Pub Date : 2023-11-09DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z
Tariq Basir, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili
{"title":"Institutional stickiness and Afghanistan’s unending revolution","authors":"Tariq Basir, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135240795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-21DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01114-4
Andreas Kern, Bernhard Reinsberg, Patrick E. Shea
Abstract Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of borrowing countries. IMF conditionality requires countries to increase fiscal transparency, which threatens the viability of kickback schemes and increases the likelihood that corrupt leaders will be called out on their misdealing. As a result, we expect corrupt leaders with China debt to leave office earlier when they try to address debt defaults with IMF loans than when they avoid them. Using survival analysis on a dataset of 115 developing countries between 2000 to 2015, we find that leaders indebted to China that go under an IMF program leave office earlier compared to when they do not go under an IMF program. In line with our argument, this effect is strongest in more corrupt regimes. Our argument and analysis contribute to understanding international finance’s political economy, specifically how mixing creditors can be politically risky for leaders.
{"title":"Why cronies don’t cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival","authors":"Andreas Kern, Bernhard Reinsberg, Patrick E. Shea","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01114-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01114-4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of borrowing countries. IMF conditionality requires countries to increase fiscal transparency, which threatens the viability of kickback schemes and increases the likelihood that corrupt leaders will be called out on their misdealing. As a result, we expect corrupt leaders with China debt to leave office earlier when they try to address debt defaults with IMF loans than when they avoid them. Using survival analysis on a dataset of 115 developing countries between 2000 to 2015, we find that leaders indebted to China that go under an IMF program leave office earlier compared to when they do not go under an IMF program. In line with our argument, this effect is strongest in more corrupt regimes. Our argument and analysis contribute to understanding international finance’s political economy, specifically how mixing creditors can be politically risky for leaders.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135513171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01121-5
Andre Varella Mollick, Andre Coelho Vianna
{"title":"Economic growth before and after the fiscal stimulus of 2008–2009: the role of institutional quality and government size","authors":"Andre Varella Mollick, Andre Coelho Vianna","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01121-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01121-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01120-6
Keith Ihlanfeldt, Cynthia Fan Yang
{"title":"Political and racial neighborhood sorting: How is it changing?","authors":"Keith Ihlanfeldt, Cynthia Fan Yang","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01120-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01120-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135825412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01111-7
Haoyu Gao, Fukang Chen, Yiling Ouyang
{"title":"The impacts of political uncertainty on public financing costs: evidence from anti-corruption investigations in China","authors":"Haoyu Gao, Fukang Chen, Yiling Ouyang","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01111-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01111-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135767326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-14DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01112-6
Jean-Paul Carvalho, Jared Rubin, Michael Sacks
Abstract All advanced economies have undergone secular revolutions in which religious belief and institutions have been subordinated to secular forms of authority. There are, however, numerous examples of failed secular transitions. To understand these failures, we present a religious club model with endogenous entry and cultural transmission of religious beliefs. A spike in the demand for religious belief, due for example to a negative economic shock, induces a new and more extreme organization to enter the religious market and exploit the dissatisfaction of highly religious types with the religious incumbent. The effect is larger where institutional secularization is more advanced, for example where the religious establishment has moderated itself or has been moderated by the political authority. The greater the moderation of the religious incumbent, the more extreme is the position chosen by the religious entrant, and the larger is the rise in religious participation. Hence, unanticipated shifts in religious demand can lead to the emergence of new and more extreme religious organizations and reverse previous trends toward secularization. Our model sheds light on the causes and consequences of failed secular revolutions and religious revivals in Latin America and Egypt.
{"title":"Failed secular revolutions: religious belief, competition, and extremism","authors":"Jean-Paul Carvalho, Jared Rubin, Michael Sacks","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01112-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01112-6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract All advanced economies have undergone secular revolutions in which religious belief and institutions have been subordinated to secular forms of authority. There are, however, numerous examples of failed secular transitions. To understand these failures, we present a religious club model with endogenous entry and cultural transmission of religious beliefs. A spike in the demand for religious belief, due for example to a negative economic shock, induces a new and more extreme organization to enter the religious market and exploit the dissatisfaction of highly religious types with the religious incumbent. The effect is larger where institutional secularization is more advanced, for example where the religious establishment has moderated itself or has been moderated by the political authority. The greater the moderation of the religious incumbent, the more extreme is the position chosen by the religious entrant, and the larger is the rise in religious participation. Hence, unanticipated shifts in religious demand can lead to the emergence of new and more extreme religious organizations and reverse previous trends toward secularization. Our model sheds light on the causes and consequences of failed secular revolutions and religious revivals in Latin America and Egypt.","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135803187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01104-6
Ilia Murtazashvili, Yang Zhou
{"title":"Complex externalities, pandemics, and public choice","authors":"Ilia Murtazashvili, Yang Zhou","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01104-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01104-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135093814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01113-5
Timothy Fitzgerald
{"title":"Regulatory capture in a resource boom","authors":"Timothy Fitzgerald","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01113-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01113-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135346333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-04DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01115-3
Margaret Bock, Benjamin Blemings
{"title":"Road maintenance over the local election cycle","authors":"Margaret Bock, Benjamin Blemings","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01115-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01115-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135591005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-29DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2
Nicholas R. Miller
{"title":"Ranked-choice voting and the spoiler effect: a supplementary note","authors":"Nicholas R. Miller","doi":"10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01116-2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48322,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135246790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：