Optimal monetary and fiscal policy are jointly analyzed in a heterogeneous two-agent New Keynesian environment, where fiscal policy is modeled as lump-sum transfers. Transfer policy does not substitute for forward guidance—as it entails consumption dispersion costs—nor affect its optimal duration. The stay at the zero lower bound is indeed influenced through two offsetting channels: a shortening channel works through an initial increase in transfers that mitigates the recession (reducing the need for forward guidance), while a lengthening channel works through a later transfer cut that curbs the expansion (making forward guidance desirable for a longer horizon).
{"title":"Optimal Monetary and Transfer Policy in a Liquidity Trap","authors":"STEFANO MARIA CORBELLINI","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13199","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Optimal monetary and fiscal policy are jointly analyzed in a heterogeneous two-agent New Keynesian environment, where fiscal policy is modeled as lump-sum transfers. Transfer policy does not substitute for forward guidance—as it entails consumption dispersion costs—nor affect its optimal duration. The stay at the zero lower bound is indeed influenced through two offsetting channels: a <i>shortening</i> channel works through an initial increase in transfers that mitigates the recession (reducing the need for forward guidance), while a <i>lengthening</i> channel works through a later transfer cut that curbs the expansion (making forward guidance desirable for a longer horizon).</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"58 1","pages":"183-208"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146199396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We produce the first measure of Divisia money for Mexico. Various structural VAR identifications with Divisia M4 as an indicator of monetary policy yield responses of production and prices that are in every case at least as sensible as—and generally offer an improvement over—their counterpart specifications with a short‐term offer rate as the indicator. Importantly, we find that our Divisia specifications do not require expanding the model's information set with commodity prices or the real exchange rate for a resolution of the price puzzle. We reach similar conclusions for Mexico to those Keating et al. (2019) arrive at for the U.S. economy.
{"title":"A Divisia Measure of the Money Supply for Mexico","authors":"LUIS FERNANDO COLUNGA‐RAMOS, VICTOR J. VALCARCEL","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13198","url":null,"abstract":"We produce the first measure of Divisia money for Mexico. Various structural VAR identifications with Divisia M4 as an indicator of monetary policy yield responses of production and prices that are in every case at least as sensible as—and generally offer an improvement over—their counterpart specifications with a short‐term offer rate as the indicator. Importantly, we find that our Divisia specifications do not require expanding the model's information set with commodity prices or the real exchange rate for a resolution of the price puzzle. We reach similar conclusions for Mexico to those Keating et al. (2019) arrive at for the U.S. economy.","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"317 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142226593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the interactions between banking panics and uncertainty shocks. To do so, we build a model of a production economy with a banking sector. In the model, financial constraints of banks can lead to disastrous banking panics. We find that a higher probability of a banking panic increases macroeconomic uncertainty. Vice versa, a shock to macroeconomic uncertainty increases the likelihood of a banking panic. This banking panic channel amplifies the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks. A countercyclical capital buffer increases welfare by reducing the likelihood of a banking panic.
{"title":"Banking Panic Risk and Macroeconomic Uncertainty","authors":"JOHANNES POESCHL, JAKOB G. MIKKELSEN","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13193","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the interactions between banking panics and uncertainty shocks. To do so, we build a model of a production economy with a banking sector. In the model, financial constraints of banks can lead to disastrous banking panics. We find that a higher probability of a banking panic increases macroeconomic uncertainty. Vice versa, a shock to macroeconomic uncertainty increases the likelihood of a banking panic. This banking panic channel amplifies the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks. A countercyclical capital buffer increases welfare by reducing the likelihood of a banking panic.","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"93 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141770314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.
{"title":"Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks' Stability, and Welfare","authors":"DIEGO MORENO, TUOMAS TAKALO","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13194","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jmcb.13194","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Consider a bank which chooses an asset portfolio and then, upon the public disclosure of the results of a review of its quality, raises funds by offering a repayment promise. We show that increasing the precision of information about the quality of the bank's assets lowers the cost of funding of a sound bank and encourages it to take risk. Maximum stability is reached in an opaque environment. Maximum surplus is reached in an opaque (transparent) environment when the social costs of bank failure are large (small). We examine how these conclusions change under alternative information and contractual conditions.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 7","pages":"1729-1763"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738482","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
CHRISTOPH GÖRTZ, CHRISTOPHER GUNN, THOMAS A. LUBIK
We study the determinants of inventory accumulation in a structural vector autoregression (VAR) framework with news shocks. Specifically, we investigate how news shocks affect two key determinants of inventory movements, namely, rates of return and marginal costs. We establish that inventories react strongly and positively to news about future increases in total factor productivity. We provide evidence that changes in external and internal rates of return are central to the transmission for such news shocks. We do not find evidence for a dominant role of marginal costs.
{"title":"What Drives Inventory Accumulation? News on Rates of Return and Marginal Costs","authors":"CHRISTOPH GÖRTZ, CHRISTOPHER GUNN, THOMAS A. LUBIK","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13197","DOIUrl":"10.1111/jmcb.13197","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the determinants of inventory accumulation in a structural vector autoregression (VAR) framework with news shocks. Specifically, we investigate how news shocks affect two key determinants of inventory movements, namely, rates of return and marginal costs. We establish that inventories react strongly and positively to news about future increases in total factor productivity. We provide evidence that changes in external and internal rates of return are central to the transmission for such news shocks. We do not find evidence for a dominant role of marginal costs.</p>","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"57 7","pages":"1907-1929"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the equilibria of market‐triggered contingent capital if a bank's asset value is not common knowledge. Using a global game setup with private signals, we characterize the unique equilibrium for the conversion of the market‐triggered contingent capital. The conversion likelihood increases with higher bank leverage, a higher face value of contingent capital, and a greater dilution for incumbent shareholders. We further show that the existence of both a private and a public signal constrains the optimal design of contingent capital for which a unique equilibrium exists.
{"title":"Market‐Triggered Contingent Capital with Incomplete Information","authors":"TOBIAS BERG, EVA SCHLIEPHAKE","doi":"10.1111/jmcb.13190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13190","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the equilibria of market‐triggered contingent capital if a bank's asset value is <jats:italic>not</jats:italic> common knowledge. Using a global game setup with private signals, we characterize the unique equilibrium for the conversion of the market‐triggered contingent capital. The conversion likelihood increases with higher bank leverage, a higher face value of contingent capital, and a greater dilution for incumbent shareholders. We further show that the existence of both a private and a public signal constrains the optimal design of contingent capital for which a unique equilibrium exists.","PeriodicalId":48328,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Money Credit and Banking","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141738229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}