Personality and Social Psychology Review最新文献

Public abstract: Social hierarchy is one fundamental aspect of human life, structuring interactions in families, teams, and entire societies. In this review, we put forward a new theory about how social hierarchy is shaped by the wider societal contexts (i.e., cultures). Comparing East Asian and Western cultural contexts, we show how culture comprises societal beliefs about who can raise to high rank (e.g., become a leader), shapes interactions between high- and low-ranking individuals (e.g., in a team), and influences human thought and behavior in social hierarchies. Overall, we find cultural similarities, in that high-ranking individuals are agentic and self-oriented in both cultural contexts. But we also find important cross-cultural differences. In East Asian cultural contexts, high-ranking individuals are also other oriented; they are also concerned about the people around them and their relationships. We close with a call to action, suggesting studying social hierarchies in more diverse cultural contexts.

Public abstract: Many people do not act together against climate change or social inequalities because they feel they or their group cannot make a difference. Understanding how people come to feel that they can achieve something (a perception of self-efficacy) is therefore crucial for motivating people to act together for a better world. However, it is difficult to summarize already existing self-efficacy research because previous studies have used many different ways of naming and measuring it. In this article, we uncover the problems that this raises and propose the triple-A framework as a solution. This new framework shows which agents, actions, and aims are important for understanding self-efficacy. By offering specific recommendations for measuring self-efficacy, the triple-A framework creates a basis for mobilizing human agency in the context of climate change and social injustice.

Academic abstract: One of the key challenges to researching psychological acculturation is the immense heterogeneity in theories and measures. These inconsistencies make it difficult to compare past literature, hinder straightforward measurement selections, and stifle theoretical integration. To structure acculturation, we propose to utilize the four basic aspects of human experiences (wanting, feeling, thinking, and doing) as a conceptual framework. We use this framework to build a theory-driven assessment of past theoretical (final N = 92), psychometric (final N = 233), and empirical literature (final N = 530). We find that the framework allows us to examine and compare past conceptualizations. For example, empirical works have understudied the more internal aspects of acculturation (i.e., motivations and feelings) compared with theoretical works. We, then, discuss the framework's novel insights including its temporal resolution, its comprehensive and cross-cultural structure, and how the framework can aid transparent and functional theories, studies, and interventions going forward.

Public abstract: This systematic scoping review indicates that the concept of psychological acculturation can be structured in terms of affect (e.g., feeling at home), behavior (e.g., language use), cognition (e.g., ethnic identification), and desire (e.g., independence wish). We find that the framework is useful in structuring past research and helps with new predictions and interventions. We, for example, find a crucial disconnect between theory and practice, which will need to be resolved in the future.

Academic abstract: Clothing, hairstyle, makeup, and accessories influence first impressions. However, target dress is notably absent from current theories and models of person perception. We discuss three reasons for this minimal attention to dress in person perception: high theoretical complexity, incompatibility with traditional methodology, and underappreciation by the groups who have historically guided research in person perception. We propose a working model of person perception that incorporates target dress alongside target face, target body, context, and perceiver characteristics. Then, we identify four types of inferences for which perceivers rely on target dress: social categories, cognitive states, status, and aesthetics. For each of these, we review relevant work in social cognition, integrate this work with existing dress research, and propose future directions. Finally, we identify and offer solutions to the theoretical and methodological challenges accompanying the psychological study of dress.

Public abstract: Why is it that people often agonize over what to wear for a job interview, a first date, or a party? The answer is simple: They understand that others' first impressions of them rely on their clothing, hairstyle, makeup, and accessories. Many people might be surprised, then, to learn that psychologists' theories about how people form first impressions of others have little to say about how people dress. This is true in part because the meaning of clothing is so complex and culturally dependent. We propose a working model of first impressions that identifies four types of information that people infer from dress: people's social identities, mental states, status, and aesthetic tastes. For each of these, we review existing research on clothing, integrate this research with related work from social psychology more broadly, and propose future directions for research.

Public abstract: Social categories like race and gender often give rise to stereotypes and prejudice, and a great deal of research has focused on how motivations influence these biased beliefs. Here, we focus on potential biases in how these categories are even formed in the first place, suggesting that motivations can influence the very categories people use to group others. We propose that motivations to share schemas with other people and to gain resources shape people's attention to dimensions like race, gender, and age in different contexts. Specifically, people will pay attention to dimensions to the degree that the conclusions produced from using those dimensions align with their motivations. Overall, we suggest that simply examining the downstream effects of social categorization like stereotyping and prejudice is not enough, and that research should look earlier in the process at how and when we form the categories on which those stereotypes are based.

Academic abstract: Manhood is a precarious social status. Under perceived gender identity threat, men are disproportionately likely to enact certain stereotype-consistent responses such as aggression to maintain their gender status. Yet less is known regarding individual variation in men's threat responsiveness-that is, the psychological conditions under which one's masculine identity is more or less "fragile." We propose a novel model of masculine identity whereby masculine norm expectancy generates discrepancy within the self to the extent that rigid norms are internalized as obligational (actual-ought discrepancy) versus aspirational (actual-ideal discrepancy), which predict extrinsic versus intrinsic motivations to reduce these discrepancies, respectively. Under threat, then, extrinsic motivations predict externalized responses (e.g., aggression), and intrinsic motivations elicit internalized responses (e.g., anxiety, shame, self-harm). We also consider the conditions under which masculinity may be less fragile-for example, in contexts with less rigid expectations and among men who reject expectations-as pathways to mitigate adverse masculinity threat-related outcomes.

Public abstract: In many cultures, men prove their manhood by engaging in behaviors that harm themselves and others (e.g., violence, sexism, homophobia), particularly people from marginalized groups. Yet less is known about why some men are more likely than others to enact these masculinity-proving behaviors. The goal of our model is to specify certain conditions under which masculinities become "fragile" and elicit these responses when under threat. We start by describing the rigid expectations men experience-for example, that they are strong and tough. We propose that these expectations cause men to experience different forms of discrepancy within themselves that produce corresponding motivations to reduce these discrepancies. Under threat, motivations driven by others' expectations elicit outward attempts to restore masculine status (e.g., aggression), whereas motivations driven by self-ideals cause internalized responses (e.g., shame, self-harm). We conclude by discussing how to reduce these discrepancies, such as mitigating the rigidity of and encouraging men's resistance to masculinity expectations.

Academic abstract: Social psychology's disconnect from the vital and urgent questions of people's lived experiences reveals limitations in the current paradigm. We draw on a related perspective in social psychology¹-the sociocultural approach-and argue how this perspective can be elaborated to consider not only social psychology as a historical science but also social psychology of and for world-making. This conceptualization can make sense of key theoretical and methodological challenges faced by contemporary social psychology. As such, we describe the ontology, epistemology, ethics, and methods of social psychology of and for world-making. We illustrate our framework with concrete examples from social psychology. We argue that reconceptualizing social psychology in terms of world-making can make it more humble yet also more relevant, reconnecting it with the pressing issues of our time.

Public abstract: We propose that social psychology should focus on "world-making" in two senses. First, people are future-oriented and often are guided more by what could be than what is. Second, social psychology can contribute to this future orientation by supporting people's world-making and also critically reflecting on the role of social psychological research in world-making. We unpack the philosophical assumptions, methodological procedures, and ethical considerations that underpin a social psychology of and for world-making. Social psychological research, whether it is intended or not, contributes to the societies and cultures in which we live, and thus it cannot be a passive bystander of world-making. By embracing social psychology of and for world-making and facing up to the contemporary societal challenges upon which our collective future depends will make social psychology more humble but also more relevant.

Academic abstract: The idea of "purity" transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity-unlike other moral constructs-is not understood by what it is but what it isn't: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm-the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.

Public abstract: People are fascinated by morality-how do people make moral judgments and why do liberals and conservatives seem to frequently disagree? "Purity" is one moral concept often discussed when talking about morality-it has been suggested to capture moral differences across politics and to demonstrate the evolutionary roots of morality, especially the role of disgust in moral judgment. However, despite the many books and articles that mention purity, there is no systematic analysis of purity. Here, we review all existing academic articles focused on purity in morality. We find that purity is an especially messy concept that lacks scientific validity. Because it is so poorly defined and inconsistently measured, it should not be invoked to explain our moral minds or political differences.

Academic abstract: In the present review, we propose a theory that seeks to recontextualize various existing theories as functions of people's perceptions of their consistency with those around them. This theory posits that people seek social consistency for both epistemic and relational needs and that social inconsistency is both negative and aversive, similar to the experience of cognitive dissonance. We further posit that the aversive nature of perceiving social inconsistency leads people to engage in various behaviors to mitigate or avoid these inconsistencies. When these behaviors fail, however, people experience chronic social inconsistency, which, much like chronic rejection, is associated with physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. Finally, we describe how mitigation and avoidance of social inconsistency underlie many seemingly unrelated theories, and we provide directions for how future research may expand on this theory.

Public abstract: In the present review, we propose that people find inconsistency with those around them to be an unpleasant experience, as it threatens people's core need to belong. Because the threat of reduced belongingness evokes negative feelings, people are motivated to avoid inconsistency with others and to mitigate the negative feelings that are produced when it inevitably does arise. We outline several types of behaviors that can be implemented to avoid or mitigate these inconsistencies (e.g., validation, affirmation, distancing, etc.). When these behaviors cannot be implemented successfully, people experience chronic invalidation, which is associated with reduced physical and mental health and well-being outcomes. We discuss how invalidation may disproportionately affect individuals with minoritized identities. Furthermore, we discuss how belongingness could play a key role in radicalization into extremist groups.