Pub Date : 2025-12-07DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103243
Johannes Van Biesebroeck , Hongsong Zhang
We start by positioning this Special Issue in the literature and explain the scope and focus that we aimed for. Next, we briefly summarize the seventeen included papers, organized in four main themes. Finally, we discuss four lessons that we, as editors and Industrial Organization (IO) researchers, draw from these papers and from our year-long engagement with the broader industrial policy literature. These are (1) the dependency of the effects of industrial policy interventions on the prevailing market structure, (2) the vital role of localizing the supply chain, (3) the role of government policy as a coordination device across market actors, and (4) how successful policy can deal with the difficulty of picking winners.
{"title":"Lessons on industrial policy from industrial organization: Introduction to the special issue","authors":"Johannes Van Biesebroeck , Hongsong Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103243","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103243","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We start by positioning this Special Issue in the literature and explain the scope and focus that we aimed for. Next, we briefly summarize the seventeen included papers, organized in four main themes. Finally, we discuss four lessons that we, as editors and Industrial Organization (IO) researchers, draw from these papers and from our year-long engagement with the broader industrial policy literature. These are (1) the dependency of the effects of industrial policy interventions on the prevailing market structure, (2) the vital role of localizing the supply chain, (3) the role of government policy as a coordination device across market actors, and (4) how successful policy can deal with the difficulty of picking winners.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103234
Beáta Itin-Shwartz
Do market liberalization policies result in more efficient markets, increase competition and change market outcomes for the trading parties? In this paper I examine two types of liberalization policies, those aimed at increasing competition and efficiency within the existing regulated market, and those allowing competing channels outside of the regulated system. Studying a marketing channel reform in Indian agricultural produce markets, which consisted of both ‘in-market amendments’ and ‘out-of- market amendments’ adopted in different combinations and timing by the Indian states, I evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms in improving the bargaining power of farmers vis-a-vis the licensed traders in the regulated markets. I find an average 3 % overall increase in prices obtained by farmers following the reform in total, and 12 % for storable crops. While apparently much harder to pass, in-market reforms appears to be driving most of the change while the effect for out-of-market reforms is mostly insignificant.
{"title":"The effectiveness of ’in-market’ and ’out-of-market’ liberalization policies. Evidence from Indian produce markets","authors":"Beáta Itin-Shwartz","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103234","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103234","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Do market liberalization policies result in more efficient markets, increase competition and change market outcomes for the trading parties? In this paper I examine two types of liberalization policies, those aimed at increasing competition and efficiency within the existing regulated market, and those allowing competing channels outside of the regulated system. Studying a marketing channel reform in Indian agricultural produce markets, which consisted of both ‘in-market amendments’ and ‘out-of- market amendments’ adopted in different combinations and timing by the Indian states, I evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms in improving the bargaining power of farmers vis-a-vis the licensed traders in the regulated markets. I find an average 3 % overall increase in prices obtained by farmers following the reform in total, and 12 % for storable crops. While apparently much harder to pass, in-market reforms appears to be driving most of the change while the effect for out-of-market reforms is mostly insignificant.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103239
Massimo Motta , Michele Polo
The paper analyzes the design of industrial policies to improve the efficiency of a local input when there is a risk of international supply chain disruption. We first establish a case for research subsidies in a monopolistic setting: private investment to improve the inferior technology is lower than the socially optimal one. Then, considering several market environments differing in size, structure and appropriability of the innovation, we analyze private and welfare-maximizing investments and optimal transfers. Subsidies are always optimal with both monopolies and research joint-ventures, whereas under some circumstamces (notably, when there is high appropriability of an innovation and investment costs are sufficiently low) a tax might be optimal under duopoly. Research joint-ventures in an integrated market or a public reseach lab socially outperform the other environments since they benefit from a larger integrated market and a wider circulation of the innovation while preserving competition.
{"title":"Supply chain disruption and precautionary industrial policy","authors":"Massimo Motta , Michele Polo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103239","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103239","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The paper analyzes the design of industrial policies to improve the efficiency of a local input when there is a risk of international supply chain disruption. We first establish a case for research subsidies in a monopolistic setting: private investment to improve the inferior technology is lower than the socially optimal one. Then, considering several market environments differing in size, structure and appropriability of the innovation, we analyze private and welfare-maximizing investments and optimal transfers. Subsidies are always optimal with both monopolies and research joint-ventures, whereas under some circumstamces (notably, when there is high appropriability of an innovation and investment costs are sufficiently low) a tax might be optimal under duopoly. Research joint-ventures in an integrated market or a public reseach lab socially outperform the other environments since they benefit from a larger integrated market and a wider circulation of the innovation while preserving competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103239"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103240
Marc Bourreau , Lukasz Grzybowski , Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo
In this paper, we investigate the potential crowding out of private investment by public subsidies in the deployment of broadband fiber networks. We estimate a model of fiber entry using a rich dataset on fiber deployment for more than 34,000 municipalities in mainland France from 2014 to 2019. We then assess whether private investment would have occurred in subsidized municipalities in the absence of state aid. We find that in 36 % of cases, public subsidies were allocated to municipalities where private entry would have occurred within three years. We estimate that about 902 million euros of the total 2203 million euros in total subsidies disbursed by the end of 2019 may have crowded out private investment. However, we also show that the French broadband plan accelerated fiber coverage in subsidized municipalities in the early stages of deployment.
{"title":"State aid for broadband and crowding out of private investment: Evidence from the French market","authors":"Marc Bourreau , Lukasz Grzybowski , Ángela Muñoz-Acevedo","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103240","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103240","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we investigate the potential crowding out of private investment by public subsidies in the deployment of broadband fiber networks. We estimate a model of fiber entry using a rich dataset on fiber deployment for more than 34,000 municipalities in mainland France from 2014 to 2019. We then assess whether private investment would have occurred in subsidized municipalities in the absence of state aid. We find that in 36 % of cases, public subsidies were allocated to municipalities where private entry would have occurred within three years. We estimate that about 902 million euros of the total 2203 million euros in total subsidies disbursed by the end of 2019 may have crowded out private investment. However, we also show that the French broadband plan accelerated fiber coverage in subsidized municipalities in the early stages of deployment.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103240"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145797040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-06DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103238
Filippo Belloc , Antonino Lofaro
We investigate how government subsidies influence the productivity of new firms, by leveraging data on more than 30,000 government subsidy initiatives and about 1.2 million manufacturing firms distributed worldwide in the years 2012-2019. First, using a DiD framework with multiple time periods, we document that sectors exposed to subsidies experience a statistically significant increase in new firm entry rates. We then examine the firm-level data through a series of augmented 3-way FE DiD models. Our findings reveal that subsidies have significant effects on the productivity of new firms. On average, subsidies lead to the entry of new firms with 5.53 % lower productivity compared to those entering untreated markets. The productivity gap of new firms in subsidized markets persists in the years after entry. We also apply a text recognition method to analyze the effects of specific subsidy attributes. We find that unconditional tax breaks and loans are mostly responsible for the negative effects of subsidies, while subsidies promoting firm internationalization and investments by small firms may lead to the establishment of more productive firms. Subsidies aimed at supporting the adoption of green and automation technologies do not always reduce the productivity of new firms. Finally, estimates about incumbents’ performance show that subsidies may intensify competition in the market and do not necessarily lead to greater resource misallocation within sectors.
我们利用2012-2019年间分布在全球的3万多项政府补贴举措和约120万家制造企业的数据，研究了政府补贴如何影响新企业的生产率。首先，使用具有多个时间段的DiD框架，我们证明了接受补贴的行业在新公司进入率方面经历了统计上显著的增加。然后，我们通过一系列增强的3-way FE DiD模型来检验企业层面的数据。我们的研究结果表明，补贴对新企业的生产率有显著影响。平均而言，补贴导致新公司进入，与那些进入未经处理的市场相比，生产率低5.53%。在补贴市场中，新公司的生产率差距在进入后的数年里持续存在。我们还应用文本识别方法来分析特定补贴属性的影响。我们发现，无条件的税收减免和贷款是造成补贴负面效应的主要原因，而促进企业国际化和小企业投资的补贴可能导致建立更高生产率的企业。旨在支持采用绿色和自动化技术的补贴并不总是降低新公司的生产率。最后，对现有企业绩效的估计表明，补贴可能会加剧市场竞争，并不一定会导致行业内更大的资源错配。
{"title":"Subsidies, new firms, and productivity in global manufacturing","authors":"Filippo Belloc , Antonino Lofaro","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103238","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103238","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate how government subsidies influence the productivity of new firms, by leveraging data on more than 30,000 government subsidy initiatives and about 1.2 million manufacturing firms distributed worldwide in the years 2012-2019. First, using a DiD framework with multiple time periods, we document that sectors exposed to subsidies experience a statistically significant increase in new firm entry rates. We then examine the firm-level data through a series of augmented 3-way FE DiD models. Our findings reveal that subsidies have significant effects on the productivity of new firms. On average, subsidies lead to the entry of new firms with 5.53 % lower productivity compared to those entering untreated markets. The productivity gap of new firms in subsidized markets persists in the years after entry. We also apply a text recognition method to analyze the effects of specific subsidy attributes. We find that unconditional tax breaks and loans are mostly responsible for the negative effects of subsidies, while subsidies promoting firm internationalization and investments by small firms may lead to the establishment of more productive firms. Subsidies aimed at supporting the adoption of green and automation technologies do not always reduce the productivity of new firms. Finally, estimates about incumbents’ performance show that subsidies may intensify competition in the market and do not necessarily lead to greater resource misallocation within sectors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145796917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103235
Michela Bonani
This paper investigates how stricter licensing rules affect firms’ incentives to innovate in standard-related technologies. I study the 2015 patent policy revision by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which limited SEP holders’ ability to seek injunctions and encouraged royalties based on the smallest salable unit. Using a continuous difference-in-differences approach, I show that the new policy increases standard-related patenting, with the strongest effects among firms furthest from the standards’ technology space. However, the effects differ across firm types. SEP holders reduced their innovation activity, consistent with weaker royalty incentives, while non-SEP firms expanded patenting, benefiting from lower licensing costs and new opportunities to reposition themselves. Although the policy created challenges for SEP owners, my results suggest that the broader increase in innovation among other firms outweighed these declines. These results highlight how patent policy design within standard setting organizations can reallocate innovation incentives across firms.
{"title":"Standard-setting and the incentives to innovate: Evidence from the IEEE patent policy update","authors":"Michela Bonani","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103235","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103235","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates how stricter licensing rules affect firms’ incentives to innovate in standard-related technologies. I study the 2015 patent policy revision by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which limited SEP holders’ ability to seek injunctions and encouraged royalties based on the smallest salable unit. Using a continuous difference-in-differences approach, I show that the new policy increases standard-related patenting, with the strongest effects among firms furthest from the standards’ technology space. However, the effects differ across firm types. SEP holders reduced their innovation activity, consistent with weaker royalty incentives, while non-SEP firms expanded patenting, benefiting from lower licensing costs and new opportunities to reposition themselves. Although the policy created challenges for SEP owners, my results suggest that the broader increase in innovation among other firms outweighed these declines. These results highlight how patent policy design within standard setting organizations can reallocate innovation incentives across firms.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103235"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103237
Hui Li , Wenzhuo Lu , Xiaochen Xie , Heng Yin
This paper investigates the impact of government industrial policy on firm capacity utilization and resource misallocation. We develop an estimation methodology based on firm cost minimization to determine optimal and actual production capacities. Using China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, initiated in 2011, as a natural experiment, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation method. Our findings show that the policy support for targeted industries was associated with lower capacity utilization rates among Chinese firms. Mechanism analysis indicates that tax incentives fostered more optimistic market expectations, resulting in increased investments and higher production capacity. At the same time, these policies appear to have stimulated additional market entry, which, while promoting competition and technological upgrading, may have also led to smaller market shares per firm and potential resource allocation frictions.
The real question about industrial policy is not whether it should be practiced, but how.— Dani Rodrik
{"title":"Industrial policy and capacity utilization: Evidence from China’s five-year plans","authors":"Hui Li , Wenzhuo Lu , Xiaochen Xie , Heng Yin","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103237","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103237","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of government industrial policy on firm capacity utilization and resource misallocation. We develop an estimation methodology based on firm cost minimization to determine optimal and actual production capacities. Using China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, initiated in 2011, as a natural experiment, we apply a difference-in-differences estimation method. Our findings show that the policy support for targeted industries was associated with lower capacity utilization rates among Chinese firms. Mechanism analysis indicates that tax incentives fostered more optimistic market expectations, resulting in increased investments and higher production capacity. At the same time, these policies appear to have stimulated additional market entry, which, while promoting competition and technological upgrading, may have also led to smaller market shares per firm and potential resource allocation frictions.<blockquote><div><em>The real question about industrial policy is not whether it should be practiced, but how.</em>— <em>Dani Rodrik</em></div></blockquote></div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-03DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103236
Mengmeng Dai , Wen-Tai Hsu , Wei Jin , Yongjin Wang , Siqiang Yang
This paper introduces strategic interactions into a Ricardian model where two countries optimize trade policies. In a Nash Equilibrium, we find that optimal import tariffs are zero, while export taxes rise with comparative advantage, aligning with but extending the unilateral model of Costinot et al. (2015) by allowing both countries to act strategically. Our analysis reveals that welfare gains from trade policy diminish when both countries pursue optimal policies. Surprisingly, a smaller country can benefit from Nash Equilibrium through higher export taxes in goods with technological advantages. Applying the model to agriculture, we assess welfare under autarky, free trade, Nash Equilibrium, and unilateral policy, showing that small, competitive nations can outperform free trade through strategic policy, providing insights into optimal trade policy across goods.
{"title":"Comparative advantage and optimal trade policy with strategic interactions","authors":"Mengmeng Dai , Wen-Tai Hsu , Wei Jin , Yongjin Wang , Siqiang Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103236","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103236","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper introduces strategic interactions into a Ricardian model where two countries optimize trade policies. In a Nash Equilibrium, we find that optimal import tariffs are zero, while export taxes rise with comparative advantage, aligning with but extending the unilateral model of Costinot et al. (2015) by allowing both countries to act strategically. Our analysis reveals that welfare gains from trade policy diminish when both countries pursue optimal policies. Surprisingly, a smaller country can benefit from Nash Equilibrium through higher export taxes in goods with technological advantages. Applying the model to agriculture, we assess welfare under autarky, free trade, Nash Equilibrium, and unilateral policy, showing that small, competitive nations can outperform free trade through strategic policy, providing insights into optimal trade policy across goods.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103236"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-02DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103232
Jing Liang , Larry D. Qiu , Junji Xiao
This paper employs a structural model to examine the impact of technology spillovers from Sino-Foreign joint ventures (JVs) on indigenous brands, measured by cost reductions for the latter. Technology spillovers can occur by sharing common upstream suppliers (vertical spillover) or production experiences (horizontal spillover). We find that spillovers account for 57.11 % of the cost reduction for indigenous brands affiliated with JVs, but JVs do not directly have significant spillovers on independent indigenous brands. Furthermore, affiliated indigenous brands act as conduits for indirect spillovers from JVs to independent indigenous brands, which accounts for 15.68 % of the cost reductions for the latter. Welfare analysis reveals that the technology spillovers benefit consumers but reduce JV profits.
{"title":"Technology spillovers from Sino-foreign auto joint ventures to indigenous brands","authors":"Jing Liang , Larry D. Qiu , Junji Xiao","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103232","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103232","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper employs a structural model to examine the impact of technology spillovers from Sino-Foreign joint ventures (JVs) on indigenous brands, measured by cost reductions for the latter. Technology spillovers can occur by sharing common upstream suppliers (vertical spillover) or production experiences (horizontal spillover). We find that spillovers account for 57.11 % of the cost reduction for indigenous brands affiliated with JVs, but JVs do not directly have significant spillovers on independent indigenous brands. Furthermore, affiliated indigenous brands act as conduits for indirect spillovers from JVs to independent indigenous brands, which accounts for 15.68 % of the cost reductions for the latter. Welfare analysis reveals that the technology spillovers benefit consumers but reduce JV profits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145747754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2025-12-01DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103231
Wei Tian , Miaojie Yu , Chunru Zheng
This paper investigates the impact of China’s retaliatory tariffs on American products at the firm level during 2016-2019. We document two novel empirical findings: first, Chinese firms adjust their import baskets in response to rising tariffs; second, firm’s likely export diversion to other countries is not evident. These imply the magnification dampening effects of import tariffs on firm exports via the firm’s import-export link. Particularly, the dampening effect of upstream import tariffs in downstream exports is accumulated and more pronounced with the length of global supply chains. Furthermore, increasing sourcing costs in either the upstream or downstream sectors reduces firm exports.
{"title":"China-US trade war: Firm import-export linkage along global supply chains","authors":"Wei Tian , Miaojie Yu , Chunru Zheng","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103231","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2025.103231","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper investigates the impact of China’s retaliatory tariffs on American products at the firm level during 2016-2019. We document two novel empirical findings: first, Chinese firms adjust their import baskets in response to rising tariffs; second, firm’s likely export diversion to other countries is not evident. These imply the magnification dampening effects of import tariffs on firm exports via the firm’s import-export link. Particularly, the dampening effect of upstream import tariffs in downstream exports is accumulated and more pronounced with the length of global supply chains. Furthermore, increasing sourcing costs in either the upstream or downstream sectors reduces firm exports.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"104 ","pages":"Article 103231"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2025-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145691277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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