Pub Date : 2024-06-17DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y
Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain
We apply tournament theory to congressional leadership to unify research on campaign finance with theories of endogenous party strength. Parties want to incentivize members to do costly work for the benefit of the party, such as fundraising. Accordingly, they make leadership offices attractive and award these leadership offices on the basis of who does the most work for the party. The more attractive the leadership office becomes, the harder party members work to win. We present a model to formalize this argument, derive its empirical implications, and find support for these implications using data from committee assignments, committee authorizations, and fundraising for leadership political action committees and congressional hill committees.
{"title":"A tournament theory of congressional committee leadership","authors":"Christian Fong, Joshua McCrain","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01184-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We apply tournament theory to congressional leadership to unify research on campaign finance with theories of endogenous party strength. Parties want to incentivize members to do costly work for the benefit of the party, such as fundraising. Accordingly, they make leadership offices attractive and award these leadership offices on the basis of who does the most work for the party. The more attractive the leadership office becomes, the harder party members work to win. We present a model to formalize this argument, derive its empirical implications, and find support for these implications using data from committee assignments, committee authorizations, and fundraising for leadership political action committees and congressional hill committees.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141529141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-13DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9
George Tridimas
{"title":"The political economy of the original “Thucydides’ Trap”: a conflict economics perspective on the Peloponnesian war","authors":"George Tridimas","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01179-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141348183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-13DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y
Pablo Paniagua, Veeshan Rayamajhee, I. Murtazashvili
{"title":"Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue","authors":"Pablo Paniagua, Veeshan Rayamajhee, I. Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01176-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141345765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-10DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1
Amir Tayebi, Sheida Teimouri
{"title":"Democratization and knowledge in social sciences","authors":"Amir Tayebi, Sheida Teimouri","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01181-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141365153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-06-07DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0
Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren
Affirmative action in India reserves explicit proportions of seats and jobs in publicly funded institutions for various beneficiary groups. Because seats are indivisible and arise in small numbers over time, implementation of this policy requires that beneficiary groups take turns claiming seats, for which purpose India relies on a device called a roster. We study the problem of constructing a roster, which involves addressing a series of connected apportionment problems. To identify suitable apportionment methods, six essential requirements direct our search to a large class of divisor methods. We show that the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method is the unique divisor method that satisfies several practical properties and fairness criteria. Comparative analysis between an existing Indian roster and the application of the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method highlights that method’s benefits.
{"title":"Rosters and connected apportionments","authors":"Manshu Khanna, Haydar Evren","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01182-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Affirmative action in India reserves explicit proportions of seats and jobs in publicly funded institutions for various beneficiary groups. Because seats are indivisible and arise in small numbers over time, implementation of this policy requires that beneficiary groups take turns claiming seats, for which purpose India relies on a device called a roster. We study the problem of constructing a roster, which involves addressing a series of connected apportionment problems. To identify suitable apportionment methods, six essential requirements direct our search to a large class of divisor methods. We show that the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method is the unique divisor method that satisfies several practical properties and fairness criteria. Comparative analysis between an existing Indian roster and the application of the Webster–Sainte-Laguë method highlights that method’s benefits.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141549898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-26DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6
John William Hatfield, Katrina Kosec, Luke P. Rodgers
We investigate the impact of the number of local governments in a metropolitan area on housing values within the United States. We find that metropolitan areas with one standard deviation more counties have housing values that are almost 11% higher. This difference may be driven by the fact that we also find higher wages (accounting for worker characteristics) in areas with more local governments. Moreover, we find that areas with more local governments have more business-friendly policies, such as freer labor markets, but similar levels of taxation and spending. The number of local governments does not seem to significantly impact environmental quality, educational outcomes, or crime.
{"title":"Housing values and jurisdictional fragmentation","authors":"John William Hatfield, Katrina Kosec, Luke P. Rodgers","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01160-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We investigate the impact of the number of local governments in a metropolitan area on housing values within the United States. We find that metropolitan areas with one standard deviation more counties have housing values that are almost 11% higher. This difference may be driven by the fact that we also find higher wages (accounting for worker characteristics) in areas with more local governments. Moreover, we find that areas with more local governments have more business-friendly policies, such as freer labor markets, but similar levels of taxation and spending. The number of local governments does not seem to significantly impact environmental quality, educational outcomes, or crime.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141166490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-25DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2
Larry Eubanks, Glenn L. Furton
This paper revisits a long-standing discussion surrounding the efficacy of the common law versus government intervention in addressing large-scale environmental externalities. Drawing on a conceptual framework developed by James M. Buchanan, we challenge the prevailing economic orthodoxy which holds that so-called “large-number” externalities inherently necessitate government policy intervention. Instead, we argue that the common law offers a viable means of addressing both small- and large-scale environmental pollution problems. Using riparian and nuisance cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth-century as a case study, we demonstrate how common law has historically managed to resolve water pollution disputes, even in cases involving many parties. The paper expands the discussion on externalities by integrating insights from environmental and institutional economics, highlighting the role played by transaction costs, collective action, and institutional reform in the preservation of environmental resources. Our findings suggest that a more polycentric system of rules, relying more heavily on decentralized legal institutions, could offer more efficient and adaptable solutions to contemporary environmental challenges.
本文重新审视了长期以来围绕普通法与政府干预在解决大规模环境外部性问题上的功效所展开的讨论。根据詹姆斯-M-布坎南(James M. Buchanan)提出的概念框架,我们对认为所谓的 "大量 "外部性必然需要政府政策干预的主流经济学正统观点提出了质疑。相反,我们认为普通法为解决小型和大型环境污染问题提供了可行的手段。以十九世纪和二十世纪初的河岸和妨害案件为案例,我们展示了普通法在历史上是如何解决水污染纠纷的,即使是涉及多方当事人的案件。本文综合了环境经济学和制度经济学的观点,扩展了关于外部性的讨论,强调了交易成本、集体行动和制度改革在保护环境资源方面的作用。我们的研究结果表明,一个更加多中心的规则体系,更加依赖于分散的法律机构,可以为当代环境挑战提供更加高效和适应性更强的解决方案。
{"title":"The institutional structure of pollution: large-scale externalities and the common law","authors":"Larry Eubanks, Glenn L. Furton","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01172-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper revisits a long-standing discussion surrounding the efficacy of the common law versus government intervention in addressing large-scale environmental externalities. Drawing on a conceptual framework developed by James M. Buchanan, we challenge the prevailing economic orthodoxy which holds that so-called “large-number” externalities inherently necessitate government policy intervention. Instead, we argue that the common law offers a viable means of addressing both small- and large-scale environmental pollution problems. Using riparian and nuisance cases from the nineteenth and early twentieth-century as a case study, we demonstrate how common law has historically managed to resolve water pollution disputes, even in cases involving many parties. The paper expands the discussion on externalities by integrating insights from environmental and institutional economics, highlighting the role played by transaction costs, collective action, and institutional reform in the preservation of environmental resources. Our findings suggest that a more polycentric system of rules, relying more heavily on decentralized legal institutions, could offer more efficient and adaptable solutions to contemporary environmental challenges.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141152738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0
Aycan Katitas, Sonal Pandya
{"title":"Investment incentives attract foreign direct investment: evidence from the great recession","authors":"Aycan Katitas, Sonal Pandya","doi":"10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01158-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141102996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}