Personality and Social Psychology Review最新文献

Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong.

Value Fulfillment Theory (VFT) is a philosophical theory of well-being. Cybernetic Big Five Theory (CB5T) is a psychological theory of personality. Both start with a conception of the person as a goal-seeking (or value-pursuing) organism, and both take goals and the psychological integration of goals to be key to well-being. By joining VFT and CB5T, we produce a cybernetic value fulfillment theory in which we argue that well-being is best conceived as the fulfillment of psychologically integrated values. Well-being is the effective pursuit of a set of nonconflicting values that are emotionally, motivationally, and cognitively suitable to the person. The primary difference in our theory from other psychological theories of well-being is that it does not provide a list of intrinsic goods, instead emphasizing that each person may have their own list of intrinsic goods. We discuss the implications of our theory for measuring, researching, and improving well-being.

Study participants form beliefs based on cues present in a testing situation (demand characteristics). These beliefs can alter study outcomes (demand effects). Neglecting demand effects can threaten the internal and external validity of studies (including their replication). While demand characteristics garnered much attention following Orne's introduction of this notion, consideration of their effects has become sparse in experimental reports. Moreover, the concept remains confusing. Here, we introduce a conceptual framework for subjective experiences elicited by demand characteristics. The model distinguishes between participants' awareness of the hypothesis, their motivation to comply with it, and the strategy they use to meet situational requirements. We stress that demand characteristics can give rise to genuine experiences. To illustrate, we apply the model to Evaluative Conditioning and the Rubber Hand Illusion. In the General Discussion, we discuss risks and opportunities associated with demand characteristics, and we explain that they remain highly relevant to current research.

Ever since some scientists and popular media put forward the idea that free will is an illusion, the question has risen what would happen if people stopped believing in free will. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people's free will beliefs. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions: Can free will beliefs be manipulated, and do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis including 145 experiments (95 unpublished), we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will and increases belief in determinism. However, we could not find evidence for downstream consequences. Our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people's belief in free will has societal consequences.

Recently, interest in aggregate and population-level implicit and explicit attitudes has opened inquiry into how attitudes relate to sociopolitical phenomenon. This creates an opportunity to examine social movements as dynamic forces with the potential to generate widespread, lasting attitude change. Although collective action remains underexplored as a means of reducing bias, we advance historical and theoretical justifications for doing so. We review recent studies of aggregate attitudes through the lens of social movement theory, proposing movements as a parsimonious explanation for observed patterns. We outline a model for conceptualizing causal pathways between social movements and implicit and explicit attitudes among participants, supporters, bystanders, and opponents. We identify six categories of mechanisms through which movements may transform attitudes: changing society; media representations; intergroup contact and affiliation; empathy, perspective-taking, and reduced intergroup anxiety; social recategorization; and social identification and self-efficacy processes. Generative questions, testable hypotheses, and promising methods for future work are discussed.

Attachment security priming has important theoretical and practical implications. We review security priming theory and research and the recent concerns raised regarding priming. We then report the results of a meta-analysis of 120 studies (N = 18,949) across 97 published and unpublished articles (initial pool was 1,642 articles) investigating the affective, cognitive, and behavioral effects of security priming. A large overall positive effect size (d = .51, p < .001) was found across all affective, cognitive, and behavioral domains. The largest effect was found for affect-related outcomes (d =.62, p < .001), followed by behavioral (d = .44, p < .001), and cognitive (d = .45, p < .001). Trait attachment anxiety and avoidance moderated the effects of subliminal security priming for behavioral outcomes-security priming effects were larger among people higher on attachment anxiety and avoidance. Assessment of publication bias revealed mixed evidence for the possible presence of asymmetry.

The present article reviews a growing body of research on receptiveness to opposing views-the willingness to access, consider, and evaluate contradictory opinions in a relatively impartial manner. First, we describe the construct of receptiveness and consider how it can be measured and studied at the individual level. Next, we extend our theorizing to the interpersonal level, arguing that receptiveness in the course of any given interaction is mutually constituted by the dispositional tendencies and observable behaviors of the parties involved. We advance the argument that receptiveness should be conceptualized and studied as an interpersonal construct that emerges dynamically over the course of an interaction and is powerfully influenced by counterpart behavior. This interpersonal conceptualization of receptiveness has important implications for intervention design and raises a suite of novel research questions.

Self-reflection is suggested to attenuate feelings, yet researchers disagree on whether adopting a distant or near perspective, or processing the experience abstractly or concretely, is more effective. Given the relationship between psychological distance and level of abstraction, we suggest the "construal-matching hypothesis": Psychological distance and abstraction differently influence emotion intensity, depending on whether the emotion's appraisal involves low-level or high-level construal. Two meta-analyses tested the effects of psychological distance (k = 230) and level-of-abstraction (k = 98) manipulations on emotional experience. A distant perspective attenuated emotional experience (g = 0.52) but with weaker effects for high-level (g = 0.29; for example, self-conscious emotions) than low-level emotions (g= 0.64; for example, basic emotions). Level of abstraction only attenuated the experience of low-level emotions (g = 0.2) and showed a reverse (nonsignificant) effect for high-level emotions (g = -0.13). These results highlight differences between distancing and level-of-abstraction manipulations and the importance of considering the type of emotion experienced in emotion regulation.