Journal of Behavioral Decision Making最新文献

We explore and demonstrate the anticipated and actual emotions that are experienced by individuals who engage in dishonest behaviors that benefit others (altruistic dishonesty) versus the self (egoistic dishonesty), and primarily focus on the positive emotion of pride. Across three preregistered experiments (one scenario experiment and two incentivized behavioral ones), we found that engaging in altruistic dishonesty was not only more prevalent than egoistic dishonesty but also evoked more pride and less guilt and shame. Interestingly, the increase in pride and decrease in guilt and shame when cheating solely for the benefit of others were attenuated when participants cheated for the benefit of both others and themselves. These findings shed further light on the emotional processes involved in dishonesty and highlight the understudied role of pride. The positive association between engaging in altruistic dishonesty and pride may explain the relatively high rates of altruistic dishonesty observed in the current and previous studies, as it suggests that having an altruistic justification may not only enable cheaters to maintain a clear conscience but also even boost how they feel about themselves.

A continuous attribute (e.g., calorie count) can be classified into separate categories (e.g., high vs. low), and a similar attribute value can fall into different categories depending on where the category boundaries are drawn. This research explores the effect of categorization on judgments of options (e.g., products and incentive-compatible games) with continuous attributes. I predict and find a systematic preference shift between two options that were presented with different categorization criteria: When two options involve a tradeoff between two continuous attributes, people tend to prefer the option with both attributes classified into the favorable categories given the categorization criteria. I further show that this effect is driven by larger perceived differences between attribute values across category boundaries and is moderated by people's tendency to rely on category information. Overall, this effect holds even when people are highly familiar with the attributes and feel confident to make similarity evaluations, when people are cued that the categories provide little informational value, and when people are incentivized to make deliberate decisions. The findings in this research carry both theoretical and practical implications.

There has been considerable conceptual and empirical progress on the measurement of rational thinking in adult samples. Studies in developmental samples have demonstrated that many of these domains and paradigms can also be assessed in children and youth, especially in adolescent samples. Here, we present an efficient rationality assessment battery for adolescents and youth—the Assessment of Rational Thinking for Youth (ART-Y). The ART-Y consists of five subtests: Probabilistic and Statistical Thinking, Scientific Thinking, Avoidance of Framing, Knowledge Calibration, and Rational Temporal Discounting. Two supplementary measures of thinking dispositions are included in the ART-Y: Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT) and Deliberative Thinking. The ART-Y battery was examined in a sample of 143 adolescents (mean age = 15.4 years). The five rational thinking subtests displayed intercorrelations largely consistent with those obtained in the adult literature. Age, cognitive ability, problem solving, probabilistic numeracy, and thinking dispositions predicted variance differently across the five subtests of the ART-Y, but again largely consistent with the adult literature. These measures, along with the ART-Y subtests, were examined as predictors of two real-world skills: financial literacy and academic achievement. Scientific thinking, knowledge calibration, and rational temporal discounting were significant unique predictors of financial literacy when statistically controlling for cognitive ability. Scientific thinking predicted academic achievement when statistically controlling for cognitive ability.

Subjective inferences of probability are critical for decisions involving uncertainty. Recent studies have suggested that extreme outcomes bias beliefs about the value of uncertain options toward the best/worst outcome possible when learning the odds through experience, leading to increased preferences for uncertain options over equivaluable sure bets when there is the prospect of gain and, conversely, aversion to uncertain options when there is the prospect of loss. However, prior studies regarding the influence of extreme outcomes on decisions involving uncertainty have only done so using 50/50 gambles, and it was unclear whether extreme outcomes biased probability perception more broadly. Across three pre-registered experiments, we found that when people made decisions between equivaluable certain and uncertain options, they particularly preferred uncertain options at low probabilities (20%) when there was the prospect of gain and avoided them when there was the prospect of loss, with these preferences being reduced or even reversed at medium (50%) and high (80%) probabilities. We also found that uncertainty preferences were influenced by outcome extremity and the relative certainty associated with safe reference options. We conclude that extreme outcomes accentuate the overweighting of low probabilities and the underweighting of high probabilities in experience-based choice.

Emotions integral to a task are often adaptive, particularly in situations where outcomes and probabilities are not known. However, decisions are also influenced by emotions that arise from situations unrelated to the task. This is especially the case with negative emotions like fear and anger, which also tend to be accompanied by ruminative thinking that might divert decision-makers' attention from the task at hand. In two preregistered experiments, we show how self-distancing regulates the influence of incidental anger (vs. fear) on decision-making under uncertainty. Participants recalled and reflected on a fear-related or anger-related event from either a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. Next, they completed a task that is commonly used to measure affective decision-making under uncertainty, the Iowa Gambling Task. The results in both experiments indicated that self-immersed angry (vs. fearful) decision-makers were significantly slower to avoid the risky, disadvantageous decks. These findings demonstrate how the ways in which we process negative emotional events shape their carryover effects in decision-making under uncertainty and point to self-distancing as a potential tool to control incidental emotional influences.