{"title":"Input and output in distributive theory","authors":"N. Eyal, Anders Herlitz","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12392","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47372976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology","authors":"G. Schurz","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12390","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12390","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47900410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arbitrariness and the long road to permissivism","authors":"Maegan Fairchild","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12376","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12376","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12376","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Informal political representation can be a political life-line, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers to them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, and justice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation.
{"title":"Democracy within, justice without: The duties of informal political representatives\u0000 1","authors":"Wendy Salkin","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12391","url":null,"abstract":"Informal political representation can be a political life-line, particularly for oppressed and marginalized groups. Such representation can give these groups some say, however mediate, partial, and imperfect, in how things go for them. Coeval with the political goods such representation offers these groups are its particular dangers to them. Mindful of these dangers, skeptics challenge the practice for being, inter alia, unaccountable, unauthorized, inegalitarian, and oppressive. These challenges provide strong pro tanto reasons to think the practice morally impermissible. This paper considers the question: On what conditions is the informal political representation of oppressed and marginalized groups permissible? By responding to skeptics’ challenges, I develop a systematic account of moral constraints that, if adopted, would make such representation permissible. The account that emerges shows that informal political representatives (IPRs) must aim to fulfill two sets of sometimes conflicting duties to the represented: democracy within duties, which concern how the representative treats and relates to the represented, and justice without duties, which concern how the representative’s actions advance the aims of the representation.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12391","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63498038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion","authors":"A. Hájek, Wlodek Rabinowicz","doi":"10.1111/NOUS.12388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/NOUS.12388","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/NOUS.12388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49420466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.
{"title":"Thinking about Progress: From Science to Philosophy","authors":"Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler, James Norton","doi":"10.1111/nous.12383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12383","url":null,"abstract":"Is there progress in philosophy? If so, how much? Philosophers have recently argued for a wide range of answers to these questions, from the view that there is no progress whatsoever to the view that philosophy has provided answers to all the big philosophical questions. However, these views are difficult to compare and evaluate, because they rest on very different assumptions about the conditions under which philosophy would make progress. This paper looks to the comparatively mature debate about scientific progress for inspiration on how to formulate four distinct accounts of philosophical progress, in terms of truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, and understanding. Equally importantly, the paper outlines a common framework for how to understand and evaluate these accounts. We distill a series of lessons from this exercise, to help pave the way for a more fruitful discussion about philosophical progress in the future.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Imagine a great wave is rising and I have dashed into the sea with my surfboard. You know nothing about me: perhaps I am one of the world’s great surfers; perhaps I am a fool. What would it tell you about my abilities, if I were ride into the coast on that wave? Would it mean I am able to surf a wave like that? Does success entail ability? Call the principle that it does Success.1 When we focus on successful action, Success is compelling. Austin (1961) said that “it follows merely from the premise that [a golfer sinks a putt], that he has the ability to do it, according to ordinary English”. And indeed when someone succeeds in something, like sinking a putt or surfing a wave, one is forced to concede they were able to do that. This is what Success would lead us to expect. But when success is not yet assured, the lesson seems different. When said before the fact, the claim that I can surf that wave is strong — it says that surfing that wave is within my control. This intuition, call it the control intuition, drives against Success. Just doing something does not demonstrate it is within my control: flukes do happen. So, if the control intuition is right, success should not demonstrate ability. ∗Thanks to the participants of the Rutgers Language Workshop, and Fabrizio Cariani, Justin Khoo, Jeff King, Annina Loets, Matthew Mandelkern, Milo Phillips-Brown, Robert Stalnaker, and Barbara Vetter. Special thanks to Ginger Schultheis for comments on multiple drafts. 1I will focus exclusively on whether Success is valid for specific ability attributions which concern whether an agent is able to perform an action at a particular time (generally in the future), like lifting 200 pounds right now or hitting a bullseye on this throw. These are to be contrasted with general or generic ability ascriptions, which say that an agent has the ability to perform an action, not at a specific time, but rather in general. Mandelkern et al. (2017) argue that the semantics for generic ability ascriptions is derived by simply embedding a specific ability ascription under a generic operator.
{"title":"DOES success entail ability?","authors":"David Boylan","doi":"10.1111/nous.12370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12370","url":null,"abstract":"Imagine a great wave is rising and I have dashed into the sea with my surfboard. You know nothing about me: perhaps I am one of the world’s great surfers; perhaps I am a fool. What would it tell you about my abilities, if I were ride into the coast on that wave? Would it mean I am able to surf a wave like that? Does success entail ability? Call the principle that it does Success.1 When we focus on successful action, Success is compelling. Austin (1961) said that “it follows merely from the premise that [a golfer sinks a putt], that he has the ability to do it, according to ordinary English”. And indeed when someone succeeds in something, like sinking a putt or surfing a wave, one is forced to concede they were able to do that. This is what Success would lead us to expect. But when success is not yet assured, the lesson seems different. When said before the fact, the claim that I can surf that wave is strong — it says that surfing that wave is within my control. This intuition, call it the control intuition, drives against Success. Just doing something does not demonstrate it is within my control: flukes do happen. So, if the control intuition is right, success should not demonstrate ability. ∗Thanks to the participants of the Rutgers Language Workshop, and Fabrizio Cariani, Justin Khoo, Jeff King, Annina Loets, Matthew Mandelkern, Milo Phillips-Brown, Robert Stalnaker, and Barbara Vetter. Special thanks to Ginger Schultheis for comments on multiple drafts. 1I will focus exclusively on whether Success is valid for specific ability attributions which concern whether an agent is able to perform an action at a particular time (generally in the future), like lifting 200 pounds right now or hitting a bullseye on this throw. These are to be contrasted with general or generic ability ascriptions, which say that an agent has the ability to perform an action, not at a specific time, but rather in general. Mandelkern et al. (2017) argue that the semantics for generic ability ascriptions is derived by simply embedding a specific ability ascription under a generic operator.","PeriodicalId":48158,"journal":{"name":"NOUS","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/nous.12370","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"63497515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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