Personality and Social Psychology Review最新文献

Victims commonly respond to experienced wrongdoing by punishing or forgiving the transgressor. While much research has looked at predictors and immediate consequences of these post-transgression responses, comparably less research has addressed the conditions under which punishment or forgiveness have positive or negative downstream consequences on the victim-transgressor relationship. Drawing from research on Social Value Orientation (SVO), we argue that both forgiveness and punishment can be rooted in either prosocial (i.e., relationship- or other-oriented), individualistic (i.e., self-oriented), or competitive (i.e., harm-oriented) motives pursued by the victim. Furthermore, we posit that downstream consequences of forgiveness and punishment crucially depend on how the transgressor interprets the victim's response. The novel motive-attribution framework presented here highlights the importance of alignment between a victim's motives and a transgressor's motive attributions underlying post-transgression responses. This framework thus contributes to a better understanding of positive and negative dynamics following post-transgression interactions.

Dating is widely thought of as a test phase for romantic relationships, during which new romantic partners carefully evaluate each other for long-term fit. However, this cultural narrative assumes that people are well equipped to reject poorly suited partners. In this article, we argue that humans are biased toward pro-relationship decisions-decisions that favor the initiation, advancement, and maintenance of romantic relationships. We first review evidence for a progression bias in the context of relationship initiation, investment, and breakup decisions. We next consider possible theoretical underpinnings-both evolutionary and cultural-that may explain why getting into a relationship is often easier than getting out of one, and why being in a less desirable relationship is often preferred over being in no relationship at all. We discuss potential boundary conditions that the phenomenon may have, as well as its implications for existing theoretical models of mate selection and relationship development.

Researchers often study constructs that are conceptually and/or empirically related, but distinct (i.e., "sibling constructs"). In social-personality psychology, as well as psychology more generally, there is little guidance for how to deal with sibling constructs, which can result in researchers ignoring or mishandling them. In this article, we start by situating sibling constructs in the literature on the jingle-jangle fallacies. Then, we outline 10 conceptual and empirical criteria for determining the degree to which, and in what ways, constructs may share a sibling relationship, using self-esteem and grandiose narcissism as a running example. Finally, we discuss strategies for handling sibling constructs in a systematic and transparent way. We hope that the procedures described here will help social-personality psychologists identify sibling constructs, understand when and why they pose problems for their research, and adopt strategies that ameliorate their adverse effects.

The impact of personal values on preferences, choices, and behaviors has evoked much interest. Relatively little is known, however, about the processes through which values impact behavior. In this conceptual article, we consider both the content and the structural aspects of the relationships between values and behavior. We point to unique features of values that have implications to their relationships with behavior and build on these features to review past research. We then propose a conceptual model that presents three organizing principles: accessibility, interpretation, and control. For each principle, we identify mechanisms through which values and behavior are connected. Some of these mechanisms have been exemplified in past research and are reviewed; others call for future research. Integrating the knowledge on the multiple ways in which values impact behavior deepens our understanding of the complex ways through which cognition is translated into action.

Choosing a mate is perhaps the most important decision a sexually reproducing organism makes in its lifetime. And yet, psychologists lack a precise description of human mate choice, despite sustained attention from several theoretical perspectives. Here, I argue this limited progress owes to the complexity of mate choice and describe a new modeling approach, called "couple simulation," designed to compare models of mate choice by challenging them to reproduce real couples within simulated mating markets. I present proof-of-concept simulations that demonstrate couple simulation can identify a population's true model of mate choice. Furthermore, I apply couple simulation to two samples of real couples and find that the method (a) successfully reconstructs real-world couples, (b) discriminates between models of mate choice, and (c) predicts a wide range of dimensions of relationship quality. Collectively, these results provide evidence that couple simulation offers a framework useful for evaluating theories of human mate choice.

We synthesize established and emerging research to propose a feedback process model that explicates key antecedents, experiences, and consequences of the emotion boredom. The proposed Boredom Feedback Model posits that the dynamic process of boredom resembles a feedback loop that centers on attention shifts instigated by inadequate attentional engagement. Inadequate attentional engagement is a discrepancy between desired and actual levels of attentional engagement and is a product of external and internal influences, reflected in objective resources and cognitive appraisals. The model sheds light on several essential yet unresolved puzzles in the literature, including how people learn to cope with boredom, how to understand the relation between self-control and boredom, how the roles of attention and meaning in boredom can be integrated, why boredom is associated with both high- and low-arousal negative emotions, and what contributes to chronic boredom. The model offers testable hypotheses for future research.

Past research has uncovered actions that would seem to undermine but in fact frequently enhance persuasion. For example, expressing doubt about one's view or presenting arguments against it would seem to weaken one's case, but can sometimes promote it. We propose a framework for understanding these findings. We posit that these actions constitute acts of receptiveness-behaviors that signal openness to new information and opposing viewpoints. We review four classes of acts of receptiveness: conveying uncertainty, acknowledging mistakes, highlighting drawbacks, and asking questions. We identify conditions under which and mechanisms through which these actions boost persuasion. Acts of receptiveness appear to be more persuasive when they come from expert or high-status sources, rather than non-expert or low-status sources, and to operate through two primary mechanisms: increased involvement and enhanced source perceptions. Following a review of this work, we delineate potentially novel acts of receptiveness and outline directions for future research.

Historically, the study of multiple goals has focused on the dynamics between two goals as the prototypical example of multiple goals. This focus on dyadic relations means that many issues central to the psychology of more than two goals are still unexplored. We argue that a deeper understanding of multiple-goal issues involves moving beyond two goals. Doing so not only reveals new insights about goal relations (e.g., how one dyadic relation affects another) but also introduces goal structure (how goals and goal relations are positioned relative to each other) as a variable in its own right worthy of study. In our review, we discuss current knowledge gaps, review methodologies both in terms of existing techniques and novel techniques we propose, and highlight new directions from moving beyond two goals-what new questions emerge and what dynamics, including intersectional issues (e.g., between goal properties and goal structure), become possible to explore.

A theory of political belief system dynamics should incorporate causal connections between elements of the belief system and the possibility that belief systems are influenced by exogenous factors. These necessary components can be satisfied by conceptualizing an individual's belief system as a network of causally connected attitudes and identities which, via the interactions between the elements and the push of exogenous influences, produces the disparate phenomena in the belief systems literature. We implement this belief systems as networks theory in a dynamic Ising model and demonstrate that the theory can integrate at least six otherwise unrelated phenomenon in the political belief systems literature, including work on attitude consistency, cross-pressures, spillover effects, partisan cues, and ideological differences in attitude consensus. Our findings suggest that belief systems are not just one thing, but emerge from the interactions between the attitudes and identities in the belief system. All code is available: https://osf.io/aswy8/?view_only=99aff77909094bddabb5d382f6db2622.

Researchers have long assumed that complex thinking is determined by both situational factors and stable, trait-based differences. However, although situational influences on complexity have been discussed at length in the literature, there is still no comprehensive integration of evidence regarding the theorized trait component of cognitive complexity. To fill this gap, we evaluate the degree that cognitive complexity is attributable to trait variance. Specifically, we review two domains of evidence pertaining to (a) the generalizability of individuals' complex thinking across domains and the temporal stability of individuals' complex thinking and (b) the relationship of complex thinking with conceptually related traits. Cumulatively, the literature suggests that persons' cognitive complexity at any point in time results partially from a stable and generalizable trait component that accounts for a small-to-moderate amount of variance. It further suggests that cognitively complex persons are characterized by chronic trait-based differences in motivation and ability to think complexly.