We evaluate the impact of the PATH Act of 2015, which allowed some existing VC-backed startups to monetize their R&D tax credits against payroll taxes in the U.S. We show that marginally eligible startups increase their demand for R&D workers more than marginally ineligible startups after the PATH Act’s enactment. These effects are stronger among startups that are financially constrained. Marginally eligible startups subsequently recruit workers with more education and experience and file more patents with new inventors. Our findings suggest payroll tax credits are effective in scaling startups and stimulating R&D activities through skilled labor recruitment.
{"title":"The Labor Effects of R&D Tax Incentives: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups","authors":"Jun Chen, Shenje Hshieh","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae026","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate the impact of the PATH Act of 2015, which allowed some existing VC-backed startups to monetize their R&D tax credits against payroll taxes in the U.S. We show that marginally eligible startups increase their demand for R&D workers more than marginally ineligible startups after the PATH Act’s enactment. These effects are stronger among startups that are financially constrained. Marginally eligible startups subsequently recruit workers with more education and experience and file more patents with new inventors. Our findings suggest payroll tax credits are effective in scaling startups and stimulating R&D activities through skilled labor recruitment.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141941383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While it is established that idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns, the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and hedge fund returns is largely unexplored. We document that hedge funds with high idiosyncratic volatility earn higher future risk-adjusted returns of 6% p.a. than hedge funds with low idiosyncratic volatility. The outperformance arises because hedge funds trade high idiosyncratic volatility stocks wisely. They pick high volatility stocks when they are underpriced and short-sell high volatility stocks when they are overpriced. Our results support the notion that hedge funds’ idiosyncratic volatility is a measure of managerial skill.
{"title":"Hedge Funds and the Positive Idiosyncratic Volatility Effect","authors":"Turan G Bali, Florian Weigert","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae022","url":null,"abstract":"While it is established that idiosyncratic volatility is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns, the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and hedge fund returns is largely unexplored. We document that hedge funds with high idiosyncratic volatility earn higher future risk-adjusted returns of 6% p.a. than hedge funds with low idiosyncratic volatility. The outperformance arises because hedge funds trade high idiosyncratic volatility stocks wisely. They pick high volatility stocks when they are underpriced and short-sell high volatility stocks when they are overpriced. Our results support the notion that hedge funds’ idiosyncratic volatility is a measure of managerial skill.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many policymakers and practitioners argue that corporations may become more stakeholder focused if employees are given more power. We study the causal impact of unionization on stakeholders by analyzing how close labor union elections affect environmental and social (E&S) scores. We find that unionization is associated with an increase in internal social scores that primarily benefit employees and a decrease in external E&S scores that primarily benefit non-employees. The negative effects on external E&S are amplified when firms have greater financial constraints. The effects on both internal and external E&S are magnified when labor unions have more bargaining power. Our results suggest that policymakers consider implications for all stakeholders before implementing policies that prioritize the corporate influence of one stakeholder group.
{"title":"The Power of the People: Labor Unions and Corporate Social Responsibility","authors":"Amanda Heitz, Youan Wang, Zigan Wang","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae018","url":null,"abstract":"Many policymakers and practitioners argue that corporations may become more stakeholder focused if employees are given more power. We study the causal impact of unionization on stakeholders by analyzing how close labor union elections affect environmental and social (E&S) scores. We find that unionization is associated with an increase in internal social scores that primarily benefit employees and a decrease in external E&S scores that primarily benefit non-employees. The negative effects on external E&S are amplified when firms have greater financial constraints. The effects on both internal and external E&S are magnified when labor unions have more bargaining power. Our results suggest that policymakers consider implications for all stakeholders before implementing policies that prioritize the corporate influence of one stakeholder group.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141769540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines whether and to what extent private firms learn from the stock market. Using a large panel data set for the United Kingdom, I find that private firms’ investment responds positively to the valuation of public firms in the same industry. The sensitivity increases with price informativeness. To further pin down the information channel, I construct a price noise measure based on public firms’ unrelated minor segments and show that it positively affects the investment of private firms in the major-segment industry. The results are consistent with models featuring learning from noisy signals and are not driven by alternative channels in the absence of learning. My findings suggest that the stock market can have real effects on private firms through an information-spillover channel, even when these firms do not list their shares on the stock exchanges.
{"title":"Do Private Firms (Mis)Learn from the Stock Market?","authors":"Dong Yan","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether and to what extent private firms learn from the stock market. Using a large panel data set for the United Kingdom, I find that private firms’ investment responds positively to the valuation of public firms in the same industry. The sensitivity increases with price informativeness. To further pin down the information channel, I construct a price noise measure based on public firms’ unrelated minor segments and show that it positively affects the investment of private firms in the major-segment industry. The results are consistent with models featuring learning from noisy signals and are not driven by alternative channels in the absence of learning. My findings suggest that the stock market can have real effects on private firms through an information-spillover channel, even when these firms do not list their shares on the stock exchanges.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141744592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How are contracts structured in the presence of relationship-specific investments when legal enforcement is weak? Using a new audit methodology, we show that simple financial contracts in combination with social norms and reputation concerns can sustain relationship-specific transactions. Wholesalers in the market for pens in India use upfront payments rather than increased risk premia to mitigate risks arising from relationship-specific investments. Upfront payments for printed pens cover only 40% of the production costs, highlighting the importance of upfront payments as a screening device. Ex-post, renegotiation is more likely for printed pens, but in a substantial fraction of cases renegotiation fails.
{"title":"Contracting When Enforcement is Weak: Evidence from an Audit Study","authors":"Rajkamal Iyer, Antoinette Schoar","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae019","url":null,"abstract":"How are contracts structured in the presence of relationship-specific investments when legal enforcement is weak? Using a new audit methodology, we show that simple financial contracts in combination with social norms and reputation concerns can sustain relationship-specific transactions. Wholesalers in the market for pens in India use upfront payments rather than increased risk premia to mitigate risks arising from relationship-specific investments. Upfront payments for printed pens cover only 40% of the production costs, highlighting the importance of upfront payments as a screening device. Ex-post, renegotiation is more likely for printed pens, but in a substantial fraction of cases renegotiation fails.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141610589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Shusen Qi, Ralph De Haas, Steven Ongena, Stefan Straetmans, Tamas Vadasz
We present a model of credit market competition to derive key hypotheses about how information sharing between banks influences the spatial clustering of their branches. We then test these hypotheses using data on 56,555 branches owned by 614 banks across 19 countries. We find that information sharing incentivizes banks to establish branches in localities that are new to them but that are already served by other banks. The resultant branch clustering is associated with reduced spatial credit rationing, as information sharing enables firms to access credit from more distant banks. These findings underscore how information sharing makes it more important for banks to move closer to each other rather than closer to their borrowers.
{"title":"Move a Little Closer? Information Sharing and the Spatial Clustering of Bank Branches","authors":"Shusen Qi, Ralph De Haas, Steven Ongena, Stefan Straetmans, Tamas Vadasz","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae021","url":null,"abstract":"We present a model of credit market competition to derive key hypotheses about how information sharing between banks influences the spatial clustering of their branches. We then test these hypotheses using data on 56,555 branches owned by 614 banks across 19 countries. We find that information sharing incentivizes banks to establish branches in localities that are new to them but that are already served by other banks. The resultant branch clustering is associated with reduced spatial credit rationing, as information sharing enables firms to access credit from more distant banks. These findings underscore how information sharing makes it more important for banks to move closer to each other rather than closer to their borrowers.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141571053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We assemble a property-level panel of appraiser-reported attributes associated with 4.6 million loan applications from 2013 to 2017 to test whether attributes were consistently reported. Appraisers have an incentive to misreport property attributes to justify higher appraised values to ensure associated mortgage loans are approved. We focus on property transactions with multiple sets of attributes reported by the same appraiser within 4 quarters and find evidence consistent with an intent to inflate valuations through attribute misreporting. We find that strategic misreporting of attributes is prevalent across markets, and that highly leveraged borrowers whose appraisals had inconsistently reported attributes were 9.8% more likely to become seriously delinquent in their loan payments.
{"title":"Attribute Misreporting and Appraisal Bias","authors":"Michael D Eriksen, Chun Kuang, Wenyu Zhu","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfad041","url":null,"abstract":"We assemble a property-level panel of appraiser-reported attributes associated with 4.6 million loan applications from 2013 to 2017 to test whether attributes were consistently reported. Appraisers have an incentive to misreport property attributes to justify higher appraised values to ensure associated mortgage loans are approved. We focus on property transactions with multiple sets of attributes reported by the same appraiser within 4 quarters and find evidence consistent with an intent to inflate valuations through attribute misreporting. We find that strategic misreporting of attributes is prevalent across markets, and that highly leveraged borrowers whose appraisals had inconsistently reported attributes were 9.8% more likely to become seriously delinquent in their loan payments.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"146 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Environmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholders’ interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal. This strategy results in a high average support for ES proposals, seemingly consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, while opposing contested ES proposals. This greenwashing strategy is driven by ES funds in non-ES families who cater to institutional investors. Indeed, these funds experience lower inflows when providing low average support for ES proposals. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, nor by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds. JEL: G11, G30, K22, M14
非环境与社会(ES)基金家族必须在兼顾其所宣传的利益相关者利益和最大化其家族所青睐的股东价值之间取得平衡。我们发现,这些基金支持的环境与社会提案与多数门槛相去甚远,而当其投票更有可能起到关键作用时,则会反对这些提案。这种策略的结果是,基金平均支持ES提案的比例很高,这似乎符合其受托责任,同时反对有争议的ES提案。这种 "洗绿 "策略是由非环境基金家族中面向机构投资者的环境基金推动的。事实上,当这些基金对环境经济提案的平均支持率较低时,其资金流入量也较低。这种策略性投票在治理提案中没有表现出来,ES 家族中的 ES 基金或非 ES 家族中的非 ES 基金也没有表现出来,这加强了策略性投票的概念,即在满足家族偏好的同时似乎履行了基金的受托人责任。JEL:G11, G30, K22, M14
{"title":"Mutual Funds’ Strategic Voting on Environmental and Social Issues","authors":"Roni Michaely, Guillem Ordonez-Calafi, Silvina Rubio","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae017","url":null,"abstract":"Environmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholders’ interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal. This strategy results in a high average support for ES proposals, seemingly consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, while opposing contested ES proposals. This greenwashing strategy is driven by ES funds in non-ES families who cater to institutional investors. Indeed, these funds experience lower inflows when providing low average support for ES proposals. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, nor by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds. JEL: G11, G30, K22, M14","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a stylized model that generates the following empirical predictions: the less (more) accessible the underlying market is ex ante, the more its liquidity improves (deteriorates) when basket trading becomes available. We empirically test these predictions using corporate bonds before and after the introduction of ETFs. Consistent with the model’s prediction, liquidity improvement is larger for highly arbitraged, low-volume, and high-yield bonds, and for 144A bonds to which retail investor access is prohibited by law. Our paper leads to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of basket security introduction than previous research suggested.
{"title":"Market Accessibility, Bond ETFs and Liquidity","authors":"Craig Holden, Jayoung Nam","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae016","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a stylized model that generates the following empirical predictions: the less (more) accessible the underlying market is ex ante, the more its liquidity improves (deteriorates) when basket trading becomes available. We empirically test these predictions using corporate bonds before and after the introduction of ETFs. Consistent with the model’s prediction, liquidity improvement is larger for highly arbitraged, low-volume, and high-yield bonds, and for 144A bonds to which retail investor access is prohibited by law. Our paper leads to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of basket security introduction than previous research suggested.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141508916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under a randomized setting, this paper finds workers with entrepreneurial ambitions—intended entrepreneurs—are (i) far more common than workers with past entrepreneurial experience and (ii) increase the rate of entrepreneurship among their peers. Peer effects are persistent, stronger for tighter networks, and extend to the decision to join a startup. As intended peers explain half of the variation in entrepreneurship rates in our sample, our results demonstrate that intended entrepreneurs, even those that never personally start a firm, represent a vital component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.
{"title":"No Experience Necessary: The Peer Effects of Intended Entrepreneurs","authors":"Isaac Hacamo, Kristoph Kleiner","doi":"10.1093/rof/rfae015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfae015","url":null,"abstract":"Under a randomized setting, this paper finds workers with entrepreneurial ambitions—intended entrepreneurs—are (i) far more common than workers with past entrepreneurial experience and (ii) increase the rate of entrepreneurship among their peers. Peer effects are persistent, stronger for tighter networks, and extend to the decision to join a startup. As intended peers explain half of the variation in entrepreneurship rates in our sample, our results demonstrate that intended entrepreneurs, even those that never personally start a firm, represent a vital component of the entrepreneurial ecosystem.","PeriodicalId":48036,"journal":{"name":"Review of Finance","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141167229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}