Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

This study examines whether monetary priming increases children's cheating and moderates the effect of prize attractiveness on their cheating behavior. While rational economic theory suggests that individuals cheat more when incentives are greater, previous findings have been inconsistent. We propose that monetary priming could explain these mixed results, hypothesizing that it may not only increase cheating but also influence sensitivity to reward magnitude. We conducted a quasi-experimental study in which children (7–10 years old, N = 178) were primed (or not) with money (real or symbolic money) before participating in a “roll a die” task that determined the number of rewards they could obtain. This task utilized an electronic die (DICE+), which enabled us to identify both actual and self-reported values of die rolls. As expected, monetary priming (both real and symbolic) increased cheating among the children. Furthermore, our results demonstrated that while participants were more inclined to cheat for more attractive prizes in non-monetary priming conditions, they became insensitive to the attractiveness of potential gains after monetary priming. These findings suggest that monetary priming may activate a business decision frame in which rewards of any size can prompt action, and proportionality is not taken into account. Our results may help explain inconsistencies in previous studies on the relationship between incentives and cheating, suggesting that unintentional monetary priming (e.g., through monetary incentives) in some experiments could mask the effects of reward size.

Reyna, Reed, Meschkow, Calderon, and Helm experimentally extend to plea bargaining in criminal cases findings from numerous other behavioral contexts that how the bargain is framed affects decisions reached. Framing effects undermine the presumption among many in the law that plea decisions will be rational and made “in the shadow of trial.” This is an important extension of the psychological literature. However, given the complexity of the process of plea bargaining, and in particular, the fact that it is controlled by the prosecutor, involves bargaining with counsel, is done in secret, and there are few restrictions, the practical import of framing effects for reforming plea bargains is doubtful. Nonetheless, given that plea bargaining privileges efficiency over truth, the additional principle of fairness is too often missing from the plea bargain literature. Reyna et al. usefully bring that fundamental concern back into focus.

This paper examines how expertise influences actors' decision-making complexity. Drawing from the research on expert decision-making, and using the context of security analysts following firms in a new industry, I argue that expert analysts engage in top-down, automatic information processing that affects the complexity of their evaluations. Further, I develop the construct of evaluative complexity, which indicates the extent of nuance, uncertainty and inclusion of diverse perspectives in analyst evaluations. Historical data from the early internet industry (from 1995 to 2005) of approximately 1800 analyst reports on the initial public offerings in the internet industry support my predictions that expert analysts—those with either prior experience or prior status—demonstrate lesser complexity in their evaluations of internet firms as compared to novice or low-status analysts. Specifically, in new industry contexts, expert analysts are more likely to assess new firms from unitary perspectives and convey more certainty in a context that calls for caution. My research aims to contribute to our understanding of the role of expertise in new domains and the differences in decision-making complexity between experts and novices.

Previous research suggests that people may infer a product's quality from its audience size (i.e., the number of people who consume the product). However, this research cautions against the overuse of such inferences by identifying the mere audience-size effect: When audience size results from incidental factors (e.g., weather) and thus cannot accurately reflect product quality, people still perceive the quality of products with a large (vs. small) audience to be higher (vs. lower; Studies 1–3), leading to a misallocation of resources to these products. This effect weakens when people are prompted to compare diagnostic and nondiagnostic audience sizes (Study 4) and to deliberate on the cause of audience size before making quality judgments (Study 5). The mere audience-size effect is also less pronounced when people are familiar with a product (Study 6). The present study yields theoretical implications for overgeneralization and quality inference and practical implications for accurate resource commitment.

A cursory read of the popular press and the JDM research field suggest that they have very different beliefs regarding the consequences of confidence. And these beliefs have important consequences themselves. For individuals, how one views the consequences of confidence (and whether they are positive or negative) likely influences the extent to which one pursues the development of confidence and how one interprets confidence in others. For JDM researchers, their beliefs about the consequences of confidence inform research programs. For example, a belief that overconfidence leads to inappropriate medical treatments, legal advice, or investments suggests an emphasis on reducing overconfidence rather than on developing confidence. This paper aims to improve understanding of both the general public's and JDM researchers' beliefs about the consequences of confidence in knowledge. We present a general theoretical framework for thinking about the consequences of confidence, followed by two exploratory studies designed to access these beliefs, first with the general public and then with JDM researchers. We used structured, open-ended questioning to generate a large dataset (over 10,000 responses) of potential consequences of low confidence, high confidence, overconfidence, and underconfidence. Qualitative coding identified a broad set of respondent-generated beliefs regarding psychological and behavioral consequences, organized into antonym pairs (e.g., arrogant/high self-image vs. low self-image). Respondents made few distinctions between low confidence and underconfidence, viewing both negatively. However, the general public drew a sharp distinction between high confidence (described positively) and overconfidence (described negatively), a trend less prevalent among JDM researchers.

Risk preference is a key concept across social, economic, and decision sciences. While existing measures assess risk taking either as domain-specific preferences (e.g., finance and health) or as a general trait, they have largely overlooked individual differences in the narrow, domain-general aspects of risk preference. Drawing from a dual-process framework, we advance a multidimensional domain-general measure of risk preference. We develop and validate the Calculated and Spontaneous Risk-Taking Scale across seven studies (N = 2116). Results show (1) the two risk styles are moderately correlated and align with existing risk preference measures; (2) they are distinct from personality traits like the Big Five and cognitive traits like decision style; (3) calculated risk-takers show more variability in risk attitudes across contexts; (4) calculated risk-taking predicts adaptive outcomes (e.g., creativity and entrepreneurship), while spontaneous risk-taking predicts maladaptive behaviors (e.g., crime, safety violations); and (5) the scale is invariant across sex and age. Overall, calculated risk-takers engage in more adaptive risks, leading to healthier, more meaningful lives.