We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California’s randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers’ unions. (JEL D72, H75, I21, J31, J45, J51)
{"title":"School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order","authors":"Ying Shi, J. Singleton","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200435","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California’s randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers’ unions. (JEL D72, H75, I21, J31, J45, J51)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83126529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Colin Gray, Adam Leive, Elena Prager, Kelsey B. Pukelis, Mary Zaki
Work requirements are common in US safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find robust evidence that work requirements increase program exits by 23 percentage points (64 percent) among incumbent participants. Overall program participation among adults who are subject to work requirements is reduced by 53 percent. Homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We find no effects on employment and suggestive evidence of increased earnings in some specifications. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J22, J31)
{"title":"Employed in a SNAP? The Impact of Work Requirements on Program Participation and Labor Supply","authors":"Colin Gray, Adam Leive, Elena Prager, Kelsey B. Pukelis, Mary Zaki","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200561","url":null,"abstract":"Work requirements are common in US safety net programs. Evidence remains limited, however, on the extent to which work requirements increase economic self-sufficiency or screen out vulnerable individuals. Using linked administrative data on food stamps (SNAP) and earnings with a regression discontinuity design, we find robust evidence that work requirements increase program exits by 23 percentage points (64 percent) among incumbent participants. Overall program participation among adults who are subject to work requirements is reduced by 53 percent. Homeless adults are disproportionately screened out. We find no effects on employment and suggestive evidence of increased earnings in some specifications. (JEL H75, I18, I32, I38, J22, J31)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"116 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135567202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We estimate the effects of an educational peer intervention in which previously high- and low-achieving students are randomly paired as deskmates in elementary schools in China. Our treatment boosts the mathematics scores of the low-achieving students. Moreover, the treatment enhances the extraversion and agreeableness of high- and low-achieving students, thereby providing evidence that peers can influence personality traits. The positive treatment effects can be attributed to the deskmate-level peer effects. We document friend network structure changes and present additional evidence on how friendship ties help us better understand the mechanisms behind peer effects. (JEL I21, I26, J24, O15, P36, Z13)
{"title":"Student Performance, Peer Effects, and Friend Networks: Evidence from a Randomized Peer Intervention","authors":"Jia Wu, Junsen Zhang, Chunchao Wang","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200563","url":null,"abstract":"We estimate the effects of an educational peer intervention in which previously high- and low-achieving students are randomly paired as deskmates in elementary schools in China. Our treatment boosts the mathematics scores of the low-achieving students. Moreover, the treatment enhances the extraversion and agreeableness of high- and low-achieving students, thereby providing evidence that peers can influence personality traits. The positive treatment effects can be attributed to the deskmate-level peer effects. We document friend network structure changes and present additional evidence on how friendship ties help us better understand the mechanisms behind peer effects. (JEL I21, I26, J24, O15, P36, Z13)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136252466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leveraging the random assignment of over 50,000 Medicaid enrollees in New York, I present causal evidence that narrower networks are a blunt instrument for reducing health care spending. While narrower networks constrain spending, they do so by generating hassle costs that reduce quantity, with modest effects on prices paid to providers. Enrollees assigned to narrower networks use fewer of both needed and unneeded services and are less satisfied with their plans. Using my causal estimates to construct counterfactuals, I identify an alternative assignment policy that reduces spending without harming satisfaction by matching consumers with narrower networks that include their providers. (JEL H51, H75, I13, I18, I38)
{"title":"What Does a Provider Network Do? Evidence from Random Assignment in Medicaid Managed Care","authors":"Jacob Wallace","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210162","url":null,"abstract":"Leveraging the random assignment of over 50,000 Medicaid enrollees in New York, I present causal evidence that narrower networks are a blunt instrument for reducing health care spending. While narrower networks constrain spending, they do so by generating hassle costs that reduce quantity, with modest effects on prices paid to providers. Enrollees assigned to narrower networks use fewer of both needed and unneeded services and are less satisfied with their plans. Using my causal estimates to construct counterfactuals, I identify an alternative assignment policy that reduces spending without harming satisfaction by matching consumers with narrower networks that include their providers. (JEL H51, H75, I13, I18, I38)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135962658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)
{"title":"Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment","authors":"Marcelo Bergolo, Rodrigo Ceni, Guillermo Cruces, Matias Giaccobasso, Ricardo Perez-Truglia","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200321","url":null,"abstract":"The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with a tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than US$200 million in taxes per year. We find that providing information about audits significantly affected tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). (JEL C93, D22, H25, H26, K34, L25, O14)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135755212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare the effects of early childhood education on adult criminal behavior across time periods, using administrative crime data that provide significant precision advantages over existing work. We find that improvements in early childhood education led to large (20 percent) reductions in later criminal behavior, reductions that far exceed those implied by estimates of test score gains in prior studies. While the benefits generated account for a large portion of the costs of the education provided, we find substantial relative gains from the targeting of funds to high-poverty areas and areas without existing access to subsidized care. (JEL H75, I21, I26, I28, I32, I38, K42)
{"title":"The Effect of Early Childhood Education on Adult Criminality: Evidence from the 1960s through 1990s","authors":"J. Anders, Andrew C. Barr, Alexander A. Smith","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200660","url":null,"abstract":"We compare the effects of early childhood education on adult criminal behavior across time periods, using administrative crime data that provide significant precision advantages over existing work. We find that improvements in early childhood education led to large (20 percent) reductions in later criminal behavior, reductions that far exceed those implied by estimates of test score gains in prior studies. While the benefits generated account for a large portion of the costs of the education provided, we find substantial relative gains from the targeting of funds to high-poverty areas and areas without existing access to subsidized care. (JEL H75, I21, I26, I28, I32, I38, K42)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79990205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study tax loss asymmetry for S corporate owners. These owners use most losses contemporaneously, reducing the tax asymmetry compared to C corporations. However, these owners face distortions due to the progressive individual tax schedule. The value of this asymmetry is approximately $3.5 billion per year. We find that this asymmetry creates disincentives for risky investment and causes allocative inefficiencies among loss and gains owners. Finally, we simulate the effects of certain provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; we estimate that these provisions—especially section 199A—reduce the behavioral distortions of the asymmetry for S corporate owners. (JEL D22, G32, H25, H32, K34)
{"title":"Implications of Tax Loss Asymmetry for Owners of S Corporations","authors":"Lucas Goodman, Elena Patel, Molly Saunders-Scott","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200311","url":null,"abstract":"We study tax loss asymmetry for S corporate owners. These owners use most losses contemporaneously, reducing the tax asymmetry compared to C corporations. However, these owners face distortions due to the progressive individual tax schedule. The value of this asymmetry is approximately $3.5 billion per year. We find that this asymmetry creates disincentives for risky investment and causes allocative inefficiencies among loss and gains owners. Finally, we simulate the effects of certain provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act; we estimate that these provisions—especially section 199A—reduce the behavioral distortions of the asymmetry for S corporate owners. (JEL D22, G32, H25, H32, K34)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136252467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yiming Cao, Raymond J. Fisman, Hui Lin, Yongxiang Wang
We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints. (JEL G21, G28, L32, O16, P34).
{"title":"SOEs and Soft Incentive Constraints in State Bank Lending","authors":"Yiming Cao, Raymond J. Fisman, Hui Lin, Yongxiang Wang","doi":"10.1257/pol.20200873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20200873","url":null,"abstract":"We study how Chinese state bank managers’ lending incentives impact lending to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We show lending quantity increases and quality decreases at month’s end, indicating monthly lending targets that decrease lending standards. Increased quantity comes from both SOEs and private lending, whereas decreased quality is from only SOEs, which continue to receive loans even after prior defaults (particularly at month’s end). We suggest that SOE lending may thus be beneficial for state bank managers, who lend to delinquent state enterprises to meet targets, which in turn may exacerbate SOEs’ soft budget constraints. (JEL G21, G28, L32, O16, P34).","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81388022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper estimates the causal impact of a sizable German public investment program on employment at the county level. The program focused on improving the energy efficiency of school buildings, making it possible to use the number of schools as an instrument for investments. It also enforced tight deadlines, reducing potential implementation lags. The program was cost-effective, creating, on average, one job for one year for an investment of €24,000. The employment gains are detectable after nine months and are accompanied by an unemployment reduction amounting to half of the job creation. Employment grew predominately in the directly affected industries. (JEL E24, E32, E62, H54, J23, R23)
{"title":"The Employment Effects of Countercyclical Public Investments","authors":"L. Buchheim, M. Watzinger","doi":"10.1257/pol.20180323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20180323","url":null,"abstract":"This paper estimates the causal impact of a sizable German public investment program on employment at the county level. The program focused on improving the energy efficiency of school buildings, making it possible to use the number of schools as an instrument for investments. It also enforced tight deadlines, reducing potential implementation lags. The program was cost-effective, creating, on average, one job for one year for an investment of €24,000. The employment gains are detectable after nine months and are accompanied by an unemployment reduction amounting to half of the job creation. Employment grew predominately in the directly affected industries. (JEL E24, E32, E62, H54, J23, R23)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"GE-19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84608819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Data from an 18-month randomized trial show large and sustained impacts on water purification and child health of a program providing monthly coupons for free water treatment solution to households with young children. The program is more effective and much more cost effective than asking Community Health Workers (CHWs) to distribute free chlorine to households during routine monthly visits. This is because only 40 percent of households use free chlorine, targeting through CHWs is worse than self-targeting through coupon redemption, and water treatment promotion by CHWs does not increase chlorine use among beneficiaries of free chlorine. (JEL I12, I18, J13, O12, O13, Q53)
{"title":"Expanding Access to Clean Water for the Rural Poor: Experimental Evidence from Malawi","authors":"Pascaline Dupas, Basimenye Nhlema, Zachary Wagner, Aaron Wolf, Emily Wroe","doi":"10.1257/pol.20210121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20210121","url":null,"abstract":"Data from an 18-month randomized trial show large and sustained impacts on water purification and child health of a program providing monthly coupons for free water treatment solution to households with young children. The program is more effective and much more cost effective than asking Community Health Workers (CHWs) to distribute free chlorine to households during routine monthly visits. This is because only 40 percent of households use free chlorine, targeting through CHWs is worse than self-targeting through coupon redemption, and water treatment promotion by CHWs does not increase chlorine use among beneficiaries of free chlorine. (JEL I12, I18, J13, O12, O13, Q53)","PeriodicalId":48093,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136019484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：