Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

Past research has shown that people are inconsistent when making predictions about emotions and moral behaviors following their own wrongdoing. However, it is less clear how people react when they did not cause the wrongdoing themselves but the group or collective they associate with. The present paper investigates people's reactions to collective wrongdoing and the question (1) whether the prediction of the experience of group-based guilt is related to actual moral behaviors and (2) whether this prediction is reliable. In three studies, we analyze collective guilt and subsequent behavioral reactions. Study 1 involved real academic situations, varying the kind of unfair treatment of others. A priori, participants overestimated their own subsequent experiences of collective guilt as well as their moral behavior. With respect to actual responses, experienced guilt was the strongest predictor of behavioral reactions, while imagined guilt, in-group identification and satisfaction did not significantly predict responses. Moreover, participants also reacted more to the direct harm caused by their group to others than to unjustified privileges granted to others. Study 2 fully replicated these results and showed relative stability in the predictions of collective guilt. Study 3 compared the responses by participants of the previous two studies with their responses 5 years later, indicating high stability of the observed effects over time. Also, we observed that making repeated predictions after experiencing the guilt-eliciting situation did not improve the accuracy of our participants' predictions. We discuss the implications of these findings for self-predictions, behavioral and affective forecasting of collective emotions, and for common assessment methods of guilt by hypothetical vignettes.

Past research on decisions under risk has documented two contradictory context effects: the contrast effect, where risk preferences in “target” tasks diverge from those in previous “surrounding” tasks, and the assimilation effect that implies the opposite bias. We present four web experiments (three preregistered) that clarify the conditions determining the relative prominence of these opposing effects. Our experiments focus on choice patterns in “target” tasks where participants choose between the status quo and a risky mixed gamble with an expected value of zero. Study 1 examines the impact of surroundings that differ from the target task with respect to the expected benefit from risk-taking. The findings reveal a strong contrast effect: Decreasing the attractiveness of risk-taking in the surrounding tasks increased the risk-taking rate in the target tasks from 53.2% to 79.7%. Study 2 investigates the impact of surroundings that differ in the payoff domain. The findings indicate a strong assimilation effect: Decreasing the attractiveness of risk-taking in the surrounding tasks decreased the risk-taking rate in the target tasks from 74.7% to 36.5%. Additionally, the results revealed unpredicted and robust reversed loss aversion patterns which Studies 3 and 4 further clarify. Our findings (1) suggest that the isolated within-task computations assumed by leading descriptive models overlook substantial contextual considerations, (2) clarify the factors determining the impact of the contrast and assimilation effects in decisions under risk, and (3) provide a theoretical framework for making useful predictions in various scenarios.

This paper examines whether risk preferences in the NBA are reference-dependent and attempts to identify the reference point. Using data from 10 NBA seasons (12,890 games), I find that teams are more likely to attempt a riskier three-point shot (vs. a less risky two-point shot) when below the reference point than above it, consistent with Prospect Theory. The results further show that teams are not influenced by a single fixed reference point, but instead, their choices depend on the score difference, most recent score change, and pregame expectations. Additionally, the weight given to the reference point changes over the course of the game. Teams show a breakeven effect, such that they are more likely to attempt a three-point shot when doing so can tie the game. They also show behavior consistent with mental accounting, as the reference point carries more weight at the end of a quarter than at the beginning. These results provide further real-world evidence for reference-dependent risk preferences while highlighting the challenge of applying reference-dependent models to real-world settings.

Betting more after losses (i.e., “loss-chasing”) is a central clinical feature of disordered gambling. According to prospect theory, increasing risk-seeking following losses could arise from a failure to “re-reference.” By contrast, successful re-referencing between successive decisions closes the mental account, and any losses are regarded as final or realized; gamblers should not chase realized losses. The present study sought to test this “realization effect” among gamblers using an ecologically valid online gambling task. We were further interested in whether the effectiveness of the loss realization varied as a function of problem gambling severity. Using online recruitment of past-year gamblers stratified on the Problem Gambling Severity Index, we tested a group without gambling problems (n = 227), a group with at-risk gambling (n = 239), and a group with gambling problems (n = 223). Over a sequence of nine bets, after the sixth bet, half of the participants underwent a simulated realization procedure that entailed cashing out from the gambling website and redepositing their remaining funds on another website. The feedback comparison group were shown their account balance after the sixth bet but did not withdraw or transfer their funds. In line with the realization effect, the group with non-problem gambling significantly reduced their bet after cashing out. The realization procedure did not significantly ameliorate loss-chasing in the groups with at-risk gambling or gambling problems. We conclude that the realization effect can be elicited in an online gambling context but that stronger interventions for realizing losses may be required for people experiencing gambling problems.

Default nudges—making the desired option the standard option—are often criticized for hampering autonomy. However, laboratory research suggests this expectation of autonomy loss is not reflected in nudgees' experienced autonomy. In this study, we investigated whether this finding translates to a real-world setting by implementing a default nudge to increase food donations in the supermarket (Experiment 1). Upon entering the supermarket, customers were asked to donate a food item for charity and were handed a shopping cart/basket that was empty (control) or contained a food item meant for donation (default nudge). Donations were collected after checkout, and customers rated their experienced autonomy of their choice to donate. We replicated this study and added a vignette condition portraying the default nudge to measure expected autonomy for the same situation (Experiment 2). The results show the default nudge reduced participants' expected autonomy but not their experienced autonomy, shedding new light on the relation between nudging and autonomy. Furthermore, this novel form of the default nudge was found to be successful in increasing food donations in the supermarket, further expanding the field where this nudge has been successful.

Subjective experiences of resource scarcity can make individuals short-term oriented, capture attention, and trigger feelings of unfairness. However, the impact of scarcity on information processing and ethical decision-making remains poorly understood. This eye-tracking study explored how acute financial scarcity affects selective information search and ethical decision-making in an economic task with competing incentives (N = 60, 12,000 observations). Results revealed that participants experiencing financial scarcity displayed a strong attentional bias towards financially tempting information, although they ultimately did not behave more unethically. These findings might reveal a “moral boundary” dictating when attentional biases translate into decision-making. Our results contribute to understanding how individuals in scarcity contexts process and prioritize information in ethical decision-making, helping organizations and policymakers combat stereotypes surrounding resource-deprived individuals, and design evidence-based policy interventions promoting ethical behavior in financially scarce situations.

Decision makers often prefer safe wins over risky gambles, even if the latter promise higher payoffs than the former. One mechanism that explains this choice pattern is the certainty effect, whereby probabilities of 0 and 1 are interpreted accurately but intermediate probabilities are distorted by diminishing sensitivity. We tested an alternative explanation that was recently proposed, the idea that people would be motivated by avoiding zero outcomes rather than being attracted to sure gains. This zero-outcome aversion in gain-domain choices was called the zero effect. By analogy, we proposed that decision makers would approach zero outcomes in the loss domain. Two eye-tracking experiments investigated visual attention as a key component of the zero effect in the gain domain (Experiment 1) and the loss domain (Experiment 2). Choices were consistent with the zero effect. In the gain domain, gambles were chosen less frequently if they included a zero outcome. In contrast, zero-outcome gambles were chosen more frequently in the loss domain. Eye movements and pupillometry indicated that zero outcomes in both domains (a) were less frequently fixated than other outcomes and (b) were associated with increased arousal. We concluded that domain-specific affective responses to zero outcomes aligned with approach/avoidance motivation. These distinct motivations in turn biased information search and choice behavior.