Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101432
Mostafa Monzur Hasan , Ashrafee Hossain , Haiyan Jiang
This study examines the relationship between firms’ political sentiment (PSENT) and their credit ratings. Using US public firms as the sample, we reveal that PSENT is positively associated with corporate credit ratings. Furthermore, we find evidence indicating that a positive PSENT leads to higher credit ratings, while a negative PSENT results in lower credit ratings. We also demonstrate that PSENT is positively (negatively) associated with the investment grade and rating upgrade (rating downgrade). The cross-sectional analysis indicates that the positive relationship between PSENT and credit ratings is more evident among firms facing severe information asymmetry, financial distress risk, and weaker governance. Additionally, we observe that PSENT leads to higher new debt issuance. Finally, we conduct a survey of credit analysts and find evidence that corroborates our findings from empirical analyses. Overall, our study suggests that PSENT has an essential bearing on corporate credit quality.
{"title":"Political sentiment and credit ratings","authors":"Mostafa Monzur Hasan , Ashrafee Hossain , Haiyan Jiang","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101432","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101432","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines the relationship between firms’ political sentiment (PSENT) and their credit ratings. Using US public firms as the sample, we reveal that PSENT is positively associated with corporate credit ratings. Furthermore, we find evidence indicating that a positive PSENT leads to higher credit ratings, while a negative PSENT results in lower credit ratings. We also demonstrate that PSENT is positively (negatively) associated with the investment grade and rating upgrade (rating downgrade). The cross-sectional analysis indicates that the positive relationship between PSENT and credit ratings is more evident among firms facing severe information asymmetry, financial distress risk, and weaker governance. Additionally, we observe that PSENT leads to higher new debt issuance. Finally, we conduct a survey of credit analysts and find evidence that corroborates our findings from empirical analyses. Overall, our study suggests that PSENT has an essential bearing on corporate credit quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101432"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141463487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101434
Nathan Zhenghang Zhu , Kun Tracy Wang
The US Securities and Exchange Commission implemented Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made it considerably easier for cross-listed firms in the US market to deregister and terminate their regulatory obligations as US exchange listings. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we predict and find that in the period after the implementation of Rule 12h-6, cross-listed firms have significantly less innovation than non-cross-listed domestic firms, which suggests that Rule 12h-6 impedes innovation in cross-listed firms. This effect is stronger for firms that rely more on external financing, have high R&D intensity, and face greater financial constraints. It is also more pronounced in countries with low investor protection, low regulatory quality, greater differences with the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and less liberalized stock markets. The results of the channel analyses indicate that cross-listed firms experience lower sensitivity of R&D investment to stock price and a decrease in foreign institutional ownership in the post Rule 12h-6 implementation period. Taken together, our findings suggest that Rule 12h-6 reduces the benefits of cross-listing for foreign investors, which hinders innovation in non-US economies.
{"title":"The impact of loosening regulatory requirements on firm innovation: Evidence from SEC rule 12h-6","authors":"Nathan Zhenghang Zhu , Kun Tracy Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101434","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101434","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The US Securities and Exchange Commission implemented Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made it considerably easier for cross-listed firms in the US market to deregister and terminate their regulatory obligations as US exchange listings. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we predict and find that in the period after the implementation of Rule 12h-6, cross-listed firms have significantly less innovation than non-cross-listed domestic firms, which suggests that Rule 12h-6 impedes innovation in cross-listed firms. This effect is stronger for firms that rely more on external financing, have high R&D intensity, and face greater financial constraints. It is also more pronounced in countries with low investor protection, low regulatory quality, greater differences with the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and less liberalized stock markets. The results of the channel analyses indicate that cross-listed firms experience lower sensitivity of R&D investment to stock price and a decrease in foreign institutional ownership in the post Rule 12h-6 implementation period. Taken together, our findings suggest that Rule 12h-6 reduces the benefits of cross-listing for foreign investors, which hinders innovation in non-US economies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101434"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141463239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101506
K. Hung Chan , Qiliang Liu , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Li Tian
The development of high-speed railways (HSRs) has significant regional economic and social implications. We study a micro externality of such development, namely the impact of HSRs on audit firms' human resource allocation and audit quality. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between the availability of HSRs and audit partner changes across audit offices in China which involves a simultaneous change in audit partner and audit office to reallocate human resources. We find that the advent of HSRs between clients and audit offices increases the likelihood of audit partner changes across audit offices especially for predecessor audit offices with severe human resource constraints due partly to the mandatory auditor rotation requirement. Such audit partner changes across audit offices most likely are reciprocal over time, occur within the optimal HSR transportation interval and can significantly improve audit quality in terms of reducing excessive financing reporting discretions, misstatements and regulatory sanctions, but exert no effect on audit fees. Our study has implications for audit firms’ human resource management in light of infrastructure improvements and for audit policy makers to evaluate the standards for audit partner rotations.
{"title":"High-speed railways, audit partner changes across audit offices and audit quality: Evidence from China","authors":"K. Hung Chan , Qiliang Liu , Phyllis Lai Lan Mo , Li Tian","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101506","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101506","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The development of high-speed railways (HSRs) has significant regional economic and social implications. We study a micro externality of such development, namely the impact of HSRs on audit firms' human resource allocation and audit quality. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between the availability of HSRs and audit partner changes across audit offices in China which involves a simultaneous change in audit partner and audit office to reallocate human resources. We find that the advent of HSRs between clients and audit offices increases the likelihood of audit partner changes across audit offices especially for predecessor audit offices with severe human resource constraints due partly to the mandatory auditor rotation requirement. Such audit partner changes across audit offices most likely are reciprocal over time, occur within the optimal HSR transportation interval and can significantly improve audit quality in terms of reducing excessive financing reporting discretions, misstatements and regulatory sanctions, but exert no effect on audit fees. Our study has implications for audit firms’ human resource management in light of infrastructure improvements and for audit policy makers to evaluate the standards for audit partner rotations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101506"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143899875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101451
Thi Thuy Anh Vo , Nathan Lael Joseph
Previous studies indicate that prior period investor protection, quality of government/institution and ownership have little to no influence on bank risk-taking around crisis periods. Using contemporaneous data for 40 countries, we show that institutional mechanisms, investor protection, bank regulation and supervision (BRS) rules, and ownership, reduced bank risk-taking around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Crisis/Sovereign Debt Crisis periods. Institutional mechanisms have the strongest risk-reducing impacts on bank risk-taking, whereas foreign and government ownership have the weakest impacts. The greater the distance from bank default the lower the likelihood of crisis regimes. Investor protection increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Government ownership increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Using a generalized bivariate copula function, we untangle the relation between crisis regimes and bank risk-taking by showing that higher risk-taking increases the likelihood of crisis regimes.
{"title":"Institutional mechanisms, ownership and bank risk-taking during crises","authors":"Thi Thuy Anh Vo , Nathan Lael Joseph","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101451","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101451","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Previous studies indicate that prior period investor protection, quality of government/institution and ownership have little to no influence on bank risk-taking around crisis periods. Using contemporaneous data for 40 countries, we show that institutional mechanisms, investor protection, bank regulation and supervision (BRS) rules, and ownership, reduced bank risk-taking around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Crisis/Sovereign Debt Crisis periods. Institutional mechanisms have the strongest risk-reducing impacts on bank risk-taking, whereas foreign and government ownership have the weakest impacts. The greater the distance from bank default the lower the likelihood of crisis regimes. Investor protection increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Government ownership increased (decreased) the likelihood of the GFC (Eurozone Crisis) regimes. Using a generalized bivariate copula function, we untangle the relation between crisis regimes and bank risk-taking by showing that higher risk-taking increases the likelihood of crisis regimes.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101451"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143899983","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2025.101647
Grantley Taylor , Douglas Cumming , Donghui Li , Jing Shi
The purpose of this editorial is to provide a summary of how legal, regulatory or political changes or innovations impact accounting or financial outcomes. The intersection of legal, regulatory, and political environments with accounting and financial outcomes is a critical area of study in the field of accounting. Legal frameworks, regulatory bodies, and political decisions create the environment in which financial reporting and accounting practices are developed and enforced. This editorial summarises and discusses five papers that have been included in this special section. A review of the outcomes of such reforms or innovations in these papers provides direct evidence of the effectiveness of policy, which can provide useful and relevant input for any further planned innovations.
{"title":"The role of legal, regulatory and political reforms and institutions in influencing accounting and financial outcomes","authors":"Grantley Taylor , Douglas Cumming , Donghui Li , Jing Shi","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2025.101647","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2025.101647","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The purpose of this editorial is to provide a summary of how legal, regulatory or political changes or innovations impact accounting or financial outcomes. The intersection of legal, regulatory, and political environments with accounting and financial outcomes is a critical area of study in the field of accounting. Legal frameworks, regulatory bodies, and political decisions create the environment in which financial reporting and accounting practices are developed and enforced. This editorial summarises and discusses five papers that have been included in this special section. A review of the outcomes of such reforms or innovations in these papers provides direct evidence of the effectiveness of policy, which can provide useful and relevant input for any further planned innovations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101647"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143873104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101495
Seungbin Oh , Ahrum Choi
This study investigates whether the degree of cost stickiness depends on the divergence between control and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners using data from 22 countries. Firms with a large divergence between control and cash-flow rights are known to take more opportunistic actions at the expense of minority shareholders. The empirical results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights increases due to the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Firms use both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real-activities earnings management (REM), and among REM, they adjust production activity and discretionary expense to affect cost. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between the divergence between control and cash-flow rights and cost stickiness is more pronounced in countries with weak economic, legal, and social factors. This paper, by examining the effect of ownership structure on cost behavior as well as its underlying mechanism, broadens the understanding of sticky cost behavior and contributes to the growing body of literature on the convergence of financial and managerial accounting.
{"title":"How does divergence of control and cash-flow rights influence cost stickiness?","authors":"Seungbin Oh , Ahrum Choi","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101495","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101495","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study investigates whether the degree of cost stickiness depends on the divergence between control and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners using data from 22 countries. Firms with a large divergence between control and cash-flow rights are known to take more opportunistic actions at the expense of minority shareholders. The empirical results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights increases due to the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Firms use both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real-activities earnings management (REM), and among REM, they adjust production activity and discretionary expense to affect cost. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between the divergence between control and cash-flow rights and cost stickiness is more pronounced in countries with weak economic, legal, and social factors. This paper, by examining the effect of ownership structure on cost behavior as well as its underlying mechanism, broadens the understanding of sticky cost behavior and contributes to the growing body of literature on the convergence of financial and managerial accounting.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101495"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142637401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101497
Tiphaine Jérôme , Cédric Poretti , Alain Schatt
We investigate whether female lead auditors are associated with higher audit fees and audit quality. We expect female lead auditors to have a significant influence on these audit outcomes for two reasons. First, female auditors are more risk averse and less tolerant of opportunistic behaviours than their male counterparts. Second, lead auditors perform more numerous and varied tasks and spend more time on the audit of a given client than concurring auditors. Our results show that female lead auditors are associated with higher audit quality but not with higher audit fees. However, these results only hold for female lead auditors with low client-specific experience (i.e., in a riskier context). Finally, additional analyses suggest that female lead auditors and female concurring auditors have a different influence on audit fees and audit quality.
{"title":"Female lead auditors, audit fees, and audit quality","authors":"Tiphaine Jérôme , Cédric Poretti , Alain Schatt","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101497","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101497","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate whether female lead auditors are associated with higher audit fees and audit quality. We expect female lead auditors to have a significant influence on these audit outcomes for two reasons. First, female auditors are more risk averse and less tolerant of opportunistic behaviours than their male counterparts. Second, lead auditors perform more numerous and varied tasks and spend more time on the audit of a given client than concurring auditors. Our results show that female lead auditors are associated with higher audit quality but not with higher audit fees. However, these results only hold for female lead auditors with low client-specific experience (i.e., in a riskier context). Finally, additional analyses suggest that female lead auditors and female concurring auditors have a different influence on audit fees and audit quality.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101497"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142637402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101510
Sean Foley , Xiaolu Hu , Haozhi Huang , Jiang Li
We examine the mandated introduction of a supervised auction framework within China's primary bond market. This regulatory intervention resulted in a substantial reduction in debt costs for Chinese Bond issuers, primarily attributed to the alleviation of agency conflicts between underwriters and issuers. Leveraging unique bidder-level data obtained from a lead underwriter, our study provides replicable tools to discern collusive bidding behavior. This sheds light on instances of artificially inflated bond yields, highlighting economically burdensome practices. Our findings can assist regulators, issuers, and investors engaged in unsupervised auction mechanisms. Our insights offer potential enhancements to regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency across various sectors, including securities issuance, construction projects, and procurement.
{"title":"Should underwriters be trusted? Reducing agency costs through primary market supervision","authors":"Sean Foley , Xiaolu Hu , Haozhi Huang , Jiang Li","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101510","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101510","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine the mandated introduction of a supervised auction framework within China's primary bond market. This regulatory intervention resulted in a substantial reduction in debt costs for Chinese Bond issuers, primarily attributed to the alleviation of agency conflicts between underwriters and issuers. Leveraging unique bidder-level data obtained from a lead underwriter, our study provides replicable tools to discern collusive bidding behavior. This sheds light on instances of artificially inflated bond yields, highlighting economically burdensome practices. Our findings can assist regulators, issuers, and investors engaged in unsupervised auction mechanisms. Our insights offer potential enhancements to regulatory frameworks and operational efficiency across various sectors, including securities issuance, construction projects, and procurement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101510"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143899876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2023.101274
Wei Chen , Lili Dai , Xiaohua Fang , Wenjun Zhang
We utilize the exogenous intertemporal variation in employment protection across countries and study the impact of employment protection on international equity markets. We find robust evidence that firms located in countries with weak labor protection regulation exhibit a low level of one-year-ahead stock price crash risks relative to those in countries with strong labor protection regulation. It is consistent with the view that when employees face material unemployment risk, they are more incentivized to engage in information search and analysis, thereby curtailing the effectiveness of managerial bad news hoarding activities (i.e., the protection heightening risk hypothesis). Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Further evidence shows that the impact of employment protection on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with a higher proclivity to suppress bad news and for firms in countries with stronger legal enforcement. Our findings have important implications for policymakers concerning equity extreme risk and labor protection around the globe.
{"title":"Labor protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from international equity markets","authors":"Wei Chen , Lili Dai , Xiaohua Fang , Wenjun Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101274","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101274","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We utilize the exogenous intertemporal variation in employment protection across countries and study the impact of employment protection on international equity markets. We find robust evidence that firms located in countries with weak labor protection regulation exhibit a low level of one-year-ahead stock price crash risks relative to those in countries with strong labor protection regulation. It is consistent with the view that when employees face material unemployment risk, they are more incentivized to engage in information search and analysis, thereby curtailing the effectiveness of managerial bad news hoarding activities (i.e., <em>the protection heightening risk hypothesis</em>). Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Further evidence shows that the impact of employment protection on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with a higher proclivity to suppress bad news and for firms in countries with stronger legal enforcement. Our findings have important implications for policymakers concerning equity extreme risk and labor protection around the globe.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101274"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135615119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-05-01DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499
Hyeong Joon Kim
This paper investigates the consequences of stock price crashes. I find that stock price crash risk subsequently reduces managerial confidence levels, as proxied by the CEO's option-based and earnings call transcript's text-based measures. I also find that stock price crash risk reduces CEO compensation and equity incentives, suggesting that a firm seeks to adjust managerial incentives after its stock price crashes to prevent future occurrences. Furthermore, CEOs with high confidence are more likely to curtail overinvestment after their crash experiences relative to others, thereby contributing to shareholder value. Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that CEOs and firms appear to learn from their experiences of stock price crashes, suggesting that stock price crashes may induce experience-driven conservatism that influences CEO and corporate decisions.
{"title":"Lesson from stock price crash: Changes in managerial confidence and incentives","authors":"Hyeong Joon Kim","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.bar.2024.101499","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the consequences of stock price crashes. I find that stock price crash risk subsequently reduces managerial confidence levels, as proxied by the CEO's option-based and earnings call transcript's text-based measures. I also find that stock price crash risk reduces CEO compensation and equity incentives, suggesting that a firm seeks to adjust managerial incentives after its stock price crashes to prevent future occurrences. Furthermore, CEOs with high confidence are more likely to curtail overinvestment after their crash experiences relative to others, thereby contributing to shareholder value. Overall, this paper provides novel evidence that CEOs and firms appear to learn from their experiences of stock price crashes, suggesting that stock price crashes may induce experience-driven conservatism that influences CEO and corporate decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":"57 3","pages":"Article 101499"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5,"publicationDate":"2025-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142637399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}