By exploiting the large quantity and rich variety of special economic zones (SEZs) in China, this study investigates how such zones affect human capital investment. Results show that SEZs significantly increase the local high school enrollment rate, but the impact varies across zone types: technology-oriented zones encourage education, while export-led zones discourage it. The increased job opportunities and wage premiums inside SEZs for employees with high school education increase high school enrollment, while such opportunities and wages for employees with middle school education decrease enrollment. A very small portion of the impact, if any, can be attributed to increased income. (JEL I21, I26, J24, J31, O15, P23, R32)
{"title":"Special Economic Zones and Human Capital Investment: 30 Years of Evidence from China","authors":"Fangwen Lu, Weizeng Sun, Jianfeng Wu","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200492","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200492","url":null,"abstract":"By exploiting the large quantity and rich variety of special economic zones (SEZs) in China, this study investigates how such zones affect human capital investment. Results show that SEZs significantly increase the local high school enrollment rate, but the impact varies across zone types: technology-oriented zones encourage education, while export-led zones discourage it. The increased job opportunities and wage premiums inside SEZs for employees with high school education increase high school enrollment, while such opportunities and wages for employees with middle school education decrease enrollment. A very small portion of the impact, if any, can be attributed to increased income. (JEL I21, I26, J24, J31, O15, P23, R32)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73122210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses the long-term consequences of voting for democracy. We study Chile’s 1988 plebiscite, which ended 15 years of dictatorship and reestablished democracy. Taking advantage of individual-level voting data, we implement an age-based regression discontinuity design comparing long-run registration and turnout rates across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals. We find plebiscite eligibility increased electoral turnout three decades later. The magnitude of the initial mobilization emerges as the mechanism. Plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of less-educated voters to register compared to other upstream elections. The event contributed to the emergence of one-party rule the 20 years following democratization. (JEL D72, D82, O17)
{"title":"Voting for Democracy: Chile’s Plebiscito and the Electoral Participation of a Generation","authors":"Ethan Kaplan, Fernando Saltiel, Sergio Urzúa","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210338","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the long-term consequences of voting for democracy. We study Chile’s 1988 plebiscite, which ended 15 years of dictatorship and reestablished democracy. Taking advantage of individual-level voting data, we implement an age-based regression discontinuity design comparing long-run registration and turnout rates across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals. We find plebiscite eligibility increased electoral turnout three decades later. The magnitude of the initial mobilization emerges as the mechanism. Plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of less-educated voters to register compared to other upstream elections. The event contributed to the emergence of one-party rule the 20 years following democratization. (JEL D72, D82, O17)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to theory, “sin taxes” are welfare improving if consumers with low self-control respond at least as much to the tax as consumers with high self-control. We investigate empirically if demand response to soft drink and fat tax variations in Denmark depends on consumers’ self-control. We use a unique home-scan panel that includes a survey measure of self-control. When taxes increase, consumers with low self-control reduce purchases less strongly than consumers with high self-control. When taxes decrease, both groups increase their purchases similarly. The results show an asymmetry in price elasticities by self-control that is more pronounced when taxes increase. (JEL D12, D91, H25, H31, I12, I18, L66)
{"title":"Sin Taxes and Self-Control","authors":"Renke Schmacker, Sinne Smed","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200479","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200479","url":null,"abstract":"According to theory, “sin taxes” are welfare improving if consumers with low self-control respond at least as much to the tax as consumers with high self-control. We investigate empirically if demand response to soft drink and fat tax variations in Denmark depends on consumers’ self-control. We use a unique home-scan panel that includes a survey measure of self-control. When taxes increase, consumers with low self-control reduce purchases less strongly than consumers with high self-control. When taxes decrease, both groups increase their purchases similarly. The results show an asymmetry in price elasticities by self-control that is more pronounced when taxes increase. (JEL D12, D91, H25, H31, I12, I18, L66)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentivization and information. If children have private information, (i) providing attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents––importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children. (JEL D82, D83, I21, I22, I28, L31, O15)
{"title":"Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions","authors":"Damien B. C. M. De Walque, Christine Valente","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210202","url":null,"abstract":"Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentivization and information. If children have private information, (i) providing attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents––importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children. (JEL D82, D83, I21, I22, I28, L31, O15)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the 2011 Austrian pay transparency law, which requires firms above a size threshold to publish internal reports on the gender pay gap. Using an event-study design, we show that the policy had no discernible effects on male and female wages, thus leaving the gender wage gap unchanged. The effects are precisely estimated, and we rule out that the policy narrowed the gender wage gap by more than 0.4 p.p.. Moreover, we do not find evidence for wage compression within establishments. We discuss several possible reasons why the reform did not reduce the gender wage gap. (JEL J16, J31, J71, K31)
{"title":"Does Pay Transparency Affect the Gender Wage Gap? Evidence from Austria","authors":"Andreas Gulyas, Sebastian Seitz, Sourav Sinha","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210128","url":null,"abstract":"We study the 2011 Austrian pay transparency law, which requires firms above a size threshold to publish internal reports on the gender pay gap. Using an event-study design, we show that the policy had no discernible effects on male and female wages, thus leaving the gender wage gap unchanged. The effects are precisely estimated, and we rule out that the policy narrowed the gender wage gap by more than 0.4 p.p.. Moreover, we do not find evidence for wage compression within establishments. We discuss several possible reasons why the reform did not reduce the gender wage gap. (JEL J16, J31, J71, K31)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135359255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine the Coasean independence property in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emissions Trading System. I analyze whether emissions of power producers are independent from allowance allocations by leveraging a change in allocation policy for a difference-in-difference strategy. The evidence suggests that the independence property holds overall and for larger emitters and that firms respond to the loss in allocation by increasing allowance purchases. Suggestive evidence for small emitters indicates that trading costs or behavioral bias distorts their emission decisions. However, their small emission share leaves the independence property intact at the sector level. (JEL L94, L98, Q48, Q51, Q54, Q58)
{"title":"Coase and Cap-and-Trade: Evidence on the Independence Property from the European Carbon Market","authors":"Aleksandar Zaklan","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210028","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the Coasean independence property in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU Emissions Trading System. I analyze whether emissions of power producers are independent from allowance allocations by leveraging a change in allocation policy for a difference-in-difference strategy. The evidence suggests that the independence property holds overall and for larger emitters and that firms respond to the loss in allocation by increasing allowance purchases. Suggestive evidence for small emitters indicates that trading costs or behavioral bias distorts their emission decisions. However, their small emission share leaves the independence property intact at the sector level. (JEL L94, L98, Q48, Q51, Q54, Q58)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"422 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135504449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Can debt moratoria help countries weather negative shocks? We exploit the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to study the bond market effects of deferring official debt repayments. Using daily data on sovereign bond spreads and synthetic control methods, we show that countries eligible for official debt relief experience a larger decline in borrowing costs compared to similar, ineligible countries. This decline is stronger for countries that receive a larger relief, suggesting that the effect works through liquidity provision. By contrast, the results do not support the concern that official debt relief could generate stigma on financial markets. (JEL F34, G12, H63, O16)
{"title":"Borrowing Costs after Sovereign Debt Relief","authors":"Valentin Lang, David Mihalyi, Andrea Presbitero","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210166","url":null,"abstract":"Can debt moratoria help countries weather negative shocks? We exploit the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) to study the bond market effects of deferring official debt repayments. Using daily data on sovereign bond spreads and synthetic control methods, we show that countries eligible for official debt relief experience a larger decline in borrowing costs compared to similar, ineligible countries. This decline is stronger for countries that receive a larger relief, suggesting that the effect works through liquidity provision. By contrast, the results do not support the concern that official debt relief could generate stigma on financial markets. (JEL F34, G12, H63, O16)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135504450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chinese local leaders are frequently moved across prefectures. By combining local leader rotation data and comprehensive firm land parcel purchase data across prefectures from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines how firm–politician connections affect resource allocation and finds that a firm headquartered in a leader’s previous work prefecture purchases three times more land parcels in that leader’s new governing prefecture than the prefecture-year mean, at half the unit prices. Identification is from within-firm-year variation in various prefectures through exogenous politician rotation. Land usage efficiency is lower for these follower firms’ land parcels. Land allocation distortion is also economically sizable. (JEL D22, D72, O17, O18, P25, P26)
{"title":"Go with the Politician","authors":"Yongwei Nian, Chunyang Wang","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200882","url":null,"abstract":"Chinese local leaders are frequently moved across prefectures. By combining local leader rotation data and comprehensive firm land parcel purchase data across prefectures from 2006 to 2016, this paper examines how firm–politician connections affect resource allocation and finds that a firm headquartered in a leader’s previous work prefecture purchases three times more land parcels in that leader’s new governing prefecture than the prefecture-year mean, at half the unit prices. Identification is from within-firm-year variation in various prefectures through exogenous politician rotation. Land usage efficiency is lower for these follower firms’ land parcels. Land allocation distortion is also economically sizable. (JEL D22, D72, O17, O18, P25, P26)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136048792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that an increase to Medicaid’s minimum drug rebate under the Affordable Care Act in 2010 lowered non-Medicaid drug spending by 2.5 percent. A stylized bargaining model shows that this is likely driven by the interaction of this reform with Medicaid’s “most-favored customer” clause (MFCC). By examining the response of drugs that faced a change in incentives equivalent to the removal of Medicaid’s MFCC, we estimate that removing the Medicaid MFCC would have reduced overall 2010 non-Medicaid drug spending by an additional 3.5 percent, though it would have likely also increased Medicaid spending. (JEL C78, H51, I18, I38, L65)
{"title":"Profiting from Most-Favored-Customer Procurement Rules: Evidence from Medicaid","authors":"Josh Feng, Thomas Hwang, Luca Maini","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200688","url":null,"abstract":"Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that an increase to Medicaid’s minimum drug rebate under the Affordable Care Act in 2010 lowered non-Medicaid drug spending by 2.5 percent. A stylized bargaining model shows that this is likely driven by the interaction of this reform with Medicaid’s “most-favored customer” clause (MFCC). By examining the response of drugs that faced a change in incentives equivalent to the removal of Medicaid’s MFCC, we estimate that removing the Medicaid MFCC would have reduced overall 2010 non-Medicaid drug spending by an additional 3.5 percent, though it would have likely also increased Medicaid spending. (JEL C78, H51, I18, I38, L65)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"252 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136048793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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