What, if anything, legitimates the administrative state? In this Essay, for the Harvard Law Review’s special issue celebrating the bicentennial of Harvard Law School, I examine three attempts to solve the administrative state’s legitimation problem, offered respectively by James Landis, by Louis Jaffe, and by Elena Kagan. The solutions have a common theme and a common structure: each appeals more or less explicitly to “independence.” Each attempts to find a remedy for distrust of unchecked administrative power, and each attempts to do so by identifying “independent” institutions that will monitor and oversee the bureaucracy. However, each compromises their claims in institutional circumstances where the force of competing values becomes particularly strong. The result is that each theorist ends up adopting a kind of roughly optimizing pluralism of values for the administrative state, a pluralism in which “independence” falls out of the picture as such, and in which the benefits of expertise, political accountability, and legalism all have some claims. Happily, this pluralist, rough, and imperfectly-optimizing approach seems adequate to legitimate the administrative state, at least in the sociological sense of legitimation as public acceptance.
{"title":"Bureaucracy and Distrust: Landis, Jaffe and Kagan on the Administrative State","authors":"Adrian Vermeule","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2863112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2863112","url":null,"abstract":"What, if anything, legitimates the administrative state? In this Essay, for the Harvard Law Review’s special issue celebrating the bicentennial of Harvard Law School, I examine three attempts to solve the administrative state’s legitimation problem, offered respectively by James Landis, by Louis Jaffe, and by Elena Kagan. The solutions have a common theme and a common structure: each appeals more or less explicitly to “independence.” Each attempts to find a remedy for distrust of unchecked administrative power, and each attempts to do so by identifying “independent” institutions that will monitor and oversee the bureaucracy. However, each compromises their claims in institutional circumstances where the force of competing values becomes particularly strong. The result is that each theorist ends up adopting a kind of roughly optimizing pluralism of values for the administrative state, a pluralism in which “independence” falls out of the picture as such, and in which the benefits of expertise, political accountability, and legalism all have some claims. Happily, this pluralist, rough, and imperfectly-optimizing approach seems adequate to legitimate the administrative state, at least in the sociological sense of legitimation as public acceptance.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"130 1","pages":"2463-2488"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2016-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68398935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A string of deadly police-citizen encounters, made public on an unprecedented scale, has thrust American policing into the crucible of political conflict. New social movements have taken to the streets, while legislators have introduced a wide array of reform proposals. Optimism is elusive, though, as the police are notoriously difficult to change. One powerful policy lever, however, has been overlooked: police liability insurance. Based on primary sources new to legal literature and interviews with nearly thirty insurance industry representatives, civil rights litigators, municipal attorneys, and consultants, this Article shows how liability insurers are capable of effecting meaningful change within the agencies they insure — a majority of police agencies nationwide. The Article is the first to describe and assess the contemporary market for liability insurance in the policing context; in particular, the effects of insurance on police behavior. While not ignoring the familiar (and potentially serious) problem of moral hazard, the Article focuses on the ways in which insurers perform a traditionally governmental “regulatory” role as they work to manage risk. Insurers get police agencies to adopt or amend written departmental policies on subjects like the use of force and strip searches, to change the way they train their officers, and even to fire problem officers, from the beat up to the chief. One implication of these findings is that the state might regulate the police by regulating insurers. In this spirit, the Article considers several unconventional legal reforms that could reduce police misconduct, including a mandate that all municipalities purchase insurance coverage, a ban on “first-dollar” (no-deductible) policies that may reduce municipal care, and a requirement that small municipalities pool their risks and resources before buying insurance on the commercial market. At bottom, the Article establishes that liability insurance has profound significance to any comprehensive program of police reform. The Article also makes three important theoretical contributions to legal scholarship. First, it inverts the ordinary model of governance as public regulation of private action, observing that here, private insurers regulate public police. Second, it illustrates how insurers not only enforce the Constitution, but also construct its meaning. Among other things, in the hands of insurers, liability for constitutional violations and other police misconduct becomes “loss” to the police agency, which must be “controlled.” Perhaps surprisingly, by denaturing the law in this way and stripping it of its moral valence, insurers may actually advance the law’s aims. Finally, the Article helps to pry open the black box of deterrence. In fact, given widespread indemnification of both individual and entity liability for constitutional torts committed by police, an understanding of how insurers manage police risk is essential to any persuasive theory of civ
{"title":"How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police","authors":"John Rappaport","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2733783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2733783","url":null,"abstract":"A string of deadly police-citizen encounters, made public on an unprecedented scale, has thrust American policing into the crucible of political conflict. New social movements have taken to the streets, while legislators have introduced a wide array of reform proposals. Optimism is elusive, though, as the police are notoriously difficult to change. One powerful policy lever, however, has been overlooked: police liability insurance. Based on primary sources new to legal literature and interviews with nearly thirty insurance industry representatives, civil rights litigators, municipal attorneys, and consultants, this Article shows how liability insurers are capable of effecting meaningful change within the agencies they insure — a majority of police agencies nationwide. The Article is the first to describe and assess the contemporary market for liability insurance in the policing context; in particular, the effects of insurance on police behavior. While not ignoring the familiar (and potentially serious) problem of moral hazard, the Article focuses on the ways in which insurers perform a traditionally governmental “regulatory” role as they work to manage risk. Insurers get police agencies to adopt or amend written departmental policies on subjects like the use of force and strip searches, to change the way they train their officers, and even to fire problem officers, from the beat up to the chief. One implication of these findings is that the state might regulate the police by regulating insurers. In this spirit, the Article considers several unconventional legal reforms that could reduce police misconduct, including a mandate that all municipalities purchase insurance coverage, a ban on “first-dollar” (no-deductible) policies that may reduce municipal care, and a requirement that small municipalities pool their risks and resources before buying insurance on the commercial market. At bottom, the Article establishes that liability insurance has profound significance to any comprehensive program of police reform. The Article also makes three important theoretical contributions to legal scholarship. First, it inverts the ordinary model of governance as public regulation of private action, observing that here, private insurers regulate public police. Second, it illustrates how insurers not only enforce the Constitution, but also construct its meaning. Among other things, in the hands of insurers, liability for constitutional violations and other police misconduct becomes “loss” to the police agency, which must be “controlled.” Perhaps surprisingly, by denaturing the law in this way and stripping it of its moral valence, insurers may actually advance the law’s aims. Finally, the Article helps to pry open the black box of deterrence. In fact, given widespread indemnification of both individual and entity liability for constitutional torts committed by police, an understanding of how insurers manage police risk is essential to any persuasive theory of civ","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"130 1","pages":"1539-1614"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2016-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2733783","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68279607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Speech Matters (Princeton 2014), Seana Shiffrin explains why lying is wrong, why freedom of speech is right, and why those two views are compatible. This review lauds Shiffrin’s book for its creative and powerful coherence of vision. It lays its claims about both lying and free speech on the same foundation: on a view of sincere communication as a prerequisite for moral agency and moral progress. In this regard, Shiffrin’s book stands in sharp rebuke to the current trend, in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, of assuming that the freedom of speech must include a right to lie. Instead, Shiffrin argues, the reasons that we have freedom of speech are the same reasons that lying is rarely morally permissible. At the same time, the coherence of Shiffrin’s view also reveals a certain symmetry between Kantian accounts of lying and predominant views of free speech, one that not everyone will find salutary. In both, the importance of communication seems to override other interests, even other moral commitments. While Shiffrin articulates a compelling view of why free and authentic communication serves a distinct, indeed a singular, role in moral identity, the question remains whether that role requires quite so much protection, either against lying or in favor of free speech. Nevertheless, Shiffrin’s book puts forth an original and authoritative view on these questions, one that will challenge and instruct anyone interested in lying, free speech, or the communicative responsibilities we owe to ourselves and others.
{"title":"How Much Does Speech Matter","authors":"Leslie Kendrick","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2724040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2724040","url":null,"abstract":"In Speech Matters (Princeton 2014), Seana Shiffrin explains why lying is wrong, why freedom of speech is right, and why those two views are compatible. This review lauds Shiffrin’s book for its creative and powerful coherence of vision. It lays its claims about both lying and free speech on the same foundation: on a view of sincere communication as a prerequisite for moral agency and moral progress. In this regard, Shiffrin’s book stands in sharp rebuke to the current trend, in the Supreme Court and elsewhere, of assuming that the freedom of speech must include a right to lie. Instead, Shiffrin argues, the reasons that we have freedom of speech are the same reasons that lying is rarely morally permissible. At the same time, the coherence of Shiffrin’s view also reveals a certain symmetry between Kantian accounts of lying and predominant views of free speech, one that not everyone will find salutary. In both, the importance of communication seems to override other interests, even other moral commitments. While Shiffrin articulates a compelling view of why free and authentic communication serves a distinct, indeed a singular, role in moral identity, the question remains whether that role requires quite so much protection, either against lying or in favor of free speech. Nevertheless, Shiffrin’s book puts forth an original and authoritative view on these questions, one that will challenge and instruct anyone interested in lying, free speech, or the communicative responsibilities we owe to ourselves and others.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"129 1","pages":"997-1022"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68274641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial enterprise; although substantive entitlements are created by legislative and executive action, it is for courts to decide independently what process the Constitution requires. The notion that procedural due process might be committed primarily to the discretion of the agencies themselves is almost entirely absent from the academic literature.The facts on the ground are very different. Thanks to converging strands of caselaw -- partly involving due process, partly involving judicial deference to agency interpretation of procedural provisions in statutes, and partly involving the long shadow of Vermont Yankee v. NRDC -- agencies themselves are now the primary front-line expositors and appliers of the cost-benefit balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. The courts for their part often defer, explicitly or implicitly, to agencies’ due process decisions.I will defend this approach, and urge that it be made fully explicit. Rather than decide for themselves “what process is due,” courts should ask only whether the agency offered a rational justification for providing whatever process it did provide. Although the Mathews cost-benefit calculus would still supply the rule of decision, courts should merely review the application of that rule by agencies, and defer to reasonable agency decisions about the costs and benefits of procedural arrangements.
{"title":"Deference and Due Process","authors":"Adrian Vermeule","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2611149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2611149","url":null,"abstract":"In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial enterprise; although substantive entitlements are created by legislative and executive action, it is for courts to decide independently what process the Constitution requires. The notion that procedural due process might be committed primarily to the discretion of the agencies themselves is almost entirely absent from the academic literature.The facts on the ground are very different. Thanks to converging strands of caselaw -- partly involving due process, partly involving judicial deference to agency interpretation of procedural provisions in statutes, and partly involving the long shadow of Vermont Yankee v. NRDC -- agencies themselves are now the primary front-line expositors and appliers of the cost-benefit balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. The courts for their part often defer, explicitly or implicitly, to agencies’ due process decisions.I will defend this approach, and urge that it be made fully explicit. Rather than decide for themselves “what process is due,” courts should ask only whether the agency offered a rational justification for providing whatever process it did provide. Although the Mathews cost-benefit calculus would still supply the rule of decision, courts should merely review the application of that rule by agencies, and defer to reasonable agency decisions about the costs and benefits of procedural arrangements.","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"129 1","pages":"1890-1931"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2015-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2611149","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68221324","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
INTRODUCTION Litigating takings claims under the U.S. Constitution involves pitfalls not encountered in ordinary constitutional litigation. With respect to takings claims against the federal government, just compensation can ordinarily be awarded only by the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), an "Article I" court located in Washington, D.C. (1) The CFC, however, has no authority to grant equitable or declaratory relief. (2) Consequently, claimants who wish to advance claims enforced by injunctions or declaratory judgments (for example, that the government action was arbitrary and capricious) must seek relief in an Article III court. This means claimants must often split their claims between two courts, giving rise to tricky questions of timing and preclusion. If they file in the wrong court, or get the sequencing wrong, consideration of the takings claim may be foreclosed. (3) Congress could clean up the mess by rewriting the relevant jurisdictional statutes, but has failed to act. (4) With respect to federal takings claims against state and local governments, the Supreme Court has held that such claims must be initially presented to state courts before they can be heard in federal court. (5) Any legal and factual issues that are resolved by the state courts, however, cannot be relitigated in a subsequent challenge in federal court. (6) Since federal and state takings clauses are generally interpreted the same way, this gives rise to what has been aptly called a "trap." (7) Although federal constitutional claims ordinarily can be tried in federal court under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983, (8) takings claims, because they must be initially presented to state courts, are generally barred from being considered by any federal court other than the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the final state court decision, which is rarely granted. This Essay argues that these pitfalls of litigating federal takings claims rest, in significant part, on an erroneous understanding about the scope of federal judicial authority under the Takings Clause. Starting from the premises that the Constitution does not prohibit takings but only requires that they be compensated, (9) and that compensation can be awarded only in a court in which the government has waived its sovereign immunity, (10) the Supreme Court has concluded--sometimes--that federal courts of general jurisdiction have no authority to consider takings claims as long as an action for compensation is available elsewhere. On other occasions however--and usually without acknowledging the inconsistency--the Court has reviewed takings claims without requiring that they first be submitted to the court having authority to award just compensation. The latter line of authority, although poorly theorized by the Court, is the correct one. There is no rule of law that prevents federal courts of general jurisdiction from adjudicating claims that arise under the Takings Clause --as long as they confine themselves to the questi
{"title":"Anticipatory Remedies for Takings","authors":"T. Merrill","doi":"10.7916/D8J38S3X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/D8J38S3X","url":null,"abstract":"INTRODUCTION Litigating takings claims under the U.S. Constitution involves pitfalls not encountered in ordinary constitutional litigation. With respect to takings claims against the federal government, just compensation can ordinarily be awarded only by the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), an \"Article I\" court located in Washington, D.C. (1) The CFC, however, has no authority to grant equitable or declaratory relief. (2) Consequently, claimants who wish to advance claims enforced by injunctions or declaratory judgments (for example, that the government action was arbitrary and capricious) must seek relief in an Article III court. This means claimants must often split their claims between two courts, giving rise to tricky questions of timing and preclusion. If they file in the wrong court, or get the sequencing wrong, consideration of the takings claim may be foreclosed. (3) Congress could clean up the mess by rewriting the relevant jurisdictional statutes, but has failed to act. (4) With respect to federal takings claims against state and local governments, the Supreme Court has held that such claims must be initially presented to state courts before they can be heard in federal court. (5) Any legal and factual issues that are resolved by the state courts, however, cannot be relitigated in a subsequent challenge in federal court. (6) Since federal and state takings clauses are generally interpreted the same way, this gives rise to what has been aptly called a \"trap.\" (7) Although federal constitutional claims ordinarily can be tried in federal court under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983, (8) takings claims, because they must be initially presented to state courts, are generally barred from being considered by any federal court other than the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the final state court decision, which is rarely granted. This Essay argues that these pitfalls of litigating federal takings claims rest, in significant part, on an erroneous understanding about the scope of federal judicial authority under the Takings Clause. Starting from the premises that the Constitution does not prohibit takings but only requires that they be compensated, (9) and that compensation can be awarded only in a court in which the government has waived its sovereign immunity, (10) the Supreme Court has concluded--sometimes--that federal courts of general jurisdiction have no authority to consider takings claims as long as an action for compensation is available elsewhere. On other occasions however--and usually without acknowledging the inconsistency--the Court has reviewed takings claims without requiring that they first be submitted to the court having authority to award just compensation. The latter line of authority, although poorly theorized by the Court, is the correct one. There is no rule of law that prevents federal courts of general jurisdiction from adjudicating claims that arise under the Takings Clause --as long as they confine themselves to the questi","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"128 1","pages":"1630-1672"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71366583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-01-01DOI: 10.5040/9781849469104.ch-004
Tara Helfman
{"title":"Crown and Constitution","authors":"Tara Helfman","doi":"10.5040/9781849469104.ch-004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781849469104.ch-004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"128 1","pages":"2234-2254"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2015-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70545355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hobby Lobby, corporate law, and the theory of the firm: why for-profit corporations are RFRA persons.","authors":"Alan J Meese, Nathan B Oman","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"127 7","pages":"273-301"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32759469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Diagnostic method patents and harms to follow-on innovation.","authors":"","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"126 5","pages":"1370-91"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2013-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32759468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"To tax, to spend, to regulate.","authors":"Gillian E Metzger","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48320,"journal":{"name":"Harvard Law Review","volume":"126 1","pages":"83-116"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2012-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"32759466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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