British Accounting Review最新文献

Most literature on the antecedents of misreporting in the public sector focuses on the propensity to report financial breakeven, with limited attention to the regulatory and normative incentives that may alter such propensity. This study provides novel explanations for public sector organisations' deviation from breakeven. Its underlying assumption is that misreporting may be shaped by mimetic pressures encouraging conformity as well as regulatory pressures conveyed through soft budget constraints. The empirical analysis includes all Italian public healthcare organisations over 17 years. The findings suggest that public healthcare organisations may manipulate accruals not only to achieve financial breakeven, but also to conform with peers’ financial performance or to worsen reported financial performance in anticipation of a bailout.

We examine the role of legal regime in the use and usefulness of management disclosures relating to firm strategy and the business model (SBM disclosures). We conduct our analysis in the bijural Canadian setting, where firms operate under either common law (CL) or French Civil law (FCL), depending on where they are headquartered. We find that SBM disclosures vary in length and usefulness across legal regimes. Quebec firms operating under a FCL legal regime produce less extensive SBM disclosures, but such disclosures have a more pronounced information asymmetry-reducing effect, as compared to those of firms operating in CL jurisdictions. Our analysis introduces legal liability risk related to the legal regime as an additional factor that shapes SBM disclosures in the annual reports. Our findings can be of interest to the IASB and the national accounting standard setters as they develop SBM disclosure-related implementation guidance across various jurisdictions.

Prior literature has examined 10-K narrative thematic bias and financial graph distortion as two independent outcomes that might arise from managements' efforts at impression management. Largely unexplored is an analysis of narrative thematic bias and financial graph distortion as joint and interrelated outcomes that would arise if management coordinates both in the same 10-K report as part of an impression management strategy. We fill this void in the literature by using a simultaneous equation system to examine the joint relationship between narrative thematic bias and graph distortion in the 10-K filings of S&P 500 firms from 2014 to 2018. We draw upon Paivio's (1986) dual coding theory to predict a positive association between narrative thematic bias and financial graph distortion based on the insight that graph distortion helps reinforce the effects of thematic bias, and vice versa. Consistently, we find a simultaneous and positive relationship between thematic bias and graph distortion. Further, we find that this complementary relationship is more pronounced in firms with weak corporate governance and weak external monitoring. Our findings suggest that management may exploit the reinforcing effects of thematic bias and graph distortion to leave financial statement users with a more favorable impression of firm performance.

We examine the impact of poor corporate social responsibility engagement signalled through negative environmental and social (E&S) incidents on equity financing via seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) across 25 countries. The results show that negative E&S incidents significantly aggravate SEO underpricing, thereby increasing the cost of raising equity capital. Managers appear to take the adverse effects into consideration as reflected in the reduced likelihood of issuing equity following the experience of negative E&S incidents. Further analysis shows that such adverse pricing effects are stronger for firms that are subject to significant social and regulatory penalties for their E&S misconducts, suggesting that negative E&S incidents increase corporate reputational losses and elevate regulatory risk. Finally, there are rich cross-country variations in the SEO pricing effects of E&S risks with legal investor protection and national culture playing an important role in influencing the pricing of E&S risk.

To better understand how the practice of auditing can be more effectively enrolled in the fight against fraud and corruption, this study (1) examines how these problems are viewed and defined by the public and (2) contrasts this view and definition with that of professional auditors. The examination is informed by the dispositive theory of Foucault and an inductive analysis of a large (90,000+) multi-year sample of news stories related to fraud and corruption in the Italian health sector. While auditors define these problems in relatively narrow terms and consign them to ‘a form of risk, a threat to reputation and revenue, and a cost of doing business,’ the study finds that the public has a broader definition and a greater concern with problematic acts and actors ‘in and of themselves’. These findings have important implications for the audit expectations gap and how it might be addressed. The study also provides a useful analytical method for locating and better understanding fraud and corruption in other large, institutional settings.

Considering the inherent stickiness of abnormal audit fees, our study contributes to the literature by decomposing abnormal audit fees into a jump component and long-run sticky component. We investigate whether and how changes in credit ratings asymmetrically affect the jump component of abnormal audit fees. We document a positive association between rating downgrades and the jump component. We find that heightened bankruptcy risk and misstatement risk are the mechanisms that drive this relationship. Further analysis shows that firms experiencing rating downgrades are more likely to receive a going concern opinion and experience longer audit report lags. Taken together, our findings provide direct evidence that credit ratings are significantly associated with abnormal audit fees, particularly with the jump component. Given the serial correlation of abnormal audit fees, our study sheds light on the importance of disaggregation of the abnormal audit fee residuals into the jump and long-run sticky components.

Using data from 123 reverse mergers (RMs) in China, this study investigates the determinants and economic consequences of auditor choice in RMs. We find that the choice of a new auditor instead of the incumbent auditor is not related to auditor competence but to the relative bargaining power of RM firms and publicly listed firms (shell firms), and that the probability of choosing new auditors is higher when RM firms have more bargaining power relative to shell firms. We also find that hiring new auditors in the RM is associated with a higher valuation of injected assets and higher pre-listing income-increasing discretionary accruals in RM firms. Furthermore, post-merger firms exhibit drops in accounting performance and firm value and are more likely to restate their financial reports within 3 years of listing when new auditors are appointed in RMs. Finally, the cross-sectional test shows that this effect mainly exists in the context of RMs where the newly appointed auditor is a non-Big 10 auditor and a non-specialist auditor. Overall, our results emphasize the role of RM firms and shell firms in auditor choice for RMs and highlight the implications of such a joint decision on investor protection.

Our study explores the association between social trust and private firms' choices to provide audited financial statements. By exploring an international sample from emerging markets, we find that private firms in countries with higher social trust are less likely to provide audited financial statements. This finding arises because social trust helps address contracting imperfections, substituting for audited financial statements in mitigating agency problems. Our study suggests that social trust renders private firms rely less on audited financial statements to facilitate contracting. We contribute to the literature on private firms’ financial reporting choices and the role of social trust in shaping economic decisions.

The extant literature focuses on the economic effect of significant changes that activist hedge funds enact, but shows mixed findings about the effect on the information environment. We investigate the informational effect on the third party — namely, the auditor — and argue that the potential significant changes in target firms heighten the complexity and uncertainty of the information environment, potentially increasing the workload or risk for auditors. We find that auditors react to hedge fund intervention by increasing audit fees. This relationship holds in a battery of identification tests that address endogeneity, including difference-in-differences analysis with propensity score matching, coarsened exact matching, entropy balancing, and a placebo test. Further analysis supports our conjecture that information complexity and uncertainty increase in target firms, leading to higher audit fees. Moreover, auditors increase their effort after intervention but do not seem to incur greater audit risk. This finding suggests that the information risk arising from the potential post-intervention changes is within auditors’ threshold of risk tolerance, consistent with the corporate governance effect of hedge fund activism.

We investigate how disclosure of key audit matters (KAMs) and related management footnote disclosures on a subjective accounting estimate relating to fair value in the financial statement footnotes affect auditors' perceptions of their accountability and their subsequent adjustment decisions. In relation to accountability, a substitution effect is found between KAMs disclosures and footnotes. That is, auditors believe that they are less accountable either when they can report on the fair value estimates in KAMs disclosures, or when management has provided expanded fair value related footnotes. However, we find that when the fair value disclosure is considered by both KAMs and expanded footnotes it results in the auditor recommending a more conservative fair value adjustment decision. Overall, our results show that the requirement to disclose KAMs does make a real difference and interacts with management's disclosures to affect auditors' perceptions of accountability and their adjustment decisions.