are associated with stronger feelings of stress. Nevertheless, neither perceived psychological stress nor elevated cortisol levels in a previous tournament predict a subsequent choice between tournaments and fixed payment schemes, indicating that stress induced by incentives schemes is not a relevant criterion for sorting decisions in our experiment. Finally, we find that cortisol levels are severely elevated at the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that participants experience stress in anticipation of the experiment per se, potentially due to uncertainties associated with the unknown lab situation. We call this the novelty effect.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"224 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136319631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0
Ahrash Dianat, Mikhail Freer
Abstract We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers’ aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.
{"title":"Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test","authors":"Ahrash Dianat, Mikhail Freer","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09802-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who receives the revenue from the auction and who (depending on the treatment) has agency to determine the outcome of the auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-credible second-price auction fails to converge to the first-price auction. We provide a behavioral explanation for our results based on sellers’ aversion to rule-breaking, which is confirmed by an additional experiment.","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"146 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135066305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09797-8
A. Kirman, François Laisney, Paul Pezanis-Christou
{"title":"Relaxing the symmetry assumption in participation games: a specification test for cluster-heterogeneity","authors":"A. Kirman, François Laisney, Paul Pezanis-Christou","doi":"10.1007/s10683-023-09797-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-023-09797-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 1","pages":"850 - 878"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48714296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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