Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244
Alexander Rodivilov
This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers and the implications for contractual design. A buyer hires an agent to draft a contract for a seller. The buyer-seller contract is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract incompleteness is endogenously determined by the effort exerted by the agent, who can manipulate the buyer’s beliefs because his effort is not observable (moral hazard), and because he is better informed at the outset (adverse selection). We discuss how the asymmetric information generated during the contract drafting stage explains some empirical observations and contracting phenomena in the construction industry and procurement.
{"title":"Incentives for contract designers and contractual design","authors":"Alexander Rodivilov","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103244","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers and the implications for contractual design. A buyer hires an agent to draft a contract for a seller. The buyer-seller contract is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract incompleteness is endogenously determined by the effort exerted by the agent, who can manipulate the buyer’s beliefs because his effort is not observable (moral hazard), and because he is better informed at the outset (adverse selection). We discuss how the asymmetric information generated during the contract drafting stage explains some empirical observations and contracting phenomena in the construction industry and procurement.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103244"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145924920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2026-01-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103241
Ann Harrison , Peichun Wang , Minyuan Zhao , Marshall Meyer , Linda Zhao
The majority of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China were privatized through ownership reforms over the last three decades. Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China between 1998 and 2013, we show that privatized SOEs continue to benefit from government support relative to private enterprises. Compared to private firms that were never state-owned, privatized SOEs are favored by lower interest loans and higher government subsidies. Moreover, both SOEs and privatized SOEs significantly underperform relative to private firms, despite some improvements post-privatization. An exception is in improvements in productivity growth, where former SOEs match or exceed their private sector counterparts–results consistent with recent research. We also implement staggered difference-in-differences and matching estimation to account for treatment over multiple periods and selection into privatization. The tiger can change its stripes; however, former SOEs face a more supportive industrial policy regime relative to their private sector counterparts, affecting their performance.
{"title":"Can a tiger change its stripes? Reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the penumbra of the state","authors":"Ann Harrison , Peichun Wang , Minyuan Zhao , Marshall Meyer , Linda Zhao","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103241","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103241","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The majority of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China were privatized through ownership reforms over the last three decades. Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China between 1998 and 2013, we show that privatized SOEs continue to benefit from government support relative to private enterprises. Compared to private firms that were never state-owned, privatized SOEs are favored by lower interest loans and higher government subsidies. Moreover, both SOEs and privatized SOEs significantly underperform relative to private firms, despite some improvements post-privatization. An exception is in improvements in productivity growth, where former SOEs match or exceed their private sector counterparts–results consistent with recent research. We also implement staggered difference-in-differences and matching estimation to account for treatment over multiple periods and selection into privatization. The tiger can change its stripes; however, former SOEs face a more supportive industrial policy regime relative to their private sector counterparts, affecting their performance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103241"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145883743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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