This paper provides causal evidence that greater minority representation on school boards translates into greater investment in minority students. Focusing on California school boards, I instrument for minority (specifically, Hispanic) representation using random ballot ordering and leverage new data from a statewide capital investment program to capture intradistrict resource allocations. I show that Hispanic board members invest the marginal dollar in high-Hispanic schools within their districts. High-Hispanic schools also exhibit gains in student achievement and decreased teacher turnover. I conclude that enhancing minority representation on school boards could help combat long-standing disparities in education. JEL (H75, I21, I22, I24, J15)
{"title":"No Spending without Representation: School Boards and the Racial Gap in Education Finance","authors":"Brett Fischer","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200475","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides causal evidence that greater minority representation on school boards translates into greater investment in minority students. Focusing on California school boards, I instrument for minority (specifically, Hispanic) representation using random ballot ordering and leverage new data from a statewide capital investment program to capture intradistrict resource allocations. I show that Hispanic board members invest the marginal dollar in high-Hispanic schools within their districts. High-Hispanic schools also exhibit gains in student achievement and decreased teacher turnover. I conclude that enhancing minority representation on school boards could help combat long-standing disparities in education. JEL (H75, I21, I22, I24, J15)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136048794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using administrative data from a large public university, we show that male students are 18.6 percent more likely than female students to receive favorable grade changes made by instructors. Surveys of students and instructors reveal that regrade requests are prevalent and that male students are more likely to ask for regrades on the intensive margin. We corroborate the gender differences in regrade requests in an incentivized controlled experiment: we find that males have a higher willingness to pay to ask for regrades. Almost a third of the gender difference is due to gender differences in beliefs and the Big Five traits. (JEL D82, D91, I23, J16)
{"title":"Ask and You Shall Receive? Gender Differences in Regrades in College","authors":"Cher Hsuehhsiang Li, Basit Zafar","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210053","url":null,"abstract":"Using administrative data from a large public university, we show that male students are 18.6 percent more likely than female students to receive favorable grade changes made by instructors. Surveys of students and instructors reveal that regrade requests are prevalent and that male students are more likely to ask for regrades on the intensive margin. We corroborate the gender differences in regrade requests in an incentivized controlled experiment: we find that males have a higher willingness to pay to ask for regrades. Almost a third of the gender difference is due to gender differences in beliefs and the Big Five traits. (JEL D82, D91, I23, J16)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135658670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. (JEL E62, F23, H25, H26, H87, K34)
{"title":"Externalities in International Tax Enforcement: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Thomas Tørsløv, Ludvig Wier, Gabriel Zucman","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200200","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the fiscal authorities of high-tax countries can lack the incentives to combat profit shifting to tax havens. Instead, they have incentives to focus their enforcement efforts on relocating profits booked by multinationals in other high-tax countries, crowding out the enforcement on transactions that shift profits to tax havens, and reducing the global tax payments of multinational companies. The predictions of our model are motivated and supported by the analysis of two new datasets: the universe of transfer price corrections conducted by the Danish tax authority, and new cross-country data on international tax enforcement. (JEL E62, F23, H25, H26, H87, K34)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135658673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the link between police officers’ on-duty injuries and their peers’ force use using a network of officers who attended the police academy together through a random lottery. On-duty injuries increase the probability of officers using force by 7 percent in the subsequent week. Officers are also more likely to injure suspects and receive complaints about neglecting victims and violating constitutional rights. The effect is concentrated in a narrow time window following the event and is not associated with significantly lower injury risk to the officer. Together, these findings suggest that emotional responses drive the effects rather than social learning. (JEL H76, J28, K42)
{"title":"Peer Effects in Police Use of Force","authors":"Justin E. Holz, Roman Rivera, Bocar A. Ba","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200227","url":null,"abstract":"We study the link between police officers’ on-duty injuries and their peers’ force use using a network of officers who attended the police academy together through a random lottery. On-duty injuries increase the probability of officers using force by 7 percent in the subsequent week. Officers are also more likely to injure suspects and receive complaints about neglecting victims and violating constitutional rights. The effect is concentrated in a narrow time window following the event and is not associated with significantly lower injury risk to the officer. Together, these findings suggest that emotional responses drive the effects rather than social learning. (JEL H76, J28, K42)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91280612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Colin Gray, Adam Leive, Elena Prager, Kelsey B. Pukelis, Mary Zaki
Work requirements are common in US safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find robust evidence that work requirements increase program exits by 23 percentage points (64 percent) among incumbent participants. Overall program participation among adults who are subject to work requirements is reduced by 53 percent. Homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We find no effects on employment and suggestive evidence of increased earnings in some specifications. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J22, J31)
{"title":"Employed in a SNAP? The Impact of Work Requirements on Program Participation and Labor Supply","authors":"Colin Gray, Adam Leive, Elena Prager, Kelsey B. Pukelis, Mary Zaki","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200561","url":null,"abstract":"Work requirements are common in US safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find robust evidence that work requirements increase program exits by 23 percentage points (64 percent) among incumbent participants. Overall program participation among adults who are subject to work requirements is reduced by 53 percent. Homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We find no effects on employment and suggestive evidence of increased earnings in some specifications. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J22, J31)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We estimate the effects of an educational peer intervention in which previously high- and low-achieving students are randomly paired as deskmates in elementary schools in China. Our treatment boosts the mathematics scores of the low-achieving students. Moreover, the treatment enhances the extraversion and agreeableness of high- and low-achieving students, thereby providing evidence that peers can influence personality traits. The positive treatment effects can be attributed to the deskmate-level peer effects. We document friend network structure changes and present additional evidence on how friendship ties help us better understand the mechanisms behind peer effects. (JEL I21, I26, J24, O15, P36, Z13)
{"title":"Student Performance, Peer Effects, and Friend Networks: Evidence from a Randomized Peer Intervention","authors":"Jia Wu, Junsen Zhang, Chunchao Wang","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200563","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the effects of an educational peer intervention in which previously high- and low-achieving students are randomly paired as deskmates in elementary schools in China. Our treatment boosts the mathematics scores of the low-achieving students. Moreover, the treatment enhances the extraversion and agreeableness of high- and low-achieving students, thereby providing evidence that peers can influence personality traits. The positive treatment effects can be attributed to the deskmate-level peer effects. We document friend network structure changes and present additional evidence on how friendship ties help us better understand the mechanisms behind peer effects. (JEL I21, I26, J24, O15, P36, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136252466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California’s randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers’ unions. (JEL D72, H75, I21, J31, J45, J51)
{"title":"School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order","authors":"Ying Shi, J. Singleton","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200435","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California’s randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers’ unions. (JEL D72, H75, I21, J31, J45, J51)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83126529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)
{"title":"Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment","authors":"Marcelo Bergolo, Rodrigo Ceni, Guillermo Cruces, Matias Giaccobasso, Ricardo Perez-Truglia","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200321","url":null,"abstract":"The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135755212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leveraging the random assignment of over 50,000 Medicaid enrollees in New York, I present causal evidence that narrower networks are a blunt instrument for reducing health care spending. While narrower networks constrain spending, they do so by generating hassle costs that reduce quantity, with modest effects on prices paid to providers. Enrollees assigned to narrower networks use fewer of both needed and unneeded services and are less satisfied with their plans. Using my causal estimates to construct counterfactuals, I identify an alternative assignment policy that reduces spending without harming satisfaction by matching consumers with narrower networks that include their providers. (JEL H51, H75, I13, I18, I38)
{"title":"What Does a Provider Network Do? Evidence from Random Assignment in Medicaid Managed Care","authors":"Jacob Wallace","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210162","url":null,"abstract":"Leveraging the random assignment of over 50,000 Medicaid enrollees in New York, I present causal evidence that narrower networks are a blunt instrument for reducing health care spending. While narrower networks constrain spending, they do so by generating hassle costs that reduce quantity, with modest effects on prices paid to providers. Enrollees assigned to narrower networks use fewer of both needed and unneeded services and are less satisfied with their plans. Using my causal estimates to construct counterfactuals, I identify an alternative assignment policy that reduces spending without harming satisfaction by matching consumers with narrower networks that include their providers. (JEL H51, H75, I13, I18, I38)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135962658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare the effects of early childhood education on adult criminal behavior across time periods, using administrative crime data that provide significant precision advantages over existing work. We find that improvements in early childhood education led to large (20 percent) reductions in later criminal behavior, reductions that far exceed those implied by estimates of test score gains in prior studies. While the benefits generated account for a large portion of the costs of the education provided, we find substantial relative gains from the targeting of funds to high-poverty areas and areas without existing access to subsidized care. (JEL H75, I21, I26, I28, I32, I38, K42)
{"title":"The Effect of Early Childhood Education on Adult Criminality: Evidence from the 1960s through 1990s","authors":"J. Anders, Andrew C. Barr, Alexander A. Smith","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200660","url":null,"abstract":"We compare the effects of early childhood education on adult criminal behavior across time periods, using administrative crime data that provide significant precision advantages over existing work. We find that improvements in early childhood education led to large (20 percent) reductions in later criminal behavior, reductions that far exceed those implied by estimates of test score gains in prior studies. While the benefits generated account for a large portion of the costs of the education provided, we find substantial relative gains from the targeting of funds to high-poverty areas and areas without existing access to subsidized care. (JEL H75, I21, I26, I28, I32, I38, K42)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79990205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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