Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

Despite the abundance of priming effects identified in the literature, the replicability of prior findings pertaining to several priming effects has been recently challenged. Therefore, research has focused more extensively on pinpointing boundary conditions under which priming effects might surface or be attenuated. We contribute to this stream of literature, showing how visceral states (“hot” affective states) moderate the effectiveness of priming procedures. We demonstrate that active visceral states inhibit the effectiveness of primes that are unrelated to this state in decision domains that are also unrelated to this state (e.g., hungry people primed with the color orange making non-food related product choices). More importantly, extending the direct implications originating from previous research, we provide evidence that unrelated primes can still influence judgment and decision-making in judgment domains that are related to the visceral state when such a state is still experienced (e.g., hungry participants primed with the color orange making food-related rather than non-food-related product choices). The present research thus presents a nuanced view on when seemingly unrelated primes may or may not be expected to yield downstream consequences on judgment and choice.

This paper shows the effect of recipients' gender on donors' preferences, depending on donors' culture. Among study participants from both Eastern and Western cultures, the choice of donating to a boy or a girl followed donors' cultural norms. In Western culture (e.g., the United States), donors chose to donate to a girl over a boy, whereas in Eastern culture (e.g., China), the choice was reversed. A choice set of different-gender recipients increased donations (compared to a choice set of the same gender), as gender stereotypes served to justify choosing one recipient over the other. However, when the choice was between an organization and a single child, the child's gender (either boy or girl) did not affect donation behavior. Thus, gender preferences are driven by cultural norms only in cases where the recipient's gender is salient and serves as a culturally justifiable reason for the donor's choice.

Life is full of decisions about whether to trust other people. At a cognitive level, people can be skeptical about another person's trustworthiness but are averse to signaling their suspicions at a behavioral level. This phenomenon of “principled trustfulness” has been documented for trust implicating the moral character of another person but not explored for cases involving their competence. We introduce a new game-theoretical paradigm, the competence game, in which participants can bet money on whether an interaction partner will pass an intelligence test, thus placing trust in their partner's competence. Across four studies (N = 3337 participants analyzed, each making a decision to risk), we compared behavior in competence games and traditional trust games, which focus on moral choice and lottery gambles. In competence games, participants were significantly less likely to trust their interaction partner than in trust games even if the pay-off structure and likelihood of reaching a positive outcome were identical. Thus, trust in competence is not as principled to the same degree as trust in moral character but seems to be approached more like a self-interested investment decision.

Established procedures of analyzing the effect of context on choice consider simple, compact environments in laboratory settings. However, these approaches severely limit the study of context effects and, as a consequence, the applicability of their findings. In this paper, we generalize existing approaches in modeling choice with the aim of developing a toolbox for the analysis of observational data. We consider three main context measures: attraction, compromise, and similarity. The proposed methodology hinges on ex ante calculation of context features for every alternative in multioption, multiattribute choice sets. This approach minimizes the computational complications of estimating the resulting choice model. The proposed approach is applied to air traveler choice data using an extensive observational dataset. This yields the first examination of all three context effects simultaneously in a large observational dataset. We discuss the consequences of product (re)design based on the results of the empirical exercise to showcase the potential use of the developed methodology in managerial practice.

Philips, R., Pachur, T., Vögele, C., & Brevers, D. (2025). Does Time Pressure Alter the Affect Gap in Risky Choice? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 38(3), e70028. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.70028.

The figure descriptions for Figures 2 and 3 were inadvertently swapped in the published article. The correct descriptions for each figures are provided below:

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People often make decisions by either choosing an alternative they like (choose mode) or rejecting alternatives they dislike (reject mode). Previous research has demonstrated that these two decision modes involve distinct cognitive processes. In the current work, we further investigate whether these distinct cognitive processes in these two decision modes symmetrically or asymmetrically impact people's subsequent preferences for their preferred (chosen or nonrejected) alternatives. Across three experiments involving consumer goods, we found that participants exhibited stronger preferences for items preferred through the choose mode compared with items preferred through the reject mode. Using eye tracking, we demonstrate that this effect can be explained by more selective visual attention directed toward task-compatible alternatives in choosing versus rejecting decisions. We discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice in the context of consumer preferences, as well as their extensions to other decision domains.

It is reasonable to expect that when making a judgment, we only consider the relevant (or diagnostic) information and that nonrelevant (nondiagnostic) information should not, and thus does not, influence our judgments. Previous research has shown that this is not always the case and that the inclusion of nondiagnostic information can reduce the impact of diagnostic information in judgments. This phenomenon is known as the dilution effect, and it has been observed for a range of judgments, including product evaluations, probability judgments, and predictions relating to people's behavior. The dilution effect has been explained as a consequence of the representativeness heuristic, such that the inclusion of nondiagnostic information reduces the match between the target and a typical member of the category. Consistent with this notion and recent approaches to moral decision making, we predict that the dilution effect should be observed for judgments about morality. Across four studies (total N = 2535), we tested for the dilution effect on judgments of morally bad actors and morally good actors. Overall, our results showed a dilution effect for judgments of both good and bad actors. People's moral evaluations of both good and bad actors were less extreme when the descriptions included nondiagnostic information. We showed that this effect is not the result of humanization, and we found that the robustness of the effect appears to be moderated by valence, with a more robust effect for bad actors. Our results highlight avenues for future research.

Qiu, T, Li, X, Lu, J. The Mere Audience-Size Effect: How Incidental Audience Non-Normatively Influences the Perceived Product Quality. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2025; 38: e70022.

FIGURE 4 Perceived product quality as a function of audience size and deliberation order in Study 5. Error bars indicate standard errors.

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Research on intuition often produces conflicting results and suffers from reliability issues due to the lack of tools that can conclusively evaluate a person's latent intuitive position. It has been recently proposed that a decision maker's intuitive position can be evaluated by estimating parameters with sequential sampling models (SSMs), which provide a biologically plausible framework to measure how intuition affects decisions. In two studies, we use the drift diffusion model (DDM), as a type of SSM, to investigate topics where intuition is difficult to evaluate. In Study 1, we used the DDM to examine how the cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores relate to intuition in risky decision making and found that individuals with high CRT scores had superior performance and relied more on intuition. These findings challenge the conventional view that high CRT scores imply less reliance on intuition and that intuition is detrimental to decision performance. In Study 2, we examined the cross-domain stability of the preference for intuition and found that decision makers rely more on intuition in the social decision domain than in the risky decision domain and that these measures are not correlated across the two domains. The evidence for this unstable preference has hitherto primarily resulted from self-reports, which have a questionable ability to assess the preference for intuition. In both studies, we demonstrate that the DDM can accurately simulate the decision outcome and decision time patterns that are affected by intuition, providing evidence for the usefulness of DDM analysis in the study of intuition.