Pub Date : 2024-02-15DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01126-0
Jean-Paul Carvalho, Jared Rubin, Michael Sacks
{"title":"Correction to: Failed secular revolutions: religious belief, competition, and extremism","authors":"Jean-Paul Carvalho, Jared Rubin, Michael Sacks","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01126-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01126-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139775690","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1
Andreas Freytag, Miriam Kautz, Moritz Wolf
{"title":"Chinese aid and democratic values in Latin America","authors":"Andreas Freytag, Miriam Kautz, Moritz Wolf","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139837592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-14DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1
Andreas Freytag, Miriam Kautz, Moritz Wolf
{"title":"Chinese aid and democratic values in Latin America","authors":"Andreas Freytag, Miriam Kautz, Moritz Wolf","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01141-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139777847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-04DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01136-y
Arthur Schram, Aljaž Ule
Private infrastructure investment is profitable only if followed by a sufficiently high price, but pricing may be subject to regulation. We study markets where regulation is determined by elected policymakers. If price regulation is subject to manipulation then private investors may delay investment fearing an electoral pressure on future prices, leading to a holdup inefficiency. This could possibly be alleviated by regulatory independence, where policymakers can no longer influence the prices. However, to encourage investment the policymakers may install regulation that serves the interests of the infrastructure owners (“regulatory capture”) and lead to inefficient pricing. Regulatory independence can then be detrimental as it may entrench this capture. Whether inefficiencies can be moderated by creating regulatory independence therefore depends on the policymakers’ objectives. We provide experimental evidence for such capture entrenchment and detrimental effects of regulatory independence that therefore arise. Even without independence, the uninformed voters do not provide sufficient pressure to remove these effects. On the other hand, we observe that regulatory independence does reduce holdup inefficiency when policymakers align with the public interest.
{"title":"Regulatory independence may limit electoral holdup but entrench capture","authors":"Arthur Schram, Aljaž Ule","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01136-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01136-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Private infrastructure investment is profitable only if followed by a sufficiently high price, but pricing may be subject to regulation. We study markets where regulation is determined by elected policymakers. If price regulation is subject to manipulation then private investors may delay investment fearing an electoral pressure on future prices, leading to a holdup inefficiency. This could possibly be alleviated by regulatory independence, where policymakers can no longer influence the prices. However, to encourage investment the policymakers may install regulation that serves the interests of the infrastructure owners (“regulatory capture”) and lead to inefficient pricing. Regulatory independence can then be detrimental as it may entrench this capture. Whether inefficiencies can be moderated by creating regulatory independence therefore depends on the policymakers’ objectives. We provide experimental evidence for such capture entrenchment and detrimental effects of regulatory independence that therefore arise. Even without independence, the uninformed voters do not provide sufficient pressure to remove these effects. On the other hand, we observe that regulatory independence does reduce holdup inefficiency when policymakers align with the public interest.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139680220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-02-03DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01138-w
Tamás Vasvári, Dóra Longauer
The 2019 local election in Hungary accelerated the trend of centralization, marked by a simultaneous reduction in available local funds and an increase in discretionary transfers to local governments. This paper, utilizing a dataset encompassing all over 3000 municipalities from 2015 to 2020, employs fixed-effect estimations and a regression discontinuity design to explore how election outcomes influenced central decisions on intergovernmental transfers. Generally, larger municipalities are more susceptible to political influence, particularly in the allocation of discretionary grants, whereas smaller settlements appear less affected by political shifts. Changes in political alignment triggered a rewarding policy for municipalities that remained or converted to aligned status, resulting in an additional 86.4% and 65.2% of discretionary funds, respectively, relative to those converting to or remaining unaligned. Our research establishes that political influence in intergovernmental transfers has intensified since 2019, offering valuable insights for the upcoming 2024 election.
{"title":"Against the tide: how changes in political alignment affect grant allocation to municipalities in Hungary","authors":"Tamás Vasvári, Dóra Longauer","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01138-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01138-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The 2019 local election in Hungary accelerated the trend of centralization, marked by a simultaneous reduction in available local funds and an increase in discretionary transfers to local governments. This paper, utilizing a dataset encompassing all over 3000 municipalities from 2015 to 2020, employs fixed-effect estimations and a regression discontinuity design to explore how election outcomes influenced central decisions on intergovernmental transfers. Generally, larger municipalities are more susceptible to political influence, particularly in the allocation of discretionary grants, whereas smaller settlements appear less affected by political shifts. Changes in political alignment triggered a rewarding policy for municipalities that remained or converted to aligned status, resulting in an additional 86.4% and 65.2% of discretionary funds, respectively, relative to those converting to or remaining unaligned. Our research establishes that political influence in intergovernmental transfers has intensified since 2019, offering valuable insights for the upcoming 2024 election.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139677927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-31DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01134-0
Mian Yang, Ruofan He, Panbing Wan
{"title":"The transfer of provincial officials and electricity transactions in China","authors":"Mian Yang, Ruofan He, Panbing Wan","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01134-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01134-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140471969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-26DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01139-9
Abstract
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of a policy that targets criminal infiltration in local governments on the provision of local public goods in Italian municipalities. Building on the theoretical framework proposed by Dal Bò (American Political Science Review 100:41–53, 2006), we use a sufficient statistic approach to describe the dynamic behaviour of local public goods when stricter law enforcement weakens criminal pressure groups. Utilizing data on the local public finances of Italian municipalities spanning from 2004 to 2015, our findings reveal that, after the dismissal of infiltrated governments, the targeted municipalities devote a larger share of resources to public goods, with an estimated increase of approximately 3.9 percentage points. Notably, this effect seems to be driven by an increase in investment of approximately 3 percentage points. Overall, our results suggest that policies targeting the problem of criminal infiltration in local governments can improve socioeconomic conditions and the well-being of local communities, by increasing investments in economically and socially relevant public goods.
{"title":"Anti-mafia policies and public goods in Italy","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01139-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01139-9","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This paper aims to evaluate the impact of a policy that targets criminal infiltration in local governments on the provision of local public goods in Italian municipalities. Building on the theoretical framework proposed by Dal Bò (American Political Science Review 100:41–53, 2006), we use a sufficient statistic approach to describe the dynamic behaviour of local public goods when stricter law enforcement weakens criminal pressure groups. Utilizing data on the local public finances of Italian municipalities spanning from 2004 to 2015, our findings reveal that, after the dismissal of infiltrated governments, the targeted municipalities devote a larger share of resources to public goods, with an estimated increase of approximately 3.9 percentage points. Notably, this effect seems to be driven by an increase in investment of approximately 3 percentage points. Overall, our results suggest that policies targeting the problem of criminal infiltration in local governments can improve socioeconomic conditions and the well-being of local communities, by increasing investments in economically and socially relevant public goods.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139582943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-16DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01140-2
Terry L. Anderson, Ilia Murtazashvili, Dominic P. Parker
Historically and currently, federal policies governing American Indian country do not typically resemble policies that economists think would stimulate economic and cultural prosperity. This special issue employs Public Choice and New Institutional Economics to analyze the origins and consequences of these policies. This approach, which emphasizes rent seeking, government failure, and formal and informal institutions offers new insights into the understanding of persistent barriers to prosperity and sovereignty in Indian country and what changes might be necessary to break down the obstacles.
{"title":"The political economy of American Indian policy: introduction to a special issue","authors":"Terry L. Anderson, Ilia Murtazashvili, Dominic P. Parker","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01140-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01140-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Historically and currently, federal policies governing American Indian country do not typically resemble policies that economists think would stimulate economic and cultural prosperity. This special issue employs Public Choice and New Institutional Economics to analyze the origins and consequences of these policies. This approach, which emphasizes rent seeking, government failure, and formal and informal institutions offers new insights into the understanding of persistent barriers to prosperity and sovereignty in Indian country and what changes might be necessary to break down the obstacles.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139495989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-14DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x
Carla Morvan, Sonia Paty
Natural disasters and related prevention policies can affect voter decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of natural disasters changes voter behavior in municipal elections and how prevention policies can mitigate the impact of such catastrophic events on budget accounts and might potentially be rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. We exploit original data on French municipalities where incumbents sought re-election between 2008 and 2020. To estimate the probability of re-election at the municipal level in the event of a natural disaster we apply a Heckman model based strategy to avoid selection bias. We find that the occurrence of a natural disaster significantly decreases the chances of re-election of incumbent mayors. However, although we show that natural hazard prevention plans can mitigate the impact of catastrophic events on budget accounts, they are not rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. The myopia hypothesis is confirmed by our findings: voters reward incumbents for delivering investment spending or decreasing debt but not for investing in disaster preparedness.
{"title":"Natural disasters and voter gratitude: What is the role of prevention policies?","authors":"Carla Morvan, Sonia Paty","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01137-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Natural disasters and related prevention policies can affect voter decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of natural disasters changes voter behavior in municipal elections and how prevention policies can mitigate the impact of such catastrophic events on budget accounts and might potentially be rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. We exploit original data on French municipalities where incumbents sought re-election between 2008 and 2020. To estimate the probability of re-election at the municipal level in the event of a natural disaster we apply a Heckman model based strategy to avoid selection bias. We find that the occurrence of a natural disaster significantly decreases the chances of re-election of incumbent mayors. However, although we show that natural hazard prevention plans can mitigate the impact of catastrophic events on budget accounts, they are not rewarded by citizens in upcoming elections. The myopia hypothesis is confirmed by our findings: voters reward incumbents for delivering investment spending or decreasing debt but not for investing in disaster preparedness.</p>","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139469825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-13DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01127-z
Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
{"title":"Size isn’t everything: COVID-19 and the role of government","authors":"Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01127-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01127-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139437217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}