This article, which was a contribution to a Symposium on the office of the Chief Justice of the United States, compares that office with the office of President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The article concludes that, while the American Chief Justice possesses more authority in most formal respects, the President of the German Court has on occasion exercised an informal public or private influence that goes well beyond anything of the sort that has been attempted (recently at least) by the American Chief Justice.
{"title":"Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives From the Federal Republic of Germany","authors":"Peter E. Quint","doi":"10.2307/40041353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041353","url":null,"abstract":"This article, which was a contribution to a Symposium on the office of the Chief Justice of the United States, compares that office with the office of President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The article concludes that, while the American Chief Justice possesses more authority in most formal respects, the President of the German Court has on occasion exercised an informal public or private influence that goes well beyond anything of the sort that has been attempted (recently at least) by the American Chief Justice.","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1853"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041353","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
William H. Rehnquist had an unusually long apprenticeship before he became Chief Justice in 1986. He had already served under two Chief Justices: first under Chief Justice Fred Vinson during his own Supreme Court clerkship for Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-1953, and then, of course, during the more than fourteen years that he spent as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court. (You will notice that Rehnquist’s Supreme Court biography happens to skip the Warren Court years—not that exposure to Earl Warren would likely have made much difference, but it is worth noting that Chief Justice Warren does not even appear in the index to Rehnquist’s book on the Supreme Court, a part-memoir and part-history that he published in 1987.) The differences between Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist were manifest. One did not need to be a Court insider— and I do not present myself as one—to observe some of them. For example, during the Burger years, it was regarded as routine that an argued case or two would not be decided by the end of the Term, and instead would be, without explanation, restored to the calendar for reargument during the next Term. The reason, almost invariably, was that the Chief Justice had simply failed to exercise enough leadership to extract from his colleagues something that could pass for an opinion. Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon was the Court’s failure to decide INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, during the 1981 Term. The case was reargued during the 1982 Term and was finally decided on June 23, 1983, by a vote of seven to two, with an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Chadha file was one of the first I looked at when I began my work with the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun at
威廉·h·伦奎斯特(William H. Rehnquist)在1986年成为首席大法官之前，经历了一段异常漫长的学徒期。他已经在两位首席大法官手下工作过:第一个是首席大法官弗雷德·文森的手下，1952年至1953年，他在最高法院为罗伯特·h·杰克逊大法官做助理，然后，当然，他在汉堡法院担任了14年多的大法官。(你会注意到伦奎斯特的最高法院传记恰好跳过了沃伦法院的岁月——虽然与厄尔·沃伦的接触可能会有很大的不同，但值得注意的是，首席大法官沃伦甚至没有出现在伦奎斯特1987年出版的关于最高法院的书的索引中，这本书既是回忆录又是历史。)首席大法官伯格和首席大法官伦奎斯特之间的分歧是显而易见的。一个人不需要成为法院的内部人士——我也不以内部人士自居——就能观察到其中的一些。例如，在伯格任职期间，一两个有争议的案件在学期结束前不会作出裁决，而是在没有任何解释的情况下，被恢复到日历上，以便在下一学期重新辩论，这被视为惯例。原因几乎无一例外地是，首席大法官只是没有发挥足够的领导能力，从他的同事那里获得一些可以作为意见的东西。这种现象最令人震惊的例子也许是法院在1981年任期内未能就立法否决案INS诉Chadha案作出裁决。该案在1982年任期内被重新辩论，并最终于1983年6月23日以7比2的投票结果作出裁决，首席大法官伯格宣布立法否决违宪。查达的文件是我开始研究哈里·布莱克蒙法官的文件时最先看到的文件之一
{"title":"How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of William H. Rehnquist","authors":"L. Greenhouse","doi":"10.2307/40041342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041342","url":null,"abstract":"William H. Rehnquist had an unusually long apprenticeship before he became Chief Justice in 1986. He had already served under two Chief Justices: first under Chief Justice Fred Vinson during his own Supreme Court clerkship for Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-1953, and then, of course, during the more than fourteen years that he spent as an Associate Justice on the Burger Court. (You will notice that Rehnquist’s Supreme Court biography happens to skip the Warren Court years—not that exposure to Earl Warren would likely have made much difference, but it is worth noting that Chief Justice Warren does not even appear in the index to Rehnquist’s book on the Supreme Court, a part-memoir and part-history that he published in 1987.) The differences between Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist were manifest. One did not need to be a Court insider— and I do not present myself as one—to observe some of them. For example, during the Burger years, it was regarded as routine that an argued case or two would not be decided by the end of the Term, and instead would be, without explanation, restored to the calendar for reargument during the next Term. The reason, almost invariably, was that the Chief Justice had simply failed to exercise enough leadership to extract from his colleagues something that could pass for an opinion. Perhaps the most egregious example of this phenomenon was the Court’s failure to decide INS v. Chadha, the legislative veto case, during the 1981 Term. The case was reargued during the 1982 Term and was finally decided on June 23, 1983, by a vote of seven to two, with an opinion for the Court by Chief Justice Burger declaring the legislative veto unconstitutional. The Chadha file was one of the first I looked at when I began my work with the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun at","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041342","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68757982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice","authors":"Charles F. Hobson","doi":"10.2307/40041344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041344","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1421"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041344","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Alternative Career Resolution II: Changing the Tenure of Supreme Court Justices","authors":"Stephen B. Burbank","doi":"10.2307/40041346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041346","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1511"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041346","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How should a Chief Justice be assessed? This conference provides the occasion for considering this question as part of looking at the role of Chief Justice on the Supreme Court and in the American legal system. Rather than examining the office generally, I want to focus on assessing William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. One way of assessing any Chief Justice is in terms of her ability to achieve a substantive vision of the law. In this sense, few would disagree that John Marshall and Earl Warren were enormously successful in having their substantive visions reflected in the decisions of their Courts. Marshall's visions of judicial review and federalism, among other crucial issues, were embodied in decisions like Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland,1 which provided a framework for government that lasts to this day. Earl Warren's visions of a more equal society better protecting the dignity of individuals were reflected in the desegregation cases,3 the rulings incorporating the Bill of Rights,4 and the decisions requiring reapportionment of state legislatures.5 Writings on the Warren Court, both by
如何评估首席法官?这次会议提供了考虑这个问题的机会，作为研究最高法院和美国法律体系中首席大法官作用的一部分。我不打算泛泛地考察联邦最高法院，而是想着重对首席大法官威廉·伦奎斯特(William Rehnquist)进行评估。评估首席大法官的一个方法是看她实现法律实质愿景的能力。从这个意义上说，很少有人会不同意约翰·马歇尔和厄尔·沃伦在其法院的判决中反映其实质性愿景方面取得了巨大成功。马歇尔对司法审查和联邦制的看法，以及其他关键问题，体现在马布里诉麦迪逊案和麦卡洛克诉马里兰州案等判决中，这些判决为政府提供了一个持续至今的框架。厄尔·沃伦(Earl Warren)关于建立一个更加平等的社会、更好地保护个人尊严的愿景，反映在废除种族隔离的案件、纳入《权利法案》(Bill of Rights)的裁决以及要求重新分配州议会席位的决定中关于沃伦法院的著作，两位作者都是
{"title":"Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist","authors":"Erwin Chemerinsky","doi":"10.2307/40041341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041341","url":null,"abstract":"How should a Chief Justice be assessed? This conference provides the occasion for considering this question as part of looking at the role of Chief Justice on the Supreme Court and in the American legal system. Rather than examining the office generally, I want to focus on assessing William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. One way of assessing any Chief Justice is in terms of her ability to achieve a substantive vision of the law. In this sense, few would disagree that John Marshall and Earl Warren were enormously successful in having their substantive visions reflected in the decisions of their Courts. Marshall's visions of judicial review and federalism, among other crucial issues, were embodied in decisions like Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland,1 which provided a framework for government that lasts to this day. Earl Warren's visions of a more equal society better protecting the dignity of individuals were reflected in the desegregation cases,3 the rulings incorporating the Bill of Rights,4 and the decisions requiring reapportionment of state legislatures.5 Writings on the Warren Court, both by","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1331"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041341","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68757969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It comes as a surprise to many—including a number of lawyers and law students—to learn that John Marshall was not in fact the country’s first Chief Justice, but rather its fourth (or, according to some recent scholarship, its fifth). Before there was Marshall, there were John Jay, John Rutledge (briefly), possibly William Cushing (even more briefly), and Oliver Ellsworth. While legal historians may be familiar with these nonhousehold names, all too often when these men, and the Court over which they presided from 1789 to 1800, do receive mention, it is only to be dismissed as inferior to what immediately followed. As Robert McCloskey aptly put it in The American Supreme Court, “[t]he great shadow of John Marshall . . . falls across our understanding of that first decade; and it has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while they and the audience await the appearance of the star.” In the last ten years, scholars have begun to focus more attention on the preMarshall Court, but a certain derogatory attitude persists. One re-
{"title":"In the Beginning: The First Three Chief Justices","authors":"N. Wexler","doi":"10.2307/40041343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041343","url":null,"abstract":"It comes as a surprise to many—including a number of lawyers and law students—to learn that John Marshall was not in fact the country’s first Chief Justice, but rather its fourth (or, according to some recent scholarship, its fifth). Before there was Marshall, there were John Jay, John Rutledge (briefly), possibly William Cushing (even more briefly), and Oliver Ellsworth. While legal historians may be familiar with these nonhousehold names, all too often when these men, and the Court over which they presided from 1789 to 1800, do receive mention, it is only to be dismissed as inferior to what immediately followed. As Robert McCloskey aptly put it in The American Supreme Court, “[t]he great shadow of John Marshall . . . falls across our understanding of that first decade; and it has therefore the quality of a play’s opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while they and the audience await the appearance of the star.” In the last ten years, scholars have begun to focus more attention on the preMarshall Court, but a certain derogatory attitude persists. One re-","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1373"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041343","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Essay explores an incongruity in the allocation and exercise of two different kinds of judicial discretion held by the Chief Justice of the United States. The paradigmatic type of discretionary authority that Article III judges (including the Chief Justice) possess is expressed through the mode of adjudication, and as such is constrained in important ways by procedural forms that accompany that kind of official action. Judges are constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by formal “law,” but their discretion is additionally limited by the collective structures of the federal judiciary and also by the normative expectation that judges give express reasons for their decisions. In this sense the appointment of an Article III judge can be regarded as a form of license to exercise bureaucratic discretion for a lifetime, but to do so under certain well-defined rules. We tell judges to follow “the law,” to be sure, but we don’t rest our faith entirely on the law’s uncertain formal constraints. Instead, judges exercise power collectively, are limited to particular cases and controversies, and are obliged to give reasons for each important decision that they make. So it is for most federal judges, including the Chief Justice in his primary role of deciding cases on the United States Supreme Court. Within the Court’s core adjudicative function, the Chief’s status as “prima inter pares”—first among equals—is a well-known and generally apt description of a type of special status that is highly visible, but also limited in important respects. The Chief Justice’s adjudicative power is structured and channeled in ways very much like the other eight Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is much like the authority of any judge on a multimember appellate tribunal. The Chief Justice exercises independent discretion in a formal sense when
{"title":"The Chief Justice's Special Authority and the Norms of Judicial Power","authors":"Theodore W. Ruger","doi":"10.2307/40041347","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041347","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay explores an incongruity in the allocation and exercise of two different kinds of judicial discretion held by the Chief Justice of the United States. The paradigmatic type of discretionary authority that Article III judges (including the Chief Justice) possess is expressed through the mode of adjudication, and as such is constrained in important ways by procedural forms that accompany that kind of official action. Judges are constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by formal “law,” but their discretion is additionally limited by the collective structures of the federal judiciary and also by the normative expectation that judges give express reasons for their decisions. In this sense the appointment of an Article III judge can be regarded as a form of license to exercise bureaucratic discretion for a lifetime, but to do so under certain well-defined rules. We tell judges to follow “the law,” to be sure, but we don’t rest our faith entirely on the law’s uncertain formal constraints. Instead, judges exercise power collectively, are limited to particular cases and controversies, and are obliged to give reasons for each important decision that they make. So it is for most federal judges, including the Chief Justice in his primary role of deciding cases on the United States Supreme Court. Within the Court’s core adjudicative function, the Chief’s status as “prima inter pares”—first among equals—is a well-known and generally apt description of a type of special status that is highly visible, but also limited in important respects. The Chief Justice’s adjudicative power is structured and channeled in ways very much like the other eight Justices on the Court, and, in a more general sense, is much like the authority of any judge on a multimember appellate tribunal. The Chief Justice exercises independent discretion in a formal sense when","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1551"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041347","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The assignment of the Supreme Court's majority opinions is one of the principal prerogatives enjoyed by the chief justice. A strategic chief justice is able to influence the course of legal policy through agenda-setting; that is, the chief justice exercises influence over policy by choosing the justice who will author an opinion and, thereby, determining which policy alternative will be developed in a majority opinion draft. Through strategic opinion assignment, then, the chief is able to guide the Court to an outcome that is closest to his preference or that will result in the least policy loss. Despite the importance of this prerogative for agenda-setting and the development of the law, the chief justice operates within constraints: the need for majority support for the proposed opinion and the efficient operation of the Court. In particular, the chief justice often assigns opinions to justices with whom he allies in order to maintain fragile conference majorities. Chief Justice Rehnquist also asserted that his assignments were based on the need to complete work on the cases and to maintain an equitable distribution of cases across the justices. Using data drawn from the papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, I test these expectations through an examination of opinion assignment during the Rehnquist Court (1986-1993 OT).
指派最高法院的多数意见是首席大法官享有的主要特权之一。战略首席大法官能够通过议程设置影响法律政策的进程;也就是说，首席大法官通过选择撰写意见的大法官，从而决定在多数意见草案中制定哪一种政策选择，从而对政策施加影响。因此，通过战略性意见分配，首席大法官能够引导最高法院得出最接近他的偏好或将导致最小政策损失的结果。尽管这一特权对制定议程和制定法律很重要，但首席大法官的工作仍受到一些限制:所提议的意见必须得到多数人的支持，以及法院的有效运作。特别是，首席大法官经常将意见分配给与他结盟的大法官，以维持脆弱的多数席位。首席大法官伦奎斯特还断言，他的任务是基于完成案件工作的需要，并保持大法官之间案件的公平分配。我使用Harry A. Blackmun法官论文中的数据，通过对伦奎斯特法院(1986-1993年)意见分配的考察来检验这些预期。
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When the Berlin Wall fell and the governments of the former Soviet world reconstituted themselves under new constitutions, every country in the region created a new constitutional court. Charged with ensuring that their nations’ new constitutions would in fact be followed, these new courts often became both the center of the population’s high hopes and a frequent annoyance for the elected governments that had to comply with their decisions. The hope was that the courts would be the “guardians of the constitution”; the reality
{"title":"Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet Europe","authors":"K. Scheppele","doi":"10.2307/40041352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041352","url":null,"abstract":"When the Berlin Wall fell and the governments of the former Soviet world reconstituted themselves under new constitutions, every country in the region created a new constitutional court. Charged with ensuring that their nations’ new constitutions would in fact be followed, these new courts often became both the center of the population’s high hopes and a frequent annoyance for the elected governments that had to comply with their decisions. The hope was that the courts would be the “guardians of the constitution”; the reality","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1757"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68757986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature on the role of the Chief Justice of the United States has been dominated by two stereotypes. One, perpetuated by Chief Justices themselves and generally endorsed by other Justices, is that the Chief Justice occupies the role of “first among equals,” meaning that the powers of the Chief are largely formal, such as personifying the Court as an institution, as opposed to substantive, such as exercising disproportionate influence on colleagues. The phrase “among equals” in the stereotype is designed to emphasize the fact that nine Justices participate in the Court’s decisions, that each of their votes is given equal weight, and that the central job tasks of the Chief— hearing arguments, deciding cases, writing opinions—are no different from those of the other Justices. The other stereotype, which has emerged primarily from social science literature, is that the Chief Justice has special opportunities to exercise “leadership” on the Court. This stereotype is connected to a theory of collective decision making in small groups. Although the
{"title":"The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy","authors":"G. White","doi":"10.2307/40041345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/40041345","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on the role of the Chief Justice of the United States has been dominated by two stereotypes. One, perpetuated by Chief Justices themselves and generally endorsed by other Justices, is that the Chief Justice occupies the role of “first among equals,” meaning that the powers of the Chief are largely formal, such as personifying the Court as an institution, as opposed to substantive, such as exercising disproportionate influence on colleagues. The phrase “among equals” in the stereotype is designed to emphasize the fact that nine Justices participate in the Court’s decisions, that each of their votes is given equal weight, and that the central job tasks of the Chief— hearing arguments, deciding cases, writing opinions—are no different from those of the other Justices. The other stereotype, which has emerged primarily from social science literature, is that the Chief Justice has special opportunities to exercise “leadership” on the Court. This stereotype is connected to a theory of collective decision making in small groups. Although the","PeriodicalId":48012,"journal":{"name":"University of Pennsylvania Law Review","volume":"154 1","pages":"1463"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/40041345","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68758114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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