Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000422
E. Fieldhouse, Geoffrey Evans, Jane Green, Jonathan Mellon, Christopher Prosser, J. Bailey
The 2019 UK General Election had seismic consequences for British politics. After three years of political turmoil following the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union (EU), the 2019 election marked a victory for the Leave side of the Brexit debate, putting to rest questions of a second referendum and any chance of Parliament blocking the Withdrawal Bill. The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020. Although there were clear consequences for Britain’s EU membership, there is debate about whether 2019 was a “Brexit election” (Prosser 2020)—even a critical election (Green 2021)—or the continuation of long-term realignments in British politics (Cutts et al. 2020; Jennings and Stoker 2017). By most accounts, Brexit dominated the 2019 election as a political issue, but whether this represents a key moment in a process of realignment of voters in Britain remains to be seen.
2019年英国大选对英国政治产生了地震般的影响。2016年英国脱欧公投后，英国经历了三年的政治动荡，2019年的选举标志着脱欧辩论中脱欧派的胜利，第二次公投的问题以及议会阻止脱欧法案的可能性都得到了解决。英国于2020年1月31日脱离欧盟。尽管脱欧对英国的欧盟成员国身份产生了明显的影响，但关于2019年是“英国脱欧选举”(Prosser 2020)——甚至是一场关键选举(Green 2021)——还是英国政治长期重组的延续(Cutts et al. 2020;Jennings and Stoker 2017)。从大多数人的角度来看，英国脱欧作为一个政治问题主导了2019年的选举，但这是否代表着英国选民重新调整过程中的关键时刻，仍有待观察。
{"title":"Volatility, Realignment, and Electoral Shocks: Brexit and the UK General Election of 2019","authors":"E. Fieldhouse, Geoffrey Evans, Jane Green, Jonathan Mellon, Christopher Prosser, J. Bailey","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000422","url":null,"abstract":"The 2019 UK General Election had seismic consequences for British politics. After three years of political turmoil following the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union (EU), the 2019 election marked a victory for the Leave side of the Brexit debate, putting to rest questions of a second referendum and any chance of Parliament blocking the Withdrawal Bill. The United Kingdom left the EU on January 31, 2020. Although there were clear consequences for Britain’s EU membership, there is debate about whether 2019 was a “Brexit election” (Prosser 2020)—even a critical election (Green 2021)—or the continuation of long-term realignments in British politics (Cutts et al. 2020; Jennings and Stoker 2017). By most accounts, Brexit dominated the 2019 election as a political issue, but whether this represents a key moment in a process of realignment of voters in Britain remains to be seen.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"2012 1","pages":"537 - 545"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83372468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000471
Eric P. Kaufmann, David L. Leal, Joe R. Tafoya
Do people’s political beliefs alter the emphasis they place on different symbols when constructing their “personal” national identity (Cohen 1996)? Does the content of their national identity affect how they vote? These are the central questions we address in this article, focusing on England but using the United States as a comparative case to demonstrate common dynamics.
{"title":"Divided Images: How the English Perceive Nationhood and How This Shapes Voting and Opinion","authors":"Eric P. Kaufmann, David L. Leal, Joe R. Tafoya","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000471","url":null,"abstract":"Do people’s political beliefs alter the emphasis they place on different symbols when constructing their “personal” national identity (Cohen 1996)? Does the content of their national identity affect how they vote? These are the central questions we address in this article, focusing on England but using the United States as a comparative case to demonstrate common dynamics.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"45 1","pages":"579 - 589"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77800655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000409
James Pow, John Garry
A pessimistic view of the potential of deliberative mini-publics to effectively contribute to democratic decision making on highly contested issues in deeply divided places asserts that (1) deliberative quality would be low due to the bitterness prompted by discussion of divisive issues, and (2) levels of opinion change would be low given the stubbornly enduring nature of political attitudes in divided places. We empirically examined this pessimistic view using a quasi-experiment involving mini-publics on two separate issues in Northern Ireland: (1) the contentious ethno-national question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status, and (2) the much less contested and non-ethno-national issue of social care. Contrary to the pessimistic view, we find evidence that from the perspective of the participants themselves, deliberative quality was higher in the mini-public on an ethno-national issue. However, in line with the pessimistic view, levels of self-reported opinion change were significantly lower in the ethno-national mini-public. Overall, the findings highlight the potential for carefully designed deliberative mini-publics to address divisive ethno-national issues: they provide a space for participants to engage with such issues in open and respectful discussion—even if the prospects for attitudinal change are more limited.
{"title":"What Happens When Mini-Publics Are Held in a Deeply Divided Place? Evidence from Northern Ireland","authors":"James Pow, John Garry","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000409","url":null,"abstract":"A pessimistic view of the potential of deliberative mini-publics to effectively contribute to democratic decision making on highly contested issues in deeply divided places asserts that (1) deliberative quality would be low due to the bitterness prompted by discussion of divisive issues, and (2) levels of opinion change would be low given the stubbornly enduring nature of political attitudes in divided places. We empirically examined this pessimistic view using a quasi-experiment involving mini-publics on two separate issues in Northern Ireland: (1) the contentious ethno-national question of Northern Ireland’s constitutional status, and (2) the much less contested and non-ethno-national issue of social care. Contrary to the pessimistic view, we find evidence that from the perspective of the participants themselves, deliberative quality was higher in the mini-public on an ethno-national issue. However, in line with the pessimistic view, levels of self-reported opinion change were significantly lower in the ethno-national mini-public. Overall, the findings highlight the potential for carefully designed deliberative mini-publics to address divisive ethno-national issues: they provide a space for participants to engage with such issues in open and respectful discussion—even if the prospects for attitudinal change are more limited.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"29 1","pages":"572 - 578"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83962868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000240
Lindsay Richards, Anthony F. Heath
ABSTRACT In post-Brexit and post-devolution Britain, relationships among the four nations appear fragile. This article aims to discover where British citizens draw the symbolic boundaries that define in-group and out-group members between nations—in particular, England, Scotland, and Wales—and within England. Within England, we also examine class divides and the North–South divide. We operationalize symbolic boundaries through a set of new innovative measures administered in an online survey in 2019. Questions ascertain agreement that the various groups “share my values,” are “people I could get on with,” and are “straightforward and honest.” Results of our descriptive analysis suggest that boundaries are blurred between the British and the Welsh but sharper for the Scottish. We also find sharp but asymmetrical boundaries within England, between the working class and the middle class, and between Northerners and Southerners. Regional differences in perceptions of Southerners map closely onto those of how well Westminster looks after regional interests, which suggests that power imbalances reduce social cohesion.
{"title":"How Divided Is Britain? Symbolic Boundaries and Social Cohesion in Post-Brexit Britain","authors":"Lindsay Richards, Anthony F. Heath","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000240","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In post-Brexit and post-devolution Britain, relationships among the four nations appear fragile. This article aims to discover where British citizens draw the symbolic boundaries that define in-group and out-group members between nations—in particular, England, Scotland, and Wales—and within England. Within England, we also examine class divides and the North–South divide. We operationalize symbolic boundaries through a set of new innovative measures administered in an online survey in 2019. Questions ascertain agreement that the various groups “share my values,” are “people I could get on with,” and are “straightforward and honest.” Results of our descriptive analysis suggest that boundaries are blurred between the British and the Welsh but sharper for the Scottish. We also find sharp but asymmetrical boundaries within England, between the working class and the middle class, and between Northerners and Southerners. Regional differences in perceptions of Southerners map closely onto those of how well Westminster looks after regional interests, which suggests that power imbalances reduce social cohesion.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"28 1","pages":"553 - 559"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91014670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000288
Nicole S. Martin, M. Sobolewska
The 2016 referendum on UK membership in the European Union (EU) led to a realignment of voters along their referendum position (Fieldhouse et al. 2021; Sobolewska and Ford 2020). By December 2019, both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party received approximately 80% of their support from voters who had been on “their” side during the referendum (Fieldhouse et al. 2021). Brexit identities were akin to partisanship, with affective polarization and perceptual screening (Sobolewska and Ford 2020; Sorace and Hobolt 2021). Research also traces the Brexit vote to a growing values divide (Evans and Menon 2017), with ethnocentric attitudes found on opposing sides of the referendum (Sobolewska and Ford 2020). The views of ethnic minority voters, as traditional victims of white ethnocentrism, have been seen largely in this debate as the same as the identity of liberal Remainers. However, despite the assumption that minorities naturally would fall on the side opposing white ethnocentrism, the referendum marked the biggest departure from the traditional ethnic minorities bloc vote since 2005, when a substantial minority of Muslim voters deserted Labour over the Iraq War (Curtice, Fisher, and Steed 2005). The Leave side in the 2016 referendum received approximately one third of the votes of ethnic minorities (Martin, Sobolewska, and Begum 2020), despite Leave also drawing a majority of its support from “UKIP-curious” voters (Evans and Mellon 2019) who had voted for or considered supporting the anti-immigrant radical-right United Kingdom Independence Party.
2016年关于英国是否留在欧盟(EU)的公投导致选民沿着他们的公投立场重新调整(Fieldhouse等人，2021年;Sobolewska and Ford 2020)。到2019年12月，保守党和工党都获得了大约80%的支持，这些支持来自在公投期间站在“他们”一边的选民(Fieldhouse et al. 2021)。英国脱欧身份类似于党派之分，存在情感两极分化和感知筛选(Sobolewska和Ford 2020;Sorace and Hobolt 2021)。研究还将英国脱欧投票归因于日益严重的价值观分歧(Evans and Menon 2017)，在公投的对立双方都存在种族中心主义态度(Sobolewska and Ford 2020)。作为白人种族中心主义的传统受害者，少数族裔选民的观点在这场辩论中基本上被视为与自由派留欧派的认同相同。然而，尽管假设少数民族自然会站在反对白人种族中心主义的一边，这次公投标志着自2005年以来传统少数民族集团投票的最大背离，当时大量少数穆斯林选民因伊拉克战争而抛弃了工党(Curtice, Fisher, and Steed, 2005)。在2016年的公投中，脱欧派获得了少数民族(Martin, Sobolewska和Begum, 2020)约三分之一的选票，尽管脱欧派也获得了“对英国独立党好奇”的选民(Evans和Mellon, 2019)的大部分支持，这些选民曾投票支持或考虑支持反移民的极右翼英国独立党。
{"title":"The End of the Ethnic Bloc Vote? Ethnic Minority Leavers After the Brexit Referendum","authors":"Nicole S. Martin, M. Sobolewska","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000288","url":null,"abstract":"The 2016 referendum on UK membership in the European Union (EU) led to a realignment of voters along their referendum position (Fieldhouse et al. 2021; Sobolewska and Ford 2020). By December 2019, both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party received approximately 80% of their support from voters who had been on “their” side during the referendum (Fieldhouse et al. 2021). Brexit identities were akin to partisanship, with affective polarization and perceptual screening (Sobolewska and Ford 2020; Sorace and Hobolt 2021). Research also traces the Brexit vote to a growing values divide (Evans and Menon 2017), with ethnocentric attitudes found on opposing sides of the referendum (Sobolewska and Ford 2020). The views of ethnic minority voters, as traditional victims of white ethnocentrism, have been seen largely in this debate as the same as the identity of liberal Remainers. However, despite the assumption that minorities naturally would fall on the side opposing white ethnocentrism, the referendum marked the biggest departure from the traditional ethnic minorities bloc vote since 2005, when a substantial minority of Muslim voters deserted Labour over the Iraq War (Curtice, Fisher, and Steed 2005). The Leave side in the 2016 referendum received approximately one third of the votes of ethnic minorities (Martin, Sobolewska, and Begum 2020), despite Leave also drawing a majority of its support from “UKIP-curious” voters (Evans and Mellon 2019) who had voted for or considered supporting the anti-immigrant radical-right United Kingdom Independence Party.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"19 1","pages":"566 - 571"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87984046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000367
James Tilley, S. Hobolt
The decision by a narrow majority of British voters to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016 was a political earthquake that few had seen coming. It produced new political divisions, not only between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe but also within the United Kingdom. In particular, the referendum campaign and the outcome generated two new political identities: “Leavers” and “Remainers.” These Brexit identities crosscut partisan identities and voters formed deep emotional attachments to them (Curtice 2018; Evans and Schaffner 2019). Moreover, this Brexit divide led to affective polarization in the form of out-group animosity and discrimination (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2021). It also shaped perceptions of the economy (Sorace and Hobolt 2021), attitudes toward immigration (Pickup et al. 2021), vote choices (Hobolt and Rodon 2020), and losers’ consent (Schaffner 2021; Tilley and Hobolt 2023a). Brexit identities have been shown to be salient and politically consequential. Yet, we know much less about whether these new identities are rooted in policy norms that go beyond preferences about the desirability of leaving the EU. In this article, we thus explore the nature of Brexit identities and how they relate to policy norms.
2016年，英国选民以微弱多数决定退出欧盟，这是一场几乎没有人预料到的政治地震。它产生了新的政治分歧，不仅在英国和欧洲其他国家之间，而且在英国内部。特别是，公投运动和结果产生了两种新的政治身份:“脱欧派”和“留欧派”。这些脱欧身份跨越了党派身份，选民对他们形成了深刻的情感依恋(Curtice 2018;Evans and Schaffner 2019)。此外，这种脱欧分歧导致了以群体外仇恨和歧视的形式出现的情感两极分化(Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2021)。它还影响了人们对经济的看法(Sorace and Hobolt 2021)、对移民的态度(Pickup et al. 2021)、投票选择(Hobolt and Rodon 2020)和失败者的同意(Schaffner 2021;蒂利和霍伯特2023a)。英国脱欧身份已被证明具有突出和政治意义。然而，我们对这些新身份是否根植于政策规范的了解要少得多，这些政策规范超越了人们对是否愿意离开欧盟的偏好。因此，在本文中，我们将探讨英国脱欧身份的本质及其与政策规范的关系。
{"title":"Brexit as an Identity: Political Identities and Policy Norms","authors":"James Tilley, S. Hobolt","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000367","url":null,"abstract":"The decision by a narrow majority of British voters to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016 was a political earthquake that few had seen coming. It produced new political divisions, not only between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe but also within the United Kingdom. In particular, the referendum campaign and the outcome generated two new political identities: “Leavers” and “Remainers.” These Brexit identities crosscut partisan identities and voters formed deep emotional attachments to them (Curtice 2018; Evans and Schaffner 2019). Moreover, this Brexit divide led to affective polarization in the form of out-group animosity and discrimination (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2021). It also shaped perceptions of the economy (Sorace and Hobolt 2021), attitudes toward immigration (Pickup et al. 2021), vote choices (Hobolt and Rodon 2020), and losers’ consent (Schaffner 2021; Tilley and Hobolt 2023a). Brexit identities have been shown to be salient and politically consequential. Yet, we know much less about whether these new identities are rooted in policy norms that go beyond preferences about the desirability of leaving the EU. In this article, we thus explore the nature of Brexit identities and how they relate to policy norms.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"56 1","pages":"546 - 552"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79558786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S1049096523000410
David L. Leal
Although my evidence is anecdotal and impressionistic, my sense is that political science teaching, research, and careers are less likely to involve UK politics and the Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.
{"title":"Symposium on the Contemporary Politics of the United Kingdom: Introduction and Reflections","authors":"David L. Leal","doi":"10.1017/S1049096523000410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096523000410","url":null,"abstract":"Although my evidence is anecdotal and impressionistic, my sense is that political science teaching, research, and careers are less likely to involve UK politics and the Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"45 1","pages":"531 - 536"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89727346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-10DOI: 10.1017/S104909652300046X
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, W. Allen
Rhetoric surrounding the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on continued European Union (EU) membership frequently has invoked the “will of the people.” Addressing the House of Commons in March 2019, then–Prime Minster Theresa May stated that “my sense of responsibility and duty has meant that I have kept working to ensure that we deliver on the result and the will of the people” (March 27, 2019).1 May’s successor, Boris Johnson, appealed to the same notion when suggesting in the Daily Telegraph (September 15, 2019) that opposition parties were “united in wanting to cancel the referendum result…and overturn the will of the people.” On the other side of the debate, Caroline Lucas (currently the sole Member of Parliament for the UK’s Green Party) stated that “[e]very recent opinion poll shows that the will of the people has changed since [the referendum]” (December 4, 2018).
{"title":"As We Like It: Did the UK’s 2016 EU Referendum Reveal the “Will of the People?”","authors":"Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, W. Allen","doi":"10.1017/S104909652300046X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S104909652300046X","url":null,"abstract":"Rhetoric surrounding the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on continued European Union (EU) membership frequently has invoked the “will of the people.” Addressing the House of Commons in March 2019, then–Prime Minster Theresa May stated that “my sense of responsibility and duty has meant that I have kept working to ensure that we deliver on the result and the will of the people” (March 27, 2019).1 May’s successor, Boris Johnson, appealed to the same notion when suggesting in the Daily Telegraph (September 15, 2019) that opposition parties were “united in wanting to cancel the referendum result…and overturn the will of the people.” On the other side of the debate, Caroline Lucas (currently the sole Member of Parliament for the UK’s Green Party) stated that “[e]very recent opinion poll shows that the will of the people has changed since [the referendum]” (December 4, 2018).","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"985 1","pages":"560 - 565"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77115573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-03DOI: 10.1017/s1049096523000483
G. Arıkan, Ðorđe Milosav
This article discusses the integration of research methods training into a third-year elective undergraduate course. We suggest that the building blocks of research design can be embedded in courses without compromising their content. This introduces research methods to students who have no prior methods training or gives students with methods training more opportunities to engage in research design. We present evidence that this approach increased students’ self-assessed knowledge of and confidence with research-related skills, especially among those without prior methods training. Additionally, the analysis of research proposals—the final assignment of the course—revealed that most students were able to apply core research design skills. These findings demonstrate that progress in research methods skills is possible across the curriculum.
{"title":"Integrating Research Methods Training into Elective Courses in an Undergraduate Curriculum","authors":"G. Arıkan, Ðorđe Milosav","doi":"10.1017/s1049096523000483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096523000483","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article discusses the integration of research methods training into a third-year elective undergraduate course. We suggest that the building blocks of research design can be embedded in courses without compromising their content. This introduces research methods to students who have no prior methods training or gives students with methods training more opportunities to engage in research design. We present evidence that this approach increased students’ self-assessed knowledge of and confidence with research-related skills, especially among those without prior methods training. Additionally, the analysis of research proposals—the final assignment of the course—revealed that most students were able to apply core research design skills. These findings demonstrate that progress in research methods skills is possible across the curriculum.","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84705179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1017/s1049096523000458
Sam Whitt, Alixandra B. Yanus, Mark Setzler, B. McDonald, J. Graeber, Gordon Ballingrud, Martin J. Kifer
What effects do contentious elections have on partisan appraisals of democracy? We consider the case of the November 2020 US election, a highly polarized partisan contest but also an objectively free and fair election by credible accounting. We conducted a panel study embedded within two nationally representative surveys before and after the election. Results indicate a familiar but underexamined partisan gap, in which satisfaction with democracy decreases among Republicans and increases among Democrats relative to nonpartisans. We find that the gap is fully mediated by partisan shifts in satisfaction with elections and the news media that cover them. Our results underscore how eroding institutional confidence can undermine democratic legitimacy in hitherto consolidated democracies. To overcome partisan divisions following contentious elections, we highlight the need to bolster confidence in democratic institutions to reduce partisan fears and uncertainties—both rational and irrational—that electoral losses may trigger.
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