Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2
Nicholas R. Miller
{"title":"Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect: a supplementary note","authors":"Nicholas R. Miller","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135246790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7
Clara E. Piano, Rachael Behr, Kacey Reeves West
{"title":"The supply and demand of marital contracts: the case of same-sex marriage","authors":"Clara E. Piano, Rachael Behr, Kacey Reeves West","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01076-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135243875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3
Sezer Yasar, Ceyhun Elgin
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the level of democracy and fiscal-policy response to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a novel cross-country panel dataset of fiscal-policy responses with time variation. Our results suggest that more democratic countries adopted substantially larger fiscal-policy packages (in % GDP), and the gap regarding the size of packages between more democratic and less democratic countries widened over time. Our analysis of the components of fiscal policy shows that democracies, in particular, provide larger packages that benefit the broad public. Furthermore, our system-equations estimations suggest that the relation of democracy level with the fiscal-policy response is established through democracy’s relation with inclusive institutions, represented by the parliamentary system, and corruption.
{"title":"Democracy and fiscal-policy response to COVID-19","authors":"Sezer Yasar, Ceyhun Elgin","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01107-3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the level of democracy and fiscal-policy response to the economic crisis induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. We use a novel cross-country panel dataset of fiscal-policy responses with time variation. Our results suggest that more democratic countries adopted substantially larger fiscal-policy packages (in % GDP), and the gap regarding the size of packages between more democratic and less democratic countries widened over time. Our analysis of the components of fiscal policy shows that democracies, in particular, provide larger packages that benefit the broad public. Furthermore, our system-equations estimations suggest that the relation of democracy level with the fiscal-policy response is established through democracy’s relation with inclusive institutions, represented by the parliamentary system, and corruption.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4
Ramon P. DeGennaro, Daniel J. Smith
This special issue brings together the papers presented and discussed at the Harold A. Black Academic Conference hosted by the Probasco Distinguished Chair of Free Enterprise at the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the Political Economy Research Institute at Middle Tennessee State University. Dr. Black is an emeritus professor of finance at the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and has had a distinguished career advancing our understanding of race and discrimination in banking and finance. More specifically, throughout his career, Dr. Black undertook in-depth empirical studies that examined the institutional details of statistically observed disparate outcomes in banking and finance to determine whether these outcomes were attributable to discrimination or could be explained by non-discriminatory factors. In some instances, Dr. Black found that addressing disparate outcomes with inappropriate policies could result in perverse consequences that harmed the intended beneficiaries. This introduction explores the relationship between Harold Black’s work, the papers in this special issue examining, building on, and extending Harold Black’s work, and public choice economics.
本期特刊汇集了哈罗德·a·布莱克学术会议上发表和讨论的论文，该学术会议由查塔努加田纳西大学自由企业Probasco杰出主席、诺克斯维尔田纳西大学哈斯拉姆商学院和中田纳西州立大学政治经济研究所主办。他是the Haslam College of Business at University of Tennessee, Knoxville的金融名誉教授，并在促进我们对银行和金融中的种族和歧视的理解方面有着杰出的职业生涯。更具体地说，在他的职业生涯中，Black博士进行了深入的实证研究，检查了统计上观察到的银行和金融领域不同结果的制度细节，以确定这些结果是可归因于歧视还是可以由非歧视性因素来解释。在某些情况下，布莱克博士发现，用不恰当的政策来解决不同的结果，可能会导致损害预期受益者的反常后果。这篇导论探讨了哈罗德·布莱克的著作、本期特刊中研究、建立和扩展哈罗德·布莱克著作的论文与公共选择经济学之间的关系。
{"title":"Harold A. Black academic conference: an introduction to the special issue","authors":"Ramon P. DeGennaro, Daniel J. Smith","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01106-4","url":null,"abstract":"This special issue brings together the papers presented and discussed at the Harold A. Black Academic Conference hosted by the Probasco Distinguished Chair of Free Enterprise at the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the Political Economy Research Institute at Middle Tennessee State University. Dr. Black is an emeritus professor of finance at the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and has had a distinguished career advancing our understanding of race and discrimination in banking and finance. More specifically, throughout his career, Dr. Black undertook in-depth empirical studies that examined the institutional details of statistically observed disparate outcomes in banking and finance to determine whether these outcomes were attributable to discrimination or could be explained by non-discriminatory factors. In some instances, Dr. Black found that addressing disparate outcomes with inappropriate policies could result in perverse consequences that harmed the intended beneficiaries. This introduction explores the relationship between Harold Black’s work, the papers in this special issue examining, building on, and extending Harold Black’s work, and public choice economics.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135385557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-22DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0
Erwin Dekker, Pavel V. Vasiliev
Abstract It is well-established that market governance can be provided by both public (state) and private organizations. However, the concept of private governance has been used, this article contends, to refer to two distinct forms of non-state governance: private governance and community governance. We distinguish between these two forms, arguing that private governance should be understood as the provision of market governance by (external) private parties, while community governance refers to a process where a group, a community, or society has the autonomy to govern its own affairs without interference from external authorities. The former internalizes the externalities associated with governance, while the latter comes about mainly as an unintended externality of social interaction in markets. To further illuminate the differences, and the relative strengths of these types of non-state governance, we distinguish among three elements of market governance: (1) the formation and interpretation of rules, (2) the administration of rules of ownership and exchange, and (3) the enforcement of rules. We argue that community governance is of great relevance for the formation and interpretation of the rules of ownership and exchange, which is consequently very hard to outsource to external parties, private or public. Community governance also plays a frequently overlooked role in administration and enforcement through the process of co-production. Rule formation and interpretation are theorized as the epistemic components of market governance, which can be analyzed within the Governing Knowledge Commons framework.
{"title":"Markets and knowledge commons: Is there a difference between private and community governance of markets?","authors":"Erwin Dekker, Pavel V. Vasiliev","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01099-0","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is well-established that market governance can be provided by both public (state) and private organizations. However, the concept of private governance has been used, this article contends, to refer to two distinct forms of non-state governance: private governance and community governance. We distinguish between these two forms, arguing that private governance should be understood as the provision of market governance by (external) private parties, while community governance refers to a process where a group, a community, or society has the autonomy to govern its own affairs without interference from external authorities. The former internalizes the externalities associated with governance, while the latter comes about mainly as an unintended externality of social interaction in markets. To further illuminate the differences, and the relative strengths of these types of non-state governance, we distinguish among three elements of market governance: (1) the formation and interpretation of rules, (2) the administration of rules of ownership and exchange, and (3) the enforcement of rules. We argue that community governance is of great relevance for the formation and interpretation of the rules of ownership and exchange, which is consequently very hard to outsource to external parties, private or public. Community governance also plays a frequently overlooked role in administration and enforcement through the process of co-production. Rule formation and interpretation are theorized as the epistemic components of market governance, which can be analyzed within the Governing Knowledge Commons framework.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136060836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8
Nathan Goodman, Otto Lehto
{"title":"Intellectual property, complex externalities, and the knowledge commons","authors":"Nathan Goodman, Otto Lehto","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01110-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135742090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1
Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen
Abstract Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties’ chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens’ preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties’ chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens’ policy preferences.
{"title":"Pre-electoral coalitions and the distribution of political power","authors":"Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Jaakko Meriläinen, Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01109-1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties’ chances of winning an election, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens’ preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes and consequences of PECs in Finland where elections use an open-list proportional representation system, and parties may form joint lists. We present descriptive evidence showing that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs, we illustrate that voters punish coalescing parties and target personal votes strategically within the coalitions, and that PECs are formed with the particular purpose of influencing the distribution of power. PECs increase small parties’ chances of acquiring leadership positions, lead to more dispersed seat distributions, and sometimes prevent absolute majorities. They can thus enable a broader representation of citizens’ policy preferences.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135939038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-05DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5
Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff
{"title":"Is participatory democracy in line with social protest? Evidence from the French Yellow Vests movement","authors":"Benjamin Monnery, François-Charles Wolff","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01105-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":"197 1","pages":"283 - 309"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42056932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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