International Journal of Industrial Organization最新文献

In this paper, we investigate circumstances in which performance bundling can be used as an effective instrument to foster effort supply in multi-dimensional competitions between two (possibly asymmetric) players. We find that besides a beneficial cost-saving effect that is diminishing with the asymmetry across players, performance bundling can cause a counterproductive unbalancing effect, which intensifies with this asymmetry. Thus, performance bundling (pure or partial) is desirable only if the players are sufficiently symmetric. Otherwise, a set of separate contests is optimal. Our model provides a new perspective for analyzing incentive schemes in contest environments that involve competitions in multiple dimensions.

High-speed internet has increased the amount of information available in health care markets. Online information may improve health outcomes if it reduces information frictions and helps patients choose higher quality providers or causes providers to improve quality. We examine how health outcomes for common procedures in Medicare changed after broadband internet rolled out across ZIP Codes from 1999 to 2008. Estimates imply that broadband expansion improved health outcomes by 5%. Broadband access primarily helped patients choose higher-quality providers; we also find some evidence that broadband improved provider quality. We use a structural model to decompose the improvements in patient outcomes over time. Counterfactual simulations imply that broadband roll-out was responsible for 16% of the improvement in outcomes by the end of the period.

We analyze the effect of different pricing schemes on the ability of horizontally differentiated firms to sustain collusion when customers are able to mix products to achieve a better match of their preferences. We compare the impacts on the likelihood of collusion and on consumer welfare from three pricing schemes: two-part tariffs, linear prices, and quantity-independent fixed fees. We find that a ban of either price component of the two-part tariff makes it more difficult to sustain collusion at profit-maximizing prices. We also find that whereas linear pricing is the most beneficial pricing schedule for customers in the absence of collusion, it is the most harmful pricing schedule for customers in the presence of collusion.

The incentives electricity generators face in investment and output decisions hinge on market design. Under some zonal market designs, where profit-maximizing participants face a uniform regional price, achieving lowest-cost system-wide production can be impossible. Further, zonal designs can incentivize siting of intermittent renewables in inefficient locations behind network constraints, of concern for jurisdictions undergoing a clean energy transition. We develop measures of mispricing that compare the zonal prices generators receive to locational marginal prices that value congestion externalities from generator output. We apply these measures to show wind and solar generators are increasingly siting in constrained areas of the Australian network, and highlight sources of potential efficiency gains from adopting a nodal market design with locational marginal pricing.

We estimate the welfare consequences of local news broadcasting decisions in advertiser-funded television, a central question in media regulation. We model programming decisions as the outcome of a discrete game played by rival stations competing for advertising revenue (which depends on viewing) by choosing lineups of local news and entertainment broadcasts. Using program-level data on television viewing and advertising prices, we find modest under-provision of local news relative to the level that maximizes television viewing. Counterfactual simulations indicate an average deficit of 7.4 broadcasts per market, or 12.8% of local station broadcasts during the evening news hours. Most of this shortfall is in the 7:30 timeslot leading into prime time. We distinguish two sources of inefficiency: losses due to advertiser valuation of local news and entertainment viewers, and losses from classic business stealing. Losses from competition represent about one third of the estimated shortfall, suggesting gains to cooperation among competing stations.

This paper studies the effect of overlapping ownership in a setting where firms must contract with an input supplier before competing in the product market. Horizontal ownership among the competing firms can here affect the input prices set by the supplier. I derive conditions for when overlapping ownership raises, reduces, or has no effect on input prices. The key factor is how demand curvature varies with total output. When overlapping ownership reduces input prices, the cost reduction is in turn passed on to consumers. This indirect effect offsets – and can even outweigh – the direct negative effect of overlapping ownership on product market competition.

Size thresholds determine whether a national authority reviews a merger and separate national and supranational responsibility. Firms could pursue competition-reducing mergers before they come under any regulatory oversight. Using data on German procurement auctions, I analyse competition effects near review thresholds. Four years after a merger, competition in procurement auctions decreases after mergers that are reviewed by the German national authority, relative to mergers below the threshold. However, when acquiror and target competed in procurement auctions before the merger, competition relatively increases after a German national merger review. Anti-competitive effects after nationally reviewed mergers without pre-merger activity in procurement may get unnoticed by the authority.

Seocho County in Korea attempted to advance the interests of incumbent businesses by weakening competition in the convenience store market. To this end, it created a regulation impeding the opening of new convenience stores. Although this regulation intensified proximity restrictions between stores, our findings reveal that the announcement of legislation condemned incumbent businesses to unfavorable survival probabilities. We provided supporting evidence that so-called implementation lags—time lags between the announcement and implementation of policies—and adaptive behaviors of potential store owners may have caused unintended consequences. Our findings imply that policymakers should consider implementation lag and the adaptive behaviors of economic agents.

Public research organizations (PROs) and universities receive large amounts of public funding for the generation and transmission of knowledge, and companies contract external knowledge from both. An important question for the management of a firm's R&D and for public innovation policies is: What is more beneficial for the generation of firm innovations, external knowledge created by PROs or by universities? In this paper, we assess the impact of external knowledge from PROs versus universities on firm innovativeness. We use information on R&D acquisitions from a panel dataset of more than 10,000 Spanish firms from 2005 to 2014. We show that external knowledge from PROs and universities increases firm innovativeness. Our results suggest that knowledge generated by PROs is more sensitive to the absorptive capacity of the firm than knowledge generated by universities. This has implications for research policy, R&D management, and organizational strategies of firms’ knowledge activities. Firms with low absorptive capacities benefit relatively more from knowledge generated by universities than from knowledge generated by PROs. Moreover, R&D managers should plan both their external and internal R&D if they acquire external R&D from PROs.